·SECRETARIAT o 610f3 84 Tb is document consists of 7 pages LE'l l'ER TO CHAIRMAN JCAE ON UK GAS CENTRIFUGE Note bl the Secretary l Commiss19ner Thompson has requested that his attached letter ot· August 8 1969 to the Chairman JCAE with enclosure be circulated tor the inf'oma t1on of the Commission · · · · _ 2 The attached letter incorporates changes requested by the Comm 1ss1on at Infomat1on'Meet1ng 937 on·August 8 1969 during cons1deration·of AEC 610 183 - Discµssions with the U K I W B McCool l ' Seotietary Aolllori tf A u 'if' lto icw Aoill l lr Nlmr DISTRIBUTION Exec Asst to GM As t GM tor Ad n Secretary Chairman Seaborg· Cofiun iseioner Rainey·· comm ssioner Johnson Commissioner 'l'homgson comisi$1oner · · · Asst GM ' Genei' l •nager· Depuby ·oen Mgr • Asq t·• Oerj Mg ' ' ' f dett · It n th · '1tt s ' l a ·' ' ' ' IA Produot orr · It ·doi ht' tor Asst· ' GM tor Plans Prod Gerie E'al Counsel Congress1Qnal Relations Controller Intemat1onal Attiai 1s· a ta c $ g1 J A t o 195 q · C SUN of' its uila' tthdrfz ' ' ' • · GROUP 1' from Exo uded a utomat1C · 41 gr arld' · · lass1fi 'oat1on • '' ' ' - pa' ' _ J UNITE·o $l ATES ATOMIC ENEf GY COMMISSION WAS►IJNG'rON 0 c 10i4S Honorable Chet Bolifieid Chairman Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Congress of the United States Dear Mr Holifield This will supplement the oral briefing whiah Paul Vanstrum Ed in a·abelay Nelson Sie ver1ng and I· provided to you and other members of the Joint coll tni ttee on August 1 1969 about our receQt firsthand examination of the gas centrifuge machine that the o x proposes to utili in the tripartite European venture • Our visit confirmed the fact that the B itish had been completely candid in their earlier·writte description of the machine as set forth'in their Aide-Memoire and the accompanying Annex of July 3 · 1969 The actual inspection of the machine again bQre·out that the u x plans to proceed with a machine w ich as compared with our o tn advanced machines reflects a relatively una vancer l state of the art · Phy ioal examination of the U K 's pro4uction model also aonf1imed·their earlier advice that t he bottom endcap res'embles the cap used on AEC' s 6 h machine which ·the· u K scientists saw during the 1960-65 exchange • Thtt u x readl ly concedes· that theY benefited from· t he ·exchange They m intain hoifever that the nd-cap is riot so unique that it o r soroe _variatiori of it· wou t no t hav been · aeveloped · in ¢1 ue ·course fr9ur th pplicauion of generally recognized engineering principles · Al though the British 40 not klie w it 'the end-cap · tn question- is no lo iger used in the advanced AEc· m ohines f oiir Thi 1955 Agreemetit l ke all agreements fox aoope a ior1 c nta ns no m t1 1a l Y agreect upon meohJ ism· · for clisposing of different views · 1t here a · diffe rence· of view exists as t does here 1'7ith respect to wlleth -k or'no't the· infontl tion incorporatecf in t ·e ehd cap i a aubj•pt to • the Article 1x· c· restrictions a9 -1n1n 4i·sqloau r e to ·third· paz tie• the ·p rtiea may con u t· apa n ego f £1it e a t i liey• bave •• ' · ··· y - t '· ' •· • · • riNJJi llihctl ff -- _- '' ' 2 ' ' ' • ' ' ' · ' ' ' ' ' ' • ' •' ' '-- • 1 -- ►I 'tii 1 lilllP '· ' ' ' ' J ' ' ' ' since·last December but tho greement does not establish which party has the burden of sa tisfying the other · Nevertheless the British have taken the initiative to ·resolve the differences And despite the· fact that they are not legally obliged to they have given the United States the opportunity to examine the precise technology in question and the fact that visual access to their production machine confirmed their earlier written description of it lends credibility to their · t stated desire to preserve the basis of mutual trust wh ich underlies our several cooperative arrangements ·rnd cati ve··' of this attitude is the fact that during the course of our most recent visit the British revealed a fail-safe braking device which might be of interest in our own program in addition tpe British have assured us Qf further opportunity to satisfy ourselves on the question o whe ther or pot U S technology is involved in more advanced developments which the U K may consider providing to the Dutch and Gern1ans in the future and which cou·J d· be argued to be subject to· Article IX C · · Notwithstanding these co11 siderations we• could elect to insist on a more restrictive view and formally object to revealing the bottom end-cap design to the Dutch and West Germans on the groltnds that in our view it contai11s restricted data weighing the merits of such an approach it is necessary to consider the possible advantages and disadvantages · In The main aavantages would ·be an assertion of the principle that our consent is required for a broader range of infotmati on tital he U K considers· is necessary and that we might succeed in preventing the dissemination to the Dutch and the West Germans £·what could be considered u s class f ied teqhnology ·• · On ·the other hartd there is no assurance that the Dutch·and the West Germans may not incorporate in their machines an end-cap of simila or improved design in which event· tfe would h1 1 ve ac gomplished little by ··objecting except to perturb our relations with the U K Moreover if we were _to force the U IC to abandon i he present end-cap design and adopt another it would probably force the to abandon their entire effort on the Mark· I machir1e Our technical people at Oak Ridge believe strongly that any cliangr t from present design T ·1ould almost certainly be 1n AA · the airection of improved design In this connection as noted earlier the AEC no longer 1 tilizos the bottom endcap dasigll in its ourrent advanced maohinos In brief in view of the unadvanced tnte of thear t represi n tod by the O K currant production inodel it docs not appear to be desirable to force them to a mo e advanced model earlier than their present schedules would seem to call for Becau e of the substantial investment which the u IC has in the· · t · Mark I machine they would probably stick with it for at ·· least five years From the standpoint of proliferation and potential competition with the U S in the foreign uranium ma·rket there is some advantage to leaving things as they are · · •· I · There is the question of precedent that is whether our failure to insist that the bottom end-cap involving data subject to Article Ix c would be regarded by the u K as a precedent that 1ould p rmit excl anging with third parties information receiyed rom the ·o s • on nuclear weapons and nuclear su ma ine design First the U K has given flat assurance orally and in wri ting that· there is no intention of exchanging s ch U S information with third parties and that in any event our consent would be an· absolute condition precedent Such an assurance is contained in the U K Aide Memoire of July 3 19 69 a copy of whicp has been furnished your committee Secondly since we have withheld a favorable response to the U K for nearly a year now and have·been in almost continuous negotia tions the need for early and·complete consultation has been unmistakably established ·The u K is abundantly aware that the Commission and the Joint Committee will insist that all appropriate measures be taken to live up to agreements ·to protect restricted data and to avoid proliferation of nuclear weapons capability In order however to ensure th t there would be no doubt about our ppsition we have reiterated it in our draft response to the U K Aide Memoire copy enclosed · ' A final consideration has to do with the Non-Prolifera tion Treaty· • We should nqt wish to take a course of action whiclJ would be contrary to U s policy U s policy · attaches gre t importance to West Geman adherence to the NPT · The West Germa ns have been sk ittish about the question· of wnether or not he NfT woula · rmit the development of an enriching capability for c v ian midlear power ·programs Similar concerns have een raised by the Japanese arid Australians If it came to the a ttention o f the Wfi st Germans that· the· U S while giving assurances to the West• ·Germans ' -- 00B AilC1' 1 ·t on this point was'at the same time imp-eding the tripartite en iching venture the effect on th German attitude toward t e NPT coul4 be deleterious On the otber band the United Kingdom was on of tho three sponsors of the NPT and ·the first to sign arid· ratify the treaty The U K considers adherence to the NPT by West Germans to be of utmost importance We can therefore expect strong efforts by the U K to cause Germany to sign and honor· the -PT Meanwhile · ' pending the coming into effect of the NPT it is the intention of the tripartite partners to adopt appropriate international safeguards For all of the foregoing reasons the Commission believes that U S interests would best be served in this instance by not raising forplal objection to the U K 's view t hat the information·to be transmitted to the tripartite venture is not U S Restricted Data The kind of sanctions that mfght be invoked to force the British to abandon their plans would seem ore drastic than would seem to be warranted bearing in mind the unadvanced state of the art ·of the British mac ine the fact that the U K has given us access to its machine and has provided us with new information on its program beyond what the agreement originally provided for Technically and politically w see little to be gained by such a tack indeed we might not be able to prevent it anyway ana we stand to lose in terms of our overall relationships with the U K and could possibly complicate negotia ions with the West Germans on the_Non Prol iferation reaty • · ' · Attached is the U S proposed response to the U K Aide Memo re which expresses our concern and· reservations but does not raise orinal objections to· the U K proceeding with the· tripartite venture If the Committee should have any quSes'tions we should be g lad discuss the matter further to Sincerely ·Enclosure ·' pJ y' Aide Memoire I 00B ilCHffll ' REPLY AlDB-MEMOIRE •1 The o s has given extensive consideration to the British Embassy's Aide-Memoire of July 3 19 69 and aoco1npanyi g 1 ' nnex regarding· the U l 's plans for collaboration with Germany and the Netherlands in the gas centrifuge· area The U S appreciates havip received the U K viBws as to the considerations that the U K feels warrants its • participation in such a colla borative effort The u s has taken particular note of the u K inten tions regardi ng · ·continuat 9n of classifi6ation 'imposition of security controls restri 7tions gainst transfer to other countries and multinational 'saf guards·with a view to the early application of afeguards pursuant to the NPT ' • e The U S rec gnizes· that such U K · participation·would be in furth'eranc of policies and objectives supported by both countries · ' The U S also appreciated ·the· opportunity to have visuct l acoe s to the present t J K•· centrifµge machine ' ' ' ' I '• there1 assuripg tpat· t h$re is no room for misunderstandings as to the particulars of th ·teq nology involved The o s ' likewise welcomed the U K ssurance regilrdi ng access to ' p ssib le o K coritributions pf oertai ' advanced research '' and development datEJ Sq¢11 ef forts to resolve possible ' ' ' ' Jl'ldi ilociiiiitliai ii nsl111i rl ' ' A · pcijai ilfo ' ·1' ix -'4 Co1 es Serles $£'4•J1 ' - ARCHIQB r ' I - -·· ·- · · · • U i - _ -_ ' t _ Jit t tn¢· · differences u1ider _ the· agr - · · ··· ·· · ·' • · ····•-· ' ·•· - ' -- · · · · 1 ' · ·s irit which necessarily must ·unc eX lie - arrangements to o s - - · such coope·ra·t ' assure t hair coi1tinuing v fal ty that -· can arise ·· of a provision in attempting to dete ine-th applicability The recognizes the diffic1 1lties • ' ·· - ' • ' • • • f • ' • '• ' • • like Article IX C of the Agreement_ to information in a '• program which is the ou1 trowth of ciri exchange c oncerned '' ·• ·