REPRODUCED AT THE NATiONAL __ -· _ - • · ARC1_1_ vi i · DECLASSIFIED Authority tvAPJ 'I r 000 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM By SL- llAAA D21eft U S DEPARTMENT OF STATE l' 0J1 ✓kb 1 1ice DIRE TOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH t 1fi ✓f 1 - 85 January 31 1968 I To Through From The Secretary S S INR - Thomas L Hughes Subject Implications of the B-52 Crash for US-Scandinavian Military Arrangements • iW ·- The crash near the Thule Base of the B-52 carrying nuclear weapons has - increased criticism throughout the Scandinavian countries of US military policies Such criticism was already substantial because of their dislike of the United States' Vietnam policy This criticism could become strong enough to cause the governments of Denmark Iceland and possibly Norway to demand formal assurances from the US that no planes carrying nuclear weappns overfly their countries Denmark Most Concerned While the Danish Government that was in caretaker status since the parliamentary election on January 23 has accepted US assurances that l the D-52 approached Greenland only because it was seeking an emergency landing Hite demands are rising in all political parties for an investigation into the question of whether US planes carrying nuclear weapons have overflown Greenland in the past Press interviews with Greenlanders and with Danes working in Greenl nd who have stated that such flights have occurred have aroused widespread t suspicion All parties support the gove ent' s policy that no nuclear weapons may enter Danish territory Greenland is considered an integral part of - Cl - lt Denmark and it appears likely that the new government currently being formed ill f eel forced to seek formal assurances from the US that such flights will not be undertaken - - ----· _ ______ _ '• - o l • t- _ _ _ - • • d' - • • • •• - •• 1 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEH CONTROLLED DISSEI- t ····· ' 'c I r • I I I I _ I · SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - 2 -- How far the new government will go iii restricting US military ac tions in nnd over Greenland will depend to a large extent on its composition '' It now aeems almost certain that this government which ie expected to be announced in February l will be a coalition of the rightist Conservative and Moderate Liberal Parties who are the most friendly of all Danish parties to the US and NATO and of the centrist Radical Liberal Party which is pacifist-inclined The leaders of the Radical Liberals particularly their parliamentary spokesman Hilmar Baunsgaard who is expected to head the new government are not formally opposed to Denmark ' s current security arr ngements including memberehip in NATO However they may attribute some of their heavy gains in the election--they doubled thei r parliamentary representation--to their cmnpai gn for dr astic defense cuts and a referendum on Denmark's continued membership in NATO after 1969 Some Leftists May Push for Anti- US Policies Many of the Radical Liberals' new supporters and some of their newly elected parliament ary deputies are antimilitarists in foreign policy who will exploit the B-52 crash aa well thP rising fear among Danes of US policies in Vietnam and elsewhere in the Far East to try to reduce Denmark's ties to the US and NATO and to put it on a more neutralist path These Radical Liberals will be supported by the parliamentary delegations of the far left Venstresocialister Party VS and the Socialist I People's Party SPP and by some of the left-wing Social Democratic deputies ' This combination of these Radical Liberals VS SPP and left-wim socinl Democrats could not effect any basic changes in Denmark' s foreign and defense policies because the great majority of th Parliament agrees on their SECRET NO FOREIGN DlSSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM rl •• • I '_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ · ' _ __ J II • SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM -- - 3 - continuation Yet the key parliamentary position of the Radical Li berals makes it likely that they will feel that they can force the government to request explicit US assurances that nuclear-armed planes will not overfly Greenland to cut defense spending and to call a referendum on continued Daniah membership in NATO after 1969 Icelanders Also Asking Questions Icelanders who are highly sensiti ve about Icelandic sovereignty over the Keflavik Base are also concerned over the 8-52 incident Foreign Minister Jonsson has already felt obliged to state that the US is observing his country's policy which forbids any nuclear weapons on Icelandic territory The erroneous impression has spread that there is a formal agreement between Iceland and the US concerning storage of nuclear weapons at the base and flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons If the Danish Government requests explicit assurances regarding the overflight of nuclear-aruled planes popular pressures in I celand may increase to the point where the government will be forced to s ek such a formal agreement with the US However US-Icelandic relations have improved so much and the present Independence Party-Social Democratic coalition has been so friendly toward the US and NATO that the US can expect it--and particularly Primq Minister Benedikteson--to do everything possible to contain word es concerning flights of US planes over Iceland Non ray Least Concerned Of the three Scandinavian NATO countries Norway is the least affected by the B-52 incident However memories of the 1960 U-2 affair when suspicions arose that he US was using a Norwegian base at SECRET NO FOREIGN DlSSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM Rtl'RUDUCED AT TJIE NATIONAL ARCIIIVE I · r' ' • -- ··· ' ····- ______ _ _ _ ___ _ _ J rf- OE Cl ASS lfl EO I AuthoritytvAI 'l fOo ey_s_t _ IIARA D21e 1 k SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - 4 - --· Bodsl for activities that Norwegian officf al knew nothing about are still fresh That episode and the similarity between the Danish and Norwegian criticiama of US policy in Vietnam le d us to believe that the Norwegian Government would most likely follow th lead of Denmark if t he latter sought formal assurances from the US t ha t no nuclear-arms-bearing flights vill be made over its terr itory However as in the case of I celand the four-party coalition in Norway ie basically f riendly to the US and can be counted on to try to prevent a y serious s train on US-Norwegian relations Potential for Str ains in Re lations How far the Scandinavian gover11111ents that are members of NATO will go in their demands for concrete assurances concerning overflights of nuclear-armed aircraft will depend to a great extent on t heir impression of US actions and policies concerning this issue I f the Danish Government fails t o get such assurances it and possibly also the Icelandic Government may have great difficulty in withstanding public pressure for forcing renegotia t ion of current base agreements to have explicit guarantees against such overflights and storage of nuclear weapons wri tten into them If relations reach this point Denmark and Iceland might also seek to ass ume greater control over a ll US activities at Thule and Keflavik SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEl-1 '