· _ j I• ' ·- · _ Gist Authority 27733 Date 07-15-201 8EGREt- - - · ' · i n - --- --- · • r l SHCRE'i'A U' Is ANALYTICAL STAFF MEETING ' FRIDAY JULY 12 1974 P- ·I 4 05 t _ _ _ _ _ _ ' -aa - r t J 3fta f -- - i -· -- •· 2 @ 1 -· r Nlv4thVJ NW# Docld 30897955 jF s r - pi • DEPARTMENT OF TATE c iu 1 July 15 1974 The Secretary 1 s Analytic Staff Meeting Friday July 12 1974 4 05 p m 2-10 The Secretary fined tHe purpose of the meeting Lord summed up the S P paper on non-proliferation srategy Is proliferation inevitable Does eOme proliferation negate any e£fort to oppose proliferation What are the power costs a policy How do you get help 10-14 The Secretary suggested a distinct on between PNE's and military application potential would be usefcul if we and the Soviets can agree on monitoring and control of PNE's This would enable us to keep would be PNE states from developing The alternate risk of encouraging PNE interested-countries pp 15-16 The Secretary discussed the dangers of over-playing a non-proliferation effort to other aspect's of foreign policy viz Jqint _ us-soviet guarantees and fear of condominium He asked the paper be recast to examine the separabili ty of civil ian and military proliferation and if so if the former can pp 16-17 be controlled by furnishing devices inspecting PNE's etc What is the jimpact gf civilian nuclear power use on proliferation pp 18-23 The validity of our supply and technology levera-ge limited to 15 years any safeguards get watery in ·the longer run The possibility lining up other technically advanced supplie s --- Canada is possible others less so The Secretary noted that potential sellers need to be lined up now and secondly pp 24-27 agreement s made to prevent one seller replacing ' another to free a uyer country from control Discussion of the Indian problem A stretch out · of testing might be useable to ke p the Pakistanis from going nuclear I NWi 27733 Docid 30897955 - p 28 pp 29-30 pp 30-38 2 - The Secretary agreed in principle to take the matter up with India on his trip this fa1l The revised paper is to identify the worrisome parts of civilian proliferation group the countries and lay out a strategy for dealing with them A joint ACDA SP paper to be done in 10 days The Secretary wants to refrain from consultations with other countries until our strategy is clarified on three levels how to control civilian technology# how- to keep countries with the technology to limit themselves to a PNE route and how to keep PNE countries from going military Discussion with the Soviets also to await a finished strategy l_ R-ll f George S iprlngsteen lJ NW# 27133 Docid 30897955 Executive Secretary · EGREt THE SECRETARY 1 $ ANALYTICAJ STAPP MEf TING FRIDAY JULY 12 1974 4 05 P M PRESENT -·- THE SECRETARY OF STATE - Mr Ingersoll Mr Sisco Dr Ikle Mr Brown Mr Sonnenfeldt Mr Maw Mr Vest Mr -Atherton Mr Hartman Mr Pollack Mr Lord Ambassador McCloskey Ambassador Moynihan Mr Kahan Mr Van Doren Mr Springsteen Mr Packman NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 HENRY A • KISSINGER 2 SECRETARY KISSINGER I want to begin developing a position on non'-prol i fe r ation sparked by · the Indian peaceful explosion AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN· it in New Delhi 'J'hat is not what they call They call it -- the bomb SECRETARY KISSINGER And there is a NS SM out on this isn 1 t there MR LORD Yes It is circulating now for agency comments SECRETARY KISSINGER Okay But I anted to get my own thinking clear Who has done thi$ paper -- Winston MR LORD Kahan 1 and Van Doren have done the esic work on it SECRETARY i ISSINGER Okay If you want to sum up where we are MR LORD The p$per itself addresses first the d sirability and feasibility of non-proli eration strategy and lays out one centering around four main elements NPT export sa F iaguards PNEs and reaction to the Indian blast But rath r than summarizing the P aper I thou9ht it might be mo r e useful to kick this off M r secretary rn r-- t- 'J1 _ ' P 1 lJ NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 3 by posing four or five questions which I think any policy maker has a right to have answered before he is supposed to embark on a non-proliferation strategy · SECRETARY KISSINGER Like what we are going to do about it MR LORD That is what· the study hopefully sets forth But I think before you get into specific actions or specific hobby-horses I think-we ought to ask th following kinds of quest ions before we ask you or the President to embarkm El major effrnt to intensify our efforts Such questions as is the trend towards proliferation inevitable in any event Secondly if we cannot - eF CRETARY KISS INGER And if it is not I then we have no right to conduct a policy MR LORD If it is not inevitable SECRETARY KISSINGER MR LORD Yes We would argue it is not inevitable and there ·are things you can do But many people do perceive in the world because of the Indian blast and the availability cf nuclear materials it ls inevitable and why waste a lot of capital trying to do somAthing about it Secondly if you can 1 t have a completely successful NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 -SECRET - 4 9olicy why should you expend your capital wh0 n DU cannot completely shut off non-proliferation Thirdly are there effective things you can do which don't cost you too much in'other areas because there are always trade-off f l ' in your abj ectives between nonproliferation and oth r objectives Fourthly even j f the D S could mount an i tensive campaign ther e are a lot of other players in the game and therefore you cannot act alone and stop all this by yourself presumably And lastly what good is a grapd strategy in non-proliferation becaus each country or each ossible nuclear count y has to be coked at in terms of its own I factors and its own conditions ' I would like bri fli•·to tty to nswer ·each of those reasonable questions t t a man has tn ask First is it inevitable not at all The answer is - Many potential nuclear weapons states aie far from having a full array of materials and facilities that they need to produce explosives such as Pakistan Egypt and many others Many others with high technical potential like Germany and Japan are inhibited by legal political and security considerations and the dependence on us for lEGRET Nvi# 27733 Docid 30897955 5 supplies arid the need to acquire delivery systems Secondly the Indian test is not necessarily a pr ecede nt for everyone else in the world parti cular f ctors at work in In ia SECRETARY KISSINGER There are In any event Like what The Gandhian tradition of non-violence MR LORD The domestic situation and other factors SECRETARY KISSINGER long-established policy I am assuming this has been a They didn't just do it in the last two years MR LORD lam not so sure the evidence is that conclusive as long established policy goes But in any event i t is not necessarily going to be persuasive for other countries just because India did it because each country has different factors at work 0ere not safeguards in the Indian case In any event there In addition there are costs as well as gains in going nuclear which countries have to weigh 'I'hey could become a target of pre-e ptive attack -- there are financial costs political costs I ret- aliation perhaps by people like ourselves -- if we want to cut of f fuel for their commercial industry ana so on NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 SECRET 6 So the first q·uestion is we don't think it is necessarily inevitable this tren is going to proliferate I 8ut 1 having said that there is no way to as ure you on the second question that you can be completely successful in stopping proliferation Nevertheless everi an imperfect attempt with incomplete success _ we think is better than not trying at all It gains you time to create more stable conditions in various r gions around he world which might_ decrease incentives to go for a nuclear option And also once a nation has cros ed the threshold it is very hard to turn it back and it sets off more of a chain reaction You·have to distinguish countries who might go nuclear Presumably Japan would be much more serious than Argentina so you at least make an effort to try to deLay or minimize the numbe of nations In any eve t if we don't do anything certainly the situation is going to get much worse and the pace will pick up and the spread will be all but inevitable Thirdly we £ace the question of can we do anything and what are the trade-offs in terms of costs You can do some things whic don 1 t cost you very much sudh as strong xpressions of support for the NPT ' l strength ning our safeguards our exports etc_ -SEBRff NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 7 ' rhen whan you begin to ·1ook at trade-offs you have to fig re how important is non-proliferation to yo_u in your overaJ l pol icy And mamy would argue that the risks of nuclear conflict are ·going to greatly escala e if you spread nuclear weapons around the world our diplomatic influence· will dee cease arms control progress will be set back SECRE' l'ARY KISSINGER MR LOR ' Would decrease Decre se to the extent that other nations get nuclear weapons SECRET A RY KISSINGER MR Lrm o In any event you have the greater I j q s t hink e proliferated world threat of blackmai 1 is a more dangerous world Therefore -- SECRETARY KISSINGER to accept all 9f this 0£ That I would question But supposing -- I am will ing I m willing to postulate the opposite what you have eoid -- that it is probably inevitable J3ut we should nevertheless try to slow it down I MR LORD Right SECRETARY KISSINGER Now what are we g ing to do I about it I MR f ORIJ Well there are certain things we do I which the paper outlines And keep in mind that other ' - nations ha e to do something too because we are not going NW# 27'733 Docid 30897955 SECI¾El to have complete control 8 And here the situation isn't so bad because in the near term the suppliers are basically serious about this on this The Russians the British are good The Canadians are going to be have made some mistakes in the past France in the near term ry firm They The only problem is And Prance -- the last couple of days they are holding up at least temporarily a contract with India because of the non-proliferation Now what we can QO is outline in the paper -and we can summarize that for now if y6u wish -- but I thought the first thing to do is try to pose these tough questions Does it even make sense to mount a major effort before you can get intp the specific actions DR IKLB It is essentially a question of getting a delay -- ten to fifteen years unpredictable What is beyond is probably But without the delay we may get a rather rapid re ction which would have very adverse psychological impact and real impact a few yedrs later SECRETARY KISSINGER South African announced today DR IKLE •rhat is one Argentina and Brazil are competing with each other to some extent and would NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 SECRH 9 be stimHlated by each oth r -- there is clear evidence SECRETARY KISSINGER What j s Argentina going to use for nuclear materials -- what we gave them DR IKLE They have a German reactor there where the safeguards are not adequate And ·they are talking about a chemi6al processing plant later on number of years do_wn the road I would ie a But moving into it more · aggressively it would stimulate the Brazilians The Braiilians have said so recently MR POLLACK · The Argen t'ini ans aro in the p races s of con luding an agreement with India in the nuclear area They would hav very small capacity to supply ·theM with materials but nevertheless it is a p ssibility SECRETARY KJ' SSINGER Do'·ypu thlnk Pat' Inaia would do it AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN they can do Tt would do anything that And they cannot do a lot yet 1 but they will certainly be -able to do more SECRETARY KISSINGER Would they be willing to help other cou tries gAt nuclear explosives AMBASSADOR MOYNIH AJ '1 For ·mon y they would do anything MR KAHAN those lines NW# 27733 They have suggested things along One of the issues is to discuss with them Docid 30897955 SECRET 10 whether they intend to put proper safeguards on their exports It is a longer term issue but it is an important one • MR LORD o answer your question more specifically what we can do the paper tries to outline specifically th various steps you could take under these headings and they cut across all countries You have to take each country specifically and target i and look at the facts at work in that parti6ular country the levers you have and your tradeoffs with other ·issues and other pr i_orities But this p1 1per does s_et out what the hr cad elements are · I think we do n ed more study on two aspects One --- -- e J '- L • 'r take country G tJJ J 1r i' v the major target areas what you I can do and what it costs you And secondly we ought to be studying what it is going 11to te like to l i ve in a proliferated world l think you have to plan for that continJency SECRETARY KISSINGER Yes That we need in any event hlell there are two problems at least One i s to prevent possible military application of nuclear explosives ' The second is to prevent peaceful nuclear explosives from being used as a road into the military use l Now the riason I make this distinction is because if countries cnn be kept from hav ng an avowedly military NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 11 i rogram if ona can the·n get an international re·gime for peaceful nuclear exp osives ·one might be able to put some restraint on using eaceful nuclear explosives ai a road into the nuclear field It i·s one thing for a country to avow that it is going militar ly nuclear It is another for it to get in through thR PNE Now Fred what you and I talked about this morning with the Soviet Union could then multilateralize It could become ·a very effective restraint and might be a way of catching part of the Indian program even now MR LORD · I thihk in addition it is imp or tan t to try to close the PNE loopholP _in any further exports We would get agreements they would not develop these nucrear explosives It is very harrt to distinguish DR IKLE Ideally you would-want to dissuade Brazil for instance or A7gentina from doing their own P E development by us or the Russians or some combination maybe through IEA offering these devices for their purposes peaceful pur oses case of India You cannot do that any morem the You might have a hYbrid situation where at least a country such as ndi would proce d in a way as to minimize the stimulation to Pakistan to go -· after Chinese help or Frenc help as they are now doing NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 12 o develop thei own we apons -- and minimize also the Indian willingness to try to acquire deliberately as they are now discussing So I think the yhrid situation where the country has semi legitimate PNE is perhaps only India and hopefully no additional countries in that fficult category But there may be additional ones Then the other countries which have national interest either faked or real in peaceful nuclear explopives such as Brazil one would hope to dissuade from movj_ng ahead much further in their pwn development by i offering -them the- P Es in a sense calling their bluff en that MR SONNENFELDt What the Secretary was arguing is if the United States and the Soviet Union as part of the th re sh old test ban develop a regime hy which you can establi h with reasonable assurance that P Es are n'ot i r fact used · for military purposes because you provide observers and instrumentation and all the other things that then you will have established for the first time a distinction that we have always said cannot really be established 1 and you may therefore have a hand e on people who in fact claim they are exploding peaceful devices SECRETARY ICISSINGEA Exactly NN# 27733 Docid 30897955 You might not be SECRET 13 l able to keep th m from e ploding the first one but you ' may be ab e to keep them from refining them DR IKLE ' l 1 hen is a pr oblem there though The only possible ve tification th t e can e- ivisage for the Russian PNEs· above the tl--treshold is one that may· be satis- factory to us because we know hey have weapons of various magnitude in advanced stages of the observations WC So we can check on the basi might make that they do not develop mo advanced weapons than they already have But that kind of verification would not help us in case of another country for which the fundamental weapon would be guite sufficient SECRETARY KISSINGER But you at least can keep them from developing the rudimentar weapon £tirther DR IKLE Not with the safeguards or with the verification procedures that ve now are expioring with regard to the Soviet Union under the threshold test ban Those would only help us to verify that the Russians are not testing more advanced we pons MR SONNEN FELD' i ' We don' t kn ow that yet and we 1 rea1·1y have not gone through that exercise completely MR KAHAN Mr Secretary there a danger already and we see it in th traffic from India - NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 14 that a perception tha·t we will develop a fool-proof scheme to differentiate between peaceful and military -- a position we have not taken heretofore -- will legitimatize the Indian program by saying there is a distinction and furthermore a danger that Brazil and other nations interested in PNEs will therefore assume that we have such a basis of making dist i nctions· will be more likely to cross the threshold taking a peaceful route and end up with a de-facto nuclear weapons capability So how we walk the line -SECRETARY KISSINGER That is what I want to have The Indians have crossed the thr eshold examined So that is not a major worry DR IKLE It seems overall th thing to work on is the delaying of these further steps del ying rapid succession of Indian tests which might come·every six months or so otherwise delaying ihe Pakistani acquisition of facilities to de elop their we pons SECRETARY KISSINGER How close are they to developing fac i li ties 7 DR IKLE They tried to acquire them from the· Piench or pe haps from China But it will take them a number of years -- fi e to eight years which incidentally NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 SECRET 15 provides an argument for probably New Delhi in that they might recognize by ·going more slowly they naintain more of an advantage than by stimulating the Pakistanis MR LOPD The s ec ific actions recommende d Mr Secretary start on page 5 of the study in which the four main headings are what you can-do with ti e NPT struct1 -1re what you have to do outside of that given the fact that some people won't ratify it but what you could do in terms of export controls what we have developed so far in the PNE problem remains to be studied further and fourthly how you limit the Indian event SECRETARY KI S SINGE R I have read the paper Y6 s I h i l ve re ad this The proilem is that in each of these areas we sufEer from a rather indiscriminating elange of t- h i ngs that could be done For example consul tif -g promJ tly ·with the Soviet Union on page 6 -- that is me thing But handling of demands for security a surances joint Soviet u s security assurances if that is wha is ·1n mind that is a rather significant event And that is sometJ1ing that perhaps could be considered in one or bvo cases But we cannot let non-proliferation ride every aspect of our policy If we hand out security assurances jointly with the Soviet Union we are getting awfully close w tl lrr r H Ui1tj NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 16 into a condomini m ituation And we will have impacts in China n l Eu ope of the ost severe nature which in themselves might produce a nuclear race And I don't know whether Japan would want to rely on the Soviet security assur ance MR LORD I agree Some things you can do f irly guickly SECRE'rARY KISSINGlm But 'if the countries feel the only way they can get_protection is through a U S -Soviet guarantee they might then decide they would rather have their ovm If the alternative is your own nucrer capability or a U S -Soviet guarantee that might spur your own nuclear capabil ity because there are some countries that don't want a u s -soviet guarantee There are other countries that want a guarantee that_believe the United States anp the Soviet Union will never be able to agre on anything in time to help them · so either on grounds of insufficiency or on o Ounds of condominium thRt might run you into a situation where it actually spurs proliferation So what I think we ought to do with this paper is to _disentangle -- first of all I would like the· thing looked at from the point of view with the qualification· which you made of whether it i possible to parate the f B Rf TNW# 27733 Docid 30897955 17 proli fer a tfon military problem se·condly if you can separate tl1e mill tary from the civilian proliferati9n whether it is possible toget a handle on the civilian proliferation e ther by supplying devices assured suP plying of devices or wh at ver the metho ds are -- or as a worst case by inspecting 'their own explosions although I grant you that at the very early stages of · nuclear technology it is the fact of an explosion and not the use to which it is put which provides the ignificance So I would not be very hopeful that the PNE negotiations with the Soviet Union are going to help us in the early stages of nuclear diffusion ' 'he next thing we have to look at is the impact · · 11 of nuclear -- the J nev 1 tab e SP read whJ ch I d o cons 1 d er inevitable of civilian nuclear users on the problem of nuclear proliferation And that is usually done in terms of safeguards But what about the problem -- I don't know the answer to that Supposing a country that has accepted adequ te safeguards kicks us out What is the situation then And gets its own supply 0£ ur2 ni um MR LORD It depends on your leverage I For example in Taiwan if they were· to go nuclear we supply as I understand it the fuel for six reactors NW# 27733 Docid 30897 955 SI8RET If we cut 18 I • that off it would be a tremendous i pnct SECRETARY KISSINGER If they cannot get it elsewhere MR POLLACK That is what the Congress has been asking all week with respect to t he Egyptian reactor SECRETARY KISSINGER MR POLLACK What is your answer We have been giving them this kind o f rnswer SECRETARY KISSINGER What is the true answer Tell me what you really think DR IKLE It is also the type of reactor -- MR POLLACK We are supplying a reactor that requires a fuel that is not genArally available Now if you move this thing down the road ab6ut fifteen years h all of the assurances that we are now offertng begin to get very very soft and watery But over and beyond the fuel theequipment itself it is not like an automobile where you can turn a mechanic loose and keep it in ·shape This is very very difficult technoJ ogy to sustain and maintain and they need a continuing relationship with the supplier So you l ave ii in your ability the capability SECRf TARX l ISSINGER Not with II the supplier with an supplier MR POLLACK No As matters now stand with sroflET t r NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 1· SEBRET 19 the supplier SECRETARY KISSINGER MR POLLACK eally · Yes SECRETARY KISSINGER MR POLLACK No Indefinitely There comes a point tn time when all of these assurances are_very watery MR KAHAN One strategy is to try·to talk to the other potential suppliers of enriched uranium We are undertaking such a program to see if we can coordinate SECRETARY KISSINGER That is part of the program I am trying to under tand what the problem is MR POLLACK _We eventually get back to this question to saying that there a e other sanctions available to a government that desires to exercise them political etc eco ornic And what we are doing is saying there is no agreement that cannot b groken An9 what do you do when one is broken that you don't want broken There is no technical answer to this probl m that would provide you with a permanent assurance You are goon for about fifteen years without any question SECRETARY KISSINGER Because there are no other countries that have the -teshnology MR POLLACK NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 Yes J --------------------------------------------------------- And after SECRETARY KISSINGER · 20 that you would be good for longer if you could line up the other countries MR POLLACK Yes sir Effats in the past to line up the other co_untries through something called the Zanger Committee which is discussed in here - woyld not give you any reason for optimism because this is a very commercial enterprise and everybody has his hands or his eyes on where his ability to compete with the United States will be down the road DR I LE There re just a few countries where the decision is in th balance Particularly the Canadians are agonizing -- should they pursue their commercial interests anc'I sell to the Sout h Koreans for instance Argentinians I or try to pursue these safeguards in their exports They want t6 talk to us urgently SECRET ARY KISSINGER Before they decide to pursue their commercial interests OR IKLE I think their decision will be affected by what we tell them MR 1 SONNENFELDT · I think it is going the other way SECRETARY KISSINGER I MR LORD J n Canada The Canadians are very firm on this I• I I I _8EBRfr NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 21 DR IKLE I think after the election they may be more likely 'l o continue to support the safeguards other potential e xp_qrter of course fs the Soviets The But I think they too so· far have been supportive of safeguards And that is where our discussions with them might SECRETARY K SSINGER prob_lems in safeguards now You have two 9eparate You have the problem of safeguards You have the problem o-f safegua rding that they won I t step in to replace us fifteen years from now Isn't that right MR POLLACK Y1c s· SECRETARY KISSINGER ' So there are two different One is to make sure that eVe-tybody safeguards involved capable of selling reactors now·will insist on the same safeguards and to avoid a situation where you get into a comp eti ti ve bidding on the ' basis of who cfEers the least I intrus Lve safeguards That is Poin't One That we have to negotiate now Secondly we should negotiate now or at any rate in the next few years how to prevent evasions where one country steps into the place of another when safeguarde are being violated Isn't that right MR POLLACK Yes sir · renf1NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 SECRET SECRE'l'ARY KISSINGER 22 And that is even more complicated When you talk about fifteen yea rs you are saying within a·fifteen year period no-one can replace us in the operation of our reactbrs MR POLLA K Right It is actually probably a little more than fifteen years SECRETARY KISSINGER All ri ght -- twenty After that others may be able to step in the host country i3ut how about Can hey just take it over MR POLLACK Not a country like Egypt I don't· think the_y will be t hat far along in twenty years But what you are going to be witnessing in the course of the next two decades is a tremendous g rowth in the technological capability of the world as a whole to deal in nuclear energy So the kinJ of know-how that is required that is not now available will become much more plentiful DR IKI P- Also in twenty years the new techniq1 1es will be available for enriching uranium It is a fifteen year time horizon e shoUld focus on MR POLLACK by then It may be a backyard technology So now is the time to move one way or the other MR LORD It seems t6 me there are somc th ngs you DREf NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 SECRET 23 c2 n do quickly that don't cost too much or require great study -- like security assurances have to e studied very But you can make public expressions carefully obviously of support you can go to various countries and try to persuade them SECRETARY KISSINGER How can you go to various countries and persuade them of what MR LORD Persuade them not to go nuclear SECRETARY KISSINGER MR LORD How do you do that Well you say you consider i t a high principle in your policy and i t wi 11 ·cost them in your bilateral relations_ if they do SECRETARY KISSINGER Except that that is rot It depeAds on the impqrtance of the all that persuasive country MR LORD As I ay you have ·to talk to individual countries with the leverage Y_OU SECRETARY KISSINGER have As you look over the list of countries you will find you are back in your original situation A country that means a g t'eat deal to you you wiil not let gb down the drain j st because it has gone nuclear even if you don't like it And we haven't gone al 1 out against India to the dismay of several ho think I owe them a tilt - Laughter - but partly_because we -SEGRET NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 SECRET 24 didn 1 t see where it would get us AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN Can I say on that the question of time horizons on the point where this stuff becomes a te·chnology ·that other people pick up in 15 years maybe but with respect _to the first point which is how to prevent this first PNE going into a military phas right away You probably don't have-six months in some respects to move If the Pakistanis get themselves a separation plant which for them will mean they are going to a bomb themselves the Indians will almost automatically then say Since this has happened we must develo i our peacful capacity and the military one 'they will start almost immediately in a direct bomb technology and they will probably also start immediately -- they ar0 already well down the road in rocketry When that hnppens then you have Iran But in any event ybu haie started that Pakistan-Indian thing up already 1 mean there it gees at that point And it is out of control What we do in the next six months is probably gcing to SECRETARY KISSINGER Like what AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN Well can we 1 the thing we wo ld have to do is to persuade the Indians not go to a bomb on the g round that we can persuade the Pakistanis not to NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 25 And if SECRETARY KISSINGER of these is possible What makes you think either rirst of all I don't kriow hat it means for India not go to a bomb AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN amazing things You are always doing· It would be amazing DR IKLE A slowdown in testing MR POLLACK Well one thing -- SECRETARY KISSINGER That I can understand But after fall you would have to assume that anything that explodes can be used as a bomb AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN You could ask them to enter a regime such as we may be negotiating with th Soviets SECRETARY KISSINGER With what · AMBASSADOR MOYNI_HAN You could ask the ndiari to enter -- let me just say I think the most important · thing is for the Indians they have got soon enough to realize that· if their weapon or the i r explosion me ans that the P aks go nuclear too then suddenly a military situation that has been finally and once and for all settled in favor of India puffs NW# 27733 and y e back at I mean you have Pakistan saying they will pari'ty again target Borrtbay up I and Indian rockets targeted on Karachi Docid 30897955 • 0 - h l• 26 and you are back in the 1950s all over again Tn at1 ' is ' one thing I think we co ld seriously make the argu erit o --- that it would- be a dis-aster for them o let the Paks go· nuclep r and ·p istan will go nuclear · nless they hold their PNE right there I think yeu can make -this argument DR IKLE What you can deliver is to slow down· the testing AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN £low it down stretch it·out let it be inspected ·· SECRETARY KISSINGER Bow do th'e Pakistanis · 'know they are not building a thousand bombs of the design they just exploded t They aon AMBASSADOR f 1 0YN tHAN ' ·• t We would have to undertake to guarantee something of· e at kind - a' i- 1 • SECRETARY KISSINGE·R What was i t -- 20 ki1otons t ' A BASSADOR MOYNIHAN ' ' · Fifteen ·-- • SECRE'I ARY K SSINGER _ Well tnat seems to be the r ' MR POLLACK I The rndians are capable within fie years of h aving enough mate ial to put together · t en if they C aq get their Madras · r ea-ctors or Iilorej' two reactors of the kind that Canada supp ied years of being in _production • They h·ave Within· two The' ¥'_ have everytpi g els -SEORET NW# 4 8 601Appea1 Num NGC l 8-0l 4A' · standard size of the first explosion_ Docl d 30897955 • • r they need They hav e got a facility with 10 000 people I I in it area They are not an untlerdevelop·ed country in the nuclear This s one area whexe they are developed SECRETARY KISSINGER what In five years they can get • ten '1uclear weapons MR POLLACK I t hink possibly more than that Out of non-safeguarded reactors -- 'they don't have to violate anything Or at least anything more than they have alrea$3 y violated in their understa ding with Canada MR VAN DOREN •The· source of this present bomb • the research reactors the y have other calls on that · They have a fast breeder reactor program which·al o needs MR POLLACK They would have to make a decision they are going to go for the weapon ln tead of the fast t 1' breeder · OR Il LE You ask how the Paks know • How • they -use the plutonium wn t her they_ us e it in pe_aceful react ors or ·divert it secretly is some·thing the Paks could observe So they would have some assurance · SECRETARY KISSINGER I don't _see any sense in going at India· until we ·have some strategy of hat ·we are trying to d • DR IKLE The time involved --'if you vist there at NW# 4860 1Appea1· Num NGC18-014A Doc rd 30897955· 2 8 SfCfffT the time of your visit SECRETARY KISSINGER The last time I was in India they had to sena the Ambassador in the big car and me in a taxi to divert· attention -AMBASSADORY MOYNIHAN No -- to- let him get s to 1ed SECRETARY KISSINGER that was the purpose exactly· To let him get stoned I didn't think they were discriminating against me MR POLLACK What ·you do have that you could move on perhaps more quickly is the psychol gical moment 1 with Conada the UK possibly some of_ the other potential large suppliers SRCRETARY I ISSINGER I won I t be going to India until September maybe eve October- So that time frame I suits me fine str tegy we That gives us two months to work out the I think we will be more Effective in India if can fit it into an overall strategy And also if we can have preliminary discussions with the Soviet Union 'l'here is absolutely no sense in taking on India and driving them to the Boviet Union on that issue unless we have an understanding with the Soviet Union of cooperative action I would have very little stomach £or taking on the Indians £CH T NW#- 27733 Docid 30897955 - -- ------------------------------- 29 on this if I thought the only result would be that tr e Soviet Union woulc pick up sorr e c i 'cap support l _vJBASS2 DOR MOYNIHAK would like to urge that the only condi tions you could hope to have any success with the I11dians right now would be that this is a world policY in the ·United States ar d vc' would like India to join it -- ra ter than as a C isy for India sr e_ r ·rARY KISSING£ In that way l think we canget some benefit for not having taken them on all out becaase the·n it would not be discriminating against them it would be something that we want to generally apply But for that we need a more di£ferentiated paper than we now have chi ch isolates only the categories but not the strategies And that is not criticism of the paper That had to be done as a first cut at it So again just to sum up We first see whether we can distinguish the military from the civilian on prolife r a- io simply as a ' ' evice T r getting at it Secondly we will try to identj Jy those part's of the civilian· proliferation that we are worried about technology fuels and so forth I suppose reactor Third we have tc group the countries -- third we ought to identify those things the lJ_nited States can do alone and those th ings for which it needs an international consensus -- especially how we NW# 27733 Docld 30897'955 SEORH 30 can avoid competitive bidding on safeguards wJth rGspect to nuclear' technology Then WA can develop a strategy in which we determine which other nuclear c ount ies we have to deal with to preverit proliferation because we have to de l with Jap n on two l vels one as a nuclear supplier and other as a pote_ntial nu c ear weapons country Isn't that t r ue Japan could expo·rt nuclear technology Now could we do this in these categbries as a joint ACDA-Policy Planning -- your sh6p -- could we give it a fairly short deadline say having another paper in about two weeks DR IKLE I think we should make it whbrter SECRETARY KISSINGER DR IKLE Ten days Some of these things are urgent like talking to the Canadians and· the rench · if we can SECRETARY KISSINGER I am very reluctant to talk to anybody until I k ow what we want And the general hand-wringing position in which we fail with non-proliferation but have no concrete view of what we want from them -- I think when we meet them -- when we talk to them we ought to say 11 This is our view of how the civilian technology should be kept uqder control This is our view of how those countries that al eady have a technology can be given 8EGRET NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 -SE8REf 31 inducements to go towards the PNE rout '€ through the PNE route to mi 1 i tary technology And third how we can keep countries that have already committed themselves like India to PNE f i -om go i ng military Those three levels ought to be -- a week from Monday then Then I can·address this problem again DR lKLE On the second one we do have fa rly concrete points in that IEA has been dealing with these export controls There are long technical lists of what is to be done and not to be done The problem there more to get for example the French government to obs·erve these rules which they are fully aware of SECRETARY KISSINGER we need done and then what e If we could list the things want from the suppliers ·and what we want from the recipients -- then· we can formulate a strategy Then we might consider holding a conference first of supplier countries and then see what we can do towards recipients On this one I th nk we ought to talk to the J Soviets first of all MR POLLACK The Soviets incidentally in ·Vienna -- Mor dikoff has told our representative in chiding terms in effect we are not doing enough about' India Ii MBASSADOR MOYNIF i • hv _ f And a NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 the British have come in 32 to say A ren' t you goin t· to do anything about it 11 SECF E'T' r RY KISSINGER We will e d_elighted to do somethinq once we have a general strategy But now to tak e on India b efo-re we kn9w what anyth j ng supplier is going to say -- vie ought to be able by the middle of August to have a general policy shopldn I t we India But then we can also approach a MR A'I'HERTON strategy Then we can approach lot of other countries I th ink we should have a general I think we should approach the Indians · I think we should do some other things before approaching the Indians to have credibility hen we approach the ngian§ SECR TARY KISSINGER T just don't hink this and- wriging a-good a itµde ·in which we t na to specialize so much -- I don't want lectures to the Indians on nonproJ iferation -AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN They win on lectures SECRETARY KISSINGER They win on lectures -- that I s right If we can tell them something con_crete that we are going to ask of all others with some I implicit pemal ti s because we have already line • up some other countries then I think we are talking a language I they ·understand If we talk the abstract disadvantages of non-proliferation td them we are in an endless debate MR LORD I think the elements are here NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 There SECMT are some concrete steps this paper 33 This is not just atmosphere in It is a matter of what you say to all suppliers how you talk in each country SECRETARY KISSINGER What we have here is a laundry list of everything we can possibly do We have no priorities no discrimination MR LORD With all due respect I aon't think that is entirely accurate What I SECRETARY KISSINGER am saying is -- Is somebody going to put it in the shape that I can understand it DR IKLE That is why it will take us only a week SECRETARY ISSINGER I am not saying it is not here M LORD We·will have to repackage it MR POLLACK May I raise·a question without wringing my hands and making a fancy speech -- might it not be helpful for us to come out with a statement fairly promptly reaffirming in general terms where we•stand on the NPT because in the absence of that our position on ratification by Japan within Japan fin ing it easier -- SECRETARY KISSINGER I think we have a better chance of getting the NPT ratified once we have a general SfBRE'f•· NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 34 non-proliferation strategy into which the NPT fits I think otherwise device I the NPT will simply l9ok like a discriminatory If we can have this thing done in three weeks -I don't think the decision in Japan will be affected decisively in three weeks MR SONNENFELDT Actually we just said in the Soviet communique we want to make it more effective MR LORD You can say you are concerned about non-prol feration ana study ng what to do about it if you want to say anything SECR E'l'ARY KISSINGER '11h at I say we are having an urgent study made we 1 come • We can As th thing progresses we could have t e British over here for preliminary consultation and that will get the word around All of that I am in favor of -- once we know what we want even approximately And then by the middle of ugust or so we can have our course set What we have to do in this paper is 'to identify the countries both on the supplier side and on MR POLLACK If I may make one other point I don't want to say anything more at this time I think we need to keep a very close eye on the Congress because tj e range of hearings and the interest they have shown SECRET NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 35 in the Egyptian thing has taken among other fo cms on the NPT for example why do we· not simply require Egypt and Israel tp become adherents to the NPT be1ore we supply them SECRETARY KISSINGl' R Because the Israelis don It want that if you want to be brutal about it MR POLLACK There are some resolutions and bills floa i ng around on the floor and s omething may end up we have to dea J with SECRETARY KISSINGE R I think we y ill be able to handle the Congress most easily if we know·what our genuine strategy is If our strategy is that we will require each country to ratify the NPT I am delighted to do it- and then to approach Israel on that basis MR SONNENFBLDT I think we should be realistic in that adherence to the NPT is not the only way to stop a country from becoming nuclear MR POLLACK lv'e have given th em that Your problem here I think is the next two weeks -- this is when there will l e the heat of this congressional concern SECRETARY T ISSING R The adherence to the NPT doesn 1 t close the PNE route at all which is the one MR VAN DOREN Yes it does specifically NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 That 36 is specifically what it does But the fact is that people MR SONNENFELDT won't join it If you say that the only way to stop them from going nuclear is by forcing them to join the NPT you foreclose other options MR LORD No one is saying that MR VAN DOREN Actually among the major suppliers all the major suppliers except France are signatories all present major suppliers are either signatories or parties to this treaty If they all become parties you -ould have a real handle on your· supply situation HR SONNENFELDT be other ways to get at DR IKLE 'fhat is an if 'rhere must the problem That is the French roblem MR INGERSOLL India can become a supplier SECRETARY KISSINGER too The trap you can get yourself into is- if you say the way to· do i is through the NPT thatthen you either get c6untries signing the NPT and later revoking it having established their nuclear capability -- you may then forego the safeguard route which gives you a better protection than simply signing a treaty which you can later break Now I admit breaking treaties has certain penalties MR VAN DOREN NW# 27733 Docid 30897955 The NPT requires 37 MR LORD The INPT is only one of· many tools SECRE'l'ARY I ISSINGER ' 'h'ere is no objectiO J- to using the NPT as one of he tools Okay Well why don't we proc_eed on this basis and meet again within two weeks here upon at 4 5 0 p rn uit ' the meeti rq waf adjourned l NW# 2 7733 Docid 30897955