----- - - TOP SECRET SEP 301957 _ - Signed Ma nsfi ld D Sprague G Prep Diot ' ISA FMRA Col C'DIJ pmD n nl a 19 2' 874 ext 54871 1 2 3 - Cbnm 'J7 Sep ms v encl Cy l Ser B Rec #B-42437 4 - PJBD w encl Cy 2 Ser B 5 - ISA Legal w encl Cy 3 Ser 6 - ' Plans v encl Cy 4 Ser B 7 - WH w encl Cy 5 Ser B e 1 8 - Readµlg 9 - OSD Files v enol Cy 6 Ser B J ' ' 10 - R C c ll • FMR Comeback 12 • Rold REPRODUCTI ON O F THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXC EPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE TOP SECRET 'J C_op_y l - -- ' __ _of A__ Co ies DECLASSIFIED Authority d NW 9 1 3bZ es I ll 11 11 _ - - - --- - _ tt SECURITY CLAS SIF ICATl O N ST AMP LOG NUMBER OFFICE OF THE ASS ISTANT SECRETARY OF OEFENSE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS r-15 768 7 INTEROFFICE CONTROL SHEET FOR INITIA L TO l NFORMAT ION 1 - ' l --l-A _ s_s 1s_ T_A_ N T_ s_E_ c 1_D_E• __r_ s_AJ_ __- CONCURRENCE - - - ----lc--c-l--- ---- -- - -- APPROVAL - · SIGNATURE - --l--- 1c - ACT I ON DISPOSITION ---le---- --l--- - - DEPUTY ASO I SA DEPUTY ASD lSA MAP t DEPUT Y lJ '1 1 SD lSA NSC PLANS MILIT RY ADVISOR sPrf - 1AL ASSIS1' ANTS T O ASO ISA - - - P-1EC-U IVE 4 J OFF ICER OASD ISA DIRECTOR PLANNING D IRECTOR HSC AFFAIRS DIREC TOR OCS AFFAIRS DIRECTOR SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1 1 DIRECTOR PROGRAMMING AND CONTROL ISA COMPTRO LL ER REGIONAL DIRECTOR EUROPE REGIONAL DIRECTOR FAR EAST REjfiONAL DIRECTOR MESA 2 • EGIONAL DIRECTOR WH II VII J _ LEGAL ADV ISOR 6 RECORDS AHO CONTROL DASO ISA 6 Colonel J w c· · 2A-874 Ext 54871 Foreign Military Rights Affairs _ ORIGINATOR AHO EXTE NSI ON SUBJECT 99-Year Lease of Northern Greenland The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum of 29 May 1956 rec ded that 1 the United States purchase Greenland or 2 the United States lease · Greenland for a long term of years or 3 the United States negotiate an agreement for long term use of selected base areas in Greenland TAB A REMARKS This memorandum was forwarded to State by Assistant Secretary Gray for a recommendation as to the political feasibility of the proposals of the Joint Chiefs TAB B Assistant Secretary Elbrick has now replied TAB c stating that the first two alternatives are not politically feasible and that the third is in effect already accomplished under the Defense of Greenland Agreement of 1951 which remains in force for the life of NATO and that any attempt to secure a l onger term might be met with suspicion and distrust and thus might be counterproductive as regards any additional facilities or areas which we may require in the more immediate future A memorandum has been prepared transmitting the Department of State's comments to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Recommend that the attached memrandum at signature tab be dispatched DECLASSIFIED Authority d IVNb 91 36Z ff 'JC li O OF ' i'EIS DO ill N7 ' J uL C1 li 'P l T 1 3 i i· l il'I J ED D- - -T ' 1I 'tl-i 2I ISSION OF f ili igned and •• • HESAREK I C onel USA Deputy Director Office of Special International Affairs 1 s··· u G OFflCE sD 1 7 161 PREV IOUS E DITION IS OBSOLE TE C 6 6 J9 4 WASHINGTON 2' D C DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON In reply refer to EUR BNA - S'P Ot mber l 3195i TOP SECRET Daar Mr Sprague 13t 1vI r I refer to the latter of July l✓ 1956 from Mr Gordon Gray addressed to the Secretary of State which asked the views of the Department on the political feasibility of certain recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that the United States purchase Greenland or obtain a long term lease for all of Greenland or negotiate an agreement for long term use of selected base areas in Greenland This letter will serve to formalize earlier oral connnents on the political feasibility of these recommendations It is the view of the Department of State that the purchase of Greenland by the u s is not a politically feasible proposal at this time or·ror the foreseeable future The circumstances of Danish political life are such particularly the fact that the Danish constitution promulgated on June 5 1953 formally made·Greenland en integral part of the Kingdom of Denmark with a status equal constitutionally to that of any other part of the Kingdom that a proposal by the U S to the Danes to purchase Greenland could well be regarded as an insult by the Danes and could be seriously damaging to u s -Danish relations Indeed even the knowledge that some responsible officials of the UoS• Government were seriously considering making such a proposal might well be damaging to U S Danish relations The The Honorable Mansfield D Sprague Assistant Secretary of Defense ISA Department of Defense TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED Authority N fu 91 362 TOP SECRET - 2 - The reasons for such a strong potential reaction to an offer to purchase Greenland are the following The Danish people and Danish Government have a strong emotional attachment to Greenland Greenland is the last remnant overseas of a great Danish empire of the past whose domain has been shrinking throughout the past 500 years and the Danes take pride in their humane and orderly paternalistic administration of Greenland and its native inhabitants The Dane regards the Greenlander as part Eskimo part Scandinavian and as a sort of half brother For these reasons and in view of changing conditions of connnerce and administration in Greenland itself the Danish Government included the change in Greenland's status in the constitutional reform in 1953 which passed the Danish Parliament by an overwhelming majority and was approved by popular vote prior to promulgation on June 5 1953 The potential danger to Danish-American relations involved in attempting to lease any portion of Greenland would seem to be hardly less serious than those involved in trying to buy it The danger would flow from internal Danish politics Denmark has taken its place in western defense through NATO tardily reluctantly and hesitantly There is a strong vocal sector of the population which cuts across party lines that would welcome the political capital to be made from an offer to lease portions of Greenland as an invasion of Danish sovereignty an ultimate and final involvement of Denmark with the u s on a bilateral basis and the subjugation of Denmark to U S interests Since Danish Governments are e·ither minority governments or uneasy coalitions handling a supercharged issue such as the sale or lease of an integral part of Denmark would involve political risks too grave for precariously seated Governments like the present one to risk willingly Moreover since the Danish Government has quickly and willingly met - without exception - every major U Se request for rights to occupy territory and conduct investigations in Greenland it is likely that the Danish Government would regard TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED Authority J'Ml q1d3b 7v ' TOP SECRET - 3 - regard with suspicion and fear of our ultimate aims any expressed desire on our part to revise an agreement that has worked so satisfactorily for the United States In this connection the possible advantages of a lease arrangement over our present arrangements are not clear to the Department It would be helpful to know more precisely how a lease arrangement would be considered to be more advantageous than the present arrangement Thus the Department of State considers that for a wide variety of reasons an offer to purchase or to lease Greenland - or portions of it - would not advance the interests of the U S Among these reasons are from the Danish poin of view constitutional considerations national prestige internal politics fear of U S motives and a sense of duty to the native population The views of our former Ambassador to Denmark on the JCS proposals were solicited Mr Coe•s reply which is set out in an attachment covers certain points not fully dealt with in this letter Sincerely yours Enclosure Views of Ambassador Coe on JCS Memorandum TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED Authority Ntih 9 H 3b l TOP SECRET VIEWS OF AMBASSADOR COE ON JOINT cmEF OF STAFF MEMORANDUM However our considered judgment is that not only would either of these courses be politically unfeasible in the extreme but that merely to propose them would be counterproductive jeopardizing both our present position and future requirements The third alternative to lease a portion of Greenland would of course be somewhat leas unfeasible but its success would in our opinion be highly doubtful and the net benefits over the present arrangement minimal The Danish attitude toward any such proposals would we believe be determined by the following 1 historical · prestige and emotional fao ors 2 economic aspects and 3 political consideration l As you know the history of modern Denmark is a history of gradual loss of territory -- southern Sweden Norway Schleswig-Holstein the Virgin Islands Iceland Except £or the Faroes which despite its headaches Denmark is anxious to keep Greenland is the only real eatate the Danes have left outside of these Islands The money they receive for the Virgin Islands has long since been spent and the benefits untraceable and there is still some feeling that the deal should never have been made Resentment of course still lingers over the Icelandic affair Against this background the Danes would most decidedly not take kindly to the prospect of separation of any other portion of the national patrimony Moreover there is a special historical attachment to Greenland itself Since the reestablishment of its regular contact with the Western World by Hans Egede in 1721 people from Denmark have taken the lead in exploring it and some of its explorers are counted among the most distinguished of Danish subjects All Danish school children are given extensive instruction concerning Greenland and the libraries are full of studies about its people language background flora and fauna ' resources etc Many distinguished Danish scholars have won their academic spurs in Greenland As TOP SECRET TOP SECRET - 2 As late as 1933 the Court of Internat1De ark successfully fought Norway intt 8 r laid claim to a art ona Justice at The Hague when the a 1953 changed thepst tof t e island The new Constitution of territorv to an int uslo Greenland from a non self-governinfg gra part of Denmark and on the basis 0 this the Danes made a strong and succes ful ffort at the UN to remove it from those territories over which the UN under the Charter exercises special interest and rights of surveillance Moreover the Danes have a feeling of protectiveness and f esponsibi ity tow frd the Greenlanders They have taken on a white man s burden or bringing the natives from the stone age to the atomic age and are trying to do a creditable job The Greenlanders are still shielded from direct and free commercial intercourse and contact with the world and as you know the Danes have been most anxious to prevent any contact between the Americans and the natives They take pride in their civilizing mission and would not want to sell or rent these 25 000 people to Uncle Sam Thus al though the average Dane has never seen the area and its problems do not impinge daily upon their consciousness the above historical end prestige factors create a strong attachment to Greenland which would arouse deep emotions if the prospect of its alienation were raised 11 2 Although the economic value of Greenland has yet to be proved there are strong economic factors also working against Danish agreement to any sale or lease or indeed longterm tenure of large areas There are no natural resources in this country Everything it produces outside of its agricultural production - and even some of that - must be imported processed and exported This means dependence on others Denmark's only hope for exploiting indigenous resources at a profit for ages ahead rests in Greenland Considerable excitement was generated here when lead deposits were discovered and they are rumored to be of fabulous value - even though thus far disappointing For the second year in a row Danish scientists have been exploring for uranium in Greenland with so far indifferent success However Danish hope is undiminished that Greenland will prove to be a fabulous source of uranium and that the Danish future will thus be assured in the atomic age Plans are reportedly under way to continue and expend current efforts to discover other minerals and subsurface TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED Authority Ntih 91 H36 Z TOP SECRET surface wealth and I b until they have exam1 lieve that the Danes will continue for any useable reso es nutely every accessiblesqusre mile Moreover Greenland 1 importance in aviation Itsl bviously an area of great future other territory Both the G es closer to the Pole than snY pioneered polar flights overnment and SAS which has economic as well as r sf'e very much aware of this and for cede rights to territ ry wtrehreasons would be unwilling to of polar control c gives them such a 1arge measure Other economic interests also play a part Considerable effort is being made for example by the Royal Greenland Trade Department to develop fishing as a commercially profitable enterprise Greenland cod halibut salmon and shrimps are of excellent quality and are beginning to come on the international market More and more freezing plants are being built in Greenland Danish construction companies principally the very powerful Danish Arctic Contractors which look for further business on the island would also join in pressing the Government to reject any arrangement abridging their possibilities 11 3 From a political point of view both domestic and international similarly strong factors operate to deter any Danish government from agreeing to such a deal In this legislative dominated perpetual minority type of government the party in power shrinks from any step which is controversial Any major move invites an opposition that can easily result in upsetting the constantly weak and precarious alignment of forces that keeps the administration in power This is the sort of issue which is made to order for opposition politicians It is an understatement to say that such proposal regarding the sale or lease of Greenland would bring a cataclysmic storm · about the government's head and that any party taking responsibility for it would almost surely be thrown out ••••• Merely to make such a proposal would jeopardize our future requirements in Greenland and I can think of few things more vital to our security than the extension of the DEW line The Danes their worst fears confirmed as to our ultimate intentions TOP SECRET __ - - · -- - - TOP SECRET l ' - 4 - the gr ons would then view our every move in Greenland with intent rutureavest suspicion and would be most disinclined to grant repercu iuests tor any extension of our facilities The relatio ons would also be felt in the Danish-American ns in other fields All with dimin rhthe above factors would operate but of course or an a rees ed force in the case of JSC•s third alternative Howeverg th 8nt for a long_ term tenure of selected base areas ment ar not real advantages of this over our present arrange• the designati le ofme The Agreement of 1951 provides for and gives us n e ense areas unlimited in number or size remain in foradefuate rights therein By its terms it is to effect or ind i or the duration of NAT which itself is in conditions whichnite duration Moreover in my view the tv o ment were the Korrnade it possible to conclude the 1951 Agreeit most unlikely wf and the existence of NATO I think revised arrangement ere ore that the Danes would agree to a conditions or crisia ed to NATO's duration except under ° n TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED Authority N i G J d3b i