' 9E8RET HlSTORV OF STAATEGIC AIR ca 'ANl JANUARY-JUNE 1968 HISTORICAL SllJDY N ll2 U C SPECIAL HANDLING REQUlRED f 'OT RELEASM3LE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS OR MIR REPRESENTATIVES t - tal • K 'OLLOWAY EXCLUDED FRQ AUT lC REGRADINGJ 000 DIR 52W 10 OOES NOT N PLY USA1 COIIIIUliler in Chi r '· - - --- --- - • ' -- - r r· ' -9£ S- -- tPH r -- t 'J I ' -f F l -A- J_J - °J --- _ -B-321 nus PAGE IS l ta MSlFJED $ 4 Cf 2 CF-5 tYS I T1 _ Alrb rM Alert · - • - lLi ' '• I0 - C r- I I 0 I c-· I I I I I I I I I C c l '1'f During 1967 Headquortera SAC developed• nov D• o plo1• inont concept to replace 1lrborne •l•rt Called Selective Emplo ment of Air end Ground Alert SEAOA 1t1 b111c •dwntecoo vere coet tibility vtth the SIOP and the potontl1l tor 1mod1ate rt1pon••• In September 1967 General McConnell 1pproved the concept•• 1 replace• mont for airborne alert ettective l July 1968 In the m11ntlme SAC continued 1n4octr1nat1on ln 1ocord1nc1 vith the bomber 1tr11m concept ot airborne alert ChrOl le Dome ·and then 01ant Wheel 14 'nit couthern route had been unavailable at tht indoctrination level 1lnc• the accident near P1lomare1 Spa1n 1n Januar 1966 Beginnlne in July 1966 the JCS had authorized only tour B-52 airborne alert aorties daily Aa a recult SAC normally 111lened one 1ortie daily to each the northern and veatern route and tvo daily aortiea to the B J EWS monitor function The 45-d•Y 1ndoatrination cycle beginning 1 Januaey 1968 involved one B-52 or tie d y trom th• 24 Bombardment Wins northern route the 5th WJna voatern ro te an4 one each trom the 380th a d 410th Vinga Dl-1 'WS monitor function J 1111 On 21 January 1968 a B•520 or the 380th Strategic Aerospace Wing monitorln t e Thult alto or the Bl in accordance 1th Cient Wheel end carrying tour un1rmod- nt 2a nuclear veapon1 crashed near T'nule Air Base Greenland A• v11 the ceae vlth the Palomares accident in January 1966 thl1 cra • h had a aigniricant impact on the SAC airborne alert indoctrination program On 22 January the JCS directed SAC to atop carrying nucl11r voepon • on airborne alert indoctrinD on sorties et once 1 5 Evon before receipt of the official Jes directive Cenerel A c 01llem II tho SAC IX S Operationa had stopped leu ches of Giant Wheol aorttea v1th nuclear veapon 16 Headquertc s SAC immediately notified the JCS that the last 1orti• vith nuclcor veepons ves enroute to its h01110 • ttition ror • 1chedul1d lend• ing at 23 05t5z 17 U T'nis accident and tho con• oquont aet1v1ties of the SAC Disaster control Team in Grconlnnd are dlacuaaed in a 1DOnograph Project Crested ls Thulo Nuclear Accident 4 ----s E C R E T • l ' - •r 'S E C R E«T UNCLASSIFffD I I I r· 0 r I 0 I I I I c- -· I I I I I I C 'c · C' • t A 'l'ho cited dlrcctlvc from tho JCS alao opoc1f1cd that in1Joc• trlnotion tra1n1nc could be continued at tho c lffent lovcl tour clrill y t hut the fact that voapono vere not boina carried could not bo pubU• cl od• and tMt plano ond procodurco tor h1 ' or level oporationa voro not nri· cted 18 'l'hio left SAC Jlcadquartora vith threo po111blo cour1e1 tlf tour unloaded indoctrination uortlo1 4a1lf v1thout de sradinB the around alert force fly tour unloudod indoctrination aort101 and con• tinue to allow part1c1po t1ng unit• to downarade one alert aortie or torset the indoctrination proGro m except tor tho aa ws monitor tun t1on Oonoral OillQm'a interim sutdance v111 to tl1 tour aortieo v1thout voapona end to continue to allov one desradod around lort aortle per participmtina un1t 19 LL I '6lf Howover on 24 January Oonoral No zaro atated that he ho d no duoire to tly airborne alert indoctrination aortieo vithout v apon1 Ao a rcoul t SAC indefinitely auopondoc1 tho daily aort1e on thrJ Horth and Voot routes and the loot B•52 • ortio on oach route was lbuneht4 on 25 Jnnu iry 1968 Two unito tho 380th Otro tesic Aeroapace W lns ond the 410th Bombardment Wing each continued to launch one B•52 1ortie do 1ly in support or the MEWS monitor tunct1on Thia reapon• 1b111ty e oss ed to the 379th nr k50th ncrnbnrdment 1nga tro 15 February through 31 March nnd thon to tht 42d and 449th Bombar4• ment Winaa for the month or April Artor 22 Jonumry all theoe B• 52 aortieo vcre launched vithout veapono and without combat m1111on toldera aboard Although SAC Heodquortera mointainod airborne m tEWS aite 1ur• Voilloncc• both tho type oircrort ut1l1iod nnd the site monitored were chuneccl on l -my 1968 W · During development or tho SEAOA otud r the SAC Headquortera ntutr had reviewed the need for an oirborno monitor or a mWS tocility llnd tho tno t efficient method ot occornpliahinc it The 1tatt concluded tho ta continuoualy airborne monitor or D m-tEWS •ite vould be nece11ar y ct tho time SAC vao recorranending adoption ot the Sr AGA concept l July 1968 Hovevcr it did not have to be performed over the Thule 1ite JIii J E C ft E - - -- -·- ii e -' ' L' • '1 - 1 rr 10 h n 5 n h-cru rt Clvmcco 1n nuc c irln lCDM doplo tmCtn t or nit a h tcctlon cnp il 1l1t 1co mode curvcillonco Al11ul u nn uc c ptobl c ultcrnntivc tJ tho uito Uac 01· D- talrcr ft ml 1n J 1 1i 11 tJt ror c1 r tho n nlt ll' 1'1m Ll l11 wuo n•Jt copccinll compotibla with thu 01 AOA ar m• llC t 1• 1•1• JcJcnt uco or KC-135 oircruft the moot obvlouo 11ltorn1Jt1vc eo t lrlna 1'0'1 •111'0 1 11n o rnt1n location neor the si to to monitorotl tho J11l 1•0c-1 tc-111bar 1%6 quarter SAC had inonitorod the 'l'hulo Z IC3 D1 t1 with tanltc1•0 rrom Goooe An and then from Eioloon AFB Boc uuoo or t h d1atan t'rom tho launch base to the Di'G WS oito ouch KC•l3S rrhn1 r Jr m1oc1ono wor not aa tiarnctory 21 Tho otart conclud- d the1t c t'rrim l lalnon YB or or the Thule site by JCC•l35o opera Ung from Thule - 79 111 t hrir n1rbornc nurvoillcmce ot the aite at Clear by KC•135o opore1t1ns c- 1 I I I I I 8 -l C· R E f c - Ir· l I --- - ----- -- - - - UNCLASSlf JED I 1 ------- An vould bo aatioto ctor Since losistical aupport would be mor c1U'ti• cu ut Th lc AD th SAC SEAGA study group roco mended thnt Ke-13 Ot O 'r1t1nG from Eiclaon AFB monitor the l3MEWS lite at Clotlr 22 'l'hh 'l'hul Clcar KC-135 monitor issue hnd not been t1nallt oettled h n th J1 nun1·y v 1llonco U- 1968 or nuclcnr nccident occurred As a reoult 13-52 aur• the oito nt Thule continued for a time On l FcbruDr 1968 General No naro and Ooneral Compton r• vlt iwt d tho lnteot ntatr cvoluo tion of the command'o DMEWS monitor r ror t 1 lurc11 The rr ain points vere tvo an orsoooorr i nt-tJt tho Soviot ICD •l threat in relation to the detection capcibilitbn or the B A too nt Thul und Clao r nnd nn evnluntion of the coat ond et'toative- Specio l tl ota conducted nnnn o ' KC l35 ourvcillnnce of the Clear sito 4 in 1 1r1rl F brurlry with tho Clco r site indicated tho t nn offective mon1• tor r Lnolon oul l b p- rfonned at tho t site t ' rit 1n11O110 n 1rborn- Tho atllft recommandtd ourveillnnce of the Clear o 1to by KC•l35 a 1rcrat't r p- r11tln15 from Eioloon AFB o o a replacement for tho B•52 'l'hulo monitor 'i 'iiri Eloloon tuni cr tuok force vould ol60 bo roopona1blo ror monitoring ih Thule oitc if iroctcd by SAC Heodqunrtaro In lcte March after rurthor roviow of th relative benefits of a Cle r or 'J 1hule monitor Md ot' tho ubUity or Kc-135s to provide continuouu radar cov1raso Orinornl ifouaro approved the_ change in monitor procedure a to bo effective _ lJWCl ASSlFltr J E CRE P - - - - - -- - - - - -- -- -- - 5 5 618 57' ·1 'i I 1 I I c· C 0 c· 'I 0 C 1 c ' I c· I I t · I I 'I I I I UNCLASSIFIED l May 1968 23 In ourly April Jleadquo rt ro SAC not1t1od all cqncarnod aconcion or th impondina tcrmlnntlon or the B•52 Thulo monitor nn4 initiation or tho KO•l35 Clt o r monitor miaaion 24 t II 'rho MJcr continulne poacotim1 roapono1b111t1oo or ho El l on tonkor tQak tore• woro aupport or reconnaiaaance mioalona on4 or Oittnt Wheel indoctrin tlon Hoadqunrtera SAC normally requlrod tht numbered air rorcoa to turnloh on rotational T t1l a specified nwi bor ot KC•l353 to tho Eiol1on tonkor tuok torce Primorily because or Aro Lisht SAC chnneod the uaual mothod or tcnkor aolection on l April 1968 Du ring the April•Beptembor 1968 porlod the 92d Strategic Aoro1pace Wing and tho 509th Bombardmont Wins operated aa tvo or the Arc L1Sht cadre un 1t1 • • Eo ch wins hnd two KC•l35 air rotuolins aquadrona and more tanker• th•n required for Arc Lisht and GIOP alert commitments dur1ns tho 1ix•month period An a rooult SAC aaalsned to tha two vinga reeponolb111ty tor prov1din8 the tank r1 noodod nt Eieloon AFB for reconnal11anoe and Oinnt Wheel aupport Each v1ns vaa convnitted to maintain tlvo KC•l35• and oix tliaht crewa on 'rD't at Eielaon Headquartero SAC 1usse1ted that each rot Qte throo aircraft and aiX crews ench woek••in one air• crnrt two crow incromonta 25 The Clear monitol 'misGion required a torco ot tivo KC•l35• oporatins from Eieloon A continuoua airborne monitor ot -thG Cloar m 'WS cite required three KC·l35 oortiol daily _ Each sortie had an eight hour monitor roaponsibility tlmo 26 The Eielson tonk r tnok rorco oatiofactorily nccomplished the now mission during the montha or May and June Ettoctive l July 1968 the monitor function would bo includod in the SEAOA operations order 23•69 Ju1t ns it hnd been in tho irborne alert operations orders 1 llf Onco tho SEAOA concept had bocn approved the SAO lt ff be3 n preparin tor 1tc adoption on 1 July 1968 Such 11 Qttora as preparing fliE9 1t plGnn rov1o1ng EWO plano coordinating Gir traftic procoduroa insuring loa1otical support and securins baao rlsht• were oome or tho moro importAnt Qnd neceaaory actions In cddit1on two Bide iaouao oxertod Gn invnodiate ertoct upon the character or the indoctrination prosram to begin on l July 1968 Both wore titd in - UNCLASSIFIED 4 ORI eo 1 srrtt r _ I vith Airborne alert eonora 11 ' and not with the O 'AOA aonoppt Dli'l 1• t101111 'rh• tirat ot tho10 vaa the BM IB 11to monitor ioauo Yh1 h hlo 1lro141 bo n d11c uoood Tho other was the vo1pona on tndootr1na• c· tion 111u• Vhich h a boon introduced but not reoolvo4 W Jll'I Ht1dquart or1 GAC did n' t orr1c1all y attompt to ptrau1do ho 700 to reviev 1ta no voapons on 1ndoctrino tion po11oy inaorar ID it l plit4 to the currant airborne alert operation ShortlJ at •r C tho Januar1 accident Air Starr representative hid intormaUr 14Y'l1t4 r HH4 lucart1ra OAC ortic or1 th t the veapons on lndootr1n Uol t11u1 mlaht not bt r11olvod b l July 1968 Sanevh t later the SAO K d• C qu1rtoro atatt learnod that the problem would not evon be oonoi4ort4 until Ma y r C _ U Jllf Ao a ruult HoAdquo rtera SAC waa compelled to rnakt tano dooi1ion1 oonoernine rt 1969 SF AGA indoctrination botoro th• woapona c· aarrfinc 111ue wo 1 settled O neral Nazzaro did not viah to tl 1 J-52 C indootrination aortie1 monitor f'unction excepted vithoijt nualtar VoApona undor tha bomber atreom airborne alert oporatton but 1n4oo• trinAtion tl1 hta tor the SEAOA operation caiwenoins l Julf were a dittoront matter On 31 March 1968 General Nazzaro approv14 a rt 190P indoatrino tion trainins schedule to be followed vhoth1r or not IUT hMil f to carry nualoo r veapona wae granted Ct' tlown Vit hout-voapona 1ndoatr1no tion aortioa would be supported bf I unit'1 tollow on toroo and alert force dogro do tion ould not be uthorizod 21 -- U 9e 4ffl Hoo dquo rtoro SAC preferred to t'l ' BEAOA 1ndoatr1nat i n oor loo vith nucloo r wo pone a board On 19 April 1968 SAO turn1ahed tho JCtJ And UHdquarto1·0 USAF 1th a listing or t he aortiH and nuclear vo1rono movem nta noodod to support the SFAOA ind octrin1t10n prosram d oirod ror n 1969 Alao addreBaed as tho numbor ot n- 2 cv1rtligbta or CAMdA ror Gll lovolo 28 Although the conwand AMUAllf prov14 4 aimil1r data to the JCS and Hoodquartera USAF thio 1ubmi11ion al10 cunounto4 to A requeot ror roconaideration or the bo n 111in1t oarr ing nualtar vaapona at th indoctrination level One indoctrination tli ht tor each auth9rl ed_B-52 o and H crev voul4 r1qu1rw 3911ort1ea 81 I Io I I I I ii I I I I I T• P--- s t-4f€ T-· --FOIM£t llSWIGJil ' ' t -I I -· annually 17 oquudron3 x 23 uthor1zo4 crev• and approxlll'lltcly lSOO nu lcnr vonpon movcmont cro41ta 9 'n o fflGXlmu nwnbor or B•52 over• flichto ot Ccu adio n torritory tor tho SEAGA pro m vat tvo cit the indoctrination lovol 20 at tho Shov or Forco lovol and 23 at th• Endurins Surviwl lovol Spoc1t1cally HeadqUArttra SAC requoeted the JCS obtcin Preeidontial ond Canadian approval tor the • ched lled SEAGA 1ndoctrlnnt1on tlteht• and ror advanced level posturca 30 t L lll'f During the timo bttvoen the SAC requeat and the JCS reeponse on unrortunnto blt of publicity occurred concerning tl16 lta vith nuclear bombs On 30 April 1968 in tho Jll Louis Poot-p Gpgtch correapondent Richnrd DJ dmo n attributed to Oononl Nazzaro the at tement that SAC pl nned to reaumo B•52 tlieh • vith nuclear veapona on l July 31 On the doy the 1tory appoorod G•narAl Nazzaro vaa appearins betoro the Proparedneaa Invcat1s t1ns Subcommittee or the Committee on Armed c· Services or the U s Otnate Oonoral Nazzaro don1ed making 1uch a C ato te ent and later provldtd tho tolloving explanation to the 1ub• committee 32 Thia 1s oppnrontl y vh t happened On 25 April 68 ve cove ono or our SECRET briotlngu to the Council on Foreign Atfo1ra In th couroe or thia briefing I pointed out that on l July o thia yoor wo would be instituting a ncv typo ot oirborna alert I 11 Qdo nO-Qpociiic reference to rac ins tl1t hta vith nuclo r voapono Apparently I vns r dsrepreaente4 nd aomohov tho orron ou1 view got into the prees Whether or not this publicity vao critical to the tinal dec1a1on it did noth ns to relieve Pontason oonait1vity concerning tlisht• with lefir voapons 1 The Joint Chiera or Sto ft nplit the SAC request into two ocpornt portu vcapona on indoctrination ond nuclear overtlisht• during ndvoncod level poatureo It• position on the first iaeuo was bo iically o roiterot1on or tho January bo n On 29 Moy 1968 the JCS not1f1od SAC thCLt 11Roquoat to ccirry nuclear veapona on SEAGA indoctrination tr ining flishto cannot npeat cannot be hvorabl y considered nt this time due to curront intorNational aenaitivity to tlishta vith nuclear voapona Roquoat vtll bo revieved in approximately 6 months 1 I I I I ' I 1 I I I I I _ I I it d oircd 1133 At tho atUno timo tha JCG otntocl that it w1u natlnB 1 to ob lin Cnnad1un approval tor nuclaar ovcrtlicht durine o lvunood GFJ Ch pooturco 34 On 3 Aucuot 19G8 tho JCS notified SAC th tho Conndinn government ha d npprovocl up to 23 overflichtr or ita torritoey doily by SAC a ircrart corqlne nuclaa r voapon• ror tho period 1 July 1968 throuch 30 June 1969 'l'he Joint Chiero or Start cautioned SAC • r-· I I tha t this authoriza tion could ba uao4 only if it directed an advanced SEAOA posture since the prov1e1ona ot tho M41 directive 1tlll applied 35 On 17 Juno 1968 Headquo rtora SAC tnrorr - ed lta aubordinate 0 i 1l L O C' Mieo of the 11 no veapona on indoctrination policy and out11nod ·1ta C o· n guidonce ror o voiding dieclo• uro ot that policy 'l'ha cormiand' a policies governino the conduct or the F't 1969 indoctrination program ithout weapons correoponded vith Oenoral azzaro'1 deciaiona ot 31 VArch SBAOA indoctrination vould continue ao outlined in Operations Order 23-69 no EWO 0G' materiala would ba corried end no degrAdation of e round alert aortioa vould bo authorizod 36 t l j LieutcMnt Oeneral William B Kiotrer Con- monder or Bishth Air Force vno not onthuoiaotlc about tlyins lengthy SF AOA indoctr1• nation sortica without veapono Ho initially rBiaod the i11ue during o rP viev or SIOP-4E plona and policioa hold o t SAC Uoadquartera on 3 l a 1968 for the three numbered air torco comrr a nrlera ancfaileoted senior staff officers At that time th JCS decision concernlns caponG on 5EAOA indoctrln tion tliG lto vao still ponding Oononl Y rrcr propoood that if veapono voro not carried indoctrination sortico complete only one heavyvcisht retuelins 37 On 21 June 1968 oh rtly ofter receipt of the SAC vcarono policy governing FY 1969 j'£UJA 1ndoctrinut1on MnJor Gen ral Konnoth a Powell Eighth Air Force Vice Comrno rocr orricinlly reconvnanded shortened indoctrination Gsions to the VCINCSAC Genoral Compton Specifically Headquarters Zighth Air Force recommended that B• 2 mla11ona be reduced to a 1ingle orbi and one air refueling in tho orbit area The Eighth qu11tioned the training benefits or additional orbits and emphasized tht 1avings in B-52 r11 ng houre and KC•l35 eortle 38 I '- ' I I · I I I I I I I I JIii - - I I S·EC K nrn - e• scan IJICt J1 ' 1 I I I f I -- ·1 C r I 0 I c- I I I I I I I I I I I U JJ lf In rooponH Ocneral Compton oanuro4 Ounorlll Pnwoll th t tho ent1rl quoaUon hud been thorouchlY oxomlncd 'l'ho prlmnry r«1uoono tor a rooliat1c indoctrinction program tor SEAOA varo tho tollow1ne 3 To tXdrc11 and evaluate the tanker t1Dk rorot cap bility to aupport the operation To rovidt realiotic trainina and in1ure Dircr•w conridonce Onco o yoar the aircrew would tl1 the identical oort1e that lo ooai nod under the more adwnced option 'l'hll 11 particularly important 1n viev or the hlsh turnover rate ot aircr1v p1r1onn1l at th pro1ent time To roali e 1N1Ximum crew training benet1t1 in multiple heov-JVoiaht rotuellns during a 1ortie 1imil1r to the SZAGA EWO proruo To ex•rci1e the· full alt1tudo reoerwtion thu1 providing indoctrlnntion tor air trorric control asoncioa 1n tho complex• 1t1oo a11oolotod vith traffic cleorancea required tor• SEAOA aortlo · To provide data tor evaluating aircratt pertonnanct 10 that plonnlns tactor1 may be validated o provido a continuing daily dell On1trat1on or SAC'• provon U copabiU 4 Hoadqucarter1 SAC'• original dec1a1on concorn1ng indoctrination aortioo v o that thay vould match a clooely a1 poaaible the unit'• Daaie ned SF AOA profile Folloving General Kiertor'o reaon itndation to th SAC t' 10 Panel 1n iy the headquarter• •£ in ovalu-ted the expen•4itur or com nQnd roaourcos and reconfirmed ita initial dec11ion O n rbl Compton doclDr d thotr Flyins an abbrovioted mlaaion will do littlo to 'rda oxorcioins the forceo involved and validat1nG our plan• nina Tho only mod11'icot1on vna that vhcn SEAOA indoctrination 1ortie1 vor flown vtthout woopona the lost r 'ucltns vould be reduced to permit 1 lli d1oto lnndins upon return to home ntutlon Ir toraed to reduce Opornt1onu tJn l Mtlintonanae O M expen l1turoa SAC would rtduoe the nurnbor or aortioo per unit rather than sortie lonsth In any evont ' the hoodquftrtora ltGff vould 1'urther ovnluato benefit and co ta after complotion ot tho initial indoctrination program 40 tJ - tll1 On 31 Morch 1968 General Nazzaro revievod and approved the 41 Only the B•52 P Opoaed SEAOA indoctrination program for F't 1969 ' - -- I I I I I I I C C I I I I I I O nn H unito voro och cJutcd tor tho 1n1tlcil indoctrlrmtlon pro m 'rho 16 D•52 O and U vinca voro troatod oa 17 unita bnc auoo ont tho 2c1 Wine poeocoaod two bomburclm nt oqundrona 'l'hreo uni ta each voro nnoi n d to tho Eioloon 00000 North Qooao South 8paninh Atlantic omt Sp0nioh Moditor ranonn orbit OJ 0nd tvo unite voro - • dened to tho Pacific orbit 1oNard orco KC•l3S tanker taDk torcoo oupportinB the B•52 O and H orbitn voro located at Eielaon IJ'B 1 Aln •kAJ Oooae AB Labrador 'rorroJon NJ SpainJ and Kodona AB Okinavo • Th• SAC tndoc• trir ation ach dulo 0111sned each unit a 15 dClf period durtne vhlch it vould launch tvo n-52 oortioa dally until all available combat•roady crova 23 authorized had participated The 1chedul• va• dravn up co thbt all aetivity on a particular orbit vould bo completed tittore an y boe n on anothor orbit 'l'he 1ndoctrlnntion ochedul1 began vith the B•52 unite aasisned to the orbit oupported by Eiel • on m the only taMor tnak fcrco base on United Stnte1 1011 42 l CJ i tJ Apart from tho bon osa1nat carryins nuclear weapon• on indoctrination another roatriction perhap1 more apparent than real doveloped concornins tho uaa or tha Mediterranean orbit In early Juno the Air Starr notified SAO tha t bocauao ot cUJ'rent politicalmilitary conaidorationa 11 tho Mocliterri nean orbit coull2 not be uae4 tor SEAOA trtUoatrinn t ion flighta 'l'ho Air Starr intended to raviev th_ rootr1ct1on attor completion or the Spanish baao nosot1at1ona 43 Since th oo ncsottationo voro expected to bo completed in September 1968 and indoctrinntion on tho Meditorro noon orbit vcu not 1oheduled until February 1969 it vao poooible that the reetrietion would have no i p ct on SEACA 1ndoctr1Mtion 44 UJ lfJ Th'l ioouo or foreisn 111111 tory rieht• vao not a criticGl problem inGofor as tho 1ndoctr1notion program for Fi 1969 van concerned HO' r• over SAC rcquirod either now or expanded K0-135 opornt1ng r1sht1 for any advanced lovel SEAOA poaturo••pBrticulorl1 after l January 1969 Before outl1n1na tho requ1romont tor and 1totu1 or operating rights the scope or tht approved program tor l July 1968 and SAC'a plan• tor exp n•ion during th f •cnl year ahould bo rev1eve4 briefly 4CLASSIFIEO S EC I T - I 86 t l- 1 ' Tho Air Starr had notitiod GAC ot oxplic1 t opprovol ior 1nclu• nion ot only tho B-52 0 one H t1 1 •cH in 1nltlral GEACiA plona Spcciti• I · 1-Ir c- I 01 ic I I I I I I I t r cally in October 1967 the Air StGtt 1ntormod Headquartcra SAC that ''On 26 September the Chier or Stott UlAF a pproved the SEAOA concept oJ' oper t1on and directed actiona to aahlovo imtlemontation ot SEAGA with the B•52 O and H aircrort by 1 Jul1 19 8 11 5 The 17 B•52 0 and H aqundrono provided a baoic SEAOA toroo ot 34 11rcrott Hovever the Air Starr vent on to 1tato th1t FuncUna requ1remento have been developed 1n rt 69 budset requoat to aupport the 64 aircraft SEAOA 46 · concept And thit moont mokina provlalon1 at vell tor the entire B•52 fleet at aome unatoted time ·u_ I Not unnaturally HcadquGrtorra SAC oon1idued this to be implicit approval for expanding tht 81 AOA toroo during Fr 1969 In November 1967 Headquarters SAC explainad lto S AOA expansion plans to the Air stnrr In addition to tho 34 D•52 Q Rnd H aortiea the cow8and intended to include up to 16 B•52D Aro Light aircraft at Ander• sen AFB in tho pla n bringing the total S AOA torco tor 1 July 1968 to a t'ltlX1mum or 50 B•521 Hendquartora GAO al10 informed the Air Statt th4t it vas proceeding vith plano to inoludo B•52 C through F forces in SEf GA later in he 69- tin o_p orioct 11•47 t - · 1 General N1 1zzRro 11lao 'anted to clovolop b t l July l968 11n e nergency plan which included moro than tho aircro tt force outlined nbovc Followins additiona l atudy bf tho OAC otcitr Genero l t az r aro npprovcd the following proeram in lnto Docombor 1967 by l July 1968 devolop an emcrGancy plan ror six D•52 C through F unite 12 aircraft in tJddi tion to the 50 olrcro ft torco cand by l Jonunry 1969 endeavor 48 Again on tn include all B-52 ·C through F foroan in UIU OA plano 31 ft 11rch 1966 GC neral rtouo ro roitorcatod hln approval of the 50 plus 12 SEJ GA force tor l July 1968 'I'h OAO Comn111ndor in Chief also re• viewed the status of nctiona token and roquirod ror the l January 1969 pooition 49 U- ttf The Strategic Air CornmBnd currontly oporated KC•l35a at all ttifl to ek force boaca rcquirod to aupport tho· -n-·520 and K forces aa voll aa the Arc Light D torce Noithor Eiolton nor Kadena required f • o iEck T UNCLASSIFl D JI ' ·· · ·I I r I I I I I I i I I I I I I I r r c· JIii ' Moo in mitl•Juna Houdquurtoro SAC wno 1nronr t1ll atlvirmd ' that tho Deputy Under Oocrotur v ot tho Air rorco tor Intornotlono l Afflllro Philip F Hllbort woo concornod nbout OAC'o preaaureo ro• Ch •dlns GEAGA plona · He roportcdl Y toGrtd thGt thn tolko in Oiraha vora not tully ovoro or diplomatic•politicGl aan1itivitie1 64 At the on4 of Juno tuJor Oonerol T N Wilaon eputy Director tt Plana J lCG Plnno and Opcrationo Handqunrt1ra USAF rorvorded Mr Hilbtrt•• otticiol omornndum ond announced A policy or cloaer coordination botvocn his orrtce nnd BAO noadquartera 65 iu_ · Des pi to thoao a dmoni tiona Houdquo rtcrra SAC intendad to prono for an expanded SEAGA rorco 'l'he official attitude or the Head• q J rtcro could be uummcd up in a comment or Oeneral Coir pton I a 11Either t ·v l ooture is required or it isn't Gt 'l'ho command's concern waa not limited to th B•52 C throuSh F oxpanoion plan• tor January 1969 In Act at the end or Juno none or tho roroisn basing and overflight rightD necessary tor tha l July 1968 poature had been orticiali canctioncd No particular problems woro expected vith the Canadian and SpGniah governmentsJ and the commt1nd'1 primary concern va1 per • · the latter • 6T tin r1ghta o t Kerlavik and Thule particularly Survivability Dlr piWnnl lo no and Ex·oroiDoa -·- 1ttl'J Force dioporaal WQD Q fundamontBl mean of improving OUl • vlvnbility or aircraft Moat bonoficinl wao per 4nent diaporaal or hlnrt forces allowinG rooponoo to tactical warning or an impending at tnck However undor conditions of advanced roo diness emergency r rca dioparsol nloo improved the strotoglc aircraft posture Oeneral t cConnoll tha USAF Chiot or Starr ho d opprovod a reoriented o nd ex• ponded SAC plnn for cmorgoncy aircr rt dioperoal in April 1967 The moot sianificnnt new toaturo or the roviood d1opcrGal plan vaa that conoidcrntion was Biven to tho Soviet oubmnrino launched balliDtlc miaailc SLBi threat GI vell as the ICBM threat Limitins the number or scnerated nircraft o t baaos vulnerable to BLm i attack 'Wal t·hua a maJor objective The rov1 od plan aloo required more diaperaal baaea EEK E T 1 6l 6 IPN UNCLASSIFIEiJ