--- OECL l5SIFIEO··- ' Authcrily NfvO ··· ·---pep · 15 a l lc u TELEGRAM SECRET_ _ C l ssl lcation - -·· · D epartmi n f Statet O •••ct ' 0 -- ACTION ' r1 7CIC J NARA 0ate 1 f - ·· By 5t - ---- ·• · · r p ' ___ Amembassy COPENHAGEN JOINT STATE DEFENSE MESSAGE fl EXCWSIVE FOR AMBASSADOR WHITE AND MR BLANKENSHIP 7 SUBJECT - 1 Thule BMEWS Site -- Further to your recent conversation in Copenhagen ith D Walske and Gen Gl asser duri which you posed several quest ns J concerning our BMEWS site at Thule the following is provided r your background information only a ---J' Although there are three BMEWS sites on each located in Alaska Greenland and England Thule's central location provides primary coverage of the most logical approach route for Soviet ICBMs and covers a gap which exists between the other two sites except at relatively high altitude and extreme range b The over-the-horizon radar s_ystem 0TH which is currendYin limited operation has a mi ssile-launch detection but not a missile tracking capability does not t fully replace BMEWS As such it supplements but The combination of the 0TH radar and BMEWS increases the reliability of ballistic-missile attack r 1•·r lfll l' _J • warning AJ1f - r1• i 1 1 o i Jr -· JCS - Adm McClendon 'i · DDR E - Mr Sargent 'if EBM ZGZl' 1fCZt 10 6e eu tvinct Vcf ey ····-···-··· _ SECRET _ _ DOD ISA - Gen Wheelo I 00D SA - Dr Selin · 'f l' Olllic f ll A TIU IIATIOl'l I hl 11 t VE ' - - ·· · OECLASSIFii o·· I Page 2 of telcgmrn to r'19cw Aulhcrily N tJO · By 51 - NARA Dale ' Amembassy-Cvrra nnus N SECRET er s t l ic11 f illll ' c We will require the Thule site until we can consider replace • ment with more advanced systems now under development Two of the more promising developments are a satellite system capable of missile launch detection which could be Htit i i operational by mid-1972 and the SENTINEL system ABM perimeter acquisition radars all of whic should be in operation by early 1974 J - en if t he satellite and the ABM radar systems fulfill their design objectives under actual operational conditions each system will still have inherent limitations - Specifically the satellite system could be vulnerable to countermeasures and except for an Alaskan site the ABM radar will suffer a geographical disadvantage more northern location of Thule compared with the These factors would have to be seriously Kldgkx weighed in any decision to phase out the Thule BMEWS in favor of new capabilities 3 In view of the foregoing the issues involving nuclear storage and overflights of Greenland must not be permitted to overshadow our need for the Thule BMEWS site While it is possible to confirm this need until the early 1970 1 s it may extend well beyond this time 4 L Accordingly it is our firm policy to s upport our requirement for the BMEWS site a t Thule not only for the immediate future but in fact until such time in the indefinite future that proven BMEWS r e placeme ' d·z E118 C H s ystems are deployed END SECRET O AM DS-322A 0-G CONTI NUATION SHEET Clttssi ica t io11