j jJ SUBJECT to Pres o f J liro·'Rpt 11 Y PERIOD COVERED · FROM Date 15 Dec 42 s i souRcE OCG Files Gen Correa MP Files Folder 25 Tab A ' TO Date --------- AJ IJ NB - C9Ver ltr from Bush td l Reports ••••• • ec 42 and re -o-'r s i IJ- L1t -e l t r f-e l r __ 11 ac k eiv-f - -- z c c DECLASSIFIED - ------- _ i Authority 903 C - 5 66 9 3 EDITION OF 1 JUL WI LL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED 9 BRIEF E61020 a s I REPORT ON PRESENT STATUS AND FUTURE PROORAM ON ATOMIC FISSION BOMBS Table of Contents Summary of Report with Recommendations Detaile d Report Organization Progress to Date Report of Reviewing Committee Funds Size of Bomb Time Sehedule German Activity Power Possibilities Heavy Water Ores Patents Past Relations with Brit ish and Candians Proposed Future Relations with the Brit ish and Canadians Recommendations ---r 9Q3 DECLASSIFIED ority Ol-5 pp a-d p 1 2 5 8 9 10 11 13 17 18 19 20 22 27 7 SUMMARY OF REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 1 The size of the desirable bomb has been increased frolii 5-10 kg to 15-25 kg as a result of further scientific research 2 Development and engineering with a view to early construction is being carried forward on three methods a Diffusion plant of l kg daily production estimated cost $150 000 000 b Pile plant of 1 kg daily production estimated cost $100 000 000 c Small electromagnetic plant of 100 gm daily production estimated cost of present scope $10 000 000 probably to be increased in size during course of construction d Heavy water plants of 2 5 tons per month production estimated cost $20 000 000 A manufacturing site has been procured in Tennessee A special experimental site has been procured in New Mexico and another manufacturing site is about to be procured 4 The total estimated cost of the entire program including operating costs is of the order of $400 000 000 of which amount $85 000 000 has been made available from construction funds under the control of the Chief of Engineers a 5 With highest priorities add allocations the best estimates are that bomb production should start about the end of 1944 or the beginning of 1945 6 Enemy progress is substantially unknown but there are indications of early concentrated activity in Germany which may have resulted in their having a head start of as much as a year 7 The feasibility of the production of power from atomic energy has now been demonstrated in the laboratory 8 The development of atomic power bas also taken as it has now been discovered that the production of a as a by-product of power production in a pile plant is Control of peacetime use becomes a serious problem on the potential economic and military importance a new aspect super-explosive much more probable account of both 9 ·We now have sufficient ores under control 10 Relations with the British and Canadians need clarification RECOMMENDATIONS It is recommended a That this program be carried forward vigorously and that it be given the highest pr i orities and allocations on materials equipment and personnel with a view to solution at the earliest possible date b b That in view of the unusual and unpredictable hazards involved in carrying out the work under this project the President authorize the incorporation of suitable provisions in the contracts where such action is deemed advisable by the Chief of Engineers providing that all work under such a contract is to be performed at the expense of t he Government and that the Government shall indemnify and hold the Contractor harmless against any loss expense includin g expense of litigation or damage including personal injuries and deaths of persons and damage to property of any kind and from any cause whatsoever arising out of or connected with the work and further that the Government shall assume and carry on the defense of all claims suits and le gal proceedings which may be asserted a gainst the Contrktor and or the Government arising from or growing out of the work under the contract and that the Government shall assume the payment of any «amr u compromise settlement or final judgment in connection therewith - c That the Chief of Engineers be authorized to enter into contracts the estimated expenditures of which will exceed available funds and that he be authorized to make payments under these contracts from any funds under his control reimbursement to be made from funds to be obtained as indicated in the following recommendation c - That the President include sometime early in 1943 in his estimates to Congress funds in the amount of not less than $315 000 000 for carrying on this project e That clear instructions be issued llm as to interchange with the British and that these be based on paragraph C of page 26 below · That at the appropriate time the President instruct as to the position to be taken in conn ctipn with the post-war aspects of international relations on this subject dJ E - --- --- or sL DECLASSIFIED ority 903 December 15 1942 TO 'Hon Henry A Wallace Vice President Hon Henry L Stimson Secretary of War General George c Marshall Chief of Staff FROM V Bush Chairman of Military Policy Committee on Atomic Fission Bombs SUBJECT Present Status and Future Program Gentlemen The last report on the development of bombs of extraordinary power was dated June 13 1942 Since then the program bas been vigorously pushed and the ultimate possibiltties together with the difficulties have be·come more clear It is therefore opportune to present the present status of this matter together with our recommendations for the future and seek further instructions Organization As a result of a conference held on September 23 at which among others the following were present The The Dr Dr Secretary of war Chief of Staff U S Army V Bush Director of the OSRD J B· Cooant Chairman of the NDRC 1 a Military Policy Committee was plac d in general charge of all phases of the development or the manufacture of atomic fission bombs and of the plans for their use as a weapon This Committee consists of Dr v Bush Director of the OSRD with Dr J B Conant Chairman of the NDRC as his alternate Rear Admiral W R Purnell USN Major General w D Styer USA Brigadier General L R Groves USA with General Groves in executive charge of the work and working in the closest cooperation with Dr Conant This report is presented by this Military Policy Committee Progress to Date Since the June 1942 report on this subject the design and construction for the various methods have progressed as follows rI l q 3 01-_5 DECLASSIFIED Authority O a A site is being acquired west of Knoxville Tennessee as the location for the electromagnetic and diffusion process DX plants Construction of administrative and auxiliary facilities bas been started It was originally expected to place at this point the pile process but that may prove inadvisable from the standpoint of safety of 2 the surrounding community It is possible that the p i l e plant will have to be placed in an isolated section where hazards will be confined to plant personnel b A site is being procured in New Mexico for the establishment of the necessary facilities for a special secret laboratory on bomb design c steps have been taken to procure all available ore to develop new sources of ore and to produce the uranium metal and other raw materials which will be necessary when production is initiated d A plant to yield 0 5 tons heavy water per month is under construction It is hoped that it will begin operation by July 1943 • L e As the centr fuge method offered less possibilities of success than any of the other methods work on this method has been definitely reduced to limited scientific research f A ten stage diffusion plant has been almost _completely designed is now under construction and should be completed by the middle of 1943 The completion of this plant will assist greatly in the engineering development of the full scale 4600 unit plant However it is not intended to wait for the completion of this ten stage plant 3 prior to the initiation of design and construction of the 4600 plant Arrangements are being made to engage a competent process engineering firm for the development of a diffusion process and an experienced operating organization is being sought for the completed plant g An experimental pile has been constructed d and has demonstrated the inherent feasibility of a controlled transmutation at room temperatures Negotiations have been in process for several weeks and we have about reached an agreement which will result in placing the pile process tor the production of 49 and the heavy water production in the hands of an experienced 49 is the code word for the explosive p roduct of the pile method 25 for that of the other methods ' engineering and operating organization In this process due to the unusual potential hazards and liabilities involved it is not only necessary but proper that the United States should assume all such risks One of these potentialities although the chances of its happening aievery slight would involve the complete destruction of life within a large area of unknown si Others would result in claims brought many years after the alleged damage ze was caused Di claims difficult to disprove no matter how little Justifi d In view of the assumption of such risk by the United States it is desirab e • that the President authorize the war Department to enter into such a contra t 4 C I • h Research and kvelopment of the experimental unit f'or the el ectromagaetic plant is being vigp ously pressed A search is now being made for a process engineering firm capable of designing and operating an electromagnetic plant Report of' Reviewing Committee Until recently this project has been primarily one of research and development of scientific principles The time bas now been reached when these principles must be applied practically On November 18 a committee of engineers of' considerable industrial experience particularly in the line of' scientific development was appointed f'or the purpose of reviewing the entire project from a manufacturing standpoint This committee was composed of' Mr w K Lewis Mr E v Murphree Unf rtunately due to illness Mr Murphree was unable to partic ate in the work of the committee Mr Roger Williams Mr T C Gary Mr c H Greenewalt The committee bas reviewed the project and has presented the following conclusions Premise Production must be substantially 25 kilos of 25 or 15 kilos of 49 per month 1 Proceed immediately with the design and construction of' a 4600 unit diffusion plant with a capacity of' 5 1 kilo of' 25 per day Of' all three methods the diffusion process is believed to have the best overaall chance of' success and produces the more certainly usable material 25 The construction cost of this program excluding uranium supply is estimated roughly at $150 000 000 2 Expedite design and construction of a pilot piled and sufficient full-scale helium-cooled graphite piles with auxiliary equipment for the production of 600 gm 49 per day While recognizing the many uncertainties of' the pile process there is the possibility of' earliest achievement of the desired result The construction cost of' this program excludigg uranium supply is estimated roughly at $100 000 000 3 Development work on the electromagnetic method should be expedited to the greatest possible extent to determine whether capacity per cell can be increased We do not see that the electromagnetic method presents a practical solution to the military problem at its present capacity at least 22 000 cells for 1 kilo per day If the capacity per cell can be increased about 5 fold under conditions of' sustained operation as seems not impossible commercialization of the method should be carefully reconsidered 6 I 4 The above conclusions are concerned only with the production of quantities of military significance The physicists competent to pmtk speak are agreed that the probability of 25 be explosive is 95i or better and that nothing short of the minimum exp'l osive quantity 13 kilos will establish explosibility with greater certainty However we are informed that mea·surements useful from a purely physical viewpoint can be made on 100 gm of material Production of this quantity in the shortest construction time can best be done by installing immediately a 110-cell electromagnetic pilot plant Such a plant would cost approximately $10 000 000 The production of similar quantities of 49 will result from the operation of the pilot pile already recommended 5 Heavy water is believed to offer the best solution to the PiW problem and is desired for another important use Since the planned supply of' heavy water is totally inadequate f'or these purposes a beginning should be made immediately toward production in this country through construction of one unit capacity about 2 tons per month using the liquefaction method The cost of this unit is estimated roughly at $15 000 000 7 -6 Engage process engineering firms immediately for the pile and electromagnetic processes and for heavy water production 7 Kg Engage experienced operating o ga nizations immediately for each project for which commercial or pilot-plant operation is to be undertaken and give them full responsibility and corresponding authority for progress of the work Funds It must be realized that the program consists not only of the developmet of the design and construction of the production plants but of the procurement of the basic materials and the operation of the plants in the production of a usable bomb The amount of money involved in carrying out the entire program is of the order of $400 000 000 The exact amount cannot be estimated at this time even approximately because of the many completely unknown factors To date $85 000 000 has been made available from construction funds under the control of the Chief of Engineers Either the additional money should be made available at this time from funds under the c9ntrol of the President or the Chief of Egineers should be authorized to enter into contract obligations beyond the funds now under bis control Additional funds in the amount of $315 000 000 should be made available early in 1943 8 F I qo3 01-_s DECLASSIFIED ority Sige of Bomb This influences a11 plans decidedly and the situation bas changed significantly since the time of the last report Briefly the estimated explosive power and hence the expected damage per kilogram of material remains substantially unchanged However none of the material will explode until acertain critical amount is assembled and properly arranged This determines the size of bomb In June this amount was estimated at 5 to 10 kilograms It is now estimated at about 15 kilograms and the- size of bomb for good efficiency of explosion is estimated at 25 kilograms Unfortunately such a change greatly increases the cost of the program for the following reason The effect of even a single 5 to 10 kilogram bomb would be enormous if it would explode It was estimated as the equivalent of several thousand tons of TNT perhaps 5000 tons although the estimate cannot be precise However it is now believed that such a bomb would not explode but that a 25 kilogram bomb would The larger bomb would be correspondingly more effective if the 5000 ton figure is used for a 10 kg bomb the 25 kg bomb would be equivalent to 12 500 tons For a military effect however the· 9 smaller figure is already large enough so that there is no really proportional advantage in increasing it What is needed is one decidedly powerful bomb plus the ability to follow it up with others If the enemy were already wavering this might readily end the war However the increase in critical size if plans are made on having a succession of bombs available runs up the size and cost of the plants to produce them This is one reason for the difference in estimates as given in June and as now presented Another reason is that the earlier figures were presented with the hope that in six months the program could be narrowed down from four methods to one or at most two It has been narrowed to three but it does not seem safe at this time to narrow beyond tba t point Time Schedule It is not possible to predict when bomb production can begin on a one per month basis If construction of the full-scale pile and diffusion plants is initiated immediately with highest priorities and allocations on materials for construction equipment and personnel the following statement is believed to present a fair picture of the possibilities 10 a There is a chance though an extremely small one that bomb production at the desired rate can begin before June 1 1944 b There is a somewhat better chance that production can begin before January l 1945 c There is a good chance that production will begin before or during the first half of 1945 Without the above specified highest priorities and allocations it is absolutely impossible to predict when this production can be reached and if the assignment of the highest priorities is not possible the resulting accumulative delays incident to procurement and allocation of materials might well render continuation of the project inadvisable on any basis of war-time use German Activitz This subject is an exceedingly difficult one on which to obtain information as to enemy activity The subject has been pursued with Army Intellgence All available pertinent information is there collected We do ow that Germany started work along these general lines in 1939 We also know that after the fall of Norway the product of' a Norwegian plant producing heavy water was increased and the product shipped to Germany and heavy ll water is at the basis of one of' the most promising methods of proceeding toward power uses and as bas been realized more recently also toward an explosive We do not know unfortunately just bow much progress tka they have made On the basis of our own time schedule and the difficulties of the whole affair which test our own scientific and technical skill to the utmost it is believed to be highly improbable that aermany will be in a position to use such a weapon in 1943 It is entirely possible however that it may be six months or a year ahead in the over-all program due to the head start We believe that American energy and resourcefulness can overcome such a handicap if the race is long enough Hence evel'- technical obstacle that is encountered if' K met both by ourselves and our enemy is to be welcomed Recent months have uncovered several such none insurmountable We have no reason to believe that Japan in such a race would be a competitor comparable to Germany 1 -- must be realized however that almost no real information is available and comparisons are hence nearly pure speculation 12 Power Possibilities For the long-range view the power possibilities of this development are extraordinary Briefly a suitably constructed pile of uranium and either_graphite or heavy water will get hot and remain hot without any use of fuel whatever Steam at high pressure can be taken off to operate a power l DS plant or a ship The amounts of power are large it is not fantastic to talk in terms of even millions of' kilowatts Such a development can greatly influence the entire world economic relationship At the time of our last report it was already considered probable that such a result could be achieved Tests since then have made it much more certain that this is the case No pile that heats itself has yet been made although such a demonstration will probably be made within a few months ' On December first the critical experiment was performed which established that a self-sustainin 5 chain reaction was a reality On that date a pile sustained its newon atmosphere by a chain reaction although for safety reasons it was not then allowed to heat to a high temperature In other words the scheme for utilizing atomic energy was on that date reduced to practice 13 ---- DECLAsSIFIED I Authority 903 o S • Difficult engineering problems remain In particular there is a serious hazard to personnel due not to probable explosions but to the very i k intense incident radioactivity which must be guarded against Also control methods heat extraction processes renewal procedures all have to be worked out in practice There remains however little doubt that man has available a new and exceedingly potent source of energy in a form which can be practically utilized In the form now in sight the cost of power obtained on this basis might not be exceedingly low for the high plant cost offsets the lack of fuel bill The first applications may hence come in areas where power is needed but where there is neither coal oil no water power available However this is the beginning of a new art possibl the beginning of an entirely new phase of manh control of the proce8ses of nature and it is impossible to know where it may lead It is decidedl y unfortunate however from the standpoint of long-range pJ anning that the operation of' such a power-plant pile inevitably involves the incidental production of a material which is to a high degree of probablility a super explosive of' the general sort which is the subject of this project It will be very difficult to extrac t and adequately purify this material but all expert opinion availa indicates that it can be done 14 In accordance with the way in which the technical difficulties turn out this may be or may not be the quickest path to usable bombs In the present state of our knowledge it is doubtful if it is ·still if sic may be and it is one path that the enemy appears to be following Hence it seems certain that it would be unwise to leave it out of' the program The entire effort of this project has been aimed at the military objective of producing super bombs However it now appears that one of' the paths to this objective involves also a substantial development of' means for utilizing atomic power Even if it were felt that the war would in all probability a end before a super bomb could be produced the question would still remain whether this pa th should not still be pursued Certainly if in the future nations are to construct and use power plants utilizing atomic power and especially if a super explosive is a possible by-product the United States must be one of those nations The implications of utilizing atomic energy which may alter th rend of civilization together with the possibility that atomic power plants may also be capable of producing a super explosive opens questions of control 15 and questions of post-war international relations of the greatest gravity There still remains a chance that the by-product may not actually be explosive This question can be answered with a high degre of certainty only when half a kilogram or so of the material ·is availabme e which however invloves much money and effort to obtain It is not abso- lutely certain of course that even 25 will explode and similarly a reasonable quantity is necessary to completely settle the matter It seems essential in order that lBDt post-war planning may be entered upon with a Bk sound grasp of what may involve a turning point in the technical be answered as promptly history OJ C i V il ization that these questions • as ossibl e If the recommendations of this report are followed this Pi rdance with the best advice now obtainable be accomplished can n acco h eari in 1944 Otherwise it may be many years before t e actual status y ject and its f'u11 potential effect on the trend of events can of' the SUv be fully understood 16 Heavy water In view of' the above this takes on a new significance The power r am in this country has been based largely on the use of graphite th uranium with a lesser attention to the use of heavy water It now appears that heavy water may be definitely better for this purpose The British bave experimented with heavy water more than we have This came about largely because the only heavy water in substantial quantity f' r experimental u purposes in existence was in England Before the war t e only place where heavy water was made in any quantities beyond a few grams was in Norway where a hydroelectric electrolytic plant had been adapted to make it When Norway fell the entire supply about 100 pounds or so was gotten to England by rather KY' t Dari extraordinary efforts As noted -above the Germans have since made more They are not likely to make it long or effectively at that place However England had the first amount of heavy water and hence took the lead in experiments which required it It now takes much greater prominence in planning i f Plans as reported on in June involved a production of a relatively sa small amount of heavy water for our purposes at a Canadian plant Present pla s involved a much 17 greater production in this country by a process only recently well worked out by which it can become a by-product of American manufacture However the production of the Canadian plant will come in first This raises one point in international relations noted below -Ores We now bave either in hand or on the way sufficient uranim ore for the entire program up to and including militar se The best ore supply is in Canada Another is in the Congo We have ore from both places The possibility of obtaining ore in Colorado is now under investigation There are sources in southeast Europe in areas under German control A study some time ago indicated no unusual activitity at the principal mines However the material is rather widely distributed in small sources It is used ordinarily in glass manufacture It is also used as a source • of radium In this connection there was quite a supply in a dump in Belgi um It does not appear easy to control this subject by controlling the or It also appears that the use of the process for power will not be limitede for a long time by reason of any lack of raw material 18 I 9 3 01 5 ---- DECLASSIFIED Authority 0 ' I Patents the utilization of atomic power must always be under It is clear that ot only because of the enormous hazards 1 nbut close governmstal contro' als because a super explosive appears as a involved in such a process possible by-product been ag arranged so that the scientific personnel At present it bas tracts on this project will assign their entire engaged under OSRD ns they may make in this field to the United States rights to any inven been taken to ensure that any important patent Government steps ba bJect in the Patent Office are held in secrecy applications on th is de to buy up pateit applications which may have been No effort bas been ia utside the governmental groups for these are filed by individ f lovalue or validity at this time certainly of dou that these steps are sufficient at this time for power It is feit in this manner when it comes will undoubtedly be under plant operationtai control by license or otherwise 19 close governmen ons with British and Canadians Past Re 1a ti ou bout this affair there bas been close scientific interchange with e c1eniific group working on the problem in England The British program bas bad two main aspects One is a diffusion process for making the explosive material which differs considerably from our own · diffusion process This will be tested in a small model plant in the spring However they do not now intend even if the small unit is successful to build a full-scale plant in England This is partly because they are short of men and materials and partly because they now lean on us for the full-scale effort The second part of their program has bad to do with experimentation on the_powee plant approach to the matter using heavy water The scientific group carrying this on is now being transferred to work in Canada They have not stated any plans for carrying this to a full-scale attempt JH ernational arrangementsJ bave been confined to the matter of scientific interchange thus far Dr Bush and Sir John Anderson President of the Privy Council who beads the British effort along these lines have had 112o an interchange of letters which bring up the broader questions of relationships as the matter goes into full-scale effort and after-the-war relations but these letters ha of course been so constructed as not to commit us in any way However the understanding must soon be extended in some manner The larger question of pest-war international relations has been left etirely in the air It should be possible to approach it under war-time conditions more readily than later This whole development of atomic power I DECLASSIFIED IAuthority 903 O J_5 tin in an already complicated civilization if it arrives as a new compli bl as an event of certainly the next as now appears to be very adifficult aa matter with which to deal decade may be an exceedin On the other hand it may be capable of wisely as between nations be world Nothing will be done of course on maintaining the peace oft blem except under definite instructions this broad phase of the pro ' with the British and Cane Mans Proposed Future Relations been complete scientific interchange between the Up to now there bas ientif'ic groups The subject now enters a new British and American s evelopment and plant construction The U S Corps phase involving 2 1 f many phases of' development and will be in 0 of En ineers is in charge Neither the British nor the Canadians will be charge of all produ 1 tivities ·It will be clearly difficult to continue engaged in producti tific interchange on the one hand and restricted to have complete scien on the other unless the arrangement is carefully development inter nf ne between research and development is nebulous spelled out fo le are often involved in both It is hence essential and the same pe P wand clear directive on future u s -British relations tbat tbere be a ne in this area e is presumably only one reason for free interchange of secret Tber information between allied nations --namely to further the prosemil itaryf the war in which both are engaged In almost all fields such cution nge is essential because both the British and ourselves are engaged intercuin tbe development and manufacture of' t he same ors imilar dev1ces In tb se at point --the manufacture of' 25 or 49 --the British have told us that neither in Eggland nor in Canada are theze facilities adequate f'or the construction of' the plants for the manufacture of the material 22 They have no intention of engaging in manufacture in this war Therefore our passing our knowledge to them will not assist the British in any way in the present war effort At present the British have well along in the development stage a diffusion process Further knowledge of this development and its progress through later stages would be helpful to us in the construction of our diffusion plant Such information is not vital however as it bas now been decided to proceed with the American plans without waiting for the trials of the British models A complete cessation of interchange in this particular field therefore would thus binder somewhat but not seriously embarrass the United States effort Turning to the heavy water method of manufacturing 49 the case is similar The British will gain nothing by access to our information which will help them in this war To be sure a group of capable men is being assembled in Canada to work on this project this group includes at least one man Balban who is an expert in this field perhaps the man who bas given the most thought to the problem in either the United states or 3 the U K o It would be advantageous to the United States if the talents 2 add knowledge of this group could be utilized but it would not hamper the effort at all fatally if the cessation of interchange resulted in the withdrawal of this group from the effort It should be pointed out that if the United States should decide to bar all further flow of information on the S-1 project to England the Canadian Government might refuse to allow the product of the Trail Heavy Water Plant located in Canada but fiHa financed by the United States to cross the border to the United States and might also do likewise with the ore The heavywater produced by the Trail Plant will be 0 5 tons a month beginning next summer by January 1944 it is proposed to have the United States heavy water plants producing at a rate of 2-5 tons a month The refusal by the Canadians to let the United States have the product of the Trail Plant would thus slow down our development program but not cripple it The question of the ore is more complicated and until the situation in respect to Colorado supplies has been further explored it is difficult to hazard an opinion as to our self-sufficiency 24 The question may well be raised as to whether it would be fair for the United States now to cease to interchange information on the S-1 project Considering the matter from this viewpoint the following facts must be borne in mind The basic ideas are common to both countries indeed to our enemies as well The two diffusion processes have been pushed along independently but with frequent interchange of ideas It would be impossible to say which group had done the most borrowing The use of heavy water in a power plant bas been pushed most vigorously by the British because Halban a French refugee formerly a German came to Eggland after the fall of France On the other band until u s scientists discovered the fact that the by-product 49 would probably bixplosive the British put the heavy water power plant in a position ot low priority If there be any national rights in this whole area 49 may be said to be a strictly U s invention From the above it appears a there would be no unduly serious hindrance to the whole project if all further interchange between the United States and Britain in this matter were to cease and b there would be no unfairness 25 to the British in this procedure On the other hand the British would certainly be displeased and whether the resulting friction would produce serious repercussions in regard to the supply of materials from Canada or in other areas it is impossible to judge The advantages of restricting all further information to the United States is obvious Secrecy could be more easily controlled We are now just reaching the point where the advances are military secrets of the first order of importance In view of this situation there seem to be three possible plans A Cessation of all interchange B Complete interchange not only in the research field but in development and production including free interchange of personnel This has the disadvantages noted above - - --- DECLASSlFJED Authority I C Restricted interchange of information only to the extent that it can be used now by the recipient The interpretation of this policy under present circumstances would be as follows 1 Electromagnetic method--no interchange work on this method 2 British doing no Diffusion--unrestricted interchange between the U S firms astgi designing and x constructing the Plant and the British concenned with the same project 26 3 Manufacture of 49 and heavy water--interchange only of scientific research no interchange of the design of plants If all of the information obtained would be made available to u s Engineers the initial Trail product could be made available to the Canadian group to an ent sufficient for them to pursue their experimentaMS lon Since there would be no developmental work in Canada British or Canadian access to the design of our plants or to the plants after construction would not be provided for 4 No interchange on research or development being conducted in special secret laboratory on bomb design If this subject is considered by itself and is not necessarily Judged in the light of other international relations it appears that procedure C is in the best interests of the United States is no assurance that the British would accept an arrangement which is thus limited If procedure A is adopted the injury to the speed of the program will be on the whole slight and secrecy will be better preserved but the British would undoubtedly object strongly ¥ Recommendations It is recommended a That this program be carried forward vigorously and that it be given the highest priorities and allocations on materials equipment and personnel with a view to solution at the earliest possible date 27 - That in view of the unusual and unpredictable hazards involved in carrying out the work under this project the President authorize the incorporation of suitable provisions in the contracts where such action is deemed advisable by the Chief of Engineers providing that all work under such a contract is to be performed at the expense of the Government d and that the Govermment shall indemnify and hold the Contractor harmle s against any loss expense including expense of litigation or damage including personal injuries and deaths of prsons and damage to property of any kind and from any cause whatsoever arising out of or connected with j DEcLASSIF1ED j Authority 903 01-_5 the work and further that the Government shall assume and carry on the defense of all claims suits and legal proceedings which may be asserted against the Contractor and or the Government arising from or growing out of the work under the contract and that the Government shall assume the payment of any compromise settlement or final judgment in connection therewith c That the Chief of Engineers be authorized to enter into contracts the estimated expenditures of which will exceed available funds and that he be authorized to make payments under these contracts from any funds under his control reimbursement to be made from funds to be obtained as indicated in the following recommendation 28 d That the President include sometime early in 1943 in his estimates to Congress funds in the amount of not less than $315 000 1 000 for carrying on this project e Tbat clear instructions be issued as to interchange with the British and that these be based on paragrap C of page 26 above f That at the appropriate time the President instruct as to the position to be taken in connection with the post-war aspects of international relations on this subject For the Military Policy Committee s V Bush v Bush Chairman APPROVED ff w If j Vice President 1- 1 G W D S Secretary of War Chief of staff