If• SECRET 0440G Clasrificatwn Departtnent of State CN fj M J6 TELEGRAM DATE 23l615Z USMISSION IAEA VIENNA ION _ i p •f - ACTION SECSTATE WASHDC INFO AEC GERMANTOWN Amembassy TA PEI Amembassy PARIS E PR IAEA VIENNA 7 4JiD6 FILES SUBJECT 1 Nuclear Safeguards in ROC IAEA VlillNA 4405 NOTAL REF Reftel indicates scheduling of next IAEA inspection of peaceful nuclear facilities in Taiwan in October In course discussions this subject with IAEA Inspector General Rometsch he informed us of his concern over reports that ROC was attempting to purchase a pilot separation plant from French sources which would enable ROC acommence development its own chemical reprocessing facilities for nuclear material 2 Rometsch expressed concern at what he surmised was ROC attempt to start developing independent KB nuclear capability which would be outside of international control and inspection He ascertained DRAFTEO BV· MIAA DJPorter s J Porter CLEARANC SECRET -- FORM A_ 68 1 Cwsificadon FS-413 l 5 J JUN '72 I g lt O I Ulllorrty NNv - ■-----__JI 1 - J QNF I PB NT I e I SECRET Poge L of C l J ifir tlon -- _ _ ___ IAEA VIENNA MRN 7 om his own sources that ROC was negotiating with the French firm of Saint Gobin discussed question with bldtx French Governor on IAEA Board This week Rometsch Bertand Goldschmidt According to Rometsch Goldschmidt assured him he would advise French supplier V to break off negotiations with ROC authorities This assurance has satisfied Rometsch that he can del y next IAEA inspection uoti 1 October as discussed reftel • 3 In Mission's view there is real question as to whether application of IAEA safeguards under existing agreements could e cover output of such facility This would depend on various factors but principally the conditions if any that would be attached to whatever material would be reprocessed is not at all clear how long existing Further it fi il safeguards agreements can remain intact given uncertainty of securing necessary majority on Board of Governors if they are challenged While U S could reimpose bilateral safeguards under its bilateral agreement for cooperation with ROC there would be serious question about any future safeguards on Canadian supplied reactor and any plutonium produced in natural uranium fuel therein Latter seems to us likely source of material ROC could use for reprocessing L for purposes extracting plutonium SECRET FORM FS-413A 4°68 CONTINUATION SHEET Cla uification _j #b DECLASSIFll U Authority N v 1 D t 0 C fos$i tct1llon Page2_ 01 IAEA VIENNA ROC Amb Liu before departing Vienna MRN 7 early June had made allusions to the Reporting Officer that ROC was aware that there were sources of supply in the world available to it France mentioned specifically which could eliminate inspection requirements of NPT and presumably of u s -ROC bilateral These allusions were made in context of a statement that ROC had essentially lost interest in securing NPT-type safeguards agreement with IAEA It now seems clear there was something more than bravado in his comments This Mission accepts Rometsch's statement as both honest and accurate Rometsch kad has excellent contacts throughout European nuclear industry and particularly in chemical reprocessing field L _J SECRET · i FORM F5-413A 4-68 CONTINUATION SHEET CIQ fsijicalion