' Approved for Re leas 2024 10 23 C06523343 EXEMPTIONS APPLIED TO THIS DOCUMENT ARE ON THE BASIS OF E O 13526 D -□ @OD□@@CnXs@r · UtfiX§ jj§ rr@ Ql Wi South Korean Oipabilitie r for Nuclear Weapons Dewlopment 8acret DCI NIO 165-75 24 January 197 • --• Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343 227 Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions j Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343 6 2 d Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343 5' l Cltl T SOUTH KOREAN CAPABILITIES FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT • 1 • I KEY JUDGMENTS 1 South Ko ea's two research reactors and the enriched uranium ·fuel these reactors employ are us-supplied Its one power reactor already under construction and a second contracted for are also enriched-uranium fueled and us-supplied A third power reactor to be built by Canada will be fueled with na- tural uranium and like the US reactors will be under IAEA safeguards We do not believe that Korean diversion of plutonium produced in the us-supplied reactors could go undetected for any significant period of time It would be more difficult to detect such diversion from the Canadian reactor 2 South Korea could conceivably build a safeguard-free natural uranium reactor of its own · secure the fuel it needs from domestic sources and construct heavy water product um fus 1 fabri cat l an and c h em i cal s e oar ti o n f ac1 lit i e s __ j - could J we o riot believe t hat the ·reduce a nuclear device in less than ten ears even ' Korea's F-4Ds constitute an adequate delivery sastem 3 South against which the present North Korean air defense system coul · not guarantee prote tion 4 The Nike Hercules could be a nuclear del-ivery syst if the Koreans were able to develop ·a warhead weighing 1 10 0 pounds or less By the time the Koreans are ready to fabricate their first device it is conceivable that they -will have been able to design one falling wi hin this weight limit Within this same period of time they might be able to purchase or even man·ufacture a missile system capable of carrying a heavier· payload Th·Ce study was pPepared in response to a request fI'om the De- paI'tment of State fol' a I'eview of South KoI'ean capabilitie ith respect _to the development of a nuclea weapon It as produoed undeI' the auspices of the National Intelligenoe Officer for Japan Paoifio py I'epresentatives of CIA which provided the basic draft DIA State INR the Energy Research and DeveloPjment Administration and the intelligence components of the r De-p-a_I'tme·nts oft-he Army Navy and Air Force I I I Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343 3 3 b 6 3 3 b 1 6 2 d Approved for ReJease 2024 1 0 23 CO6523343 SECRET 3 3 b 1 6 2 d DISCUSSION I EXISTING FACILITIES AND RESOORCES 1 south Korea·already has modest facilities for nuclear research and has taken the first steps in a nuclear power pr_ogram 2 The res·earch program is under the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute - KAERI located on the outskirts of Seoul and established in 1959 • From 1959 to 1973 its exJ enses totaled about· $21 millJ on · I n -' 1973 it - spent about $2 million • · -Research pro rams t he Insti tu inclu d - - utro diJ fri '-ction st_y dies n u tron beam research_ and radi oisotope production I _ _ I -- -- - -_ report that with the exception of the two us-supp li ed-research reactors ' the labora ories are not very well equipped by US s t andards and the research in progress is not very advanced ·1 KAERI planned nuclear power studies are reported to include power reactor systems the _ nuclear fuel cycle and fuel fabrication and reprocessing technology 3 As of March 1974 KAERI had 217 professional staff members 45 of whom have PhDs eigh t in physics and nuclear engineering ·Many of the Korean nuclear scien tists have received the j r formal training in the US and are considered to be well quali fied in · the_i r t e ch_nica 1 are s J 4 KAERI has two TRIGA nuclear research reactors a 250 KWt Mark II and a 2 MWt Mark III and is contemplating acquiring a third The first went into operation in 1962 and the second in 1972 Both reactors were furnished by the us and are fueled with enriched uranium supplied by the us Both are under IAEA·safeguards and in any case neither is suitable fpr ·producirig plutoniwn for nucl ar exp_lo'sives • ■ « t r - ■ • • 5 The ROK · fs seeking to purchase from Canada ·a - - o -_MWt heavy water moderatedt natural uranium fueled research react b'·f '1 This is similar to the reactor Canada built or India at Tromba' y · the source of the plutonium used in the Indian nuclear test of May 1974 - 2 - Approved for Release 2024 10 23 CO6523343 Approved for Release 2024110 23 C065 2334l S E_A OP i I ' ' Approved for Retease 2024110 23 C0652334 3 JA PA N Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343 SECRBT 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 6 The ROK has an ambitious power program which calls for more than doubling installed electric power capacity by the end of 1981 According to present plans between 25 percent and 40 percent of total power will be nuclear generated The cost of the p-rogram is projected to top $2 billion with about half the total going to nuclear expenditures The government estimates that the nuclear plants will permit oil import savings of about $250 millio annually 7 This long-range power development program is now in its initial stages A 600 MWe power plant equipped with a Westinghouse pressurized water reactor has been under construction near Pusan since March 1971 and is scheduled for completion in 1976 The Koreans have recently ordered a second Westinghouse reactorequipped power pl t of the same size and for the same site it is scheduled for operation in 1979 Both will be fueled with US-supplied enriched uranium and will be under IAEA safeguards After extensive negotiation the Canadians recently agreed to provide Korea ith a 600 MWe power plant equipped with natural uranium fueled heavy water moderated CANou·reactor The cost of these plant may exceed $1 billion provided largely by foreign loans _ '__' _ __ l Even if expl o itation s lo rla prove to be W1economi c -det ermination to secure a source qf -qnsafeguarded uranium could le d the ROK to proceed with mining operations · All costs are in 197§ dollars 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 3 3 b 6 - 3 - SECRET Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343 Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343 II A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM - PROBLEMS AND PROS ECTS 9 1he us-supplied research reactors and the Westinghouse power reactors under construction which use enriched uraniwn fuel and are under IAEA safeguards are not well suited for production o f fissionable ma te·rial for nuclear explosives Reactor-grade plutonium produced in the Westinghouse pressurized water reactors·could be used in a nuclear explosive device but this plutonium would require special handling because of its high radioactivity If weapons-grade plutoniwn high-purity piutonium-239 is desired more frequent nuclear fuel changes would be required than for normal reactor operation · Because the enri hed uraniwn fuel must · be imported the higher fuel consumption would quickJ y 19 po_t e d bv f ue l - pJ j 9r and -C _j 3 3 b 6 inspectors r -13 3 b 6 · 10 The CANOU reactor will also be covered by IAEA and bilateral safeguard agreements Both agreements re expected to prohibit he use of reactor products in any nuclear explosive device However the CANDU rea tor - ·with its on-line refueling capability is mQre easily adaptable than the American-supplied reactors to the production of weapons grade plutonium and diversion of plutonium from the CANDU fuel cycle is soinewhat more difficult to detect 11 In order to have a safeguard-free CANDU type reactor the Koreans might attempt to build their own an effort upon which the Indian s are already embarked Canada began to construct the first CANDU power reactor at Rajasthan at the end of 1965 India began to build similar reactor at Madras in 1969 without Canadian help and thus free of safeguards This reactor is scheduled fQr operation in 197·7 A similar scenario -which would be in violation of the Canadian-Korean agreement would be as follows a Mid-1975 -- construction begins on a Canadhm -built CANDU power reactor b Mid-197'9 -- Koreans begin construction on an indigenoµs copy of the CANDU c Mid-1987 Korean-built CANDU ready for operation The Indians' effort does not viol ate their agzoeement ith Canada nor do bJe k-now that it is being undertaken in support of a -weapons pr gram - 4 - SECRET Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343 3 3 b 1 Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343 6 2 d SEGRE - 12 In addition to building the reactor the Koreans would also have to obtain natural uranium to fuel it This _ mi_ght_be ___· gbtaineq_ from same 9ut_sj de sources wi ou safeg rds 3 3 b 1 6 2 d - Xorea woula a Ts-cf nave to o tain unsafeguarded heavy water tor use in the reactors Construction of domestic heavy water production facilities would be necessary un eas n·ew s1 1ppliers emerge ifilling to sell heavy water without safeguards In addition Korea would need chemical facilitie_s _t o_s_ r_a t__e the olutonium_ from the irradi ated _- --f ue l ----- elements - - - · Finally before they could fabricate a -device tne Koreans woula have to conduct research and development i n l'l _gh explosive tec ology and weapon design 3 3 b 1 i · 6 2 d A nuc lear weapons program based on a domestically1_ rodu ed· safe ardt firee CANDO-type reactor uld n_ot put an inordinate str in on Ko·rean financial resources Mo over as long as it appeared that their _efforts were directed toward power productidn outside financing might be obtained The necessary capi al investment for reactor heavy water plant fuel fabrication facilities and a chemical reprocessing plant would approach ·a billion dollars Additional expenditures would be reqµired to procure uranium without safeguards operate the facilities to produce plutonium and conduct the nece·ssary weapons R D The total prog·ram would run to about $100 million annually representing 3 to 4 percent of to al projected government spending for 1975 Much of the equipment would also contribute to the further development of electric power generating capacity beyond that now planned for 1981 and to other non-explosiver uses of nuclear energy • That portion required exca s i Yal Y t Q reduce nuc e_ g _ sives would be rel ive y small I 13 3 3 b 6 - 5 - BECR T Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343 r 3 3 b 6 Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343 SECRET 14 A smaller program producing one or two weapons per year would probably cost around $200 million before the testing of an initial device This ·figure ·would incl ude capital investment on the order of $50 million for researc·h production and testin facilities and some $150 million in operating expenses A small nuclear reactor using natural uranium fuel · could perhaps be designed and cons'tructed without going f i rst to Canada for a prototype Other f a cilities required would also be on a smaller scale The requi ed $200 million in outlays spread over a decade would be ex emely small compared to Seoul's projected 1975 defense spending of about $1 billion and total gove·rnment spending of $2 • 7 billion in 1975 However although a program of this type would be considerably le as expensive than - the program described in Para 11 j t wo lld pxesent trut_KOreans with stroi la r · tecb-ni l orahlems ____ l · - - - - -3 3 b 1 15 Even as-suming some foreign as·sistance technological problems would be the most_ serious _ onstrajnt on a nuclear WAIU20D S I____ nroaram 3 3 b 6 j - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -- - -- -- ------ - In addition their overall_ industrial7teclinological oase although it has developed rapidly in the last ten years would have to be significan ly strengthened - - 6 - SECft T Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343 Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343 SECRET III DELIVERY CAPABILITIES 16 south Korea's two squadrons of F-4D fighter bombers already constitute an adequate system to deliver a nuclear weapon to any target in North I orea Although North Korean targets are well protected by an integrated defensive system of SAMs AAA and fighter aircraft a well executed ROK air strike could neutralize the defenses long enough to allow at least one P-4D to deliver its nuclear weapon to a predetermined target 17 A missile system if attainable would ·have obvious_ advantages The Nike Hercules mis siles of which the South Koreans have 72 can be eJnp loyed in a surface-to-s u rface mode with a range of about 100 nm with a 1 100 pound warhead It is probable that the weight of a first-generation South Kore-an nuclear warhead would severely reduce the missile's· surface-tosuif ace range and cause structural and control problems By the time the Koreans -are ready to fabricate their first device it is ·conceivable that they will have been able to·design one falling within the 1 100 pound weight limit 3 3 b 1 · 6 2 d 18 Rather than confront miniaturization problems the Koreans might try to purchase a delivery system that could ca r ry a heavier warhead They have already raised the question of whether th Nike Hercules could be _mQd ifie9 to car_rv 2 QOJ ·_I o d warhead - _____ ____ ___ 7 19 To develop a system in their · own country the south Koreans would require extensive foreign assistance in all but one· field They probably_ have adequate metal fabricating and preci sion machining facilitiea to produce missile airframea and ground support equipment They might however l ck adequate ski lls and equipment to fabricate missile components from hignstrength materials - 7 - SECRET Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343 3 3 b 1 6 2 d Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343 21 South Korea would have no difficulty in securing a propellant production facility and technolggy for its op eration frau some forei countey _ _ - - - - - - -- thi 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 22 The South Koreans -would require significant outside assistance to develop a missile with an inertial guidance system but they probably could develop a radio controll d system o·n their own fairly easily Nike Ajax and Hercules surface-toair missile guidance equipment in their pessession could be modified ·for·--use wl th a · new missile Other types of tracking equipment either radar or interferometer can easily be acquired as could the necessary computer technology 23 In addition a test range would have to be established Again the necessary equipment could be bought easily If the missile were radio controlled the associated tracking equipment could also -serve the test range 24 Tl'le fiye years or so that President Pak envisions for the development and de_ployment of a mis-s ile system probably ·is based on something like the following schedule a Two years to acquire the equipme_n·t and t construct the necessary facilities b Six months to place the facilities in operation and to learn how to use them properly · c One year for the development and static testing of rocket motors d One year for flight testing e An additional six months for missile production checkout ·troop training and deployment While this schedule might be · possible with good mana-gem nt and if verything goes correctly it is highly unlikely tha the South Koreans could manage it • They migh be able to develop · a ·r adio-guided missile of simple design within eight years ten years however is probably a more realistic estimate · - 8 - S CRBT Approved for Release 2024 10 23 C06523343