CIA HISTORICAL REVIEVJ PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZ D 1997 Parts 16 February 196Z MEMORANDUM FOfl Director of Ce0 tral lntcltigence SUBJECT Inspector GeneTal Survey of tho Cuban Op cratloo dated October l9ol It la rny undertta udlng that you have requested iolorroatiol concerning the dhtributioo of the IG Survey of the Cubac Opc ation a Qd the DD P com mo ate on lt At the time the report wu writteo it wo e uo deratood ·that c opiee of the report would be scat to the Preeldent1 s Board nd coru1equently ZO copie1 were made However the only distribution made of the r •e port h aa follow Copy 1 - Mr McCone - 2 1 N vember 1961 Z - DCI then Mr Dullea - z• November 3 - DDCl tllcn Gen Cabell - 24 November 4 - DD P theo Mc Bl ••cll - 24 November 5 - IC Mr Kirkpatr ick 6 - On file In office of Acting lC Mr McLean 7 - C WH Col Klog - 24 November 8 - Mr EatetUne WH Divlsion via Col King - 2 4 Novem be t 9 - On file in my of11cc 10 Prctiidca t' • Foreign Int o lligence Advit ory Board via M r Earman t request o DCI 18 January 1962 1 1 through 20 - On t1le n my olilce S L y-m a c B Klrkpa t i ck T ' R SSCPYliP Th is docw nent conto int t he items listed bolo and should not be broken up 'nus is at tbc d ireet ion ol' Mr John A McOone Director o Central Int elligence Tab 1 Inspector Oen eral I s SUrvoy or the C bM Opertlt1ona October 1% l ' 2 ' --- Momorand lll o tran cttal ot IC SUrvcy of the Cuban Operation to Mr J o h n 1'rcc Inspector General 20 J ovCllber 1961 3 fl mor0-'ldum h i m ttal ot IO Survey ot t he to OCI from Inspector Cenoral 1 5 6 DDCI Memorandu m tor the Record concerning restricted d latrtbut1on or IG 1 s P l port on Cube 26 Novew ber 1961 Memora ndWJ tor the IX troa lG subJect Op eration l December 1 9 61 Report on tho Cuban Mcmora ldum p1-cpared by ODCl oubject Su rvcy of the Cul on ra·tion 7 Cube - Oper t 1on 2h tlOl embor 1961 The I nspector Oenera l ' s 15 December 1961 An Ana l ysie or t be CUbon Operation by t be Deputy Director Plans Central InteWgence Aaency 18 Janual ' 1962 8 Letter to Dr James R Xill1an Jr Cho 1rmnn Pres1dent'fl Foreign Intelligence Board rrom DCI tranem1tt1ng the IG Survey and the DD P -'l ly•l• of tbe Cuban Operation 19 Jenuarr 1962 9 M9ore ndui i for Depu y Direct or Plans from c 't're cy Ba me oubject Survey of Cuban Opero tion 19 Jo nuary 1962 10 V emora ndum or Mr C Tracy Barnes trom 1 yma l B XirkP4tri ck rcrerencing Bo mes ' 1 9 JtulUOl Y meo randum 22 J anu ary 1962 u Memorandu for Del f'rom DD P t rans JlitUng 27 JMuary 1962 r Barnes' 19 January memorandum tS 17 160 •• 1 •• I 12 Y eJDOra 'ldum to Mr K irkpatriclc tl'Ol8 Mecors -ei d• IG Starr ott1cers aubJe t 1'bc IO'• Survey oDd the 1 D P 1 a Anal yo 1D of' tho Cub l ll pero t1on ✓ 26 Januory 1962 l3 tor Mr John McCone DC1 t rOo Allen W l Jlle5 subJcct The Incpector General' Survey or the CubM Operation 15 February 1962 l'- DCI 'a letter of' cknowledgcment ot Mr Dul lea 1 1 5 JPobrue ry rnndum 19 Fob -uury 1962 Y esx re ndua OP eeenat XCP RCPY'J of 1-bc CUBA OPERA1' 0M October 1961 TS r o 17301 0 CJw 110 • f_ 0£ OP SkCHBl' TAP SEC Pil Z Il SPEC'l'OR GENERAL'S StJRl'EY of the CUBAN OPERAT10l1 TABLE OF COll'l'EllTS A Introdu-ction • •• •• • • • • • • • 1 B History of the ProJect • 3 C Summa r•y of Evaluation ••• • ••• ·•••• •• • • ' •• • · 31 D E-1aluat ion of Orgtlll1 at1cn and Commend Structure •• 36 E E- 1alua tion of Staffing • •• • • • • 4l f E-talufttion of Planning •• • • • • •• 46 C 'i'he Miaro1 Ope rat ing Base • •• • ••••••• •••••••••••• 67 H Intelligenc Support 75 I Th Poli t cal Front and t he Relation of Cube 18 to tho Project •• • • • •• • • 81 J ClM dcoti -ie Pe ramilito ry Ope 'ationa Air • ••• 98 K Clandestine Pa ro m 111tary Opere tions Mo - t me •••• 110 L Clandestine Po ro n1 lite ry Opere tions - - Training 1 'nc erground Lec dcrG • • • ••• • • • • • • • • • • • 125 Security • • • • • •• • • • • •• • • 135 U Aoe --icans in Combat ••••• •• • • •• • ••• • ••• ••• • •• • 140 0 143 M Concluoions and Recorcnendations • • • •··•L _ P •·• e - ' E 1 · '•• · - · · l· · · ' f • · ' ' • • - -j- -- -- - •· '° ' _ ' 1960 A Basic Policy Plan of 17 M rch n Jl tj efing Paper C Opera tion l Pl an of ll March D Opera tiona l Pl a l of J Ope at1on l Pl on of l2 AJ r l 1961 or l February J 961 1961 16 Huch 196i 1i on ctcnr·r aaor 8 F s2 A INll10tl C' 'ION l Dds is tbe Ins pc-ctor Gen ral 1 • repo t on the Centr l Intelligence Agency'o i ll- fated a tempt to implement national policy by overthrov1ng the Fidel Castro N81me in C'Ube by i iean s of e covert pa re m1 11tcry oper-ation 2 SJ ects ' J be purpose or the ropo rt i s to evaluate oelected ot tbe Ageocy' s perforoance ot t bis ta st to describe veak nessee and failures disclosed by the study and to u kc recomDend tions for their correction and uvo1dancc in the tutu re 3 The report concentrot-ee on tho orgMiurt 1on stet'ting und planning of the project and on t he conduct ot the co• ert pare a1lit r phase of the operation Jncllld 1ng co ents on 1n ell1gence cupport trai iins and Gecu r1ty I t does not detcr ibe or anal y c in dete 11 the pu rel mi l itery phase of the etto -t h 1'bc SU J Orting o nnoxcs he ve been Chosen to illus• t -ate t tle evollltion ot national pollcy as outl1Ded in St-et ion F of the body of' tbe report Anne c A 11 the basic policy p per approved by President Eisenho• re r on 17 'Arch 1960 Annex B is a paper p epe rcd by the proJect 's opc -a- ing chWs for t he briefins ot President Kennedy in February 1961 Annexes C D and E are U c planning l CJ er• wccetH hely prepo red during ¼9 rch and April l 961 1 n the la st t'C f vco'k a before the 1nvu1or · --··· tr 8 8ti8R8 q g p 5 BS 7il' f '11 o report in ludea references to the rolco s layed by J gency oft1c1als in Prcsldentiel con 'erencca and int erdepart - mcntal meetings at which pol icy decisions A t recting tho course ot the opo ratton - ere taken but 1t c onta 1 n no evaluation ot or Judgment on any dcciaion or action t ken by an • ott1ci al not employed by the Agency 6 In preparing the survey the lns ector General and bis reprcsent t1ves int rvieved about 125 Atcncy employeea of all l evel s and •tudicd a large qUMtity of do u l entary material - 2 - g 9 e z c t 3 r 'i'8P Gi liliilf B JIJ S't'ORY OF 'l'l B PROJEC't l The history of tlMI CU ban proJect begino 1n 1959 on f or the Ul1 osee ot the s urvey eods with tbe invasion ot Cuba by tbe Agency-r mpported Cu ban b1·1go de on 17 AJ ril 1 961 o nd i t s defetrt and capture by C O atro's fore • in the oo xt t vo d aya 2 Fon al U S Government adopt 1on of the proJect occurred on 17 Ma rcb 1960 wben otter prelllll 1 no ry prepo rations by the AgencyI Pre41dcnt Eiee nbo'Wcl' app oved an Age wi c y pape-r titled 0 A Program of Covert A tioo A la1nst tbe Ce stro Bcglllle Annex A Md the -eb ' authorized tbc Agency to undertake tbio program a l'orae tioo or a cui m exile orgamutioo to a ttnct Cuban loyalties to direct O 'll O• ition activities and to pro fide ¢0VC r for Aaancy operat1or ta b A pl Opaganda ottens1 ·e in t be ru oe ot the oppos1 t1on c Creation in aide Cubo ot a cl Mdestinc intelligence collection aDd action o pparatus to be reaponnive to the d 1 rection of the exile ot ga niz ation d Dovelo cent outo1d• Cuba or a small paraml litary t orce to be introduced into Cul tl to orga nize train and lead resistance groups 3 ThO budget tor this act1v1 ty Tbe bre down wn s va • estl lllatod at $11 ioo ooo Pol 1t1cal action $950 000 propaganda $1 100 XX paraailltary $l 1 5001 1XX Jnt elligencc collection $250 ooo 'l'OP G C R f r r _j Ii This docw ient p rovidic g for tbc n ishoent or a 1 0' ICrfu l intenial 1·esi tance -prcgl _·am t hrough clon de ti nc cx'- 4 r ·na l atsistance tl $ ·tbe b ASiC o nd indeed the otlly U S Government poli y pai e r 10011 d throughollt tho life of t he project l'he concept vas cl assic The Cuban ex ile council would serve as cover 'or e ct1o n • •h1Ch became publicly known Agency per o nnel 1n contf ct '1th Cu beo ex1lec ·ou ld be docu ocnted as representatives of a grou p of privAte Jut - ri can bus1nes 'l'he hand of the IJ S Covernment vould not o ppear Preparatory Action 5 Some oonths of prepat·ation bed preceded presentution 01 tb1s paper to t he Prc 'lidcnt In 1ugus t 1959 t he Chief of the Agency ' s Pttr ' Ullilit o ry Group atte ded meeting •to discw s the creation Qf a pe ra lllili t e ry capabilit y to be used iu latin American cri$1S- situo t1ons At this time Cuba V $ S only one or a nuober of 'J OSS1ble te rgctc al l o-f' vM ch o ppcared equall_v cxpl otivc mi litary Cl'oup prepared a s eries ot The Chie f' of the Para - $ta ff studies for the Western Hemisphere HD Division ou · artous aspe ts of covert 11lnit d l ar- fa re u nd urged t he creation o-J a divisj on po ramll Ltary s ta U l fe also $et up a small propr1ctarJ airline in _ fer eventual s uppor t use 6 In Septe' 1 il ier 1959 the 'F D1Vl $ i 0n assigned an officer to plan pot ent iel Agency uction for cont i ns encle s vhich migh t Ceve lop J - W8 F £ B - q - W - 'POP SB Rii f o 'in a number of lat in American count r ies There - 1C1 S a lack of ufricient readily avai1able operat1ona1 1nf'orma t1on on p0tent al ts rg et o reM so fi re quirement wit h special emphe s1s on Cuba hose Comnru nist control as now becoming more end more appnreot · ra s sent throughout the intelligence community and resulted in a three-Yolu me operutioau 1 study By December 1959 these studies had produced a plan for 7 training a smo 11 cadre of' Cuban ex lleti a G paremili ta ry inatruetors these in turn to be UGed for t a ini l8 other Cuban recruits' 1n a • La tin Aocricen country fo r clandcGt iDe inf'iltrat1on 1 oto CUbe to -provide leadership for anti-Co stro dissidents Orgon1Ul tion of Bre ncb On 18 January 1960 t he WR D1Y1sion organized Bra lch 4 8 WB li as an e x pando ble te Gk force to run the proposed Cu 08n operation Toe ini'l ial ' 'able of O'l'ganizo t1on totaled t o persons i ' l th 18 a t Headquarters 20 at Bavo na Station and tllo at Santi ago B ase 9 site The brancb oJ eo began negotiations for n Panama training Its ofr cers econnoi cred the area of Miami Florida in see rcb of suitable inste J J ations fo1· office Spece warehouses sate sites reeruiting centers cor roWJ cations center and bases for the ll OVCll lCJ t or persons materiel a 'ld propagand into or out of Ccl a • 10 At the same time Read quarters end the Havan8 Stu tion ve re c oudu cting a stu-d v of CUbM op X $i·tion l eaders to prepa rc - 5 DBP eBans·o ·· · WOP for the fol'D'lttOQ or O ECJ Ji T unified political 'rotit to serve aG the cover i ootnaneat for clandeotine operations and ru a ral 1 -Iog _poiat tor Mt1 -Caetro Cubano 'lbe ' -ere Al GO JIIU ing map reconnaisec ncc of the Cal'1bbce n 1 aceklng A site tor a powerful r edJ UC -- n lVO llDd abort- Vl VC radio station Prel imirory ll Pr¢grCH NJ a reoult of tlue intensive octiv1 ty over o relatj w ly brte r period tbe ncy vaa able to report c onaldet 3ble prel 1 a 1Jm ry progress snd to pn dict e o r-l y pertotimnce 1n a number or c pcct a • hen it corrieQ 1U rcqueet f'or policy o ppro-nll to the Ptts 1 clcnt in mid-1- al' lb of 12 Agency 1960 '°D the fe cta ' lnfl 8Q reporte l Am ex A ' The tbe 1il c l oJ'JC touch vJ th l codera ot t hrco lNJ Jor and r eput3ble anti-Ca s·t ro groups ot CU'be n vboc-e reprcsentatlvee po e1bl r together '1th others vould tol'111 4 ' llUl'ied oppo1ittoo council vitbin o days thl t the l geocy ' alrel dy oupJ Ort Lug oppos1Uon broo dca ste t 't-om M lW bad a cranged tor 6dd1t1onal rad lo outlet ln M Let-acbuaetts - and that a Overf'ul and _ gro y station probably on $ 'M Island c 'Uld be oadc ready 1a tvo months t hat publ icatiou of CUbM lle'- rpQ ' er bAd been fLt'I e Cilo e 'U tlon or a tonf1scated Ar raagcd tbat conu-olled a ction group va u d 13tr1butin g p ropago nd n insj le Cuba 1 n nd t h t o nti -Ctt t t ro lecture TS vere be1ag sent on Win A er-tcan tou nl - 6 T OP 8 891'1 8 ' TCP 13 SJCTIE The Prea1deot was t'urtbcr 1u to noed that an ettectiYC inteW gence and o ct1on or gan1zot1on i nside Cuba reaponslvc to direction by tbe exJ l e oppoa1t1on could p rob bly be created v 1 thin 6o d tmd that prcpa re t1on tor the dcve lop nt at ot an sdeqwrte pol1 111Utru -y force vould requ Lrc o m1n l mum or six oootbs and probably closer to eig lt • Polley DiOCU881onG 1 4 Discussion at Mgh pol1o r level• or tbo Government bad prec e ·d liUbn leaion 0 1· tbi s progro m- to the Preuident In the ls at llOnthl ot 1959 the Specio l Gro p composed ot Nprezeutat1 • of seYeral depar nto and agencies Md charged by NSC 5412 1th rcsponoibility fo1· policy upproV' l of amjo r covert nctioa operat iono conaidered several Agency proposals t'Ol' cx1 le bro6dcuta to Cubo nxrtna Janu u-y and l'ebruary or 1960 tbe Director of Ccntrnl Intelligence informed tho 8-pecinl Group of Asency pllulning dtb regard to Cuba and on 14 M rch an c ntlre meeting to dJ ICUBsion ot tbe Agc o cy' - Concern la I devoted va s exprescecl oYCr tbe length of time requl red to get tra1ned CubM exil es into action B Ild t here vu d 1 scussion ot U S capabilities for immediate overt action 1 f rcqu 1 red 1' be Chai 1 ' 13n or the Joint Cbiel• ot Starr is reported to Mve G l d tb4t foroeo totaling 50 000 ' ' vcra reody it' ucodcd CLnd that tbc firBt or them could be oJ rbol Tle vi thin tour ilo·Jre t t'ter- receipt ot orders r s ot the gJ'O g urged ear1y fon rltion or an e x1la Junta 'Ihe Agency anDOWlCed its intention of requeotiog -fu ndo to pursue the progro m and no ol Je tioua -ere raieed b r the group 15 'nie project to unsent Ceatro hod tb UD bccCX11e a major Agency act1V'1ty with tbe higbo -t policy aancti 1 engag1ng the Ml -ti De octivi t r or the ereoonel or a rap1dl e cpo nding ope rating branch rcquir1oe o great t unou nt 0£ detailed dtly--to -day atten- tion in b f 8ber Ageoe r echelona lld en' a1l ing trequent liaison vitb other agoocies and departments or the Gove'r'mlent 16 J lre activitieo dcocribcd to the President conti lrued st an accelerat e4 rate but the tin a oc1al ai prooc h to tbe proJect' rol 8 t1vc l y cautious in tbe earl vce k PiDancial Preparat1008 17 On 2l M u cb 196 the proj ect vn o approved by the Director of Central Intel l 1gence 1a tho i n1t1al «me unt o-f $900 000 for tbe rest or Filcal Year 1960 Rovover Olll y two vee ka later on 7 April llll 1 Branch - ported toot 851 or tl e $900 0CO bad been obligated 18 By 30 Jw c an ed4J Uoc J l 000 000 vaa obligated In April tho Director of Central lntelllgence told a meeting of W 4 pe oonoel tbnt be vould - call people from o nyYbere in the vorl'1 i t they vere need l o tbc proJect _ January 196 •ben 1t tw d 110 people tbe braacb expw dod to 588 by 16 April l 961 beeomJ ng one ot tbe large$t braDchea 10 t be Cl ande1t1ne Services urger tb n 00cte dirtoloo Ito 'l'o ble or Org m Uatlon did not include tbe lu rg nuznber or air operation fl pe rsoanel vbo vorked - 8 - 'RO F 3E8 Ailt' on thu proj ect o nd vbo vcrc o ain ietorod by tbc1r ovn unit J J o Develop ent ProJects DivJ oioa DPD cor clld it include the i uy people eng-a g cd 1D sup Ort act1v1tJeo or in ervico of comr cm concern vho 1 thoush not o ooigned t o t he project aeverthelcaa devoted - Y hour• to 1 t In tbe ea rl months o the project tbcl' - 1atcoa ive 19 ctt orts to organize an e X1lo t'ront gro Q ' to get pl'Opag da pr__ under vuy to l egio a brood «n4 varied ' l l llZ ll i t ary to aeqldre aitca 1n Florida '1d ei evbere or pn graa md trn1n1Ilg Slid recruit- ing o cti•litieo awl for ot 1'1ce spa ce 20 ' ibe so-called oder Group coc sposcd cal action otficers il8 3 ot proJect politi- c et up as a D Ot1oMl org nJ r a tion or American busineoG1J1Cn to prov1dc cover tor d e -lJ ue vith t he CUbo ns Arter a seriea ot' aeeti ogo 1n tlev York and M1a d • nrndno y unified Frente CYolUC1onar1o Uemocrat1co FRD cOOJ Osed Cullen fact1oo s v u agreed ll'OD on ll l' o r ProJ ll8rul 21 ot aeve ral 1960 A tiv1tz d1o bl Oa dco ot o from H18Jll 1 into C'u ba were cont1JtUCd under the o pon1orehip or tL Cuban grou p Pre-pa rations verc 'M1e ror e x Ue pub Uc ation or AY Dee boa ft B va m plant bad been ae U d by Co etro Anti-Co Gtro p da opern tioXl 8 were 1nten o1 r1cd throughout I atin Mlertc o and 3 boat tor marine broad caste fflD pur- cba ed 'i1le $van Isl and ra41o stattcin on vbicb the resident had been briefed VUiJ cmr plet-ed and o n the air ith tco t s gna ls by 17 May I - WOT 9 - 6 til8R 8W T9P S ' 'CN Pf 22 TM action --co dr - instru ction training proe ro '-'8 s being prepared and $25 COO o rth o f 6ter1le Pn na ma training base which 'tl D roins - rere l eiag cent to the activated 11 Y o y At t he se me time Uceppa I sland -Florida va s acquired as a site for aooecament and holding of Cuban pa ramilita-ry cn ndJ dates and for training radio operators • Screening o t p U e ' ld lita ry recruits had begun in Miami in April and the trniDiD6 in Panama began in June 23 The M ie mi fuse vaa opened on 25 Muy in the Coral G$blea bUBiness d letrict- under cover of a l'fev York career dev'elopment and placement fin backstopped by a I epart me at of Def ense contruct and oo 15 rune a comr runica tion site • 1th Army CO 'er vns opened t the J orm cr Riclnnond- UavnJ Air Station vhich was he ld umfer leu se by the tfniveraity or Miami We how es 'WC re 1n the M Lemi area t or- VttJ ious operational UGec a u o acqu iJ'ed The use of otber • sites for proJect act1Vitiea in tbe United States r nd other countries vsa acquired tor vu ry1ng period's' 24 tters 1 LS time • rent on Project officers vere engaged in liaison on rru m erow In April they re bed an agreement vith tbe bm ig roti on a nd Natura U za t1on Se- rvi ee o n special entry procedure for Cuban s o f intere8t to the operation Taey concul tcd vith Voice of Ame3 -ica u nd t bc 1 nited Statec rn t·o rmatlon Agency on propaganda ope ra tions There ver e lll8JXy d 1Scuas1ons dth the Yec e ral Coamnmica tiona eonr IIIJ ccion on tb e l icendng of Badio Slnw a od vi th the D fen e U protmen-t concern 1 ng its cover COU $ul tcd OU The State n t pollticol 1Ratter_s ·i ·- 10 - II 8 1' 6 8 91 R E T W3 fl regula rl y CR SFCPR 4' Uneasy Front 25 Al though Cubcm leaders b$d i·onied a rront at Agency urging 1 t ve s an une uy one They ere by no means 1n ogrccxncnt either MIOng tbe ncclves or vtth Age nc y ca ie otticers oo pol1 1cs or on operationo 26 l'l r r at Ules develOped early In the lite or tbe The CUba n leo ders vantcd something to say about the cour e p ram111tary operationa 1900 ru early Y ay FW ot one of' tbe n ore prom 1 nent l ead ere vas w-ging an inva ion on a ·ra1rly large-- scale' trom o third count 27 By June tbe Aaericu press was begfonlng to nlbbk the opero tion princi1 4ll r at P ad1o Svan some ot the stories imply1 ng that st • nts not a completely l egitimate comoerc1al venture Another J nd 1cation th t operational •ecurity -'U O less t ban per feet waa a tate111Cnt by a detected Cuban no val a tto cho that it vn o com• aon knovledge ADOng exllca in K1am that a ce -ta tn Cuban leader ' ffl s backed by the Agency and that t bere vcre entirely t oo 28 On m ' J' y 22 June the Deputy Director or Central Intelligenc e br1eCcd the llat1ona1 Seccurity Council on tbo -project Ultinnte objective o f' tbc trainJ ng pros r6 R GC col'ding to tbe paper prepared 1°0l C hia b riefi ng Vt 6 a mJ n1m Ull fo -ce of 500 men split lnto epprox ia telY 25 teaaa skilled 1 n of'igan1z 1ng trt1i nlng nd leadil'l g lnd tsenout dissident aroups each tcnm to be prov-1ded vi th ll '11 9 P '· Ji F C P 'B t ' ·· ·• L radio '3 1 operator S BQ A 't Prep a raUona vcn under vt Y for ere sung an exile Cuban n1r- forco and utte mptn ere being Mde to develop o rltime capabillt1es for Gupp0rt of aro ml litary groupG 29 l 'b 1G briefing cont31ned 411 expression ot doubt tt at n purely clit ndeatine c re'ort vould be n 'ble t o cope vith Coot ro' s increeaing a111tu- capal 1Uty pointing out tbat b ple aentati on or t he paramilitary pbn ae or ope rat1ons vould ba contingent upon the e d•tence ot dissident torces vho ' sere v11Un g 'tO resist Md tbllt such groupe bad not a s yet eoel'ged in strength Training in Panamo 30 ' 'be oJ r tnrlning pr gra began to get under y 1n T 1960 Vl tb the scree ning o f Cuban 111lot recruits o nd negotiat ions vitb fen•• for 12 AD-5• and the Navy bein3 asked to supply 75 1n strw t1on and maintcM llce personnel 31 I n 111 d-June 29 Cu bane had arr ved in Pe n oxna to Oeg1n t Tainitl6 in s- 11- unit 1n 4 1ltl ation 32 Tbc l'RO IO s resis l ing Agency ta ttclJG t s co pera ll de i t to 110 e it a head quart eris to X ico and vas dtr 13-nd 1ng direct cont lCt vtth the State Oe nt or '1th acme b lgh govcr 1Cent otfici4 l in o rder to argue 1ts ca 3e It o lso shoved reluctance t o become 1nvo1- ea in the recruJUng ot Cu ban pilots It presented a budget tor $5 0 000 a month cxcl l ding -po rrun1l ito ry c onts but • ras told it vould have t o get along on $131 XX and vould get th1 only it' it agreed to move to Melt'lco It d Jd a g rcc to f'Urnhb 500 C IF8 ll 12 - 9B 8 'AS't - ••• I TBP BitOHttf pa realHto ry cond1dat cs 6J'ld finally ga vc tn on thc- isauc oi' mov1ng to Me dco It remained there only a rev '-'E elca because ot ba r n n 1 by th MeX1can Qovel'nmcnt 1n tpite of prior agreements to the contrary It oppears tho t one rcnson vhy tho FRO l mdero vere oo reluctant to be bclsed 1 n a third country is tbat they desired to estobllsl n direct or·ticiol channel to tbe U S Covema ient Elltpho ois on Rec1 ta nce 33 In Acgu t 1111 11 Bn nch prepare papers for use In br lctb1g the Pres1dont and tlU Joint Chlcro or stett re pcctivel ' about 1 November i t ·ao cXpected to have and 37 radio opcratoro ready for action 500 p re anilito ry tnd nces It vas Gtated that this group 1 ould be available for use os ioC1ltre t1on ue u 2 u inva oion force 11 Y an The briefing pape k · i'o r th c Jo1 nt Chief's ll'l8de the po1-nt that •obviously t he 3ucces$1 ul iuipleme ntation oi' any large scale pa r SlJto ry opcro tiona 1s dependent upon v1de$l read gc rrillo reslsto ncc throughOut the area 3 1 ll gl llp The paper pre a red tor tl e Presldent•s br1e1'1ng iden t ified or 1nd 1rtduals vi th vboa t he A ge-ncy bad sosne sort ot contnct a nd ho claittd to have a aeets in CUbe 'the po per for the Joint Chiets spoke or t he robleictJ or obtaining oupport base$ nnd l ia• c to bo backed up by a cont ingcncy ron e aU@llent ed by U S Army Spec1ol FoJ-CC$ pc1·sonno1 - 13 ✓ ' TOP SECR 6'f 1n these documents olt hough the etrlke force c oncept docu not occ-m t o bave been given any sort ot policy sa nct1oa W t11 t bc Spec1 1 Croup wc-otine l vhich took place t oward t bc end o r 1 96o Plan of 0peratioru 36 l'ho l e ldontiul briefing papcr ot AU lllt 19 outllood the plan or operations a s tollovc Th• initiaJ pbooe of pe renulit ry opcration o envisoae• the development support e nd guid o occ ot dissident groups 1n three Ar'Ca s Maestra P1ts e r dcl Rio Esc embra y and Si erra ot CUba Tbeoe groupo vil l be ors lJl1zed tor concerted guerrilla a ction ogo 1n•t the reg1 mc 'Ihe Gecond phase W lll be 1nit1oted by o coobined s ena 1 r a uault b FRI 'forces on the Isle o f Pines c001 d 1oated Vith general guerri lla activ1 ty on tbe ma in iel aod o r Cubn s vill e$t 4bllsh a close-in staging baS-C to' tut u re ope r-ationo tbe last phase -'1 ll be e 1r a 5eo ult on he Havnna area Vlth t he guc rr1 lla -f'or ees in Cuba JQOVing on t he ground f'roca these a rea c illto t he Havana n reo al ao 37 Expenditures est1m tet were r apidl Y runn1ng beycod the or gin u The Ill Div lslon e st1 Jno ted operating coats ro - four vccks utarl illg 1 J'Uly at $l 700 000 EU d tor tbe tisctU year at ap11r0Xim te y $25 000 000 On 19 Aueust nn adcUt onal $10 000 000 · ' ··· 'P 8 P B '- 'R · 'f 6 IQP 9t1G REW About haU' of' th1a Cl g lre t bc va s requc tcd and obt a 1ncd cotU O t cd cost ot paramilitary w tivit leo vi th about o nothcr $2 0CX 000 eat 1 tlft ted ror propago ndo Anti-Castro l3roo dc•sta 38 l'ropoeanda oct1rtty hod goUcn orr to en early ot u-t o nd hacl dew loped rapidly Af'ter Wl 1oit1oJ sMl edovn perlotl Jwllo S-ollMl had eonc on t be ai x- nrst vttb ant 1-'l r J Jlllo then vltll anti•Co stro broedcMta Rodio prou aloo or gil AUng 'l'bc nell6J 8l Cr Avnncc 1-n Exile ve s being 1n Mio mi and publ1$bcd by the end of' the aummer a ad e oecood pepel' and a veekly mo g6 %1nc vere plll nned black operationa There b o d f llao been some s uccc-o sf'ul Moat such QPe nLtioos baa tbu s tor been con ducted f1 tbout rtk1pnt1on b the FR 39 By the end or August tne FRI had lo'W 'er tea oet tor a tatin American l ropaga n da tour D nd was ready 1th i tc first broedc-aat on Jbd 10 S- ran which as re-ported to be getting vorld-v1de recepti on vJ t h mtU V U cteners in Cuba An anti -Cas tro co c book va s being reprinted and a Spo niah-1 e nguage telcv1si on progrcm va s being p r d 1n Miami 40 At tbo end of August IIJ 1 BrMCb eporting thnt machloe run S arch had ta lled t o find aey billngwu Ageocy p1oy e su1 table es a R8dJ o s- an announcer u on 28 Deceaber tne branch 'J 'b1s ac tLrch 'ent on for · some reported Nn41ng a candidate but on 18 Joouary 1961 t ho t hr had bocked out • th 8 T8 41 Wte September 1960 S t Ch £ G V the a Laoet GJ multancous ecw- rence of the f' l rot mar1t 1mc op crn t 1011 w'1d the fir st nlr drop over Tbc C'ub ton c r vats succe $1' al ' be latter the f'lrat ot a s eriec of fu1lureo re$ J lt cd in the co pt-ure end execu t1on of a peru lllto ry egent on vboa the project hod set great stor Mor J time Opcrat iono l2 Seve ral suceeaat ul marltlJDe opero t1ona took ple ce during tbc l ttct montha of 1960 be f'or-e Mlte th-tm alJooat 111 oe ible oevere Vinter veo thcr beg sn to But tbe pT'OJeet bad only one bot t r egularly u vailAble dur-ing thie period and the proc eee or supplying and buJld1ng IP a rcaisto nca aovemcnt tb rough cltuldeatine meu na beg o n to ocu intolerably elov e1pecioll y since during tb1s a a me period Ceotro'o e nn y was reported to have been strengthened wHb 30 to O tbouu no tone of moc arm and CUbon internal 6ecur1ty vae be1ne tightoned L3 Tbe stri ltc rorce conc e lt vhich as no 1 bad L adJ' begun to be e o oc1o ted with tho proJcct tJ O eaxl y as J'uly bego n to play an ever greater t Ole ln WH 4 p onn1 ng tt'b ls role became doul lnant in September 1960 v th tbo assignment to the p-rojec·t a chief or 1ta Pe roallltary St a tr ot a sne Corps colonel experienced in WIIJ hJ bioun operations 411 In late October the Niearagwl O Government offered tho Agency the use or an o 1 r atrip l LM docking rac1Ut1c-s at Puerto Co bcu s no e 250 1111lea cloocr to Cuba tba n the rac1l11 1cs in 16 'i 6 t 889 Q I tl Q2 9 P S 9 9 CQ At about the aru e t 102' the Agency u stcd the Arny Cuat e nl o to supply 38 Special Forceo peraonnel 66 1not ructors Due to prolonged policy negotiAtion$ the$e tra1ncro did not aM jvc in Gc - te1ll6l4 until l2 J Muary 1 1 1 Svitcb 1n Concept 5- On llovember 900 fll took ronnal action -to change the CO ll $C or the proj ect by grcfitly expanding the size ot tho Cuban pe re mJU tary unit and redire-ct ing its t1'a1n1ng along core convent 1Ql $ alllt a ry l1ne5 Appropriate order• veN eent to tbt Gua teoola Base which bad 75 air and ground traineeo on 10 November and to Mi ulll vbere recruiting c l'l'ort we re 1ncr-ee cd 46 · this t l mc MiW Base through liaison 'itb tbe FRD al lit $ atart' bed l re od y rec nrl ted o nd dispatched to Guate ola 101 air o nd 370 pereJrliUt a ry tra lnee-G plua oix apecial ists doctor dentists 0 n l c haplains l fj base had oloo l CCruited 12 V' lll i time personnel for Q6 l1ll 1ng tM 1nvaG1on fleet thAt vas bein g acquired 7 By 28 Janeary 1961 the strike to • strength vu 6 o 3 February it 685 by 10 Ku-ch it bod r ocn to 826 by 22 Maxell -to 973 48 On 6 A'pril 1961 brigade •trcn th voo reported at 1 390 On 3 November 1960 llll 4 reported 1t llail only $2 250 000 le-rt tor t bc rest or f'lccal Yero- 1 961 1 and by 16 Dccea bcr tbJ al mo t gone 13 $ A Guppl emento ry 'budget ec tirot c 'as prep -u-ed and an additional $28 200 000 w-J o obt a ined f l'Olll he Dureau of the Budget - l7 - 6 P £ P C R 0 1' li'rcedom F tnd Cupa1gn 49 'lbere vere ct lao ttno ncial problem on e ccall er set Le 1'o JJ'Qbl1c1zc Radio Sva n and perhs ps to enhance ita cover the- Cuban Freedom Fund CG mpaign 1-oa orge nizcd in tlo rc mber to tiol icit dona t 1 ns through nevape per adven is cmentl The radio station W'hicb vu a bud gcted at $900 000 1'o'r Yi seal Year 1961 received $330 1n gij'to durin the nert f v veelu 50 Bohemia Libr-e o handaome veek l y mgazioe budgeted ot $300 000 but actually coating ab° t $35 000 a - 1esue had o n issue on that uccount to-r 1t severnl tit es ot 126 000 said to Additional funda had to bo so1Jght Yet it developed L audi ted clrculatton be second only to the eader's Digest in the Spanioh•lBJ16U080 l leld 51 llhile tbc proJect moved for e rcl acquiring boat plane$ and ba fJes training men negot1o t1ng vi tll 1'oreign govern Dents Gceking policy cle r11 icat1on tn lning e n FRD security service p i'bl1$h1ng ma azineG o nd newspo l Ors pxt ting out r d 1o broadcasts and ottcmpti n to move arms men aod propaeando into Cuba by sea or alr the PRD 1n •hose n c cost or th1 s activity '-tM being carried on u a mo k ing little prog reDs tovnrd unity 52 back 'eri eri • ould resign in a hu t't e nd ha· re to be 'beedled FA ch t'actiou anted supp11es to be cent only to its own • 18 - · ' 9P G'i AR ' follm te rs in Cuba vhilc groups lnaid e vcre -reluct ant to rece1 ve 1nfiltrcc s oent in the his ori n rl Ul C of the FRD 2 ' he HU coo rd1notor bo d radio boat v bich Dade u oouthoriud broa4cast s u ntll l1oltod by the Fede1·t1 l Commun1cot 1one C'o cmls ion and the 1' ederal Dlreau of ltwest teat1on Provici onnl Covermr mt Pla lS 53 T intat1 v plans tor a prov1 o1onal government ven first discussed with PRO leacleru in December and thie fict oft o n ot 1 ntri uc and bickering vhicb delayed t he recruiting proc Ga and did nothing to advance the cause or unity In a l d January Mio mi Be cc reported that 11 the oYer-nll problem is c1 mply to m1n- tain the lreote PRD an operational racade until Dilitary action intel Venea o nd a provisional govorument co n be eotabl113hed Until the question ot hOW' end by whoa cucb a governcent vo s to be uelected coul d be w t vered the base reported ve U'e · a t political d ead ce er 54 'hie det l center rc nained until very near tbo target do te and vaa only reso1ved by an ultimtum o the PRO Exec utiV't Committee directing its u tmbe rs to o grce on the chaJ n o n for Revolutionary Cou ncU or risk the lpss or e ll f trther gupport 55 UoveYer io selc cth e ve ys the ran proved t o re•ponsiVc and U Ge i'ul io c t rument An example be a ot th1$ vas t he countertnte Wgencc and secu rlt -y i erv1cc vhicb under close proJcct control developed iot o Un ef 1 1C14 nt and valuable un1t- ln support of tbe FRD KlADi Bo ae end the p roJect p rog nm - l9 'i8P B81i1I'P - i _ Of cnF T 56 Br md-Msrch 19 l this 1eeurtt1 organ1ut1on cocprlsed 86 cmployeco or vhoo 37 ve're trained ca so o C'f1cors I tho Gervicc ha Ying tour clasaea mm ito ovn vhooe chici' n atructor vari a tralDJ ng center pollce offiCC r Seeurtty Activ1t1•• 5T The 'RD'a oe rVice rao opemtiona into CUbe a w y of It b-u 1lt up a volum 1 nou o eet ot ce rd t1lea thca cuccc stul on Cuban personalities report 011 · Qc e of 1t o lllOSt helprul servicce Vtl-8 meet1 - of- FRD c '1ttce - ond other ant1 0 stro gro 1'8 alld on pollt1cal maneuverlng v1thin the l'RD hierarel y It A11lo llcl ped in rccrul t1na for the s t rikc roree at a tmi vbell the polltic aJ l•acers vere aabotagt ng thia ctfort Securit ' and counter1ntc ll1gouce t eo mu rorC alco tJ ained for integrat ion - d tb tbe strtltc force • 'Dle e bad tbe p r1 lc l y ld asio ' l or securing vital record 6 and documeutu t urlug the 1nvn s1on Md o sccondtu'y duion or usist J ag in catabUGbiD8 aod arlntain1ug oart 1-al lov 58 'l tic serV'icc al GO carried on ra 410 J t O nitoring twd con ducted 1 otcrrogatione o o4 clebr1et1 ngs An 1ndJ c4 tlon ot itc alertness Mil eff1c1eDCy is tbe tact thnt i t supplied Miami Bue vltb itc ttrat infonr t1oo on tbe loca tion of' a C-54 pl De ilbicb va• forced dovn iJl 1tur tiw after a mi ssion over CU be 1'he chicC of the service 'Wac largely responalble tor pe roooall y i erouaa tQg ' - 20 - • · f C1 8 BQ1lFT ' - ' ¥6f 59 8B8RiJliF In t he f'1rst three JDOnt bl or 1961 t he problett S taced by the proJect • ere many and cocplex Al though t he · Specj al Forces inst Nctors had finel l y a rrtved ID OUo tecal a the brigade tro 1nee quota we s still only hul f fulfilled CLnd a co U vent to tbc training • _ for special recruitU fl tuEs M Md to be MeMWM le trninee vho b ad been in tbe camp •e it to tor oo· a ral 00nttul had be d DO c00tact v1th tbe l Oll$1e l f N nt and verc vondering v hat sort of a CUbe n tutu re they ICre c XJ Ccted to f1$ 1t for 1 1£tw-bcnceG broke out an4 the project leaders _persu d ed three Ji1UJ fi gure a to Visit the can p and D'l llif'y t he men Trein Jll in the U S 6o luring this period the Jf1caroeunn o1r ctr1 l 1 1cb bad beer placed a-t the project• s diaposal vu being me de reedy for use and two ne t raining sites verc act1vuted Al though e dd'initc policy Qet erndn t1on on the traini Dg of Cubans 1n the U S had never been mde 25 t o nk opero tore vcrc r uccecaruu_v t -ained tor the st rilr e fo rec at Fort Knox Another eleve-nth-hour t rainSng rcq_uireoent v·a s fulfilled vhen the proJect ac luired t be use of Belle Chace kmau ition Depot near Nev OrleaM This VaG used tor the training ot a iUd unit hurriedly recruited tor CO llpllnj'- dive roion l o41og e nd or an unden t-er demolition t cOJ ' I 61 Our1ng the period beweeo he U S nat1onol e l ections and tee inauguration or President Kennedy tbe Govcrrwent'o - 2l ' 4' 'E' 0 SR -l poU cymu 1ng machinery bod olo· ed dove A nw aber of' 1 ieceme11l pollc dcc1eionG verc vouchsafed bu oot ll the spec1 1c onca tbe proJcct ch1ett _ e re pt'eHiog for tor example authority f'or tac dca l air strilcs and permission to u ae Aaerican ccmtre c pilots 62 Prcside lt 31 enhove ' co 29 bad given a general go-ahead eignal Noveobcr and had reo 1'1'1 rmed it on 3 January 1961 but t he ilq ending change 1D ad 111n1etrat1on w3s clo illg J11Sttere down ex iplc a propooed pr_ m drop vas wn ed down on ror tbia ree son On For 13 January 19 JM'U J r'I at t b c Special Group'D la at meotl Jl3 before the t i o n i t ' ' agreed tbnt high-level meeting to include tbc nev Secretaries of State and Oc rei u e S lould 'Oe set up as £OCX Al possible to ree tf' m tb e basic concepts of t l e proJect Pre poro tioos 8ndoroed 63 Such D mcot1na vas held 22 January and th proJect and curreot preparation itCZ'e generally endor•ed - J t a a eet iD g v 1th t he nev Preaicient on 26 January the Agency va s autborit-ed to contilluc pretSent- act1vit1 c a and was 1 n tructed to s ubmit the tact ioal paramilitary plen to t be Joint Cbie s ot Starr tor a oal y'sia Shor ly ther eafter 1n an at t ocspt to get a high-level internal revlev of the pl AD it was briefed to 04 o Cabell C-en Bl1ll consul taot and Adm right ONB By 6 February tbe Joint Chief's had returned a faYora 'ble valuation of the st rik e pl An t ogether _ 1'th tL nu m' er of auggcst ions • 22 - 0 P 6 Y Ca HI Ou 1 1 li'ebrua cy tl1e f cucy presented a l flJ er Annex B to tl1-e Prtoident vb 1cb outlined th-' f e poasibl e cou rsee or a ction aga1 not C tftro 65 Notine plans f'or ear fo t -1 gn Qf a goY- rnmer t tn exil e t he paper descr1bed ttoo graving stl' 'ength or t he Ca otro reeime under Bloc su p port a v d o'buerved 1'beretorc a f'ter sonie date probably no more th«o 1x month a avay it rlll be come millt rily 1 nfeae ible to overthrow tbe Ca stro regime- except by tbe commitment to co mb t or a sizeable or n 11 ed military force The opUon of' azt1on by the Cuban oppoe1tioo rlll no longer be open ' 66 Thie paper found t he use o-r small-see le guerriJJ a groups not f e asible a ad advocated a surpriGe l u nd ing of a m 1Llta ry force conc luding th at t he brigade had a good cbanee of overthroving Cu stro or a t the very least ca-Jstng a dairagi ng c1V11 var vithout requiring t he U S o colCtiit ltsell to overt e ction against Cuba 67 FoUovine preoenta tion of' thi s pa per to the Presi dent t he project lea de z·o rt'erc given t o under te nd that it VO tl d be at least t vo veeks betoz e a deci siou vould be I Bd e e u to uGtof' t he inY8 flion f'Or 'l'b ey the reu pon vit hheld action to iexpand t he f orce up to i ooo or t he time M lveroent 68 001 lt ot being -5entfi Although the invasion prepe r4t1ons -ere aboorblng or t he project ' s energies and J Ulds w Branch va s - 23 TCP GB8lt 1' still attempting to oou r1sb the uodergrmmd 'I'hert ve re c1x su cc e6G- 1' J 1 boat operat i ons c arryin g men and materials io February lJ in ftlld Ma 1• h o nd tvo eu_c cesstul air drops i n u-c b t111Uon of agent• vaa continu 1 ng l nf1l AJJ of 15 Febru ry M1 '1 Baoe reported t he rollowin nu mben and type o f ae ents i n Cuba Counterintelligence_ 20 positive int clli genc 5 propagoJ ldti 2 8 l'$1111lltary - AtJ or 15 Mo rch tbe b e r ported tb t these numbers b e d rieen respectively t o 2l ll 1 91 and 6 69 By the invu ion date tbe personnel stre b 01• Miami e bad grown to l 6o The 1oteru ity ·of acti-vity thero dur tb e latter months o-f' t M opere 1 1on is indicfJ t ed_ by the record 01' a d e y picked at ran 00 - i t happened to be 9 February -- vheo 21 case officers fJJ ent llJO man hours 1n pcrso al cont ct v1t b 125 70 Cubans Succieot iv-e changes in t b e operational plan and post- J Onements o f t he st r1ke date N d 1 CU$st d l ater 1u thh report 8J ld are docW11P nt ed 1n Annex es c D1 a nd E policy authorization Cor scme s pcciric actions V G Dctai1-ed e ither never 1 tlki cle rit ied or only resolved at t be eleventh hour and even Y $ $ s till some bat 1ri doubt up to t he vay ncmcnt or e ribarka- t ion 71 D iri_ne tbe vceks preeeding the inVt'lslor t he pac4 events qu jckeoed ot Io earls 'arch t he State Depa rtc eot a sked t he Tffit Cl'CPtW 1'8f 8B8MJi Y or Agency not Lo annc U lce t ormut1on the Rcvo lut iontt ry Couric1l o r to commit any untov rd M t untll tte r the City Peace Coctc -cxe 5-9 dl rch Mexico Tbe Cu be a con 'eJTing 1n Cev Yo k dJs• - reed on vl 1w• 11opcot Q or JJOGt-Ce etro plstrorn eeJcp 'a The Gus om11 b h V'1ng counte r lnt elll gcnce problems Sabot fc Act toe j On 12 March tbe I CI Barbara J sucoesot llly le u ebod e nd ttcovercd a aahoto gc teBO in 0 o e-t1on gflim1t the Texa co retioery in Gaotiago 13 na1ng 13·15 March proJec1 cb1efa vorld z a laten- sively to prep re a rev1ocd plan vhicb vouJ d aeet policy obJcctions cited by the State Ocpartoent On the 15tb t he n ev pltm va s pttatnt ed to the- Prca1dent 7 In m1d- t-h%-ch t en oe cbers • f N sd dcd to the ffiD E lcecu- t lve CommJttee t he p01Jticia ns contJnued their pl-0trorm talks and 23 M rcll ¥ set ae deadllne 'for Cboice of a e 1n ns1ve d ete ctio0 proJcet was st art ed t'rom W Boae An A sur ey vao 1tart ed wtth t he object or determin1r ig 1 he t re 1nf cs ' 1mowlcd gcab1Uty ot U S i nvol ve ment in t b e st r1ke 1rrepe ra tlon11 'i'raiJ eeo al Ouate as 11 vere lEpaUu1 and a mud er bad gone Al OL 75 oc Jose Miro Cti rdone V $ l uno iiCID'Uely el ted Cha 1 nn e a the ll ¥Olut1eoa ry Cow cU - 25 T8P 85 011£ 1 f0P 76 0E0QB r I n late Ma rch the OGtcnsible • Iller or the SVM I ale nd ro d 1 o otetton tbtt nll' d a1 1 the eponcora o t politicM prograa o n ad advised 1 bca that no JIIOre ta pea o1 Ud be requlrcd purpoae o f t hig uction WfJ 6 -to clear the wu y 'for a unity program dwing the action J1ba se or t he opcratJon A R dio S-w'M llt tetter uur-roy countriee h$ d received l 659 repliee traa 20 $hips Vit h utrike force equi 11 e'nt vere fll'Ti vine in rnco raguo n nd tt c Guatemala CQP vo o Gt1ll recehing tre ioec s as la as the veil ot J April Overtl1 hts S'uspea4ed ·n Cu bful o ve rtligbt o were au speeded o i 28 HaJ cb reason fl have been given f'o-r this cuspeD Glon a Tvo that the air- craft v er-e needed to lllOVe t he strike force tro a G· w temala to Puerto Cabez3-e Nic a ragua t o r cmbark t1oo on t he 1nvtt G1on ohipe O that tbe Ageney vlabed to a void 8 JlY 1ne1dcnt s uch ·a6 o plane betns dovned over Cube vb 1 c h tn J gb t ups et t be course of eventu duriag the critical pre -1n nW1oa period 78 ·r-or a White Rouae 10ect1ng on 29 MFac h po pert verc pre- pared on t hese ubJectt b a The status ot t he defection p r ogrm nterool Cubun support 1'h1Cb could be expected ror the lMdlng operation 79 On 5 April t he B-26 ' defection plao vus prepared in et fort t o knock out some of Castro• 1 1 jr torcf before D ct UO er vbich_ Vould satisfy State Depa rtwmt objections WOP C dditll'il Ds y in 311 ProJect wsF e s ·1ec chiefs agreed that i n event of a poUcy dec1oion t o ca ll off' the 1n-ro s lon tbcy would r iovc the t roops t o i eF tell them that oev intelllgt ncc a adc the invasion i r adviel Lble ruid dlV'e r t t h e f'orcc to Vicq ucs I sland for de IC obilization 8 Cn 12 April a t a mee1 1 Jlg -with the Pre idcnt it 'as decided that l r• Berle v ould tell Miro CO rdona there would be no overt U S 1 qipo rt of the 1LV0$1on The President pu bllcly anno ced there 'Woul d be no U S sul port heudqua rte r scctiocs went oo 21'-bou r d u ty On 13 1pr11 0 11 i 4 Tb e Revo l utiO W ry Council ve s ass embled 1n New York and advi se L tba t it 1ould be briefed in stages oo the a ilitary aspects of the project on 14 April the Cowtcil a greed to go i n to 1sol J lt1on during tt Aoding phase of the tUlitary operat ion 81 The raids on three Cuban e 1t-t1el lG were ca r ried ou t by e isht B 26s oo 15 April and dest-ru t lon or h tJ f ot Castro ' s a 1r force as estimated on the ba sis of good post- st -ike pbotogr a - At'ter a rd Accord itlg t o pl aoJ en of th pi lots lan ded 1D Flor1deatid awlQunccd that the rai d s had been ca r ri ed out by defect-ors trc ri castro' s o- n e-1r f o rce str i ke 'Ihe Co 1Jlc11 vas briefed on the a ir The d iversionary ex ped 1 t 1on by the for- e vhich had DC'en trained 1n llev Orlea ns f'ailed to make a landing on tvo Gucccssive n1£hts preeed 1ns the strike 82 iatel J• b ci'o re D Day Radio S 'a n and other out l ets er e broadcasting 18 bou r s a day on medi u i•wave and 16 hoars on ab ort-wa ve Il0 lediately ter D f ey these total vert- increased - 27 ii O P S EQ i lil Te r e ea r - m to 55 hou ro Md 26 bouro rcspectivel y Crt ust -d Fou -t ee-n 'Nqu enele By the t 1 tc of l he 1nvBsiot1 o total or l 2 0CX 000 pc w s or leaf'lct hsd bee ropped on Cuba 83 t ot e on 16 Ap -U t be eve ot D Dl Jr t be Air • rt ket1 dedc l e d t o kllock ou t tho rcut of Co at ro ' s nlr tol Cc on the f ollovlll6 aorn1 cg we re ce Ued orr Tbe aes agt reac bed the f' td d too lAte to halt the landing Opt' re ti oc 1t 'the de 1 1 1 t o cancel the a ir stri ke was made ar er t he Landing orce ha d been ccca1t t ed 811 the 1Jmloica t i et vlll ch ba4 uGellbled ott the 60Uth ceas e or CUb on the night o J 6 April included tvo LCI• 110 by the Ae eocy a U S navy LSD cart·tl O S three J' l Ja IJ'ld rou r LCV r 1 e l cf them pre-l oa d ed vitb upplles Oil u ven cb rt ered cm r er cial h-ei st t ert All t heae cr tt part 1c1p0 1 ed in the assaul t phaoe except r o r tbree frcigb ters lmich were l oaded vl th foll o 1-up eu ppl es tor ground Md air 1'or es TJ- i e vee-gell Ct'C ru ced o-tth 50-e aUbf r cachU e guns In eddittoa ee cb t C1 a iu 1t e l t vo 75-mr reco1llc6G rifles 85 In aMJ Uon to t he person l vcapoi s of the Cubon exlle soldiera 1 be 1 1 t provided for combat 1 nelud ed auITic ler t m m le r s or Brow n lng •utoaaa t lc rifle• mcbi ne guno c ora n rccoille tJ ri fl eG r ocket l o wicher a a nd fle ce-th roYera Tm •re l ere al so the M- 1'1 taru ' A 12 heavy - rucks e n a 1 t1oo fuel u ulk t r J cl a tract a - c rtt e e 1 a t ul ldtner t o l e 'g e vat er t reiler s end nuoerou 6lf' » ll t rucks and tnt ctorn - 28 g p s - oRIIT Bl 86 C1'Qfil i1Jl 'The 1n• i s1o n brigade eeup ri$ed l _ 5ll mer1 a l l of' thee on t he 1nvasjon shit S exce-pt1ng one airborne inf8J 1 t ry co r pany or 177 mee c The bri gade 1 ncluded f i ve 1ntootry ca npanies a tJetlV ' v eapons an int eU 1 gence-reco 'l ' f 1 S ' ance c oopun y 87 ' d plf 't-OQO These troops 1'- 3d b een ooved by ui r co tbre-e eucoesnlve nights fr-oa tbe Gua te10le tn1ning cuqi to t he t U S ing u r ea 1A Nicaragu a vhere they embo rked on the ship vhich had beeu pre- loa dcd at Ne11 Orl e Ils The sh i ps had 1110ved on separate courses fran tiica ragua md er unobtrusive Na ' escortJ to the re udezvoua 40 miles of'f6bo re 1n o r der to avo1 d the appcaiwnee of a coo w ry t hey bad mov -d in colu nn W'l dcr cover ot da rlme G to t rca there point 5 000 ye rd c from t hc l w ding area where ·they JDet the Navy D 'i'bc e cm plicated oovcments were apparently $CCcmpll hcd in a secure tr anner and vithou _ a J erting the e 88- or the three tollo f-u p ships o ie va due t ·O arrive f r om Nlca ragua on t be morning of D Da y pluo 2 and tYo others we 'e on call e t oeo s out b ot Cubo l dditional supplies were av'e ilable tor a 1r laDd ine or pa rachute delivery at airfield$ 1n Guater 18 lo Nicares ua o nd Flor i da At a Defense base in Annioton Al Lbwna t here ver e u Luo iupp U es readf for l 5 1COO a aen - ere tl ra s Alt Qget er t 4 C and equipment a va U b-le to furnish 30 000 discidcots e ccted t o Tal ly to the invasion force 89 Tbe landi ng was t o be carried out at three beaches about 18 dl a from e ci ch other en the 'Z pa to Peolnsu-1 a The lef flank or the beach ii- Wl ' las Red Beach at the head or Coclt1nos Bay Gr een - 29 E'GF Sf' C A S T 1'81' SYCPR'fs Dea ch vas ut tbe r lght flt wk V1 th m ue Be11 ch at the ce1iter lodc nent to be 6e1zcd Yas thus a cOl l ltol utrip about 4o The m 1 l ee l ong Gt po rated f'ran the interior by M bq aa sable r vn mp penetrated on 1¥ by tll ' W l'OMD Crea the north nod flanked by a coastal I'08d from the c ast tion teams each led by D America a coutnu t emp vent ff 8borc to 1113J' k Red and Bl ue h eo Ea cb of these pe rt-1 es engaged in fire tfghta vith saall enetQ' torcce but accQIIPl hhcd their taot s · o od the troops be6'Ul D VUlf ashore in -11 al Uld lrum -t• md Beto re da711g lt 111 lJ tia force a vere eDCounte red at LCUs both beeches 'lhese ottered l1ttl 1 opposition and lll8DJ' of the Jailit i 11en were quickly captured 91 Not long after daylight t he B irborne inta ntey CampanJ' vas 6 CeGGtull '· parachuted t rom C- 46 a 1 rcraft t o rou r of the i-1ve acbed u led drop t ooes ·vhere its e lemc nt e vere g iven tbe Dli ssioa o sealing off approach rowls 92 At davn began tM cno ey aJ r atto ck• vldch the proJect cW ers bad a iaed to prevent by t he J oued do wn strlkea vi th Castro 's e 26c Sea Fur 1es1 and Jet T-33s rc s-ul ted in the or a supply S hip tbe bcac bing of' a t t'4 ll$port and damage tcl Ginkl ng to e ai 'Ole -pl3n for a landing at G_ r e en Beacb las t hereupon abandoo ed l llld these t roops vitb the r te nku and vehicles were put aubo ro a t m ue l3euch Sbipping v ithdrev to t W ooutb under eont iouous air a tt i • 30 • · OP s ·v cssw ·- - ' ­ r r s a o a 93 il • The o 1r attacko contltwed thro J8 0'1t tbe Lay B-26 or the Cuban c xlle torcc vhich l'Cre 94 traa JOO riti me ne VM cnt l't •1o1A d by tr1etldly o 1 r aup port hit by OUCCCGr lft of' artcraoon Md cv ning· of' luted these • Md Nff ral l T -re beaten ott ld lltlA the lll 1le ution April vitb be YT - or Ca otro '• tw o ve re balted or or tr1co4J y eJ r action C i tbe 110r n l ag B1ue B acb Y1tbout bc 2 ag preosed by the 95 -r 33 Jetn Hovcvcr n tiret gro 4 ttack e b7 Caotro'• fottes ocC UTed rt led BMeb vtlicb mornJ ll ava UA ble tor clc tSe sU port and 1otcrclict1oo re no tat it-c h for tho 8 Jl tire 'Ibo of ulloJ Ueo 6eatro 'M by gro md 1 8 April the i- d • II' In ad41t1on to •-rlu g the QOUDd tottes end protect 1 6 ahippl ng OD 17 A1Jr1l be f'rl eocll y B-260 Also MM Cttotro patrol eocort abip and attacked the Cienf'uogoa airt1el4 Tour ot be trle dly • abot _ vtlile tbrce retumed aaf'cly to Nicaragua a nd tour lc nded •t other frjendly baa R - 96 Atte pts - re - de to rH-ly tile br1g de 1t b Uoo by o 1r drOJ s On the nlgbt or w i 17- 16 AJ rl l obe e-51 drop voui d e a t d Beach and t b J 'ee at lllue a eh Md o n tbe 'follold Dg c J t bt 8llM Be4ch received tvo drape PreJ 6 1 3t1ona f'or reauppi b ' actt bad to be cancelled d ue to encm y- 'lir action 31 - 1 8 P J Allil ·- ·• T8I szeR13f ' 1 At m ue Deach the eneiey- ground ut to « As supported by 18 April alr-craf't begwi from three dit eCtiona on the t tter n ooa cf Si x friendly I -26s tvo or tbem f'lOl l I by kiru-1cans intlicted a cy il im i• on t o n k G toe C11 str o column monng up and abQut 20 troop-laden trucks- froc tbe 11eot us Air support to the mue Beach t 1' '00pG vru contioued o o the aorn tng o-t 19 April vbe n t hree friendly B- 26a 1 ocl udiog tvo piloted by berica na vt re 6hot 4o- r by Cut ro T- 33• Jet c-o r froa the llavy rart carrier Essex• lwl been expect d t J protect ti 19 April sorties but a 1Cdsund e rst Mdi D8 over timing ho mpcred its eftect1veneos 98 In t pite of' thia air u ct1on howe r and 1n spite ot 11 reported 1 Boo co al$ l t ieo euf'f'ered by tbe Castro torc ea tbe brigade' G e billty to resist depended 1n the L' Lat rec or't on rcs1 1'l l y of a i ci rm1t1on - hich had ncv bcccoe irq ossible On the night of 18 Apx-11 vben f o ilure appcuc4 vl t ble ti Cubon brigad ' CG mma ndcr retuDed an off'er t o eVJ Cuatc hit troc pe on the 1110ru1ng or And 19 April ct th GmlllUDition n pidly rwmin g out the brigade -as stiU a ble to launch a Mile eo-unte-rattac k o g a 1ost tJl fgrce§ rel ¢ntlcaGly 111QY1_ng 1 n tram the Ye6t 99 I n the laet hours of reai f lt3l ce the bri gad e c e r c o - obip pleoding or be p We arc out of 6c Ud help 6JIIIDO tLOd f'igbting on the beach We cannot bold - ' - • - 32 Pleas •1n vat er Out or a Ila Belp aw t B Dc Q' c l o-lSng in arrive in cert hour '11 n y0ur help v1 U be bere and vith 1 at7 I 10w- belp baa oot cmer 100 'Die ltu1 t me nl'H gC equi- ut - c -mic UOIUI- o f 1 lb v t th 'o r ve n a a t'ollovs ' ill •18' t - I a t 1 1na to VQOda I - aotllillg I CMMt repeat cllllDOt -t YQU • 101 A4 1 100 CODYOT vaa llude4 r or tbe 'boaeh 011 tlle e 1'1 c nJoon or 19 102 April l beu i t - DuriDg the a ext rev d ay$ Uiat tbe - - tvo Americans Cuban t'l O@ P o euccecdcd in roecuing 26 - • a d eotl 0 1 ng o ll B lr'Ti'YO r'G ad n-o c-tt- or the blrlaeh eo atal iol DdD - 33 - • av P ICRl f 'POP 899itBT c SUl MARY 1 Di OF EVALUATION evaluatilla the Aaeocy ' a performance it 1e e Gacntia l t o avoid gre 1ping immediately e s pers oc e ba done at t be expl o Dat1cn that tbo Preol dent'a orger c lllcellin the D-IIIY 111 r strlkoa vas the cbiot ce use ot failure 2 1 1 acwoa1on of tbat coe dee1 1oo 1d under lying q stloo a ttzy ra 1ae thia It the project had been better conceived better orgoni ud better s tarted and better 4 voul 4 t hat preci e iaaue e'rer have bad to 'be preae oted tor P'reeidentio l decioian at all A 4 voul 4 it ha been presented under the sam i ll•prepe red inadequately b riefed c1l cumt nces1 3 Furthermore it is eaoent ial t o keep 1n mind tbe poee1 b111t-y that the 1tava e1on vas doomed 1n ad V3l ee tb l t an 1Dit1al l y sueceastul landing by 1 500 men would eventua bo ve - c Nll- i - C tro'a coabined lliUta ry tt• •• otrengtbene4 by Soviot Bloc-s wpll ed military mat eriel ta 1 lure to g1 ve the proJe ct o otvithatandlng itt importance a ad its icm nse potentl lity fetr daDage to tbe IJnited Statea tile top- fllgbt hm dl1l g vhich it required -- appropriate organiz t100 _otaffillg t hro lgbout by bJ sli-cy qualltied peraam e_l 4 ull-tl De d lrect10l and control or the higbeat quality 5 DJeuttic1 encies 1n tbee e Vital e re3 0 reeult ed 1n prc•eures and d1 stort1CJDs hlcb in turo produ eed n roua · T6f 8 B9ft8f 119P 08811£1' serious operatton l mistake and omiesiooo and in la ck ot e v8 re oe1 a of developi ag dAngeraJ in failure to taJt e act ion to counter tbe 8D4 1n grave m •t « kee of Judgment There vaa failure e t high levels to concentrate intormed1 wivavcrin6' scrutlzly 011 the pro ect and to apply experienced lllbl Ased ju4-nt to tbe nacicg o1t uat1ons that le loped • 35 - -- - tW C f D C E C P p EVAWAl'ION o OllGA IIZAT ON AND C l MM'D STRUCM E l The proJect fas organit-ed o t the level ot en 0perat1ng branch the fourth echelon in t he orgauiz ation of the Agency in the Western liemispbere Divisi on Its clliet e GS-1 5 -as not given the independence and the broad extensive power£ of u task force coam ander IDstcad be had to apply constantly for tbe decision of policy quest10118 and inlport ant rational problems to the Deputy Director Pl ens DD P 110 •• 1n fac t d1 recting the project although this vas only one of his many re6pons1bil1t1es Tbe DD P delegated much or hia resp011sibility to bis Deputy for Covert Action especially the handling contact - iith non-Agency ofi'icials l OUcy inttere involving The office of the DD P a rA the oftice s of the project were 1n different buildings Coosiderat ion ' given by tb e 'fJJJ P 1n late 196o to raising the proJect out of WK D1v1Sion and pl ac1zlg -1 t directl y under bi6 Deputy for Covert Action but tb iEi l S not dop e 2 The Chief of WH Division we s in tbe chain or camw nd betweeo t he chief or the proJect and the DD P but only 1n a partial senee Be exercised his riabt t o sigo the project's o tgoine cablee until the eek ot the invasion even though the proJec •e ovn 61 glla l center 'W act ivat6d at the en-d of December 196 He super11s tb e staff'il Je activities and attended some of the meeting of tbe si ec1a1 Group But tbe DD P and 111s deputy dealt direct l y vitb t ile project chief and g -adual ly tbe Chief Qf WB Division began t o play only a dimini shed role • 36 ' BF 7JiliJ' P 'i' P 3 8B8 i'i The DD F 1n turn reported to tbe Di rector of Centred Intelligence DCI Olld the Deputy Director ot Central Intelli- gence OOCI lfbO usually represented the Agency at the n eetin ga ot tbe 5412 4 Spec Lal Group The Director deles ted hie re•pcms1bU1ty for major proJect dec1G10Jl G to a c011Bid ere blc extent DOCI 3 l He r-elied OD the Air Force general for policy •tterc in volvin8 air operatiozu For '1Utacy adrtce he rell•d otticers detailed to the project 011 the military 'l'h1II r o deprived the Director of completely objective COUDSel since the project's llll lltacy pe rsODDel were deepl y involved in building up the strike force and tbe DOOI 'WWI tskiDg an active role 1n the condw t of air operat1ot1s t a t i o n of Authority 5 1bus the project lacked a single hi@l -l evel fulltime comm nder poGsessing stated broe d powers and abilities aurttcient f'or tbe carrying out d1ft'1cult mission a£ this large enormously In fact authority vaa fre g De13ted amous • the project chief the military chief of tbe t1r0Ject 's Para- cil 1tary Staff and several hi gh-level o tttcml s1 vbose vida respoDSib1Ut1es elsevhere in tJie Agency prevented theJu troa giving tbe project the attention it required There were too many echelons the top level bad to be briefed b7 briefers who themselve were not doing tbe d ay-to-day vorl - 37 4R OP J e ft B T · W G ✓ 8 Be M8 i 6 Three- further extro ordin o ry facto ra mu t be mentioned l Tbe Cb let of Operations of the Clan d eetl ne Servl cea COFS 1 wbo 1a the DD P 1 s chief to f'f advisor on clarideati De operatioos 1 plAyed only a very minor part in the project 1 ng Ou at l east two occasions COPS las gi ven e ll J rees va that tbe project ' ' be1 Dg perllousq m i _ d but be clined to involve b 1mscl f' vith the project 2 Tbe three SeJl lor Staffs tbe As ney' e top-level tecbliical a dviaora in their res-pect1ve areas' not c ted fully eitber at the important formati've a e of tbe'•pro ot or even after grave operat 1 0nal d1tf1cultiea bsd beg m to developJ instead they- al loved themselves to be more or lesa 1 gnOred by tbe chie f of the project and bis prJ ncipal ' •ietanto Tb1B state ot faire is part ly o ttribu te ble to the q t e managerial ek ill e nd tba lact of experience tn clandaati ne pal ' Ell Utary operat OD 8 of tbe Wll 1' chiefs ·it was not C rl' lcted by t he DD P or b1a deputy or by the Chlef of WI Division 3 Tbere was o o reviev of the project by tbe Agency's Project ev l e_v Committee wbich would st l a-aat ba ve al loved the vie ws of the moat senior reviev body ill t he Agency to be beard IndependellC of DPD 7 Still rmother Important factor 1 D the dif'fusion of direction and control vas the insistence or the Agenc 1 s air the Devel op ent Projects J J vis1on DPD on proserTi Dg · _· - -t - - - - QJQJ SL8ftBP t 'r • • • · · -' · ' - 0 I 8 8 8 R 8 g 1U 1 nd cpendencc an4 reati1D1 0a outside the organiz a ti onal structure ot the proJeet 1n vhich i t bo d e vital central role lncludJ Dg o 1r drops to the UDderground tre ining C ban pUota operation of alr baaea tbo 1mml 1 se ll giat c l prc blems ot t ro nsporting tbe Cul le n voluote-c ra and the p ocurtng and servtcl Dg trom Florid a to Guatemala - tho military p JJ µeo projoc t cblof bad 110 C '1d autbarlty o air air operat i on a ' 'be Dl'D 1t •-llsbe l The »l annine and tor tbia purJ Oee va COJllPl etel y 1 ndependel t 8 'lbe result vu cooperation divided c -nd deplJ1de11t upaa aitual There was no c ta y-to-dsy cont inuing sta relation- ship vbleh 18 ease11tia l tor proper ly coordl tlatd operatlC US Be dquartero of the tvo unita were 1n dlffe '-Dt buildil go ffa e w y from ee ch other The chie f o'L 1r operations in Guate ial and llk8r gua were DP rei reaent t1 a 1 n °i ie t of tbe Ii cbJ e S of these baa es and the Headqusrtera coa twsion va u cQll OU ded In the field 9 ID October 1960 shortly a fter his Ss1gnment to the project tlle parsmllt ry ehlat noted coordiMtlcn dilf1cul t1ee betveeu 1111 and DH ll'e pointed out tbllt tbe organiiat10ll8l s tructure vo s ccm t rary to aillt ry eomm«n d p r1 uc 1 ples to accepted menAgem 'P t practicea 8 Dd to the prinol pl es enunciated by t he DD P himeel t 1n 1959 and rec -nded that tbe Dl'D llllU be 1Du grat41d 1 nto m 1 Ul1der c or its cbte r • · WOP 8 8itB1 ' · · ' '' -e e I e B on £ Fe Uure of Integre tion Ef·fort 10 'l'be DO P rejected this rec lllll Ddat1ou 4s oot being the 1nost efficieDt solutS or f or t eclmlcsl ressono Tbe iDsu ft1cicntl y eftect1ve relatiaD hip bet Weea the prQJect end tbe DPD Wliit vas one o'C the gravest purel organizational i'a iluree of the operaTbe 00 P bM ouboequentq confl rmod this coru lw ion ti011 hsa ascribed t h is lack or effectivencsa to pereon a J 1ty t'rictians and t o tbe cle ssic service rivalr y We ltQ lld note th t this doea not exist 1ll present- cambilled c m1111mda ll The organizatiOMl contusioo a gmented b r tile exbten ce of a large forva rd operating base iD tbe M1alo1 area 'Which 1n turn had 1ooae control over several a ID-ba sea MSUOD or this - vas -q 'l be defllled and Dot rell understOO i · In theory the base bad e · aupport l n8 role ·act it wa a conducting operations hicb ror the JDOSt part p rall el ed similar operations being cond» cted by lllf 4 £ram llea dquartero This divided ef'f 'ort vs a expensive cumbersome and d 1ff1cult to coordinate In some casee the cfi orts of tbe tvo elements vere dupllcat1ng or onfl1ct1llg or even compet1Dg 'With e cb other 12 The upshot of th1 s complex and bizarre organizo tiana l situation tbat 1 n tb1s tr do lsq difficult task the Ager cy fail ed t ma rabal ts torcea properl y - t appq them ef'fecti ve i y ii O D SRCRBI ·- '• TOP E CFCRSW EVA WATION OF STAFFING l In April 196 the Di rector or C Jrt ral Ii '- e W fJOnce stated that be woul d reco ll t'rom a r y st4t1001 1D the vorl d j ersolll Ol vbooe ablllti o •re required tor tlk suc 88 of tbe proJect Tide nC e n1t i oo or the oeed tor higll-quality raon oel is novbere ret'lecte4 1n tbe hietory ot tbe project The DD P's Deputy rqr Covert Act1011 advued hls GUbord l nates that tbe Ouector•• vords did not - tbet the proJec t vea to be g1 blancbe 1D pereonoel procurement but that officers coul d be adequately eecund tbrc U£h a gotU tion 2 In actual tact pe ra ft el f_or tbe project we re secured by tbe customary· rout1lle method of negotiation betveen the proJect and tbe employc a ' • office or curi-e nt asetgnment oo reccurse va s bad to directed assigmae nt by the Di rec tor of Ceotral Intt-ll1gence Tbe traditional ind e Ddence ot tbe 55 1 odividual division and branch chief's in the Cl ande1tine Ser -t oes rem i Ded UD tf'ected by the Di rector's state111CJ1t 'l'be 11ets prepared by th project tor the purpose of oegotia t1on for p r•onnel n a t reflec ted tbe pret•rencea of' tbe chi ef or tbe proJect and tbe vi u1 np•e of tile penOI In queet 1on t accept tbe aasigmoent ing 6 given persOll to the Dl mall¥ ca es the re4son tor usi_gn- proJect vsa 1¥ tbe t b bod Just - 41 If P 8 8 8 ft L 1 ·' IP8P S OflBi 3 The baeic Dt1 stake vo s oa de of filling the key epots early without realh ins hov much the project would grcr an that it t boul d be staffed for a ma Jor cf'fort In some cases officers ori all y selected to supervise t1ve per ona ultimate Jt had to supervioc 15 or 20 tilbcs As many Of t he three GS-16 officers assigoed to the proJect none was given top-level managerial responsibiUties reel Ut ot all these factors was tbat n e of the most experienced senior operating o tticen of tl e Agency J Grtici p ted tul l tillle 1n tbe pro lect An Indication of uality 4 An interesti Dg insight into the quality of the persOllDel or w 4 ie attorded by be· 1nitiol Relative Retention L1sts 11 prepared in April 1961 ·oy the divisions and senior staffs of the Clandestine Services end otber Agency uotts puraUNLt to tbe requirements of Regulation 20-701 Sopar tioa 1f S plu• Perso e1 Be ch such unit -as requ J red to group 1 ts officers 1 n ea ch grade ill to ten groups on the basis ot the performance and qua l if'icatioas of e h one U nder tbe prescribed procedu re tbeee lists are to be reviewed at eeveral level a before becoming def1nitiVe 5 Of tbe officers holdi tbe pri ncip l operational Jobs 1n IIB 4 1n grade GS-12 through GS-15 17 officers vere pl ced 111 tbe l®e-st third of tbeir respective grade and 9t or lovest tenth The r tl ngs or 23 of tbese 21i 1n tb e were le by 11H Divisioo vbich plac a seven ill the lowest third and 19 Yere rateC by otMr units vbich together placed ten 1D '' ' · lowest third - ·' i' 8 P 8 E 8 R R T · the ·- 6 lt ia appercut t'rom tt•-' se ra tt nee t hat tbc other unito Md not deto l led their b st people to llll l1 but h d 1n aome 1 nst o ncea given the project their di apoul CM s 7 Flu tllenore although the proJect eventuall r 1 Dcludlld the large n u mber of 588 pcroonnel there ICre long por1ods in hJ cb iloport4Jlt 61ota went unJ'll l ed duo to difficultT 1n l roc uring au 1t4ble ofticera For exam ple t he cou oterJ ntelli g eoce officer of tbo M18lll 138 oc vo a never oupplled vitb o couc officer o ssietant tbere vas a loag _period 1n v bich the Jl t'Ojcct prc f'e ssed J nAbilltT to rind a Cl officer ro r Cuatemua Baae 8l d months vere opent 1n search ot an o anouncer tor Rud lo Sva o Few Clandest11lc Servicee people we re found li bO ve r e capable or serving a base cbiet1 tbe fNPPC rt - ervices bv d to s upply ll at of' tbeJI All of t be par 1il 1tary o Heers h d t o be brought froco O ltside WU Divi1 ion or e ven from outside the presented no etatf'i ng probk• tor 0 1 w '4 ucy Air operat i on dnce DPD upplied its pecplc 8 'l'oorc vere in tact insuff icient people to do tho job during tho lotter •ts$ • of t he proJect Personnel Ol'kod auch l l bours and so 1ntena1Yel y bu lr 1 r cff1ctoncy Personnel 5hortages We re ol e o r the project o'O S affected ot the r ASOM vby lnl Cb o1' the vork perfonoed on o cruh'' bat is • 3 Of v o a 6i8 CRFIJ pg 1 li CR O Scarcit y 01 L J ngu 1 ot$ 9 Very te ' proJect personnc1 A oer1co n bo ckground knovledge spoke SJ e Dieh or bad Le t1 tl- In a number of insto nccc thoGe Mn for operating peroonoel in tbc field sta'ti ons tbst did • pou 6-iob bad to be lnten-upted 1n their regular dllt1CO merezy 10 order to act o a interpreters in pO rt bcc4u Je of tbc scarcity Tb 1 o lAc k occurred ot Spdniah linguists 1n t he ¼ft 'Cy and 1n part bcC4use 1111 Division did not traz sfer to the project ou tt1cient numbers of 1to ovn Spaniuh speakera 10 There vcre skilled personne1 many other e xample• of illlproper use of I n many lnat ncea cs se ot ticers ve used merely o o 'h e ndhol dero for ae ents and tecbntce l f pec li liots vere used e a stevedores 5o ioo or the people vbo served the proJect oo contract turned out to 'be 1neowpctent ll Stuffing o f the project IOs defect1V'C becauae tM vbole Cla D le stine Services ste tring eyste m vit h absolute po-- er bo1n g exerc1Ged by tbe d1 vi a ion alld brt ncb chiefc is dd'ective £iieh division seeks to guard i ta ovn asoctsj scant y recognit100 is givec to tbe rea-pe tiv-e priorities ot tbct variouo projectc 12 tn spi te ot the f o regoing t he re ·ere a great ron y excellent people in project vbo VO ked ettecti'Vf ly o od wbo de- ·eloped considerably 1 n the cou r e of t heir vork It 1bould Bl so be Olll l M Biz ed tbo t oJmoat vith ut excepti on peraonnel - 4li - 8 P 8 M 8 R 8 I '2 9P 8881139 vo ked extremely long hours for mooths on nd it hout compl n i nt and ott er iae manifested high mot1vat10 l t ogether with great persc· erooce and ingenUit y in sob r ng tbe JDOJlifold w·oblel 00 that t M 'proj ect constantly r a ised I t cboulcl be stated thAt n general the oupport people sent to the _pr oJect by the support component vere o t excellent qualit ond e ffective l e r formance 13 Unfortunately hovever vbile many- per ons performed prodigies of eft'ortJ theee vere otteo d trected t ovorda over com1ng oba l es lfhicll tter organiZ E1 tion and rnAn ge nt vou l d Mve eliminated Such efforte 'ere espec 10 l l y neceee 8 l'Y a 1n oupport of the chinZ ira of non-attributo biUty of the operation b in negotia tJ ne with the Ar d Services fo1· e quiPl nt tra Loing peraoonel etc vhicb the Agency Ghou ld have been able to request as of right and c 10 providing the support for on overt military e-n terpri$e tha t was too large for the N f ncy'a capebUlti es - 45 'l'QP ' 6B8B34' rnon so0r·'J1 • EVAI UA'l'tO l CF PW llING 1 Defore proceeding to un evaluat ion of the Age11 cy •s planning t he over-all policy dec1aione of the United States Govcr lllll lnt wit h reference to t he CU bail operation 111 firtt be stated in s ll X 'ary form The$e dec101ono not only const i• tuted tbe ba c - g rou od against vh1ch Agency plAnning 'a s conducted but a 160 present ed numerous important factors tbn t limited or otherwise determined 1 t scope 2 fo vill next endeavor t o point out the various OCCEl$100 S on vbicb we believe t hat the Agency officials responsible for the project mo de ceriou s planning errors both of ccxmni $Sioo and of' oc dssioo hich affect ed t he project in vital re t Ccts 3 Betveen tbe plan epproved by Prec1aent t cnho er on 17 March 196 Amlex A and t he 1tivt1sion pl an actually carried out on l' April change 10 concept 1961 Annex £ t here vas a c a l Orig1nall y t he heart of' the plan as a l ong slow clandestine buil d- of' guerrilla fore es to be trained and developed in Cuba by a cadre of CU haps b om the Agency would r ecrui t t rain and 1nf1ltrate into Cuba 4 But t b1rteeo months later the N ency spoosoroo an overt 8$f a ult -type amphibious landing of 1 500 ccmb0 t- tra1ned Sl d bea Vily e nned 8old1erc gu errlll a art·are Moct of them vere unvc rs d in Taey vero expected to maintain themselves 46 Ql 0 0£0 £1 • IOI SBEl'tttsl for o period of t ime some a aid a week Guff'ic1ent to O dmin1ster o shock and thereby it 146 hoped to tri gger an uprioi ne Discard of 01•1gl lllll Pl M 5 By Nove nl er 196o the or1g1ne l plAnning P P•r Annex A bad for practical purposes cea$ed t o exist as n charter for Agency acti on By tbo t date tbe Special G rou p had ca re to be UJ 1 ao l mou$l y or th opinion tho t t he cbo nged conditio is chiefly C stro' s increaoed m11 Uacy otrength througb SOV1 et support and tbe increased effecti veoeGs of hi a security forces had oode the original covert act ivitiea plo n obsolete 6 The Special Gr oup had ho e ver not ye·t agreed on a uba ti tute pl an and strong doubt wa expressed -vbetber any- thing less tban overt U S forces Would suffice to obtain C3stro' s downf'all But there appeared t o be agreer n't that whatever the ult ilDD te decision it vould be advantageous f'or the Uni ted States to ha ve s ome trained Cu ban refugees avail able tor eventual use a nd that CIA eb oul d continue to preps re such a for ce 7 f- At the end of llov lmll@r 196 l tbe Agency p1 sented reVised plan t o PreGident h'iseoho 1er and hiG ad vieo1-s Tb 1G included a nf1ltration into Cuba by air of 8o n en in ll' 3 ll paramilitary t eami after recept ion ccmnittees bad been prepared by xnen infiltreted by s-ea b an iwph1b1ous - 47 - 'J'AP J and1 ng of a te of 650- 700 C EO R Bi ll n with extro ordinaril y hca 'y t'1repower c Pl--el1mioory llir strikes e g 1nSt military targets CIA ctated tbat it believed 1t fell Sibl e to seu e lllld bold a limited area 1n Cuba ood then to dras diccident elementt to tbe laod 1 ng force vbich vould then grodual ly acbieve enolJ8h $tfJ ture to t rigger a general upr1Giog At tb is Gta ge o'f t be pl Anning clo ndeGtine nour1sbme a t of resistance forces -was still an important ele l'l llt tbOUgb now over6b3'3 owed by the overt strike force concept 8 President E oenhower oralzy d llected the Agency to go o b ca d vitb it preparati ons vith 61 l speed But this meeting occurred during the U S political interregnum and the propO$ed target date was late r than 20 Januar t l 961 eo that 1n ettect the Presi ent I s inetructions - ere merely to pro e-ed und t o keep the preparations going UDtil tbe nev Adaitaistrat ion shOUld take office and hould take the definitive decisions especia lJ v vhether and under o1he t circumstances the landin g should take pl ace Se arcb tor Polley Deci sic ns 9 - As an example of the decisiO -' lki ng pro M at the JOeet1og of the Special Group held 8 December 196o the Agency requested authorization a t o make propaganda leaf let f lights over Cuba b to sc reen non-official U s personnel for use 1 n ma ritime ope rations c to resupply Cuban r esistance - '129P 118 8B01t£i T o P s Q 0 a r w eltt ent s froa U S aJ r bases at tbe nte or tvo i'Ugbt a a eek Only tbc f irot uutborlza tion vao given at that tilne 10 ID a1d•JaoU8ey 1961 various osJor poUc • que1t1o is ••re at CIA' G request under discussion by th Speci l Croup 'lbesc lnc udcd a ' ' ot ADCT1co n contract pilots tor tnctiea l a nd logistj c l t' l 1r operat i ons over CUba b use of a U S al r be sc tor logistical fUe ts to Cuba c commencement ot· air otrikes not later t ba n d o vn o f the day before the saq b ibiou s ssult and v itbout c urtailment the number or ot a ircroi t to be employed from thoae e vail O ble d u ae ot Puerto cabcu Hico ragua •• an o1r-str1 k e base and maritime etagiog area U In the end ool 000 ot these policy stion5 v resol ved 1n tho eff1rtM t1veJ that wit h J-egard to tbe use or l'Uerto Cebeua It should be copec1Al ly noted U t tbc proJcct 'c parwnJ 111 aey ch1of bod strongly recOill ended that tbe operation be aban4ooed u policy IMUJ d cot uov adequate tactica l air oupport eonr11c ·t 1ng Views J l resolve 1'be 1 1 6 of these questions and tbc faUuro u tr any of tbea del1101 1$t rates the 48 ngeroo a c-ontllct bct cen the dG61re for politioai accepto b i litt and tl to need for aillta ry eff ectiveness It elao 1ndi at e the nu ccuat- ine polic7 bockground 8ainot vhich tbe officers runniJl l the - 49 'f8t' GCC BW mo r e b eR s project had 1 o d o the Jr da y - t o-dil y busln ss Thi s policy under ta 1 oty va in gever al rcSpecta never s 't isractorU reGol tcd riS ht up t o the very hour of action o nd maoy proble nG aro6e out ot t he chang1ns l 101te t1on• to hich author ty t o do ¢er'to1n tblngs v 3-9 subjected 1 D the na»e ot politic l necessi ty 13 'tbu S du ring t he months 1 moediately- preced ine the iD3UgUrat100 co 20 J8'luary 1961 the £ency v s re ruitl ng and training Cuban t roops o ud othe rwise proco d1ng 1t h 4 chan8 ed plan not et dct'initely tonulAted or reduced to vrl ting vith no a8$ l ' 8nee t bat the invasioo which vas nov tb e e onco ot the pl an ouJ d ultimately b e o ut h ized b ' the new Admin1Stratioo cno- Jl og The Agency vas driving for a td without precie ely heTC 1 t Ca going 1Ji Tbc first formal briefing or President Kennedy e nd hb advisor t ook place oc 26 J anuary 1961 Re had received briefings on earlier occseions even before bia election At tbi$ meeting there V05 a presentation l drgcly o ral of tbe status or p reparo tions aJld President K ed y a ppro- cd Oieir cootlnua tioo nut ther e a• still no o uthor 1zat1 expreG o • 1 mplled t hat military acti on ouJ d in t act eventua ll ' be undertaken 15 Io 1 be ensuinS vc-cks tbe Di r ctor or Central I ntelligooco and tbo OcPlltY Director Plano occanpaoiod l n • 50 • war Gieon@ r wo r a B e r w soir oe instances by ot her J sency representatives attended a number or meetings fi th the nel-' President and his adVisor o •rhe pape - prepared for a 17 February meot ir g is appended as Annox B In he ¢Ow- e of these meetings the Agency preaented t hree l nfonral planning or concept papers dated ll tt arch 1961 16 March 1 961 and 12 April 1961 each a rcvi ion of i ts predeceGsor Annex es C D and E r espectively These pspero erted chiefl y e a the bs ees tor oral discussions at these meetings Succe sive Alt8ra t1ons 16 According to our info n ltioo the revined cooeept as exposed by the paper of 12 Apr i l 1 961 was apPar ently acceptable to t he President o lthough he- indicated be lriight order a di version Before that he had authorized the Agency to proceed vith mounting t he Operation but had reserted tho right to cancel a t any time ' rhc Presi dent as advised that noon on the 16th was the l ast hoar tor a diversion The DD P checked 1th Mr Dundy Ghortly a fter noo i on t he 16th and no div rsion being or dered a uthorize-a the landing to proceed 17 These t nrcc papers di sclose that starting i th tbe World War II c - i9- type operation outlineo in t he n -l rch 1961 paper Annex C the t J an had beeo S'llii'tly and successive ly altered t o i ncorporate four characteristics which had been deemed essential in orde to ensure t hat t he operation would look like an infiltrat i on of guerrillas in support of' internal re• olution a nd · ould the refore be pol itically acceptable - 51 r' 'OI BBSRBI 8 1 9 2 fi % C I 18 Tho four cllaractorist ice were a ao unspect Cul Ar night l L 'ld1 Dg b poso1b1l 1ty or conduct 1 Jlg air opero tione trc m a base oo eeized t ert1tory c a buil d-u-p lM atter the iu ltlal lendl ng to precede oN'ensivc action o ga 1nst Ce stro•a for ces Md d torre in cu ite ble tor gu errllln vortare in the e ·eot tbc iuvasioo torce c-OUl d not hold a l odgme nt The a1rt1el d requ1re llcnt Obliged tbe pl Mncrs to obitt 19 th 1 nvas1on Oito -f'ra a T'r inidad close to to Zapata 'l'b c ton e r arc wao the Escaabro _y Ho mt a 1 n s a od tbereton ottered lx tter 8 •rrUJ a po861bil1t1eo but o tile latter bad a cuitaolc e 1rf1eld 20 'l'M third papor a Lso l Otroduced a pl on tor a guerrilla- type di• crsionary l wldJ ng i n Oriente Province t o ly-t before the •trike and provided thAt su pplies should be l rulded at Dig lt du ring tile J oitial stagu It e l 10 prov1 ded tar 1r strlkca on cdl1ta ry obJecti vcs at dawn of D O y us well f D on D 0$ ' 111 n us 2 21 Cloao reading ot the t b rcc pD pers al co discloses tb t tt- e 1Irvas1on vae no longer co11cc1vcd a s ru i c rtort to Cuba a guerrilla torccs 1n a coordinated attack The papers IN lke no c11 ' 1 m tbat s1gnif1eant g uor1·1lla for ces exis ted itb - 52 - T O P 6 B O fi - I 7 8 1 BSCPRT 1'hom --- af ter e -alw tt i ve reports from our O ln ti•ained agento coof rJ01Dg their strength auf'ficiency of antlS an a wrenuoi t ion and their 1·ea diness - - ve had orked ou t p s for a c oordinated combined Jnsurrect1oo ond at tack againot Gastro Art the 12 April 1961 paper expressly states tb e concept vas that the operation thould hllve the o ppearance of an iriiernal resistance 22 1- ' ith reference to t he ctrength 01· the reeieta nce 1n Cu ba tbe l l March 1961 po per ref'ere to an eetimated 1 200 5 en·iJ l l S ood 1 000 otll r indJ vidual o engaeing in acta of conspu-o cy 001d sabo tage but it make no claim o f any cont rol exercised by the Ag ency or even that coordinated i lun a bad been made o nd f irm radio cQmn unications establisbed 23 Tbe l2 April 1961 p£fper etatea the est1J a' l te a t nearly 7 ooo ioau rgento v1thout specifying the n uc iber of guerrillas included t herein -'h o vere responsible to scur e degree of control t hrough e ient 'J fith vhom communi cat1ono a ro currently active It l ocates these i n t hree vi dely s epm-ate regioD S of the island and sta·tou that the t ndi viduol groups ure small and vet ' 1 lladequa t ely armed and t bat it va s planned to auppl y them oy air drops after p o y 1th t he o J ¢t1ve of crea l ng a rc•1olut io iary situation 24 The COJ egqiug laoguagc suggest$ existence of 7 000 insurgents b ut retrains front cl aiming o ny pro$p ct of inttrediatc help from trained guerrt lla f orces in being - 53 'i' 8Jl 8Ji39RB1 '1'he term TO 8f C11Bt insurgents '' seems to have been used 1u t he sense of pote-ntial 1 nGu rgents or roorc civiliu o o pponents of CO stro A s t o tement a bout militro y and police defec tors voo 8i Ilil a rl y vague the gency Wat 1n touch Yi th 31 ouch persons ul1001 1t hoped to induce to defect after O Day4 Arrcc ts of' Agento 25 These t acit admissions of the non-e d eteucc of' efiective contr olled reaistance in Cuba correspond to the intelli n c e reports which clearly s howed the unfavoro ble sit tion resulting frOD t he failure of our a ir supply operations attd t he aucceoo of t he Castr o tecu rity force$ in a l e s t ing o u r agents rolling up the fe f existing nets end reduc i ng guerrilla gt•o u ps t o 1ncffectivenesc 264 It i s c lelXr t hat tl e io 'a 6100 operati on -vas based on the hope tret t he brJ gade vould be able to '-'intal n i toelf 1n Cuba long enough to prevail by attracting insurgents and defector$ f rcm the Caatro d ser•d ces but without ba ling 1 tl advance any assurance of assiotance f'rom idet 1ti f i ed t»ovn con trolled trained a nd organized guerrilla u The Agency ho ll d tbe invasion vould like a deWl ex lll lchino produo a s bock11 vhicb vould co use tbeee defections In otber words uoder the final plan the inva$10ll - a s t o take the place of an organized 1-esi stance which did uot exist and vs s to generate o rganited r e jisto nce by provi dio'e too focus and e ctlng as a catafyst rep S 89AE T PO£ 27 The A ncy' r 'aS o ·· oiR e r r tch1 b g t he 1 500-zi m brtgad e after wt1_phibious landing agoinB t Co otro's combined milite ry fore a vh ich the his lest-level U S 1ntell18 nce USIB reports eot1tlcd Tile Military Jlu1ldup 1D Cuba dated 30 Noveober 1960 e nd 9 l'ebrum-y 1961 reopectively estiMted follol o Tile Re ·olutionary Arr - 32 000 t en tbe Jn1 l 1t1 8 - 2001 000 en employing lilOre tbo n 30 to 40 thouno nd tons of Bl oc-fu rois bed -' aD4 heavy mter1el of tbe value or $30 000 000 28 It ia d11'1'1cult to tmder otond hov the dec1o10D to proceed vith tile invasi011 coul4 hav been Ju otified ill tlJe latter t ages of the 0 Oro tioo Anoex C Under the Trinidad pl on acceen to tbe Eocen bra-y Mowitatne tor J 0601ble guerrUla existence eight ba -e constituted Goite Juot1f1cation t or t be enorruou o rlsks 1Dvo ved 1'hie Juat1f1cet1on did not apyl y to the Zo pe W area vbich · -o s poor guo rrUla to rrain and offered Utt le poos1bil 1ty for tM break-out of Ul -aston force The lAct I surrounded ot coo t 1 ngency pl am11ng ror either survival or rescue of the 'brigude Ma never been gat1of'n ctor1ly expla1Ded 29 'lb -gwnent baa bc n recle that the Af ncy'B theory of sn upri1ing to be set t by a auccessf'ul 1 nve l oo Id tbe ma 1 Dtcnance of' the bat tallro for a period not been disproved It M ot l eek or so baa not put ·to t he teat thio arguoent goes because the ctmcel led D-oiiy ail strikcs were eaceutto 1 - 55 'l' e I' s e n e i »BP 889ltSf to tbe Luvoeion ' s uucccoa or C stro' o Sueh an ars meot 1'u tlo in the t'o ce de tonatratcd pover to «rrest teoa or tbou$aDdB or s-uspected P«JrGOD s iznediately- a r t he D-Doy mlnus- 2 a U' atrl kea ond tbe effect1 oness of t he Cru lt ro oeolll'lty forces 1n arrest ing agents as dema1stnted by unilcpeacbable 1 nt elligm c e recx-1ved Vievs ot Joint Chiera 30- Agency po rtic11 1lts 1n the P ject b lve sought to det end be 1nvu100 pl an by c iting t he approval g1 to pl on by the Joint Chiot o of Statt JCS t iio To tb1s argumo jjt member ot the JCS ho VO replied 1n the cCJU rae ot e notbor inquiry 1 that the final plan ' ' preoented to ti oo J orally wb ich presented normal ot lffl ng 2 tllat they ree nr led the OJ10rat10D as being solely CIA'• v1tb the c litary cal led oo to tl lrnleb rioua types of support and tbc cb1ef int eroet of the J CS being to ••• to it tbat e very kJ nd oJ ouw ort r ques ted vas fUraished 3 tb a t they vent cc tbe nss umpt1on t hat full air support would be tu rn1shed and cor t-rol of the lir sec w -ed ond on the Aseccy 1 s ooBUTancc tb llt a great nUni 'bor of insurgent• • ould 1Aa lediately join force v lth the invo o-ion f s d tl at l D tbe event th• battle v i t aS'-'illJJt them the brigoda vould a t once ngo guerrtllo 11 and take t o t b e biJ le 31 The Agency coa Ditted at ast tour extrcDely serious miatakes iD pl tuming n Fail ure to L mb j ect #tbO pro ject J enpeciall y 1n i ts lattcr t're nz ied oto ges to 3 cold e id obJ et ive appra1Ml 1 - 56- JPO P GiiO llf i G SL0R 91f by the best o peruttng t a lent vailablc portl cularly by those not involved in the opero tloo su ch as the Chief Operat1o s and tbc chiefe of t he Sen tor st8 tto or HD d tb1$ beeo dolll t M tvo rolloving mietal eo b o nd c belov 111 gbt bave beeo avoided b Fa11U ' to adviae t he President o t an appropriate t llllC that s ucccsa Nld bee om dubious and to rec 01 11mcnd t hat the operation be therefore cancelled aad that tbe problem of unseat1n g Castro be restudied c Fa i lure to recogniu that the proJect had be¢ overt and tret the ail i tary effort bad beco oo too Lare o t c be bond led d oy tbo Agency alooc Failure to reduce ucccGsive proJcct ple t U to -fon a l pdper s and to lea·•e copies of them v ttb the President and hia a dvisora nod t o r e quatst opccif ic wr1tten approvnl and coot trrat1on thcreot 32 TIJDely and obJcctive oerutiny of tho opero ti oa 1Jl t he month s before the invnuJ on incl uding c tudy ot all available intelligence vouJ d hove demC0$trnted to Agency official a tbat fai led tbo t tbere vo o no controlled and resJ OM 1ve undere rourtd mo ot r to reJJy to the 1 D'41UJlou for ce and tbat Ce stro's obil1t ootb to f18ht back and to roll up t he l Jlteroal oppooi t i on ioo st be very cons1dorabl y upgraded • _- 57 - 9 8 J f 8 8 9 'P Y Si' 33 It vould Also hove rai 1ed the question ot· vb • the Uoited Ste tes should ccmtellplntc pitti Da l 500 soldJ cro however veil tr ed a nd a rnx d a ga 1 not an enemy vo stly s ri or in n r nnd o rtllllaX Ilt oo a terra n vbich offe1-ed nothing but vngw hope ot a1p 11'icant loc41 • -t It aigbt aloo bavc eugs ested tbo t tbe Ageocy' • rcspoMibillty in the operation abould be drastical ly rcvtsed ond vould certo have reviealed that there vae no real plan ror the pOGt- 1 Dw eion period vbether for aucceas or rauure Existence 34 ot la rninga The Le test llnite I States Intelllgenee Bee rd o fiee or tlatione l Eatimates Md Otti ce of Curren t rnteUlgence stud ieB on CUba wail ol le at tluJ t t ime provided clear varn l cg that a call reappro 1S l vas necessary 35 Dut the atmoo-ph re vas oot conduc i ve to it The cbier ot t e proJoct and bio oubordiDato• had bee_ i aullJected to sw b gruelllng pre1 ures or baste 8 lld o ervork for ao long that t heir j i npettl 6 twd purpose ot drive ould have been d iff'icult to curb tor gucb o The strike preparations tmde r tlE povertul 1 n 'l uence t lle proJect ' s par8J ll lltcry chief to vhicll tbere a a no oti'e ctive counto rbalance bad gn J ned ouch o eration bad surged far t bce d of' -policy t 1 0 11 tbo t the The Cube n volunteen v ere 8Ctt1 ng •e r i oua ly rcet1 e and threatening to get out ho nd befor e t hey could bo c ommi t ted ot 'l'he Gw 1tc1nol an Government _ WOP 8LCA B1• TOJ 0'89RB' f liSS urging the- Agency to t o ke a v ay its CU oo na vo s hard upco the Co ribbeo n T be roo pprai ool The fflil'ly seaaon never happened thoush tbese very factora vbich helped prevent it should bo ve varned the A Je»cy Of 1t• DCC60 1ty 36 The o Adve rse ractorc • ere compouo d and e-xAcerbated by policy rcstl 1ct1oo o that k opt ccal Dg ooe upon other out a period of voekc o nd r ight up until the point 'lbese- caused successive confusioo plo D ntna or no returo ¢l l0 Dges end piled up oore Rapidly accum ul 8 ting ntreca Cs 1n our op1nion co used the y opera tore to l oH al gbt of tbe fact that the mt t rgin ot e rror van v1nzy norr ovt ng o nd had e ven ve nbhed before tbc fo r¢e vu a cODOllitted At ome point in thia degenerative cycle they s hould have gone to the Preeident e nd said tr u Jtzy Ile re ore tbe fc ct s Tho operation 6bould be halted We request t'urtber instruct toe a Consequences of C ncellatiou J7 Cancel 1At10n • ou l d have btt n ea harrAasing 1be b r i gade could not bave bcon held tw Y l onger in a rcod y statuo probabl y coul d not have beien held at all t heir dJ 1s e ppointJrent far and vidq Its cembera would have sp -e d Deta J 5e ot multiple security leaks ill this huge operat100 the vor l d al ready knew obout the prepartlt i on $ and t be Gove rru ient' G and tbc Asc ncy' s emba rra 1 61 dnt vould have been publie - 59 T8P 8B9JllT AIOP CFSf 82 38 llovc ver cuncello tion ould have ver-ted failure vb 1ch brought even ao rc cdsorraenen eorrted death and aisery to hundreds deetro ·cd JOi l l 10 ls ot doll ors' vortb ot U S roperty t10 1 aerlouoly dtllna g ed U $ prestige 39 1be other poselbl e out OCIO -- tbe ooc the proJcct a t rove to o ch1eve -- va t 1 o succeccful br igade l n t bouc1ne the Revol utionury- Counc il but tsol h t cd from tbe rest oi' CUba b sve cp s e od CUtro•s tor ea ArM- vcre held 1D readiness fOT 30 000 Cubono who were orpect ed to mo ke t he 1r tlu-ouab tho C stro Ube rs to re 6ru y vo y wumned on l wade the ova zpo to rally to tile Bxcept for tb 1 6 e ore une vare or turf planD 1 Dg by the Ascncy or by tho U S Gover o 1111' mt for thia Guccesa 40 lt io beyond the scope ot tl io report to •uue•t vl Ot U S a ct OD might ba'f'C been t eltc D to consolldote --tctory I but ve can conf i dently assort that tho Agency bl Ld no in telllgonce evide nce tb o t CUban 1n signitico nt ma bet's could or would Joln tbe llltvadere er that tberc -as 40 1 k1 cd of an ettect i't'e Wld cohesi ve rooiotance move- oont undor o oybody' 1 s control let I lone the Agency• s tha·t could have tu rnitihed 1 ntcrnal leadership tor an upr al ng i 11 011pport o the 1Dvnaion 7ne consequences of a succcs ot'ul lodgment unlesa ove rtly supPQrted by U S ll J 1Ted for ces vere dobiouo • c - 6o - • • '· O'OB C QCPJ11 ' T AP 980 tEI The Choice fil Tbc choice vaa bf tween retreat itbout booor and a ble l etvccn ignom1 D1ous defeat and dubious victory The Agency cbo e to galltblc 4t rapidly decreaol ng odd 2 1960 Tbc project bad lost its co rt nature by J 'oveabcr Aa it continued to gro operat10ll81 security beco c more o nd JII Ore diluted For re tbao three llOUths befo re tbe invasioo the A zrican press vao report ins orten v ith come o ccuro cy Qn the i-ecru itillg CLDd t rai ning o Cuban - Suell masslvo preparat1®• could 004' be laid to the U S The Agency's UAD '' • treely linked vitb these e ct1Vit1ca Plausible deni a l wos a pa thetic i llusion 43 fl Dlabten e on odher i ng to t he fon alitiea imposed by non -atiributabil ity v hich no loc ge r ex ieted produced absurd- ities and created obstacles a ad del Ays or For example t be uoe obsolete and i nad C quate B-26 o ircra tt 1 o otea d of the more efficient A-5s or-1g1 n4 lly request ed Va G a coneeesion to oon- uttributab1l1t y lo'hich ho m X't-ed the opera tion acverely A cert un type or surgl cal tent requested for tile loading bescll vas not supplied becouse it could be traced to tho U S A certain til O rn r ifle wo a- not supplied for t ho fl reuaon although several tbouao od of tbe11 bad recently been declared surplus ID be end o a could bave beeo foreseen everytbi»g as traced to the U S - 6 8f Oti9Pii' 44 U $ poli cy collcd for e covert Ol cro tton and assigned 1L to t ' e OlP'ncy charl m d to band Le such t bJ na lben tile proJect becanie bl c- n to every ne vapaper reader the Agency obould huve tntorlm d b1gllex author i ty t hat 1t ·as no lon ier O crotihg v1tbin it 0 charter Bad nat icmal policy the n called tor coot1nu- e tioo of the overt effort under a Joint natioruLJ to ok tor cc vostly greater m U -povcr resources would ha ve boen 0 -a11Able tor tbe t n -o sioo and the ncy could bave pe rt'ormed an effective uupporting role ' 'be cootl y de oyo • - r ienced by the Ag ncy 1D negotio tioa for eU Ort tram t bo o nred Gerviceo vould b ve bee-n avoided P1eoen al Policy 45 ID the beetle weeks before the st r ike policy wac being ton ied piecca eal and the 1 cposition ot successive restrictions va s contracting -the margin or error 'l'be l as t or t be$e reotric- t l ve decisiCJJ G caoe f'rom tile hesident vheo tbc b rigade 9 already 1n - u boato 110v JJg tov -4 the Cu 'b3u ahore Bad it C e a fev bours earlier tlle inva1Jion might bavo been avert ed and lOS$ df life and prestige avoided i 6 Ir ro ml pa TG OIIU Dl ng the final strlli pl an l n dbtoil and emphas h ng the Vital neceosity o r the D-Day oir at riles bad been prepared o nd left vitb tbe President and bis ad vi sore 1 ocluding the J'oillt Chief's vitb a reques·t for vri tten cont1rnl 3 t1ou t l'IAt the plan had rec eived full - - 62 9 8 P SRClltr i - • 'f -OP £ 9 1-l B W «miprehonsion ond approvo lJ the c ulm tr o t 1ng incident vh1ch prec eded the loea or tbe Cu bo o br1ga de Right ocver bave hllpperu d 47 We o ro inforn»d thot tb1# took place as follovs Ctl tho evening of 16 Aprll tbo l'rc•1dent l ru trucwd tile Secretary of State t hat the D-'01' y strikes cct f ot the toll T-'lllg oorn iDg eboul d be cancelled unleao t here vere ove rriding considero tioru to 11 1 -toc him ot Tbe Secretory Ur en intor d tbe ·Deputy OJ rector of Centra l Intelligence the Director beiog 1 sent f'l'OJI '11Mhingt001 and the Deputy DI rector Pl llzl3 of this a c1a 100 offering to let tbe a call tht President at Glen Oro 1f they v1obed Tbey ferrod not to do so and t be Secretary concluded fr D this that they did n ot bel ie •c the st r Lkes to be vita l t o s uccen 8 Borlier that evening tile p ojcct cbtct •-nd bis Jl 1'8• IOilitnry cntet' had empbatic ll y varned tbe DD P to J noist 1 hat cancellation ot the Gtrikeo vou ld produco d 1 co Jter i'hus the oo P a ci Vilian v itho J-t m litary experte oce a nd tbe DOCI rut fur Foree general did oot follov tile Vice of the project ' a po r1' lmil1t ry cb1 ef a spec1e J 1 ct in omphib1ou o oi era ti oJl 8 tbe Prclident n ade tb is vital la at-- 1 nute dec1 iO l vitbou t di ' ect contact v itb the n illtary chiefo of' t ho inva lio n operettOD - 63 - re ' ' SRCBRT 1· • • · •• And 2 1'9 a The Pn 1ide it CO ' s 8R I never have been clearly a4 Yised or the need t or coli1 ll6 0d o the air 1D o n al IPbibious operation like tb 1 e cme T'oe OD P iO s a 1 1are that at least tvo of the P're-eident 1 e 4UtN' Y d vuors both rer bors of tile J oint Chiefs did not Wldors to nd tb 1G principle This llLight 'ell have served to om the DD P U at tho Preeideot need d to be Japreoood coot otl'On 1t h tb o principle by moons of c formal vr1tten oam m1ca t1on u advl sabilit7 of e ccepting tho 811d alao hav• al erted b1Jo to Sccreto ry'6 in 'ito tion to ce ll tbc President direct 50 I the project's pe r- Ut r Y chief aa Leader ot the o ·ert military ettort had a ccompanied the DDCI and tho DD P to tbe me•ting vith the Secrcta ry he mJ g lt bave bro g lt atrong persuaoion to be r on the dec1 1 00 51 Thi e te tetul incident 1n ou r op1n1on resulted in part troa failure to ct- rcW te fonut-1 -plarm ing pepero toget her 1th request s for s pecific com'irml t1on Sblf'ts 1D Scope 52 The general vagueness of pol i cy o nd dixection pel' '11 lttcd cootl nual stu tting of the scope e nd scale the pro ect that 1s the tn e or oper t1onal plw lnl ng cOOJlllOJ' ll y referred to as playing it by ao r and th l e 1n turn led t o vartou a kind $ ot difficu lt1e$ a bout people money o uppl1eo and ba3co 53 A stuf'fl ng gu1da -prepo rcd in May 1960 listed • total of 235 persoonel re lu l rod for the fores eeable future 107 bel Dg - 6li - i'8J' ou board 228 3CCJt£1 By SeptcmboJ· the strcogth had been bu l lt up to In Oct ober anotbcr ot«fting gu ic e ll•ted a tote I of 363 positions By tbe end of the proJect wa 4 - • ere l6Q people 1n 1ng 1n 588 people tile M lw vere vork- ro I i 'lbe orlgilJal plan eontcapl nted 200 to 300 a cont ingency force con siderod ulO e Cubana 84 Dy mid -Jul ' a force of 500 -e s being In early tlovembcr th-0 plA a wae to w e l 500 ioon and there w s talk of ae 118 0Y a a 3 ocx br1go de of 750 as agreed upon 664 by tile end of Januo ry tr81 D1Dg nw il ere I 3- In early Deced er a Ito atre1J81J V1l8 built up to By 17 'arch t ile ground force s 1n Jly 26 Mi rcb equ l t tor l 6oo IIOD Md been ordered o od tbe actual brigade etrongtb on 6 April • • 1 390 Such cbo ngeo made it very difficult for tbe a PPQ21 ing e011po tc pcrtieul o r tbe Office of 1 ogtstiea tuid Developnent Project Divieion vbo were not given much lead time 55 'l'be original catllaote tor the prc ect anttcipoted expendJ turoo to the toti l of $4 400 000 during tile tvo f iocal years 1960 and 1961 On 24 J t rcb 1960 $900 000 tor tbe balenee oi F'laeal Year 196 1'b1 $ - t -as releMed WM eXJ Coded vitbi D a IDOllth and an o dcU t1ono J million dol l o ro releaocd to Al Ty the project to the end of June 56 In August a bude ct vaa presented for FiBeal Year 1961 vb ich amounted to $13 000 C lO By December $ll 300JOOO l l d · - P8 t• BB8HB 70R ' RC been oblitl ted and en additiocal $28 200 000 ve s requooted 30d authorized In P Y iy 1961 o n dditional $5 000 000 to uiet obligations incurred The total aaou nt ot v t'LO requcote d r ODeY ro r tbis project for P'i tcal Ycorn 1960 61 instead of $4 t oo ooo voo re tb lD 5l $116 ooo 000 When tbc proJt ct et8rtcd it vas not realized that baa es vould be needed at Uocppo Itle nd Key W'cst M U 1 U ond Ope-loclw Florid Nev Orle ana Puerto Rico Pa nmna Guatetal 4 e nd Nicaro gua o o veil as 1 nnwnere ble oofe hou oco and other fa c111t1eo Consequently tbe proJect ouftered bees ow t iea wero not reo dy' vheo t eeded or tbeoe factll- Tbe W-1 Di v1 e 1on lo unched into a large 3ral UUta ry- ·proJcct without ti b IMs the boats the experienced pe ro adlite ry per aonnel or a complete J l d 6uff1cicnt plan tmd never re1 1 cnugbt 'Jl - 66 J£ 0 2 S E C Jt £ I T OP G 6139' Ft P 1' B MI AMI OPEl lATDrG JlASE l 'J'h e confused relR-tionships be t een W 4 li eadq_uari ers nnd the fo r- a rd ol era ting bMe i n the Miami e rea '-e-re h $1gnificant factor in the over•all rf6nn'l nce of project mi sion 1'he base 1 1aa act ivated 1 n l nte Apr il 1960 and vs a put 1n Minmi Dll inly because i t l M t he c h i ef' center of Cuban Tefu e es in the United States z From the oeginning too DD P ®a tus associates tool · a i'PD et and agai nst allowing this be se t o become more tho n a small ·• t organization and unt il Septemoer 1960 tbe base did little except c o rry on l ied c on ith the C b an x11 e organizations and U S l a i enforcelll nt agencie$ For o xomple t here as only cne paramilitary o1 ficer at the base dw ing t his period 3 'l be DD P'o Cbiet or Operation• vroto in June 1960 l recognize your need for 6ome opero t i on O l pe '6omlel in the d i'O E i o rea to servi ce e nd cocduct cer te in act iyities t here I n firmly opposed bovever to the grovth o1' an o --ganit ation -which -o_ul d represent A second headquarters or interirediatc echel on t bere At this same time the- DD P' a A seist ant f or Covert Ac t i on emphaslzed tbat tbe function of tbe forw rd operating base obould l one of coord 1 ne t10ll wi tb co ana ad r el llLioill in Headquarters 4 In A uguat tbe DD P vrote that be vas vorr-1 d o bcut • M1s ri1 a ad - rant ed t o be oure that re are oot duplicating t here M ' f'unc tions that at·e being p I'formad in Head quarters - 6·1 W O P s tRE f- Ji'or i' 8 f 8 E 9 ii B P ln t j Qee I o m not quite clcCLr vbat are the dut1ea of the PM type t berc ii nee this component is neither a headqoortera nor a train Jla bat llatiou uor even e t or4r'd c d poot Al d 1n enotber mcJtO m llovooar he again urged t hat ' flf 1 be eopecie lly co ret l l to ovoid o ny duplication o t effort between iu-1 and Bea4quartcrs Duplieatl on 5 or Ettort By tllia' t ime' t bel'C -• plenty q e rters 8ll4 tbe M1sl d ot duplic nt 1on 1 88• ba4 beC loi - 4 1n i u y llead - po ral J el qr overlapping operationa ed ere e rCn C 'IIOtiDg i th • other Both co opoMnts band 11 ng U kinds of 410Dto 8lld in Coe co see the ' ' ones 'IM actirtty tbe t Mi o - 1 414 not get U to vao 1r operattono but even hero it necesBe r1 ly had a role in M8llY of t e cl 8ndllat1ne air dropa 6 'alere vau « a nno l feeling forvaor-d bllae existed sol el¥ st J r e r • tbnt tbe tor support and t rt KeadC rtera vu 1n tbe be et pot ltion to handle o raticnB becm ac it hi d ready ti CCeea to policy gut once 001d rust ro dio e ommuntco tion n to e nd f'rcm ll el c ment s or Tb is vi e' ignored tbc fa ct tbtLt S l Ch t lli caumm 1cAt1m vl tb Cuba was O lly by secret - n iting 8ll4 courier a that Miami W8J3 the tnO ll s ource of 1ntormt1-on poli- ticie D s e g cnta sold 1ore tor the p ojcc-£ that it vas· tbe logice l location for infiltrstton and exfiltrstion tbe t the b se t llrou gb the ca intenanco or effective l1 a1s oo hod the - 68 ' O P sz a a --OCO 8Bclttti complete coopcrt t ion of the local F BI the Border Patrol Inn ti_ gra tion Coast Gue r d FCC Cuotow lfa vy o nd pol ice otticio J s 7 Sx cept tor the Dir ector of Cent rD l Intelligence vho visi ted t he bace t op Agency officie ls concerned 11th t he proj ect did r ot have firot-hnnd kno-iedge of wh e t was being done a d vbat could be done at Miami Tne l imita t ions they- p1aeed on ba sc o ct1Vit1es had seriou s coosequeneeo For eX8 llp1e when t he resistance or gani zers being t ro 1 ncd 1n Guatemala were r ea d y to go into Cuba i n Septe Cber the ll'AX'1t 1cc co pa b111ty to in- filt rate thee did not yet exist B y the t il ne t he base had bu11 t up come capo b111t1es in Ya rious l ines Yalua b le m nt hs had been loot ' Ille Miami Vie 8 Ou t he other hc od there ·o1u G general feeling at tl1c baee t hat i t should be a st ation conduc·ti ng operations just as Havana as able t o do up t o tbe dat e hen d1ple mo t 1e rela- tiono vere broken off' vith Head quarter s pro•T1 d1ng support guiden e and _pol icy This vi e·• failed t o l ·ealizc t hat a stati on wit h several hundred people vould hove boen very dif icult t o conceal that i t would have coot e lll1111on dollars to m ye everyone t o M LIUU and that Hcodquarters i tould heve gotten into the oper ltJ ona anyho'lf due t o t he easy access tQ VJ a mi from Wat h1ngton 9 especio lly by t elephone The letter ct i nst ructions to t he b8 $e chief dated 6 Oct ober 1950 wo pretty vagu e 2 9 P It s t'lted that he ' toul d ha e 8 B 9 HEW T 8B ft 3I authority over all pro ject perso el and rcspon$1b1lity for the super v101on of' a ny proj ect activiti es conduct ed thr ough the Miwnt a 'ea froti o t he r areas It autbo riz ed him to u s e per onnel mt r1el fsc111ties and funds for the accompl1sbir ent of t he ne over-all Aaency mission •as made re pons1ble to he chi ef or the proJect 10 The f i rot intelligence FI case ofUcer reporte d to the baae i n September 1960 and proceeded to a c quire train and di rect agenta At tho t ot tbe invnaion the Miam1 Ba Ge ba 4 31 FI agents ill CUba o ll of whom vcre r porting and a ll of lfhom had been recruited by the base 'E'le CI section U Tb c ounterintelligence CI sect ion began to £unc tion 1n mid- July 1960 By the ti Ile of t be strike this sect iou bad 39 carefu1ly select ed highly- educa ted Cubo ns trained a case officers to form a future Cu ba l Intel ligence Service a l so 100 select ed Cubt os trained as 1 -ture CI officia ls and civil governm nt offici ls also a reserve of 100 old er non- political 1nd1·v1duals t r a i ned e s 12 Thi reserve i ntelligence corps paramHi te ry l'N secti c n as O Oad in late June 1960 vith officer His job - ras to conduct liaison with the Cuban leaders 1n ordfl r to obtain 1-ecruit s f or the Guat eoola camps A second PM ot'f icer l'eported in August and at tb1 time t here was a beg1nlling o an at mpt t o 1 nfiltrate ar r1B - 70 - 1 81 S E Cl £1 I e a-unition end pe soonel int o Cuba cl andest i nely by boat f'hese were the FM t ypes Mhosc dut ies had eysti ried tb e DD P There iere also two roo rititoo type •• who - el·e training t he cr cv oi• a bQrro·wed small ·ocat tor c landestine tr1p8 13 By 15 lfovem b cr 39 people had been assigned to the l' d 6llli b8 $e 1n addit ion to 44 people from the Agency' Offie of Comm ln1co tions rn addi tion to cu ppo rt elements t h re '-'l ' re sections £or propagand e FI CI pol itical action and PM 1li- By 15 April 1961 t he base snci its sub- bnae had J 6o person aes1gned ac followG 10 J 'I 5 CI 2 l'olit1coJ Action Propae anda 7 25 26 support lli- Seeurity Co»m nico tions Miscellaneous FM 68 3 15 While the Ravnno Stat ion as stil l operating Miami Ba Ge vo s in close touch With it by cou rier e nd socure comm mica tionc When Havana Ste tio n ' 18 $ c losed Miami expected t o take over t he s·tay-behi od e ssete such as they were took ove r t heir control llo-wever flead q uarterG Miami concent r ated on t he tro 1n1n s o nd i nfiltration of a gents FM support Rol 16 In PM acth1 t i es cont rol ·as tightl y held by Iree dquart ers and the PM section o f' -the bese va lim1 ted pret ty - m tch - 71 I UP o F CHEl PQP BtiOP EP to Jll'QY i l ing stq p0rt in recru1t1Jl6 eoldierc and ' rU ' l ning small bout operatioll 6 Th1 s t i ght control oeant that 'the PM oN'icers at 'the baoe looked to Jfuodquartert fo r guido nce rattier than to the chtet or b u e ' he PK on 9tber oect1ooc hod their mm cbe nnelo tQ Head quu rters o nd tbio l ed tQ u neor trolled act ion and considerable confusion b o se ot PK orttcers in lCey lest a sub- tiwn 1 1 e l Go sou etimCt com 11un1co ted directly lfit h Head- 17 Ther e are o L leged to have been caeeo i n which a Headquarters de_ 1sion vii s conveye d to th6 Base by three persons a il 1J l t$neously eo ch over the t elephone 'Die result o f thiG was t hat t he base bo d an enorn aa s J y h1gb phone bill a nd the be so chie t ott cn wu not in f'ormed of events until after they wer-e over if at all 1 8 The Y 16111 c e se officers retaine-d their e gcnt 1 es long ns the ogonts - ei o e portiDS by secret vrit 1 118 Oncf the agents reported by radio they were taken over by Ee dque rtera Thia a• resented by the Miw ii c e officers vho t hey vere in the best posit i on to el t t h a knOv the agents Mv1 ng r ecruited and trained them 19 case officers in Readqu e rters on t he otb er hand telt th t YJ ami ca e officers tried to stea l their a gents lib en· they paot cd through t he Miami o rea One ogent vho v1 s1ted • - ' 'l' - 1 - p O L S _h C fu s ' ·• •· - » C F O L Clt i l i i'Ur beyond ·ho t the case officer i-n Miami had off ered The b llGe vac not informed o t these promises until the ae ent tnention-ed t hem For th next aeverM Jr onths t his articu 14 r ugent was unma ne eeebl c and vould not even I Yttb the Miu mi cMe officer ll'his tas n aturo lly vie red os Headquo rters meddling kx8 Illl l es of' Contus1on 20 Cnsc o i c ers in Miwni al so felt t ho t t hey were W tduly he ndicapped in that Headquarters vao not only co ll eting 1th them but also revieid ng their a ctions Yhich was comethlng like ploying a g axoo Vith the 'UJi ll ire on t he otbe·r team · It is doubt tul t hat a renev1ng co nent can D'ltl1nta 1n obJecti Vity ' ' fheu it is u1ao competint rttb t he component who$e act1v1ties it 16 re Vie 1 ng 21 lw nei·cus exwnples could be cite d to illustra t e the confusi on thnt xisted The d1V1ded control over maritiree o_per-o - t i ons 11 discu8sed else here i n th1a po per There vac an ex- pensivo fiasco over s ome special l ubr-1 cuting 011 additive intended f'or sabotage use L l Cu be The organiutional arrangement made necessary hundreds of telephone calls e nd cab les l'hicb ot herwise ould not ha ·e been sent a nd tbe areas for unc rt 1nt y and misunderstanding 'ere s·til l c onsldc r b-l e For l' 'X1L'nple s Miami cable of 15 February r e ferred to un a gent me ssasc wtd nsked Does Headquart er$ intend to an sver a nd erre na t h16 opc -at ion ' - 73 T er 8B8 1 lJ T 9 8 SBB J E'l' The general situation also led t o en ext rJlordinary 22 nlmlbe r of tempo r-aJ •y dut y tr ps back and forth between Wasbiugton nd Mi e m-1 These '-'ere not only expensive but -dded e gr e t many problems i n the vay or s upport e od tccurity I n December 196o the base chief pointed out to Heo d - 23 quarters that tb c base needed nclo r1 fica t io o and specificat i on o'f the requirctoonts i t is e xpected t o fulfill und taake that i t is expected to r e rform together W'ith t he 1nve bmnt of sufficieut authority and dis cretion for the o-perat1onal act ion vbicb Cl 1y be involved In M u-cb 1961 he pointed out that t he base ould velcoDX more p1·ec1se requirements for i ts agents t bo n bad been rece1 -ed U P to that titte in the int erests of making efficient U8e of them 11 24 13 y 1961 he wrote a memorandum en control of denied- area oper ations '-'hkh pointed out t hat tuture operations should eit bex be coo tr olled from Beadquo r t ers or from a forward operating base but th8 t the divid ed cootrol whi ch had ex1s ted d uring t he project had resulted in pa -a llel s orr et ill1 s dupl1ca t 1ve and con f lictine effort s and in ope-rational rela tio 'lsbips which were comr et1t1ve wi thout U r pose and sometilr es ¢•U lti l -' Woducti• e 25 The 1o $pectors agree that tbi diVidetl effort repre$ented an ineffective and uneconomical use oi' time money and materiel a nd less t han rraximum utilization of Agency empl oyeeQ plus unexploited delayed or poorly coordi nated use of Cub1 -0 a gents and asset s - 74 Q OI BIS RB ' i 9ii0 P ti' Q lQ H Ill'fflLIGmC E SU l'ORT J '1'hc WH Brnnch had not only the r-eaponcibili ty 1 or the Cu bo n proJeet but a loo the norm l are duties or a geograph1cel unit 1n the Clandestine Semeo B oideo being cons1dere a task tor f Vith the aisaioD ot overt lffling the Castro government it oleo had the Headquo rtel'o desk reoponaibility tor Cube 1n cllldin g support ot Eavana Station OJ '1 d Sant i o go Base u -- til the break in diploma tic relatiooa 2 'l'h1• arrangecent required im 1 ' • 1DtcU1genee FI section to collect i ntelligence on CUb not onlt ror the tsok i orcc vitb its s-pec1al rcquirecents but al so tor the entire U S int ellige nce comnunity ''1th ito di v n·se and l ong r ango nec lo 3 • • 1bc 6ect1on vas pl o gued ''1th pe 'eoMcl shorto gcti from t he sta_ -t but as long a s the U S E llbusy in Ha -ana tt rained open t hus nu ring coam ln1co t1ons i t received o nd processed 6 good yield or intel 11gence troa CUba1 ch1efi y on political economic und Comatniet Party mattero Late in 1960 t he sectjon a s dire ted to i la ce emphasis on m1 Utary 1nfon- ation but it f wnd that 1t5 ngent • In Cuba lacked neeess t6 high-level oili• tary a ource 4 The FI section trunumitted cop l es 01· a l l t ho r eports it processed to the pe r llli litary scclion t -S veU as to the reat of' 1te regular i ntelligence cuctomers • 75 · XQ P 9 8 8 BI ' - 'OP SECR SI The let in Uo vo na 5 Tne 8ecti on devoted considcrAb1e crrort to Stq port1ng Hn•ray a Station t n preparing ita a gents t or etey behinci roleo in the event of 6 bl'lak In d1plomt1c re1e t1ono Whoo the eabaaay finally closed on 3 Janunry 1961 the otntion hsd • mgl e net tor posit ive 1ntelli tencc It COlapriaod aome 2T persons l5 of' vbom vcro reporting a e ents nd t he reot radio operators cutouta and courie J •s 'lbe principal e gento and one of tac radio opc r atore vere U S citizens and thus hM doubt tul irtatus «tter the break Ill relntionc 6 In ptci nbcr 1960 as the mi litar- 1 invasion concept va s beginning· to ga1h asecndancy in project planning the chief of tne proJect created a C-Z uni ' But Instead of plnc lllg tlli a unit direct ¥ under bimnelf as a proJect-Vidc unit and making i t c cw et a x ellit er of his 1 mitJeditl te c ta f'f he p 1 t it in the param Llitary section under tho aggrcst 1ve YArine Corps colonel fbO bee one the pro-amilit o r y u nit chief ut about tb o t ti J E 1- Al Ch 1c t' 01· this lov-eche lcn int elligence unit oa e Wlu lyscs were to ba· e important inf'l uence on a o action vitsJ J y aN ccting no tional ••curity und prestige rf lt bN l bt 1n on of icer ot undoubted abil i ty but of limited experi enee 1n par 1'11 lit3XY and FI operati one It v-a s o gr ave error to plo cc t trla G-2 UUt 1n such a Lru bord 1Mte position 1n t h project a nd this e rror produced t he serious • consequences desc ribe i beloY - 6 Jil 6 f 8 TOP SEC fi _ F mcti on or G-2 Un 1 t The po remil1ta ry C-2 unit consisted of rour off'icera and ae verM cecretar1es r t e principal function '-'Ss to pr epare sources of 1n1 onr u tion i ncl ded in o dd it lon to the FI aect 1on 1s repor ts pb ot cg ruphic intel ligenc-c CtLrtographic intelligence S cc 14 l 1ntell igence 8 l Qed cervices reports and llleSsuges r Ccived f'roc the pa re Ulitary cce ion' s o· m ag nts- in Cuba Reports· t'X'om the anned t erviooa ve-r e procured rapidly through • direct intol D'Al liaisop ro the r than th rough the Wi'Ual slower 9 In -arious vayD the functi oning of the regular FI Gection 'lf i Ch vo s direct cy under the project chief ve s 00 Yers · affected by t he po roml lita r-y· Q- 2 unit 10 The PM unit nb$ O rbed the avail Abl e l C x-sonneL chief of t he n section '6 8 not 1 nvited t o ut te d The WB 1 st a ti toeetings and ror sectU'i ty r ea cons lie ne·i'e r had acceeo tO WH 4 r c 'ar rooo L'uring t he final v eks t he FI section va a not pertrltt ed to exe cine tl1c FM section' a 1ncomine O Ct-ational cables for possible posi t i ve 1ntellisen ce content Tb n sect i on chief did not have a cl e ara J ce for photog ropbic intelli ge nce lack of 11 There f8S L1e 1zon no close l ia i ton between the t o sectione end t his resul ted in some duplic i t1on 1n preparation of reports - 77 - re1 j ' SYC RRlf •' - ·' - --f'V 5 - 8RB1• by the DD P because neither occt io n ould l earn or requested the req1 o cst a oode of' tbe other Until t he end of 1960 the tvo sec tions 'ere l1ouucd in different build lngs 12 1110 moat serious consequence of tbe th1r•d -echelon position of tho 0-2 unit es that it concentrat ed in t he hands or the unit chief the du al fuo ction of rece1V1ng al l the infor- mo tion nvo ilo ble from Govern nent-wide sow·c-cs inclu d 1ng that from the agents ot hia own po r o military section and of i nter- preting a ll thece dato 'or the purpose of •UW lo'ing intellig once support to the variou a invasion ple ns 1 3 Interpretation of intellige oce affecting t he s t rike force aspect of the operati on as thua entrusted to offi cers o1ho w-ere $0 deeply engaged ill prepars t1ons for tile invaei on the t t heir Ju dg DeDte could not ho vc been oxpect d to be altogether objective 'l'hi s cir umst ance undou btedly h ad a otrong influence on the procesa by vhich WH 4 arri ved at the concl usion t ho t the landing ot the $trike force could ®d 'ould t r igger an uprhing a nong the CUbao popule ce This conclusiuo ill turn became an e ssontial element in the decision to proceed vi t b the opera t io J s it took th'3 plaeo or the original concept no longer oaintainable that the inva iou lltlS t o be undertaken in support or exi stint and ef£ec tive guerril la f'orces 14 Irrespective of t he validity of that conc lusion it is clear ·that the interpretati ve al'la lysia should b ive been made not • 78 - TOP SECP Q by the pe-rsons who • 1ere orkl ng day and night to prepare t he 1 nva sion but by an obJect1v aod d isintereoted sen101· interpretat icn specialist from the Agency ' s F Staff or from 1 0 Offioo of Current Intelligence In tell igcnce Support Vacuum 15 Anot her seri ous error in the field or intelligence aup rt wos t hat Miami Dase received e l Qost no intelli nce support f rom the Irea dquo rters G-2 oection This ma • be attributed to tile facts that the paromilitary chief va nlmost complete · preoecul i ed v1th the strike force pre ps re tions end that bis subordinate G-2 as not eiven proJect- •ide responsi- bilities o nd to the rigi d security rest1·ict1ons u 'lder vh1cb the p ro mil it e ry secti on 'tl S expected to o rate as ''ell as to the general c onf'uaion in the ore o n1ze t1onsl posit ion of the Miami Be se 16 This ser ious support vacuum at Miami 'tl s compounded because the bace in spite of its lo rgc size and the 1·oct t hat i t wes deep • engaged in i t s O'llll operations i u Cubo hnd no intellitence support sect ion ' lllere as uo single of ficer or v n11 coorge l with respons1b111ty for interpreting tbe considerabl amount ot intelligence derived directly £rom base sources ond fro n Speci al Intelligence 17 Furthermore no photographic intelligence oo'tlS twt ilable to Mi ni ll ase hich had no of'ficer vitb e clearance enti t ling • 79 · S OP 1Z0 J3'f • - 1 6 him t o rece1·ve it SCCftJ _ '1'11cre was aubetanti ol ly no intelligonce support coveri lg tbe CUbo o beach areas or the political sit uation lnGide C ibo There veo no e nalyeie or interpretation of Spec1al llltell1gonce and tho re vtui no l chenimn to c U c ritical mteria l to e n yone' o e tt entioc 18 'l 1le result ot tbi B h1sh ¥ defective otate of atf 1ro vae tbtJ t individual Miami ce oo ottieers vcro torccd to rely upco their own 1Dterpretat1011 of true sepan te 1 Dtell ise ce reports t notead ot ho vi ng th 1 o 'l IO terial inte rpreted by sp S ta Ust$ tw them· Tbey vere not given a number of other 1te or opere tiocal intelligence vh1c b vere in c xistence 1D the CH 1lll1t or the paromilitacy ocction at l llo lquorters • 00 • 1 9 P G89ttB tf G Q 9 tl £ 7 l 8 P I 'i'HE POLrI'I CAL FRO iT AUD TlJ2 RELATIOtC OF CUDAl1 S TO TUS PROJ'BC'l' 1 'rhe CubWl opposition front e s conceived by the Agency in consultation with the S tate Depa rtmen ves to have the fo l lowing character stt • a Full rcGt oratton of the' 1940 CuOOn constitut i on b Return t o the basic pr-1nc1ple G of the revolution as enunciated 1n the 1958 C O rncas Declare tion c Pro•Western and strongly ant1-Coomuni$t or i entation d l'olit1CQ1 complex1on rru ging ti-om n itttle to the right of center to ooroo hat lett of center e Ability to 1 Just er the 'brcadcst posdbl e support fr«n the Cuban population 2 'l'be functions of such a fr mt organization '· ere conceived to be e A co veT for covert Ac ion against the Castro regiille b A cata J y - t ana a r allying point fo - anti--C stro groups var iously l'C X rted t o nu nber 178 18l O 211 c A possible nucleus f or e proYisionsl government o f Cuba tol lowt 'tg Castro ' s dovnfall 3 The t erms of l'eference thus e xcluded fo llowers o f t he f'onncr dict ator Ful geneio J3at i st 'rll y also excluded ext rel ie leftist $ - Sl p 8 Beftf l'f woe saea B P 4 ExclM1on of t he l3a t1stisnos and other Ultre -cona erva tives C8 used one kind of p r obl m · Ma ny of the exiles bad been Ba tieta fo llover r1cb u nd had asaets such as boate a Mo ny of t he ere l Ud toilover6 llhicn could be used Some bed lllilitery expe iencc Some of them hi Ld An erics n friend $ who vere 1nf'luent1al enough to urge their cla 1 ms to cons ideration U 'On the White House Tbe Left tot Fringe 5 Exclusion f tbe to r-lcf't hinge c8W ed o nothc-r kind of problem It was bard to te'l l hov f'ar •1er t 80 00 pertio s ere And BOlll e of those wbOse polit ical acceptabilitY VM qtiCGtionab l e • neYertbeleee clo 1 med such sub6tant1U f'ollowing inoide Cuba t ha t it VM 1tficul t to ignore the m 6 In foJ 'Il' ing the Frente Revolucionorio D m x rati co FRD the Ag@cy focu eaed 1to attention pr1oc1pal J v on personolitieD Castro's government o nd grou ps who b8 d either pe rt1c1 patcd in or supported his revolution but had -become dia 111-usioned and gone into opposition 7 ln ea -ly 1959 the n a · rana station 10 S alrea dy- assessing a Vidc variety o f anti-Castro persono litles '- itb vhom i t VM in contact In l l--J 959 a station ei ent var OXJ loring the X SSibili ty ot covert support to the M ontccri Gti 1-' ovement of Justo Asencio Carrillo Hernandez 8 ln the m1d-1950s the Montecr1sti group bed been acti ve tl8ai lst l3at1stu who exiled Car dilo -·- ' • · -· • r_or 4 He r etu 'il e d after the 82 6Be· n '80P revolution to QIJ £1 tsJce $11 11111 0rtont bonk ln g post bu t f'ou '1d Castro 10 Coa wliat Undenciee intolerable and '--eft t inW opposition aga 1 n lUe group 1e deeeribed tu l1bero l o r d progrec81ve bu_t reJcctina any ncco '1l0dllt1oa th Communism ' be 9 Carrillo l 8 D Organid Dfl ecnrltt ee one of 6cvcrel Cub8ll figures 'Whom -tbo Nt oncy J nduoed to de ect i n late J 959 or tho early u ontlul or Othere vcre Manuel Francisco Art1 me Bucaa Jose Igiw cio 1$60 --- Rasco Ber mudcz and •Mo nuol Antoni Verona LOrcdo It 80 the6e ' tour who Gfter long ncaot i ationn tonned the organiz a lttee of tbe PRD J n l' 'l' 10 coa• 1960 Artime who 1G otill under 30 Joined Castro ' s tr10vcoent as an o nti J3 et1ata student Under in tructionn t'rOm -the CtLtbolle Cburch he organized a group of 000 Catbolic Action •tudent G to go ih the t annero ' hel p eg linfrt Bo tista expressed tbAt be Mo·1eme» t 8 8 'l'bo v i ev he o been tbc Jesuit ' penetrt1 tion of the 26 July Ce tro gave him e bia h poot 1n Nat1cna l Agrarian Reform Inot 1tut e D1RA 'rom -bicb he resigned otter t en 110nth to ron the 'J wement to Rccove r tbe Rcvolutio i coopose I in p or his ronoer Catbollc Action fl llovers Tlils exile oppoeition g roup provided o large proportion of the recruits tor t he strike to ce u 1a f l Rasco a college and univer sicy cWo•te of C st ro's lavyc r und history pro ressor •deocribed 6 a nice young 83 il 0P 81 0 illiW 'f8 F eeer stfI n tbe f o ll o f lntel lect WL L vithout mch talent for action 1959 be beccu e the firG't president ot the Cbriat1e n rat1c Movement MDC an anti•Conwn ut1$t Ca thollc g roup wtucb Cootro drov• underg ound in April 1960 at vhich time R co fled the countrf 12 ve rona ' c career in government and in opposition politics go • ba ck to the 1%'0s President D n-1 ng t he r aime of' Soc arrae be held aeveral 11 rport o nt posts 1ncludina that of prilllc minister and va s reOponsible · for ant 1-Communilt policic0- and mea auree Re coll boro ted vitl'I Ce stro until t Com uniat pa tt crn ot the ncv regime bec a e ev1dcnt cornne to tho u s 1Jl April 190 llcfore lc«ving Bavnn e he had presented- a plon tor Caetro'G overthrow 1nw eluding o uni fied oppoe1t1on end U S aid for developing pr0 8onda and milito ry capooilit io• 'l'he Political Spectno 13 Varona - as representative ot the ol der opposition parties Autcntico and Ortodmco which had sw'Vi •ed both Batis ta and Castro and vhich were roughl _v 1n t be tlddl e ot the p 11t1cal spectrum Artim ' s Ol tp also occupied a centrict position but its membereh1l as dro vn 1'rom the younger generation o u CU bans Carrillo e nd Rosco appeared to be a little left and a Uttle right of cen't cr res pect1vcl y - 8 Q Qp lii ii Q flBT - - 1J Tl uo t he original group o r orgo ni2 -ero reprc cntel ti t 1rly breed range o pol1 1 cal vievs They vere Joined i n June 196 o by AureUu-o Sanchez Ar411f O tho clatmed lead cr M p of the MA g Oup the inititlc l o11ib y rcpreoenting Asociru ion de kalgoa de Aurelleno Both Sanc te-i Arango d Verona cl61 ned to have conoiderable tollo ring in the Cuban lobor field S lllcbez A 'aJ'l60 Md his foUovorG appeared to have e«ue genez-al kno ledge of t be use or cle%J de St 1ne techniq_uca 15 11bcoe five o aoociated tbCJr Gel· es_ 1n 1oGu1 ng a m on11e to at Mexico City on 22 June l96o Tb1• docUlllont ca llecl '4 0n C Ubons other Latin k Derlcans o nd tbe vorld at large to help the FRD throv Co Gtro ' s dictatorship 07er- The FRD pl eotcd i tself t o c tabliab a representative democratic government Vi th tull civil liberties 191« Cuban uncler the eoru t1tut1on It pledged tree general election wit hin J 8 ®ntht or eetabl1Ghment ta provioional govel'lUIC l t a progru 16 or It propo oed to ban tbe Coll'l IUl 1tJt party and in et1tute socio l end eco' ' O dc progress tor all classes ot Cul l lls V t·ona 1 s outurit • and experience l ed to bie 6clocti on as coordinator i l effect general manager ot 'th FRI This lnreclietel ' prec1p1tat cd the res11 114tion of Se11el o• Arango end in turn led to the b eginning or prob l em in oot6bl1ohing ood lll intai n 1 ng FRD unity vb ich tbe project never tul l y so1ved • 85 • 9 8F ·' 9J'C ' R J S - T6 1 SL8FI E9 Ch 'lge in Pollc y 17 Tbe f'RD had or1gina Uy been conccl ved a s the e 1 tbrougb h1ch all of the project• e aid to t be Cuban ce uae vould flow However Sancbez Arango I s lolkout tb rab tened a loo a of M SCts and car obillt-1e o vhich the project vented to UJ Ye The r es-u lt vas expreooed as tollovo 1n a brie tirlg prcpe rod by l fJ 4 or ClNCLA 'IT 1n 1 ovember 1960 ln October vc Mde a change 1n operational llcy Heretofore we had kept o ·c ttorts cc tart' d dn tbe 11 » · QOvevcr ve vUl nov consider req ucsta tor po re a1 Uto ry aid tror or y ant1-caatro and ·DOD-3at11ta group 1nl1de or outside Cuba 'h icb can shov it has a ¢npabillty tor i aroa 111 t a 7 action age in it tile Castro regime vc £eel tl et I he oooi 1nat1on or our controlled por tary a ctio n under tbe Ji'JU aegi 'B ond the_lcooer-contl'ollcd operations ot othtr cu ban revolutionarie• brin g abou t e con s1cerable a ccelero tion of e otive e lt-1-Cn otro e YJ l'e OUons 1 t bin Cuba We vill in ·o ny event ho vc the lc•1er of suw rt as a cecb liem tor in luco cing the w ti 16tc Cllllrgence or one 1nd1V1dual or group u t ho pr1M ry fteuro i n t he anti-Castro community l 8 • Because Yt the gregariousness or CubM ex11e tbe project • U unable to pre 'e nt tb 1o change in pol icy frQ m becocing know to t he F RD exccutlv o committee --w r When t be ·· i t 'v 'Ji'CP GP P' 'fi Bender C roup no genero lly L'ld erstood by Cubo ns end w eny other s to r epresent t he Cl A bcgo n rcspondJ ns to request s i'rom and giving support t o defec t ors frQm t he FRD and to groups h1ch t he FRD coD61dDred pollt1cally uneceepMble the orge nize t 1on which ' 'O S Gupposed to be a 'Orld•- ride s ymbol of CUban treed om and -which w M being groome-d as the nucleus of t he next government of CUllo naturt t lly i'el t that its pre$t 1ge he d been undcrm l ri ed •Diffusion of E1' fort 19 This co llcated rele t1one betveen proJcct case office ·s D nd the FRD leo dc rs I t nl so appears to b aYe resulted in $ome diftu sion of effort in the attcapts at clandest1r in filtro t 1on of e r1 cs ond pa ramilitar r leaders int o Cuba I t seriously htu Jpe red progt•ess tovard FRD unity sharpene-d internal FRO ant o gonisn s and contributed to the decline 1n strike £oxce recruiting effo rt c 20 The compos1 tc poll tical complexion of the FRO shil'ted a 11ttl e t o the r1gnt in August 196 vi h the join1 ns of Ricardo Re to el Sardini a vho headed on o rge niiation called the J ovimicnto lt1•t H 11c1011al Democrntico MID - A s ource of fr i ction betveen t he fRD and 1to JlX -oject sponsorc was the effort to induce 1 t t o set up itc headquarters outside the U S 'I'bc Cu ban leade rt ere f inally persuaded by i'ina neial l e · rer e to m ve to Mexi Co City vhere t he V exi cw TOT CR J3 I or 988ft c J Covet nmcnt had a gre d ·t o be bosp1t®1 c -· ' ' Hou ci ng Md o ' ieo s pace • vere_o rro a scd tor the executive oomca1t 4- ee 111C llbcr end tbeh· tatrdlies and 'or a proJcet c a se office o nd hie cccretary - in Mexico City VM 1•eo et1Vated for cupport duties JMdc 22 However the Mexican Oovermoont appe -o not to have kept its vord and -tbe Cub verc PubJected to 8UM'e1l l Dce Witbin a fc v v cks '-t a ru1 0th he re esment that t he dtua t1011 to be c rt dont intolerable and cvc t' 'boey' m vcd ba ck· M1 u 1 vbich 10 were th• CUban e Wilted to be 1n tho tint 1'bc Bend er Group 23 PRD 2hc can respone1bl e for lGy1ng tho grow dc ork of the ar-rane1ng a lone ocri es of meetings MlOt e ' the CUbo noJ and per uad 1og tbeci to merge tbcir d U'ferenccc und• issue a Joint aant re to Ye G the cbiet ot the project'o political He vas knovn to the Cuban o nd 1 novi tel ly to tbc section The Bende r CroUp t or reasons ot 1 press as '1rank Bender plaus ible den1Gl p rp Tt d to be COllllX Sed of U S busl neaa- men vhc vented to hel p overthrov CCL6tro 'l'he Cuba n s do not tJet o to havt cared vbetbcr this '138 true or not bilt the guiee irrita ted tbeo because hey -anted to be 1n 411-ect touch vitb the U S 00 '0rnment at the higbest' level po3sible - 88 0P £ CCPET 70P 24 Oii RB lf Bende1· 1 linguio t1c occourpl1Ghmonta did not include Spe o1sb and this mo y havE diluted his effectiveness in dea lL'lS V1tbeubans 25 After the FRD 1'119 lounebed t ho bM41 ine of purely FRD o f'faira in Y cX1co City tU'ld later in Mio mi va s tu med over to a case officer Vitb fiuent Spanish and long experiCAce in La tin kner1cen art iro 26 However Dender continued to be 1dent1ticd vith the project i'bc PRO l ea ders' ante gonism toV'l l'd th-e Ecnder Group vaa ba PO cd vhen et tile t 1 'e of the c b 1n operational policy noted l bove lB 4 aouigned Bender t be reoponsibility of dealing vteb Cubon individuals and group• outoide of the 'RP f' -- ork ibc Rubio Padilla Group Zl One of the outside 81 0Ups the prOJ6ct Coot 1nu cd to vork vi th vu the Action Mc vettent 'or Recovery MAR beaded by Juen Padil le Uoc or tbi s conservative gr-oup of rich landlo rd G wao etroJl8 l y a dvoca tcd by Wi llio m D Pawley u n infl u- cntia l Mie d bun1nets man A paper p rep red by WS 4 tor the Dlroctor of central Intelligence• s u ae in briefing Sfflator Kennecy in July l 96 stated MIIR' s oWmu to a Videsprond resist e nce orgu ni ation needing onl y o r a and M'll I Wition - oa o rde -s to go into action an4 called t hc Y AR relat 100 hip e J110at encoW oging develop ment 6' · ' DQF 28 iiovever Rubio - 'e 6 too conservative for the 'RD's taste rotd the 29 8BCRE1 v m 1t 9 never 1ncorpore ted into the FRD An orgonii c tion which r-esiet ed 1ncorpore t1on 1n tho IB l wt1l Marc b 1961 ond hicb roe®vh1lc bad a stOl'lll ' r-cl Llt10n• ship vith the Be der Group v8 8 the Movimicnto Revoluciono r1o del Pueblo MRP headed by Manuel Anton J o · Rivero Roy had been Ce 3tro ' o m1 n 1ster of _public vorke until he 1ost h1G Job to Com nun 1st 11 He arri ved in this count ry 1n llovemtier 1960 and agreed to accept MS1 Bto nce fr the Bender Group but wiohed to 09 intain bi8 freedom o f choice Tho project ' s un1later Eµ use of Ray resulted in some succeaaful maritime operations 30 »ender I s efforts to e ct Ray to joi n the Ji'RD produced strained relations but in December· Ray agreed to accept r d lita ry aid through the PRD Rey 's program e ppeo red to be identical 'with ca tro ' $ but -ithout CoimlnUl 1Gm and 'Without hostility to tbe ·Unit cd St o tes Rey bec rune less intransigent as time went on o nd in February end rt arch 1961 M pro •tici Pating 10 tolks ' 1th l3ende1 · wid Ve J -ona on t he formation ot the Revolutiono r · Council 1'rhich be u lt1ms tely Joined ' 'here seew s to be no substance to alle • aa ions i n the Freie that Rey $ 1gnored In factJ bis unoub• stootia ted claims to vido underground resources are siJ id to bo ve been received uncritically by ome proj ect personnel - 90 - -· WC P O I t fl T Contact witb Batistianoe 31 Another a Uege tion 'Whicll gained sooe currency vo t t hat tbe pro ject v ns upi orting o nd othenriae w ing f ormer a asociate6 ond supporters or Bati atn At one point Ill cil i llnve e ntaot Vitb one ex-Batista le ad er Sa n chez Mosqucrra and gaye some support to hio grou p but this effort wo soon co lled -o ff' Tb er vore eJ eo a ttempts by t1stisnoa to penetrate the project's military effort but these ve re reo1oted The F ID'o m n 1ntelli- gence cect1on vas active 1D attempting •to screen out Bat1et1e non ' 'he strike t'orce cont o incd some Inellil era of the to rmer ·eubao Constitutlonnl Amr I --wb ich existed undc r 'Batista but these ere recruited a soldier$ not as polit1c1anc 32 'l'hc brigade officers seem to he Ye been clean of tbe Batisto t aint However the FRO tor vb om they -were supposedly fight ing justly complained that it hod had no bsnd in t hei r selection 33 Jooe Cardona a d tstinguiahcd lawyer who tu -ned to pol1 tics le te in h1G career we s t he f'irst CUban prime DU Diet er after the Cestro r evolution vae later aml e ssndor to Spe in @d va6 6l00usse dor- dea1gn o te to the Unit ed St ates l lbcn he broke With Ce stro took 8 8ylum in the Argentine Ei nba say e nd lo a s eventually g ranted eo fc conduct to thic country in October l96o •here bf 'became the 1 W 1 s aecreto ry-general fol ' public relo t10 o t - 91 il9P SFC VC COB SS O Pilff Under the gu1d 8 ncc of Bender he becrooe a Gtrong force 34 ror unit y 1n t he I1'RD during its mos t dJ fficult period tbe Virtual pol i t ical int e r regnum before t he inauguration o f President Ke nned y ro vao 1nflucnt 1e l i n b ri1 6 Rey into 1 R VQl lUO l lr ' Co lDCil 'Which VM formed on 20 March Vi tb Miro as c h Visit to Troi ni ng Camp 35 Miro 1t h o ther Council members vi sited t he otrikc rorce 1n Gunt mo l a on 29 Morch 1n a much-needed effort to pur troop morale There had been fm- too llt t le contact bet ccn t he FRD and the eol diers being t ro incd •1 n 1 ts name A rtime Voran a a ud Antonio J aime Me ceo Mackle had been t here 1n J 'cbruary in an o ttecpt to calm cu tinouo spirits ' I be l St rc•11ous visit lla d boon made in tbe fal J of 1950 by Col Eduardo Jsle na hee d ot the FRD ' $ mil 1tar-f staff ond e former consti t utiODel krrq otficer Jl rtin Elene 8l togon1zed th e txaineea o ncL Vith the beginILing o f s tra igi t •m tllto ry traini og under o U S - oft1cer ho bad no interest 1n CUban politics a bon US placed on visits t o the 36 COJJ p by CUban pol ltici OJ Ul This va i probably a mi s t oke and an unreasonabl e inter ference in th Cubans' manageltl nt of their O'W'D e ffo Lrc Con• trolled contact betveen the t- 'RD and t he troops could have done much to improve t he moro 1 e and motive tion of t he troops and me k'e the training job easier There vas nobody in the Guate r $ le ca nw b o could ans-ver the political question s o f the t rainees who - 92 • rer O RO'Rll'f 'i'8P 813 9ll G t'J -ere a ll vol Ulteer6 and deserved to imov vhe t kind of' tbey ere repa r Lng to fight for 11 f'Uture l urtbermo re tbe 1 RD needed a ¢b6nce to develop the loyalty of the tl OO ' $ who '·ere pres 'lllM bly to 1notell and protect its lco d ers on CUban non Mll b•r• of a proV1o1onoJ govenune nt 37• ' l ' hio - ras ooe e Plc or a higb -b onded attitude 1 o d Cubans that beca i rie n ore Wld IDOre evident 4 0 · the -project progreoccd C- ibo ns vere the bade ingredient tor ·e ucceGsi'ul operation and ru tbOugh the aim of ru ' ing the exilee d rect acti-vi e• probably- i de6l1st1c wid unattainable ncvcrthe1ess the Agency sbau ldhave been o b1c to organize them ror msx 1Jz n nn po rticipa tion and to hand le t b ctn properly to get the Job done A n 38 Amcrtca n Operation But n th t be Americans running the JOilitary effort r lllD1llg Rodio Swan end doing 1latero J recruit1ng the• operation beceme p'Urely an Amc7 ice n one in the cXi l e Cuban min an6 in the l Ubl1c '1nd ns J Oll In by-J Me1ng t be Cubano the Ageucy 1l S e Uen illg its ow cover 39 The official atti tude 1'll1Ch produced this situat ion 10 rcl'lected 1n the proJtct•s progres6 re OrtG In November report no d t be t t he Agency had pl enty of £lexibilitY to boose ' tbe CUben e roup ve 'Ould eventuo l ly co nction as e provieional • govc rnment A J'anua cy re pc i·t indicated tha t the N enCy ra tber than t he Cubans va 1 mak ing the phn s snd deci $10ns - 93 9 8P Siif8RJL 'W'e ho re 1 TOP 51J 0'RL1 charted five different l i s t s of proposed usoign neots for any fUture l ro- risional e oYer oocnt ot Cubb Md are compi ling bi ogral hic date on those Cubc w 'ho might be utilized by UG in forming ·a future Cuban goYe nutient 11 II ' Ille c rovn1ng incident wbicb publlcl y demow tro ted the ins1gn1t1cant role ot the Cu ban li adcro and t he cont-en pt they vere held occu rred at the t Ltne of' the inyaaion 1n Which Icolated 11 in a Miami sate hoUGe vol unte i•ily but under ·strong persu e sio the Revolutio council members o --oJ tcd be ou tne of n tullt a ry operation which they had not pl Mned end knew 1 ittle •w-out -wbile gency--wri tten bul lctin were issued to the world in theii nAIOC- 41 project 'hey had not been puppeto in the early s of t he Some o f the CUbano had dravn up deto ilcd opere t1ona1 pl ans for ree1stance in s ri a G of Cuba tllo t they kne · intimately others prov1ded cover wt l ·support One 'W'Ca ltby exile even vol-' m too •ily went tbrough the e asessl'Il ent ro ltine at U$eppa Ielond 'l'b ey had re a sou to feel tho t tbc along ith the young t rainees p oje-ct was in the· ne ture or a j oint venture at leo ot 11he Millta ry Er rpha t 1 a Bl It 11hcn the project begen to llllift f rom a clandestine o perot i® to a milit ary operation Cuban · ad vice· end_ pe rt1cipat 1cn no l onger seemed neces sary NOYember l 96o Cubans who up t o o bout bad been clos e to some of toe pl8n8 8lld opcru- t ioru ere cut out To the itd llta ry o f'f'icers on loo u T 0 P - 94 SB8JlflY to t bc TOP S' 89i11if p roject t he problem •a J a milltru Y Okie a 'ld their o ttitu de -o s to hell rlth the Revol ut1one r · CoW' cil and the political Side 3- 1'llc parwnJ Utro-y th d the POlltiCAl ot16n oectioxu 0£ WH 4 vcre not 1n effective touch vi th ea ch other in c t l'ect they t roated their ta G t o ao unrelated And t his '13 6 ref1Ccted in the field The dim1nisb ed relo t1onAh 1ps Yi th the Cuban leaderu vere a meaaurc of the extent to vhich people in tpe project became carried Avoy by a m l lito ry operation 44 The effectiye uti liz at 1on of Cuban and coopera t1on nth them ve s also hampered to some extent becauee o ny of the p oJect officers ho d neve r been to CUba d i d not a peok Sp IJli sb a 11d made judgmentc or t he CUbm ic on ver 1 slim knowledge A noto blc exce-ption was the p rope ge nda section 'Whi ch - as ell qwtli i'ied in this respce-t l'bey considered the Cul ane untrust· rorthy and difficult to 'Ork ·with Membe l 's of the Revo- lutionary Council have been dcGcribed to t be inspectors as idiots and mt l llbers of the brigade as ''yellow-bellied 45 £ovever oa ny sta tr employees in tbe project realized that toe C lboos would have to be dealt v1tb r eal l atie'11J y and a llovancea t' i8 de for their differenccG and w eelalesses ln some in s tonces co s off icers o cb 1evt ' l quite remarkable rapport -- dth tbe Cubans they verc handling 'I'J ese of1'1cers -were ones - 95 -O P 6 B enB1£ y ·ot 6£91' flI who had had considerable experience 1n deal 1 ns · r th foreign ne tionals 1n voriouo part a ot the -orld and t he results shoved it J e Ung vith Cubans 1'6 So mc military officers on loan to tbe proJect vere leeo oue eo•ful ill d e vitb CUb 1U The o1 mply gavo m111tor r o r ders to t hese foreign nationals and cxpcc t d to be obeyed 1 1 So ne of' the contr a ct emplo ·cco r i uch shipaJ officers a G treated the cu bans like dirt Thio led to revolts mutinico and other troubles Sow e ver y Mle cu bans V1thd rev fro o t he project because of the ve y they vere trentcd li8 The in spect1og team has received a dcf1£l1tc 1mp rcso1on that tbia operation took on a life of its o '° that a number of the people inyol ved bee ace so Te pPed t 1p in t Oe operation aa ouch that they J ost sisJ t o ultiJ ate goolo J 9 ere i a a 6U0$tont1o l question 'whether any operat i on can be tru l • successf'ul vhen t he a ttitudes tovara the other people are eo unte vorabl c i'horc does not seeJ 1 to be much excu oe f or not being e b le to -ork d th Cubans It th l a nat1onal1ty 1s so difficult llov coo t he Agency OSS1bl y succeed rlth t be natives of Dl a ck Afri ca or Southeast AG1a1 50 The J gency and for th8t ma tte r 1 tl e American nation 1o not likely to vi n m lllY peaple e -a y f'ro0 CollWlV l is m if tl le Alllcrlcans t reat other nationals -'1th condeecena1on or conte Jnpt - 96 'i' 8F 6B8Jil f '21 9P 9130'PIE1 i gnore t b e eontr l butione o u6 the lc 1 l'ledge lbieh t-iJey can bring to bear ond genera Uy t reat them as incollJJ ctcnt children ilom t he Americans o re going to r escue f or rea Gons c r theiJ • owu4 - 97 l8P 8Bell ·E 'i • 81' J 8J SP7T CL INDESTDlE PARAMILITARY OPERATIC •• AIR 1 The first att ml 't o t a clandesti ne a ir drop over Cuba took plo cc on 28 Septem ber 960- ny coincidence this was the same night os the fi1•at WJ 't'it4tic ope ration A 100-ma l a pack wna dropped for M e gent rut ed as ba'ling co iti icn able potential as a rcr istance leader 'l he cre· 1 l l1Geed t he drop zone by seven mil es and d ro Fcl t he weapons on a - C astro forces s coop thero up ringed t he area caught the agent o nd later ' 'be a icyl o nc got lo•t on the vo y back to Guat 1 a chot hi n end lO nded in _Mexico 2 It is 6till there Thie operation might have indi i ted o n unpromising future for air d ropt In -f l ct 1ts fa ilure tas in f'lu ent ial in persuading t he cbiet o the pr oject of the futili y of tryi ng to build up an Hiternal reii istonce orgo n1UJ tion b clandestine J ans a nd Yith1n t he next fev weeko t he operational elll haGiG we a beginning ite i'e teful swing tc-w·a rd tbe overt strike-force concept To th G extent the portent of fail ure 10 s heeded but it di d not suffice eit her to halt t he air drops or to ena i X'e a r re ngeil ents for their success The atte m pt G vent on BJ ld on iitb results that were most ly lud1crous o tragic or botb 3 Otl 26 DecetJiber 1 960 Eeadquarter s recei Yed o'ord tb at a Cl foa r agent vbo had b en gi veo Agency t rab1 iog io this count y w nted an a ir drop of not nore than 1 500 ounds oi' demolition ai d sabot a ge materie l and ieapoos • He elearl Y speci f'ied t he - 98 • L10P 9 BJ P ET layout e nd t bo loco t10 1 of the drop zone and al Go t he tunounto and kiuds of materiel e$1red lJf 4 cabled t h1o t-equire ment to tbe eir ba oc ill Guo t tnalo where all the tlighto origlllO ted Ilovevo r t bs Development Projects Division DPD tbe- l cabled Guat ccal 8 t bo t anco and '11t1on 1 d be dropped vith f to m9 ke o lllAX imum load also 200 pounds of leat'l cts fctr o drop clsevhe re a This co ble was not coordinated vitb age t o tbe WJI 1 vbich sent agent tbe follov lng d o r otat l ng tbiot n cargo lrop vould toke pla e requeoted e ud tllat tbe l ght vould bo l 500 pound a Rice and Bel'1DB 4 A drop was made on 31 r ece mber The 15-man recepti on teem received not on J 1 500 pounds of materiel vhich vaa dif- ferent fro i tbe original requeot becauoc t s pecif1c itc o s c ould not be PO cked 1n waterproof co n·to i ners in time but s tao 8oo Pollllds of beWlS 8oo poun ds of rice a nd l6o pound a of lard 5 This va s t he only drop to t his Cub e n ·a gent vaa- so vexed • 1th the drop that he came ou t of Cuba specifically to roake a conipla int a ld to cancel a succeeding drop vhich had been pl alwed Ile ntatcd that ho tould not accept another drop no ztte r vhl tt tbe cargo vaG J c po1ntod out t hat the N JmJ Y hnd cndnngored ht4 · aafety b d ropping carg9 • hi ch be bad not Q $Jced for did not need eJ 1 d could not handle lu rtbermore the aircratt bad ot ed in t be v l ci o l ty too long had tlov vitll ito lond l ng llgbto on - 99 3 '9F Ss9 RRQI T or € e e z 1' - He aeciaed the Agency lo eked prOJlElgando 1e-aflet on b i property t he P 'ofess ona l competence to 1 18 ke clandestine air dro l S 6 ' 'hiG opcration we recorded a s successful by the Aacocy beco use cargo 'l herc ie-re ' 0 8 a ctualJ y delivered to the people i t ws meo nt for su ch cuccecc eo in o 11 ou t of 30 llrl so lon s fiO o-n up to 23 April 1961 air dro ps The The FioceJ Year 1961 budget called for Q firGt of theso took place on 30 December after numerous attent ot beginning in mid-Oct ober ceaef'ul atteinpts durin8 Js nuary and There vere 13 uueuc- Februo ry i'he- success t ook place on 3 Ma r ch when three gent s ve re drOppcd pr eviouG a t teJIIPts to drop tbem had been Jl lde on 7 J cbru9 ry w d 27 l cb ruary The f ourtb succe$8f'ul drop vas oo 29 ¥ arch The Successful Drops 7 Except for the rice-and-beans drop t he cuccesc ful drops vere ell to au agent rllo had been tro ioed 1n air reception pro- cedures by eta ff personnel at Be adqua_ -ter s 8 1 'hc three cargo dro-ps known t o be euccee1 ful were all mo de ii the Pi n lr dcl Rio P rovince Io other 'ord e practically all the su Pplies ent to on G m9 ll area of weetero Cuba Sir all amounts ere thought to have been received in 'ama ey o nd Orieote but none 111 liate nzas or Eavane Teo mi G iono ore tlown into the Esco mbro y a t the request of e n agent who hrui no reception training in al Twice the cargo WG not dropped bece us-e the drop zone lt8 S not loc ted and once the pl a he turned back becauee of ba d - 100 - 01 ·• • · ·- s s eRB I _ '· ' $1 1P-0B C R ET • 1eatber On the seven occasion a cargo va a dropped it watJ either tota l l • or in lo rge p8 rt recovered by the Caetro torceo Three times cargo 1-ao dl-opped bl ind three times in the vro i g plo ce and once on the drop zone wheo the reception committee ll l S not there 9 r n all about 151 000 pounds ot equipment verc trru sported by au- arms e mu mtt i an and lfot more tbo n 69 000 poimdo of t his vas actually dropped the relft ret w ned t o baoe this 69 000 J unds at leant li6 ooo pOUJ ds OJ' wre capt ured-by caetr o forcea vbo recovered o l l or a la rge part cf ten drops compared wttb our o gentS' vho recovered three In ot her vards out of 75 tons which we e air-lifted pa rami lito ry agents o ctuall y got about tvelve about enough to snn 300 Me n figuring 7 500 l ounds to l O a hundxed- 00 D pack Except tor tbe one team t here were no clandeat personnel drops made or e••en attempted d J u•ing the entire proJect Ack of Pr0¢edure u 1'le agentt on the ground did not have o oto ndarti pr ocedure for e 11· reception u ost of them bad not 00 en -trained The locations of drop zones vere var10 ivly e nd ills Zffictentl y dosertbea by coordinates sketcbesJ or az1 tttut hs r n two opera- tions t he requesting agents did not even ba· e caps a£ t'heir areoo In o -ie of tbese 'WH 4 he a d quartc rs DPD and Miruni B -me ee cb arrived at a different set of coord1n atQc from t he reference points gi ven - 101 Qt' e1 ssel BI fi' 8 P GE Pil li' lo another case the coot ' J ite't-ee given -f'or a drop zone vere in t he occ cu1 Reception parti ea proposed to n ark t he drop wne vitb various bi arre a nd impra ctical pe tterna IJUch s s tv o red ligb te and one vbite light a bout l 5 teeJ a part moving clock' tise an at-ro'w 50 meters long - ritb lights e t tvO-meter intervals lights in the form of' a strai ght l i ne witb s aig o in t he m iddle lit up vith Christ zMs lig rits on t his one the ere at one point 0ie-ta kenl y idenU i'ied car s on a r oad a s the dl -Op-zone - igne l tvo croeeee side 'oy oide a triangle of tbree 1 1 gb t s with a fourth light 1n the cent er In so ie area a ther e we1·e co many small l iglrts 1n the vicini ty that no pattern could be l oc o ted mo de four proposals to n l id succession 1ror one drop the agents p o lights 8 nine- man cross a line of' f i •e bon1'1ree a 00--meter line of colored flasb lights 12 The s tandard l ight 1 8 t t c rns to USht by po re military instruc- t o rs o nd genera ll j' ti ccepted a s best wei e a an L'' of li lights b e T of lights an I c a cross of 6 lighto All lights Should be 15 to 25 ya rd a fart with one Ught diff erent frcm t he others 13 T oe Ciioau e ir ur ews must sh are the bl 8Jlle for the te ilures as must their t re i ners Polic • d i not allaw J Jnerice n observere t o go a J ong on t h mission s to correct the 'errors Pilot disc1- pl i»e was lacking an l in$tructt ons wer EO oot f ollo- ced in nurr erou·s iost ances - 102 - f 8 r BB e ft s w 8F 0BEJRB'2 14 ' o r example one aix c r e under spccU'tc orders t o abor t- t he miesion if the drop tone vaa t lisaed on tb e illitial run a ud not to s e8 rcb for it or circle around mo d four pe 1 ses four nilcz 4 i£ty accordJ Dg to the ground report '-'bich added Pilot-a drunk or crazy 15 Another crev CCilll' lO lldor under orders not to drop u nless the T pattern -- ·as por itively ident f'ied elected to 9 l op withput seeing the T because be bad o 11p0sitive feel ing that he vas over the drop zone Another 'o 1 rel o ft remained in the· drop z-o ne aren 4l minute• before droppUJl argo Headgua rters Direction 16 'l'be Reso qua ct ers direction of these e ir wops left much to be desi red D D vbich controlled tb crews and planes never bad a representative phy'sically aesisned to WH 4 and t he tll'o e ctivitieo vere o 'ra t Lng in a divided cac une n'd oit O tion on the be ala ot mrt UAl cooperati on rather than genero lly accepted manage ment practice end m 111to ry command princ ples l7 Dail ' coneulto tion n'oved icpoooible e lthousn t here ve o e requirement of it There ElB trou ole on cowr et cries on fund 1 ng on security and on ce blea 8 lllOng ot h r t hings It vae difticult to determi l where tbe rcsponsfb111tiee of one COlDpOlleht ended and thooe of the other began 18 ' 'be w li pa x-runilitoo-y chief reco nded t oot the DFD unit be ass i gned to tbe chief of th t ask 1'orce f'or integr tion vithio - 103 'fO SE9ctBT T C bis steff But no a ction as ever taken and the situation ren eined oz a$ described for t he du ration 19 niques B 8 H B the proJect WH 4 and DPD did not even agree on doctrine and techTo Addit ion all flight pl J ns had to be per$Ona ll y revieNed e nd approved by tho Deputy Director oi C-0ntrul Intelligence Dl CI e nd by t he 5 12 Spec1Al Gr oup T' oc r equests f'o r a i r drops ca i nc from CUOO by radi o secret vr1t1n g or tcilepbone t o Miaicl a net then we1·e f ol o'U rded to wB 4 headquo rters which then put 1n Wl operat i onal request to DFD vh1ch in turn directed t he Guo tcmal 8 a i r b e ae to mount t he fl1gbt t tf'ter o pprov tl l had been given by DDCI Dl D could and d 1d rele ai e i t s o• -n cabl es without coo rdinatioo 20 '11 lli s cumbersom e systel'll was complicated even more by the scarcit · 0£ agent re d 10 operators inside Cu ba Sooe 01· t he arrange- ments had t o be m de by seeret - ritil S which was not only slo- bu t contributed to misunderstanding Necessary last-minute ch$oges of ple n b 1 t he re cption groQPs or air cre• s could not be cct J runicatcd to ea ch otbcr Exem le of Confusion 21 'lbe drop finally eceompliohad on 30 December i an out- t'te Bdl ng e xAc ple of t he con 'us on t hat prevailed 22 WH 4 inforn ed Rava na that t he drop •Jould 'b-0 made from 400 f eet 1 000 feet l PO told the Cus temala Jl se t hat the d1•op oul d be at Guatema on the ot her hand -fcl t that '- Ould b e best rd 1 6oo feet informed t he igents that the a i rcraft defini t e · - lOl WOP 3£CRE1 r- zcn Oul d ma ke only one pass • •er the dro zone one 360° Dut DPD author i 2 ed turn i n order to m 9¥ e t he dr op good i f the drop one wa s not l oceted on t he ni t1C l ru -i Actua lly t he ere made passes ' 1 1 s drop then ro llod on 5 Deceinoor because tho recep t ion St'OUP u nderstood th at the plane ouJ d cake only one pass a nd t urned off the 1 ights whea the plane CSJt e back for e second t n • here as a l $0 confusion ove r the t ime of the d rop and the n b- r of b Jlldlee The d i'ficultieG 1u ttniving at an understanding among ell pe rt1ee concerned 1Cre so great that this ope dticm 1 f1rot planned fctr 22 October '-'8 B re- scheduled tor l3 November run o l 5 Decf O ber vtthout dropping then scheduled tor 19 Dec e J ber To en this r o d to be changed to 25 DeceJ lber and 'ino lly to 30 December 23 For 6nother operat on im 4 told GliateimlA that the cargo -should · tcigh 6 000 pound s but DPD told Guat m-lla it could 110t be more than 4 ooo or 5 000 pounio The DPD JtesS8 ge • ta s irot coordizw te • ti tb WB 4 as GU 'l t emala then r o1nted out 24 able So M of the techni aues used by DPD • te re highly questi on- Xn one inSto 'lce DPO t old Guate re-1 a th lt in th e event the drop-zone lights ere not seen by the crew the p ilot s houl d oever - t2lel ess 1 rop bi $ c ax-go on 1ng the O rop zone as det ermined by dead rec kott• As it tllt'lled out the reception group had dit per$ed e tte r an e ncount er wit h a CU ban pat ol and was unable t o be at the dJ •op z one 'l he Cast ro i o i-ce t then p i cked u p at least b ll f or t he bu tXUes c ropped ' 7 -4 l 8 r 105 _ - 8 B Ei Fl ii 'l' WOP OL CRfl Suppl ies £or ca $t ro 25 In another case l 6o pounds of' food s nd rne terJ el ver dropped blind in the dark of the moon on each of four hilltopo to a gr-oup 'hi ch 1t e Imo-JU to be 1n eucb e preca t 1ouo pos ition that i t i BS Dot abl e t o stay in place l ong enough to l u y out a drop zone 26 Aisa 1 n th e Caatro· rorces got most or tb e load In still another - OPD told Guat emala that t urns ''ere al l wcd 1f the plAuc -was not U o ed lU on the in1t1al run over t he drop zone • j'ho a gents r e ported that t he plane- pa seed oyer twice 1thout droppl ng and tbat this a l e rted the C stro ar ey- w e ttaclr the resiBtance group and to diaperee it 27 Once t' to planes Mere s ent over the drop zone bD lt a o hour ap rt a nd allO' ed to IDake two pa sees ea ch Not a w11 ris1 ngly 200 milit a cea rched the o rea t he next day w d s e ized the cargo Tb e drop Altitude fcu- an·ot her operation was set a t 1 C Q i'eet • nxe pUot reported he bad hit tb e d ro P zone J'ran 3 500 f eet even though une ble to recognize the •188 l ker but t hel'c iG evidence tho t t he cnel got e t l east bnlt the drop 28 On aircro -rt rocc1vca beo V ' fire and · as damaged Its ere th • learneci the hard ' '-Y that dropping lea flets £iret had h elped to a l ert the area and recamnended t hat in the future the ca r go be dropped fl rst M1 am L Ease point -d out t o lleadquarterD t ba t i t -'ns a m 1 G'take to drop heavy e8 0ns before a- group bad a Im-own a bi lity 01 using ·t aect or'·ho d si cci ti ca lly r equested t hen - io6 ' '· 1 o r--- 6H 1 -t'C h - r - l I - •ff --4 •·-vt r •· For a l o ug t1hle the results of t he drops 29 $$ xepo_rted by t he ground elemeuts vere not f'oz ' a r d ed to the a ir c -ews w-ho got no crttlqueo bt vt continued to report successes when 1n f act they 'ere missing t he drop wne by many kilometers IIAodHng 30 desired phone 'J n Emergency The b 9 ndli'og of an emergency a loo lett eooetbing to be One of the pl o nes httd to le nd 1n JOJMJ ca 'l'be COJlttlland er ' s ca u to e n emergency p umber · in G'oo tetiale produced the reply 1 1 rGt heard of n-ong y that 31 In Janu r r 19 l DiYision D of the Agency•• FI Ste ff ca je a 6tud vh1ch raised pertine ot qu estion s a bout the a ir drops The project's pa ramil ito J y ataft l il 'ld e a study' in ll $rch e tld concludc_d that the Cubo u ere rs did not ha'vo s·UJ 'f'icieQ t experience or super- vi $ed t ro 1 Ding in clandesti ne po ramUite ry air operati ons to O Ct -tb e p roJe-ct objecti ves end that t hey rere too u od 1LlC1l li ocd to obey instructions or to r oake con-ect reports 'l'his study recom- m etld ed that cootract Alllcrican a ircreft co11wi rnd crs be used but it did not reeeive the approv-dl of tht pat'llmllitllrY chief an vent oo t'urther 32 DPD tlso made a o analysis in Ma rch and recc tl'l l' erAed cer ta in O eraue co r-rectl ve e ct ion such as obtaining agent reports of drop resu lts 'or prompt dispatch 'to the e ir bese 1 11 Ou teo l t - 107 • o· or G ii Ci i I crl tiqu e s for each mi ss ion r egarding ccmpli ance 1th i nst ruct Lons ei-ta1natiou of blind drops and botter dcl Ytiflcaticn of drop zones OPD ceblea Guat eirAla on 7 March t bllt an analysis of t he nd$s1on result t o date - ouJ d be fo 1'lrded shortly to be used as e basis f or refinecent of tactice and ilnprove ment of coo1'diootion '- i th the recepti on teaJ 11$ And at t b e end of March a check pilot 'as 1 ncl 'ded for the first tillle in a mission ere Re noted dfocrc»anc1es in pilot procedure e nd crew coordinat ion Tardy Cottective Acti on 33 1'hc e corrective actions ca m e t le te 'lhe Geendng ioo bili ty to $u pport reo1Gto nce elemeotc a igl lented_t hl gro f1ng reliance being placed on the idea of ao runphibious ttril e force t o o cc XD lish the objective t hen e s the strike id ea t ook o- · et· more o nd more int erest in c landc tine drops decr ea sed aooog ofi'icers in charge of the project On or a bOut 28 March a policy decisi on vas made thet there vo U d be oo Jr Ore cl Ul de$t1ne drops until after the w phJ bioua e asaul t Ina $TIUch a$ the WR 4 ca s-e of ticers band ling these drops were not informed e s to t he sttike plo n or the d o t t his posed a problen for thei n bcca US 19 drops to specific drop zones were rcqucst -d bct Qeen Marchand 19 April and it was necessary to Sta 11 off the requests vith such messages as ' Dou't give up hope We ' ll drop o s· soon as Regret unable mount BERTA ope 'at ion uJ_ Def1n1 tel v planni ng lPpOl t yo- u Beg you understanll cur probl e n s •• - lo8 TCf can 0 J CR ET · - 1 '9 1 OLCftfJl But tbe a gents r ad their own problems during thie tillle 11 UnJust to delay operation so much • This 1e not a game 11 11 80- t long till I have to wai t for t he drop The l i ve of pease nt c and students depend ou you 11 Doo r Allies colll lied o nsW'cr Anne urgent You he ve not We mo de o comniit Jne nt If you h o ve decided to abandon us 11 We are risking hundreds 01 peasant tamlliec supp J r u s we viU bave to • • •dC mQbllize e We ho v If you c lnn o t eour reapono1b111ty t hought yw were sincere- All groups dem ore J ized • •They eon sider tbCDSClves deceived because of failure or shipment of arms and mney according t o prClnioe 0 Perba po the situation wee best 61 llllQed up by this agent meesage ''Impo sible to fight Eit her the dro'Ps increa Ge or we die • • -' en '1 tbout e nw or equiteent34 God hel p tw 11 Toe Inspector Genera l reluctantly conclud co the t the agent •ho as sh ' ered Vith rice and 1» ns was entirely correct i n his find1 8 that the Agency sh c •ed no professional c ompetenc·e in its o tt mpts ut clAnde stine a ir drops 1 nto C' Furthermore t hese attempts in their o• -er-all effect probably hurt the resis-tance more ti' a o they helped - J 09 • • fl 0 P I • T K C P C B 8 N- I CLAND m PARAMILIT o lll' OPERA'l'IOliS - - MARITIME l Wl 4 Branch had tvo separate msri ti lle probl ema needed to tl-8 n sport n en and ouppUes clandestinely to tre It coast of Ma by sm il J boato and it needed ships to transport and nu pport o n wcphtbioue l ru acUne of e military force more or lees overtly This section or the report will be J100tly conce n ted vi th cmo 11 boat opere tioas 2 The WE Division had no e sets 1n beings there was no Agency element c e ble to lJPD to call on and for ®ocµrc reaoow the lfav ' - ae not asked to provide the hOlj it might_ have w 4 h o d to at art 1th nothings the se emed to be ver y lit tle maritj JJ e lol -how •Hbin the Agency • 3 The ori gl nAl operationnl plll ll calle l tor bUJ lding up o £'U 0etentia l reoistance orga niw tion vbich coUld be done only- if ouppllea and people e e delivered to th e right plo ees During •the cri ticel period 1 arcb-Decembor l96o lll 4 had -2 boat the 1'Metu sa Time a 54-toot pleasure cruiser which liae lent to the Agency by o friend Two ma rit IJ ne operationa ofr'icer$ more or less JJlder deep cover J labored J'om Y arcil to October to outfit this boot and tro in iti crev 4 The- boat vent on its f tret IUssion on 28 September oftloodillg 300 pol ll d of ew-go e nd picking up two ex filt rees By Jw uar i t bed made n ve aod1t10001 trips end tranoport d about five tons b 1t only one 1nt'i1t rec It had 8llother su cce si' 1 1 ope 'Etion ln March 1961 a nd other 1n April - - - 18 F eg· c REl' Y ·· - Boo ta 5 In November and December there vere oix othei eucceGOful Olrl ll boat opero ttona conducted vlth boats owned by various Mane '1'lu - $1 nt@ w1 ir9 IQ b ' 114 V1 IW J e otf1ecra at MWJd t1 're 'being no itilre oection and lllOJ nl ¥ in reoponae t No J OelQOro ndo of d el 'Gtan d 1 ng -were 1·equeote by tbe o - nera and tbo •sreementa as to aupportl ng equippl ng and l 'lmding tbeae Cuban boate vere exceedingly l ooa e thw l caw ing m 8 nJ problem• later 6 A Cubo a 'WQuld oa y 01ve mo o tank or gQfJ d a h'8_-0b1 ue gun e ud you crui WJ e our boat and ve Vi ll help t'U h i t After the oi eratlou he CM likefy to c - be cl M d oo y tbat the boat needed U aorta ot cqulp ent vbl ch bad been dalwg d by the operation and JUal Y cl41M ve1·e bu lt up in t hle lfJ • ' Alt hough more than twnty or thei l boeto voro oUe red to c e e-e office re moat ot tMm _vor t90 JJuall d too l ilni d 1n r mse to be or 'ch uae vhleb usted t •o li'urthermore the bad veather· December into March reds U boat operat1ona u poss1ble- at a timo when they vere badly needed 1961 th¢r •• not a • auceeaoM o r•t1Qtl 8 lly December tho ncc d tor oome bccondng obvious ' l1 e sea In J'as 1'7 ul l IIeadquartero aboat thl 11 t J e · o«to vna aeebelov vaa picked up b y It t ed Qut to be a complete 1£01 Metts lc mon one of the most experienced employec -1 1 in smal l bouts spent - t or h1o t ime from I ecember t o J me t 1 '1 n to g t i t t o ru n 1 and it ne 'Cr did particip 0 te in an inf'1ltret1on or cxrntro tion operat-ion Ale 0 1 about December a 75-root yncbt 1 t he 'Wo sp 1 • • • • • · It bad e l 7 •lmot speed and o 6 io•milc ran se and ran it fi rst successful missi on on 15 Februo xy 9 About Febtwlry the ''TeJ8 DI alco becruc -e operational Thie - as a llO•foot yacht vb icb bocwne uvailo blc t hrough a CUban coot a ct of a ca6e offic er Tbe a rril ngcment a '-de by t he case officer 1t h t he Cuban owner were so va aue that paymeiit of bills incurred wa o a continu1llg 'Pro olem However the 11TcJo oo i n tour operati ons in March I infiltrated 19 000 poundc o s coops rod 1 th 12 700 pounds whi ch he d been intil- treted from S pt mber up to Fel rw ry l y all available bootB 10 'l 'b e ote tiot ics caaplled b W 4 t11ld by Miemi J ase on the strall boo t operotione are sc cwwhAt con f l Sed a o d However the general pictw-e 16 clear inconeistent smll boo t opera tions 9 J Cceeded in getting a bout 76 The· peopl e into CU ba cls Jlde$t 1nely Mo t ot thcs wcye taken 1n during II arch Up to t te llliddle of February- only ten hAd been successfully in fil t rated by thin mean a the ti rst being in mid- Noveltlber 11 In the matter of' S J t lS axr mw li tion and other e-uppliee to t h resiste nce t he· boe t operat ions vere not an outsta nding ' • - Iii' 9 P £RC R £ W • ·• _ l'9F r uccess 839RBt Prom Sept ember to e time of the otri ke about 70 000 pou nds were successful ly 1nt'i ltrated Thi tilt a bout t hree ttmee a s l l'l lcb as vas put in by air drops 'l'he tots l a mount ot ouppliee put into Cuba by a i r e nd boo t 0perutions WDOUJJ ted t o a bout 93 000 pounds 4 tons this llOuld be 6bout enoue l to equip 1 250 ' '· U U ted Area Ther llas one succeacru 1 boat operation in September 12 two in October three 1D lfovCl lber a ix 1n December none in Up to FebJ 'U B l' only six and A half tOI1e vere sent in l3 One should not ge't the idea that tbeee supplies vc i o un ro d 1str1buted thro l8hout Cuba Moot ot t b em vore ple ced in one sr a U area the nortb coo at of Cu ba cloee t o RaYOJl B 11 The small b oa tG did not have the range to go ta rtb er In almost e ll coses t he supplies were t ra nsterred to a CUbell boe t or o n o1't bo re key rather thao depooited on the shores ot Cube 1t el1' I n the fall boat operat ions · ie-rc restricted by policy to offshore rendezvou a By J'o nuary MiB Di be d begun to plru l bca cb landing operations o s a means of overcoaing t he unreliability of CUban- b lGed boats At this tll e Miaini Base d1d not even ho ve a erial photos of t be north coeet ot C-ubo 15 Of' th 33 missions rate ' l e s-uccesetul only 27 could be considered entirely ao since ·t he ce rgo on the other operations · - 113 --- · 4'8 P Si CRS T · Y - •Y 't 71· · '·· •• t 41 G F e B 8 t L I -was lat er recovered by the C stro gove rnment or tbe success 'W8 -S only pa rt1 al Tl1e reception C• wnittces did not seem to have bed much training 1n mo l itime reception procedures 16 In sum a stt all 8 oount of J1 1 teriel · •a s p-ut into the Havana area 1n 'the period Sep e mber- Deccreber by some 111-su1ted sma 11 boats Then by u sing the asp and the f'TeJe no a $ubStontia lly larger amount ot' Gupplies was put in duri ng February and March s vel l a s s«ae people but to a lim i ted area only At this point t he krbara J o nd the Blagar11 former lCis o1cre u sed because of' their longer range and larger s ize ho- ieye r tor various reasons they vere alGo unsucce sstul 1D placing anything oa the couth eoao t except at the esterumost po rt Lack of n Plan 17 Ott icc rs ibo -worked on these operat ions reported tba t there wee uo effective project plf ll for us'1ng small boo ts to deliver men and equipment tO f orces 1oside CUb a ho ere best suited to w e them to build up a -powerful u - derground movcn- ent ega1 n t C'astro Accordin g t o these oft1 e r i 1n-1I 4 did not pl a D sooll boat operations the case officer- s imply responded t o requests by io d ividual eu·oa ns and groups On£ officer Temar k d t hat t he CU bans e e nwniug the ope at ions 18 Of a ll the e ttempts made to a 'ld r n en and supplies i n Cuba clandestinely by • • ater some'of the most notabl e ''e re ms de - ll4 'f e t s t e r w · - • TOY by the SE6h£f 11 Be 1·be ra J e r u rpl us LC vhich the l-1 gency bou tht in October 1960 It lf8 int ended that tbia craft 'ou ld serve as a ther ohip for s uo ll boat operatiou s and also provide a loog-rro go 1 11·t capability 19 A·f ter a sho ked o· iu voyage 1n centber fee t-ured by a mutiny the Ghi p vas 6Chcduled for cll mdeatine maritime infiltration of three po r•••1l1tary teams wto Cuba Illitiall y there vaa oo me c ion o s t o who vas runn1ne t he operation since M1 '1 been ba nclliDg 8lllOll boot operation and ·hod _J Odo tbe rendezvous pl ools f th 16 ooe but Ue-0 1quo rtexe bad rcspon s ibility t·or tb e Barbara J4' 11 W 4 t n sent the chief ot its ·mar-it s ction t o Miami to coordine te t o b rie f' t he captain and to dispa tcb the boat on its mission on 16 January 20 Tbe llarbara J put into Viequeo Ioland on 31 January 1961 e fter bavtng bccn unsuccessful in putting ill Cuba e nybcdy ashore The crev 1 8 t 'lOX'e le continued to deteri orate so mc refused to Ulke direct orders uttempte to disc1pl1llc the me-n ve re 1noffcct1ve t he engineer$ refused to stand vatch and all or the crew -anted to return to Miami and resign u $0 nine o f t he ten agents d t d not ish t o ste y oo the shi p t or el lother A Si t -down St r ike 21 11 Co 4 February the Ba rba ra J sai l ed fl-«n Vieques for a rendezvous on t he south coast Of Cu baJ - 11 5 - ex eer s 1· 2-4 ere nib rs having · been lert on a Viequcs be$¢h 1 here tbC'y a to ged a sit-down und e hw i ger strike On 9 February tbe 11 Barba ro J'1 r eported that the contact hod not oboi n up at 22 rendczvouo poillt Arter trying as ain on 10 F bruary the c o ptc in of tbe rbal-a J cobled 11 Take a mci sage to Garcio The relu ct u t heroes in f 1ahing 'boat ago in couspicuoun by their e boence ••ta ot mesao ge to On lJ FebrU$l he aont o nothe1· odd coble Your f ioblng boot still t 1 8l 1feoting extreoo obynees Ge re $ Suge 1at ext opero tion ocn$1 in varsity sent 11 On 3 3 February be- Crubed 'Wi tbou t Jnking c ontact _Pick d U'p sma' ll target on rad F Lr tre cked it do -n o nd $Cared heU out of tlO rt tisber- c- en wbo wanted no part of 23 c tory UA 11 The cs se officer o nd the team leaders had ei different They sto ted that vhen the Dro-bara r• ro-rived ot the rendezvou a point i t vas approo cbecl by a 8ma ll boat that came e t tbe right tiine and gave the cor r-ect eignal s but tbe t aa' the boat CaJl lC- alonga idc tbe captain of the Ba rbar6 J4' ordered tvo flood ligbte tu r-ned on t he boat hi ch appe rcntly sc¥ed i t avay · OD l8 Februacy tbe reccpt ou pa r _- eeni a lllOSIHlg tba their boot Md been at the rie ht plo ce at t be right t ime tllld that a patrol boELt had showed up 0 I instructions The ' barn J1' o r-rived at 14 February vitbout having received arrival On 15 F br uary Mi i 6 nt a rucsoa ee coying t ho t it 1raa aett 1ng u_p fnc111t 1es st Key W'eot to r ce1Ye the - ll6 - ··' • _ _ _ • J •• r · ' V i i · ¥ -J - - · _ 1282 S E CRB · · - - · · • i t - • 9 t - ··r ' · u Barbara r• Upon landing 1 n Key Weot the teo parru n 1 lit a ry 6gcnt s having been on t his tt'ip for o month after opendJ ng t 'o ioonths in a safe bou ce ' 'Ct'e reud y t o resi gn o nd 1 t t ook a considerable am owit of persuasion to get t hem t o sta y ti th the program They '-'C t e t hen E ent to N'ev Orleans for holding Earning a Citation 2H SeYera l off'icers vho o-Cre a ssociated vitb the ce ptoin of the ' 'B arbara J'' a contract emp¥ yee e cqull'Od i'ra n Mili t Ary Seo Transportation Service M$TS have teatl ried to us drinking o n dut y' bis buJ lying of CUbens 4lld hi Q disregard f or security D rov Pearson wote about t he dru nken American LC skipper bo scu red e f'ey Cuban undergroUDd lea ders -1t h his ahip'a floodlights and vho t hreatened to aband cm a sabotage team On 21 March too project' o pa ra mil1to ry chi ef relie 'e-d t he captain of his con i and and requested that be be term inat ed Hovever tbe o pta in '-'B 8 rete iood on duty and eveutual ly r cce1v-e d full pa- and e bonus f or a aix-montb con tract period 1n t bc o mount o 25 $1 698 W 1 Bran ob inl t io ted action to get the capt oi n commended by his parent servi ce tor outstanding per fonr ance In July 1961 he 1'8-G c i ted 11 for completing an assigmtent iJ lvol ving ' extreme hazard $ in an ou tat a nding lOS l lCt a od diaplaying e x¢ep- t1onal s kill and courage' and given the fa'Vy Superior Civil ia n - 117 c T O P SE OFL r Se rvtce Avar d -- t he h ighest honorary civilian a e rd within the sut hor1ty of the t-STS coc r ander 26 The bre nch had never ta ken action e i ther to clear him or t o conYict him oi' serious cho rges end the higb cccmendation he received casts doubt not ooly on the validity of othe·r WH 4 rec ndations for n erit cite tiono but o lso on t he q ll lity · of' persOODel JUUlB ge ment 1D the pro ect Pcculit r Orge niza tion · 27 Tbe or ge nb o tion tor controlli D g el andl stine' maritim-· - ope ti ons ve s Culiar ' 'l'bc forward opo ro t i rig base in Mia mi had the reGponsibi lity for si al l boe t o pero tiona but could not run any wit-hout Headquarters approval It vas oeld om that Headquarters had any query o r refused t o give approval 28 But •the Mi Base did not have tbe eqUipr ent s nd experience tba t vere needed i'aci-litiee were 1n8 dequate For a long titoe the docking The desirability of having e base at Ke- ' West i as recognized as early' o s llovei i iOO r 1960 but this ba se vas n ot established until mid_ February It vaa 1llsuffic1ently staffed and had a e r-e nt l'rulY cover security and administrat i ve problems on vhich i t recei· ed little ussiste nce At fixst i t was under t he d u ection of the Muuni par mili tary sectt en eventually i t 'Was placed under t he chief of' t be M le i ni Base ·'·· - ll8 - ' • · ' f • · r or e av1 a w 29 The small stof C' ut Key West not only s upport-0d s ir all boat opent tions it al co Md to take whatever action v-0 nec ssary vl en d1 'blccl black fllsllt• came 1n to the local ll• l a '1 r stotioo oi oce DPD bt d no reprosonte ti vc 1D t he oree uasucceas r ul mari ti De oper3-ticn dou'bled tbe work I Each BoBts cooing back to a ea re baYe O 1 vitb anu And explooivc a ll3uaU crewed by C lbO ns and oo ootimea d11 abled in varioua wo ye had to be unloaded again by vhoe ver was uvai l' able aoong par n1l1tar1 office re a Bi security and support people A rev ate ft emploync1 11orked a l Jnoot e round t he clock for a month loading and unloading car go vithout bene f it ot even a ' forklift Many tons ·ere ao ba ndlcd 30 It is clear tba't t bere w a no over-a U Polley 1n repl'd to t be mall boat$ There vas no clco r dire ct i ve c e to whethe r -to to o cqutre 5hort rongc speedy boats or loug-ro nga alover boo to vbctbcr to use tisbing cntt encl crev1 or spec1 l•J Ul' OSe built apecittcal cy 1 or our use 'l he ro of a Other craft '8 $ no policy on the uac Tberc- va s no control over tbe tLOO lllt of ooney spent oo these smul bo ts and their outt'ittJ o ' 'be l ' rit Joo Unit 31 WH 4 HeodqUArtore he 6 a otof£ employee whoae Job vaa small boat coord llator 'l'h 1s t nt iJ I effec t checking proposed operations ritb be 1ntell1819noe section extend ulg approvalu and k eping l'Ocords WH n - ll9 · also had a se t 6te ma ritillU -1119 SAOvli P unit lh i ch be ndled the tecJu1ical side of the small boo t o pproved fuuds for t hem and onc cd for personnel tor them but had nothing to do wit h the1 r operat ions 32 This roaritiioo unit also had the reoponG1b111ty t or acquiring and f itting o ut the larger sh1pa such us t he Barbara f' tho Blo go r 11 tbe three LCU o and the shipe c used Th is unit a loo had t he responsibility for 1n the Gtrike t r a ining underwater demoliti on teo ms dJ recting r aiding ope ra tion end overseeing the Vieques Base 33 The le ck ot oq ui pmentJ the shortage personnel tbe recS of time end ot experienced the problen s of coordination arc show by t he exper ience vhicb tbe ma rltime Wlit had ·1t h the o quisit ion and outfittiog oJ the LCD M d the LCUo Toe pre s of time hardly allo ed for advertieing fo r npecif ic t pea of craft or ooliciting coCJp ti tive bids The t o LCis 1 the Baxba ra J o nd the 'Bl agar vere purchased f rom a private corpor ntio n in Mi rur 1 for $70 000 About $253 000 was tben speD t in 10od 1 ty1 og repairiDg a nd out fitting them 34 This ork lobi ch extended over a period of several blCtitlis W s dL-r-ected by off icers i'rom Headquarters during short t e mpol' 0 ry duty tours in the Miatll o rea The day-to-day s upervision of' the - ork vas under several Jiavy chief petty officers borro oed from t he Agcuc y •s Off ice of ' 'raining vho had no c ontact vith l' 1 a mi Base ho authority to spend CJone t or · · •• • • - · 1 · · · - l 20 - llJOP 96CJ lB' ' gl' 'e ordera and no channel to procure parts and equlpr ent The technical and training ab 111 tie of t hese NO 'Y chiefn vere grossly misused by t he project web ot their time - ms spent at otcvcdor c or deckhand labor Training on LCUs 35 t hree I CUa ere bought directly from t he ttavy in September 1960 at $125 000 eoch SUpposedly in opera ting condition these crC tt bc d been titripped and were in su cll Qe d shape tbe t they could hardly be n oved from t he dock The dozen ot· oo Ascncy employees who vent to Litt l e Cr eek to get them iJlto operational condition were o busy vith repairs that there ve a little t in e l eft for learning hov to operate tbe c raft even t hough GOlOC me mbere of tbe group vere not f e miliur vith LCUs the e ngineers did not all k nov enginee ring and the skippers- d1d not all k no navigation This group got tbe LCUs to Vieque I a l and tomehov and proceeded to trSlll the Cuban creva ' roich 110 fever ere given no t rt i-ning in night lo odJ ng and vet-y little ln nu v1gut 1on 36 In oll about $1 lioo ooo vus spent on boatG e nd chips and tbe toto l cost of the maritime phases of the p roJcct was about 679 XX Wo e ea ve r e a oono1de rablc item t••or example Ghip' ma $ terG on contract •ere budgeted at $2 500 month cooks at $1 000 There seemed to be a general fa i lu re e t the top to • · 121 - · · Tef S £GHE res UM how auch boots cost to l UD CUld to keep 1n repair 'l'he arrMgcment ber eby otficera in lleadqun rtero t rtod to control the ex-penditure1 being mad c 1n Florid a to repair and operate boats which 'I ICrc urgently needed Vt O highly 1 pract1co l Tbe hieh cout of boot• 1n t hto proJect iD vell Uluat rated by the d 1 G r 0 1 ca e of the Sea Gull• caco ot t b c Sea Gull 37 It had pre- vtouoly beeu u oed to service oi fsbore oil dx1111n s rigs and II estixated to Mve- a -fair market V$lUC or $71i 50 38 The requeot for opprovnl for the chief or tll pro ect by a el Ccl Al aao1otant 1 n the FI ect1on acting tor t be acting cbiot and opproved by Deputy Chief of Ill D1v1oiou act ing tor b J e chief the I t vos cbr1etened the Sea Gull• end tro neportcd to Mi8J111 vbcre it broke dovn 500 ye rd from the pi er on ito f'1rat trial run On 6 JMuory 1961 it coHmnted tllilt repairs and modlf1cat1 lWI vould coat $10 000J by 30 JaullA ' ' the oottmate bud Eiovn to $32 000 by 22 Februo ry t•o $1 0 000 ld on 2k Fcbruru-y tbe sblPY rd dol 'og the vork s ubaitted o b i ll for $65 000 - 11 ID t ll tbe Sao Gull coat i'8P SltEIBBT $39 500 Repel ro evcntua reduced from $65 000 58 000 Coc rrou -licatioo gear tool s arms Jl8 • 1go tion 14 ooo $ill 5 0 o i ds 39 The Sea Gull as not ready t o be used until the leBt 'eek of M lrch at tbie tirr e it es Commallde t-cd c long witb t he Wasp by a headquarters unit vhicb wo a staging a dece ption operat ion in connection wit h the wn phibiow i s t r i ke over the atrong pl'Otests 0£ JJ'J o mi Dase ·o1hich never got t o use the boet on sn infiltration operation 40 '1'be lack of qualified personnel the co nt usioo of respo 101b11ity the la ck of pleru 1ng and t he 'Jk y t ocketing cost in the marititoo act iVity led to o hiS b -lcvel t-cque st l Qr tbc assignment of' a quslif'ied senior lJaval officer t o the pr oj ect When a cepta 1n i-eported no one seen ed to know wbe t to do vitb him ond after ho or1efzy Visited m 1 and Key I est bases he as assigned t o tt e ns vn 1 side of the strike planning at Headquarters ffo 1 s reported to btl ve been not entirely In any event he was anot her he ppy vi th hi$ brief Agenc y tour example of poor ha ndJ ing of peopl e in t hie project and Pe '-'8 S not gi· en a clwnce to Elolve the problems of n'iritime operations i It i a appo rent tbat tbo Agency bad very little capeb11 lt ' for mari time operntions ev n of a c landestine nature - 123 - - - TCP 8B9 f-1 Ji' x It lacked • T OP SPC Rl 'P tra1ned perooon el boat bases doctr1 De end o rs niz a ticn 'Ihe employees who orkod 1n th1o aadly alighted oct1v1ty wore -eu ave re or this and 11or-ale ve s not bigb t a14 As one or thea 11 T' oe loveet kind of operations offtcer ta a paro militro-y opcrAtion s orticc r 04 t he love st kind or PM officer 1 s a llllU itime oper tione otr1cer · • '· - l 2 I · · · OP L sse 1 Cl' A ' DESi'lliE PP RAMlLITARY Ol'ER' 'flOlfS -- TRAllilNC ln D i OUt D LEAJJEF S 1 £arl y in t he pro ject a caref't lly Gclcct ed group of Cu bani trained for in filt r ation into Cuba to or15aoi z e resistance The l coa e triane gel' IY nt of the proJect 1 illus- trated by be con 'usio betveen t l'¼e headquarters element s @dtbe tro 1 oing e lemontc over what tbese men vere being trained for nd by the f'ailure to have their missions cieana ot mtr ond reception reedy 2 - them ' he trained Cubans pJ t iJlto CU ba vere too fe and · too l e te to do v'ery much a o d the $ trike planners ignored them 'l 'oe cost of t raining o od boldi ng the e aen p robo bl y ran veil over e million doll a rs yet moat or them were never used i'or v hat they 'iere t re ined to do a nd some vere not used at e ll 3 Tbis pe rt Lculer endeo Yor be f'Ul 1n Decel llbe r 1959 when t be 'ilR Division Jnsde a decision to pick c s ix io 11 g roup of 'Cuban s and train t hem to tra 1 n other C- lba n s tor 1nf'1-ltrat1on i nto Cuba Possible t r aini11 Gitcs in Fanwos vere surveyed at this time but no f urther action was taken l Jle basic policy pape r approved by the President in Ma -ch l96o included t he above p -oposal - l 25 - 1iiJ · 8 P S E 8_jR It X 0 F 8 B I e RBI In April 1960 t he CUbo '1 leo d cr Manue l Art ilte ·who V t 6 I in VJ a mi of·f ered a number of his follower M recruits for t his program Useppo loland W$ 8 acq lJ red ti $ un aseeestteut ond holding site und a prel1m l nary ccrcening of the cnnd1do t o for the t t·o ining progra o began 5 During M iy end June 1900 COmJ l et e polygr aphs ps-ycbo- l ogico l and psychia tric t -ccts and e7al ua t1ons ie re obt ained on 66 individuals the ioland Bo sic M rse code tro 1ni Dg' vaa begun ·at In June 29 t re 1 nees wei-e eent om us ppa I sland to Pan ' I 1 or basic p xr11Jl 14tary _troilUDg • I n JUly_ 32 tro 1 neeo vcre sent to Gua t 9 o to be t rained as Uceppa Island ru S radio' OJ era tore J and - then cl osed dom The Tra ini ng Sit e 6 A rorse training a i t c could h3rd ly have been c bosen t ho n the one in Gua twle it being tl l J oo$t inaccessible '4th no t raining fac111t 1e o and at no li' ing tacill ies Tlle t rainees vere put to w rk buil dillg the cam p working dw ·ing t he d e y and study ing at night This ' -ent on f'or several JIX nt hs 7 1'he number of Amcricims at tb e rJ nhaua i or securi ty rec cons CUJJ v as held to a bare The vere represented to be eit her tourist s or o dveo tu rers 'The ca mp commander · ras e l $0 the cbief of tra l tdng end the pr oject o tticer for Gu atemo la When h e arrived he had to eet up t he temporary Camp find an area for u pct-oanent car sp contrnc't for buildinge supplies ' __ 126 · · '•· ' 1 sr s e oaB r and equ tpment he llso had t o find sites for a suitable air base a maxitime base and e pri son and contract for these fo ci Uties to be b li lt · Re had tb ree asdstants a con aunic tic_ nc officer and tl 'O cont 'act empl oyeee • 8 The initial group of pa ro m111to ry trai nees ve a transferred to t he Guat o ma le l3o se 1 rol o P8 tl8 l1la after tYO month6 of •1n1 ng By 23 AU UOt tberc ere 78 pa ro m1l1tory ti·aineea 34 COll ll lllications trainees Slld nine star and contract enlployee6 • •• • • •• • 9 y Septeml ler the troinillg comp bad enougl l tac1llt1cs ' • r • d 1n8tructora t o 'begin o four-'1eek basic tr ng course ' L'he trainees i'Crc oortcd into oovcn-mo n tea ms accord 1 og to their area k 'lowledge and t hei r aptitudea Sixty -'Oro celccted to go into CUba either 'legally or iUegally and to contaot resietance groups 6o were selected for action tea ms to go in 1llegtllly- a nd Jo1D the resistsnce groups that bad been contacted by- the 1 irot teu ns tho rcil'Aindcr of the tre ineea vo ll be tonned · 1nto a sme l l convcnt1onul ti-1kec force The tra1 ning ·bMe expected t he teams to be ready to go 1n O tober ond A$ke quartera to provide the infiltration pla a 10 The trainers did not reel he that Rea aqus rtors had cb-•d the plan Alreoey in July the J'l'J t he exile poHtical front had been asked to provide 500 indivi duels for ' a paramilit ar r act ion co dre ond the t raining bo se VM U lked i1 it cou1d accommodate this number O l nioUGly 1 t could not or aeenzr Conditions act ually got o --$e r n September tho trUin n g CSJ'l l 11as plug ied by torrenti a l t ro ' lical l ai ns sho-rt uges of food and oupplics plus t rouble wi t h a gitators a nd hoodluma WOODg the1 recent ly arrived trainees vho vere not beiDg screened and eaaessed as t he first ones had been The trti1n1ng base chie f got io t o d i fa vor vitb lleadquarters apparently beco uoe of hie blunt co bl cs a sking for ass ietance bll lgry w '' 1 r men are going • ba retoot Request f or Missions ll In Octpber the 1ll 1ltrot1on teams t hat had been selected f'rom e moog t he t ra ineeo vorked out de t ail ed operation al plan s for t hemselves COltll lete vit b Jt Aps propaganda handouts a nd res i o t a nco operations When the base announced t he t about e hundred men ver e ready to go Headquarters r6plied thDt it vas proposing the 1lle8 l 1nf1ltrat1on or t be tewr s 1n No• e be r by boat Actue J 1 ' this time as t he 54-foot 11 the only boat the project had at Metusa Tilr e Beadqua__rters further co bled t ho t 1 t was engaged 1n rep rillg a ge-o ral plan for t he cmpl r1cent o f the inf'i lt -ation t eams but that t M det ails rere not yet ready The base chief 'as rece lled 1n Qctober and t hereafter t he training base had a ne chief eoch veek for five wee -- s One tra inee -as put 1 ito CUba legally at the e nd of October - 128 P OP 0 ' ' ES QBT 0 P 9 Bit£ 1 12 1n lfovember 1960 12 months o fter t b original decision bo d been me de t o trb 1 n cubo n t e Jl IJ f or- resict ance orge- 'lizet ion ten tee rie were reported ready to go But the ere stil l O la iting lreadquort • plans for infiltration ln e J J 178 men including ·23 rad £0 operetor-s hod been t rained in secu rity bMic cle ndeotine trad ecraft 1 ntelligc ncc collection end reporting propae o ndo ond e sitc ti-0n oubvert ive activities reeistc nce orga n1wt1on t-ecep- t jon operations explosives and demolitioll8 guerrilla action and G1milar matters • 13 Headquarters approved tbe UGC o t 6o o1' t lese men tor t he resistance teeJ $ o 11 other o we ro scheduled to begin t or o c l conventional combat tro 1n1ng on 1 5 Jlo- en ber as an element of a strike force o t 1 5oo· men Tb is drMtic cb o ngc in ovcr-al 1 plan was announced to the trti 1 ning bo oe by a cabl e o 'l Ii Uovember wid 1ed t he b0$e to pleo d tor closer coordinat ion in the tutu re betveen l eodqunrtcr• planning and the field tre inine During this month s ix tra i oees vere moved to a llJ ami u fc hou oe where t h y stayed for h O m nths e vait I Jlg trensporto tion into euba Move to P ' 1 In Decen ioer 1960 lieadquartero advised the training base that i t vo s expecting appt'OVo l of to operati one l concept which 1 1cluded internal r es1ste nce st1l Julo ted by tea as e11 as the use of o ground und a ir astau1t force It advised tbe bMe tbat 750-lllOOl brigade i stead of 1 500 _ he - 129 TBF E 8 G P3W · · •• _'- pla med • P-8P 83 ld that teams 8o men 1no tead of Go sse· R£r vere approved t or infil trc tion Dw iog t h1o month the 8o r ell were lllOved to Fo na no wbcre t hey 'iere held unti l somebody couJ d f1 nd out what to do with t hee An offer trom DPD to give thee jump t reinine ru turned down by the p roJect 15 By January 1961 the l lOTale of tbe traineoo in Panama There e a not even a n interp r eter bo d declined coneidernbl y ave iltlble tor b ricti lg e nd debriefing them had Beadquartero then 24 of tbe m brought to 8ate h9u cs in Miami to be lt Ad ready' f or dispatch Twelve re dio opero tm-s ¥ ere m rved from Pa no ma to the Agency I a trflin 1 ng bQSe in the United Ste tee for further troJ n1 ng 16 By Febrµo ry 1961 t he 32 trainees ot1ll in Panama rere described a a dieilluoioned and at the brco king p01nt ve re then tro nsfcrred to a base in fo t They Orleans to be gi ven additional t r8 1n 1 ng i n sabotase and tli r•ma ritime reception February vs s actually a red letter iwnth 00 o-perators vere in filtre ted lega 1 ly Six ot the r-udio OU 14 Feb rwu-y t he first resi stence teom as put into Cuba o ud tvo oore teams ent in et the end of the month Ho •ever the t• -o town$ vhich b ld sat in a Mioni1 Gate house from mid-November to mid-January ret urned to M1e m1 in bad hurcor in mid-February ai'ter a oonth on the '' u-ba ra J circum oaviga ting Cuba rithout b eing put ashore - 130 - •• ¥ ' • • _ TOP 17 J n 8 B eflB effective 1nf1ltrat1on lt' l-2Cbwt1Bm never vn o developce Uot one of the pa re o ilito ry t QJn '-as e ver delivered by air 29 March the project Guantanamo Baae done earlier 'l l'O S On oblo to put four ogonto into Mo through It 10 not clea r '-'by- tb ia could not have been lo illf'iltration vno over tried by oubnarine Morale Problems On lo Karch 1961 16 ntb after tbe orig l ne J ·decto1on 18 to train reeiate nce teams the 90 men llho bad been tr8 1 ncd tor thie vere distributed as foll'ovs 32 in£iltrated1 inc1ud 1ng 11 i adio · ol C' ratorG 5 at se4 on o co bot age rzd ssion 6 in Nev Orleans as e ro of a -s ider teroi 2-9 in Nev Orleans still mro iti n g ini i ltrat1on 19 detached to M1 '1 for various impending operations The mora le of t he reJnaJ n 1 ng 1 rainees va a lo· r ro d their 'OOger 'l'hia co uGcd a great nany problem$ 1n tlev Orleano· high Some ot these men hnd been held 1 n five difiP rent ca nrps O Tcr·a t en- 'llOnth period On 30 March about three vee b efore -the invasion the remainder o'f' the group ol ut 20 • ere t ransferr ed to H tem t and turned 2oose being described ns a collection ot spo11ed individuo l s dictinguished by bed onduc t At l eaet 30 of the agents Wo 'ere recruited bet een Moy nd Septel lber 1960 ncv r got i nto Cuba at all 8li long the 30 - o re eight vho came into the p ject in t he orJ 81nal group in May 196 and 'llh-o vcrc in trei li ng o l Jnost ccntinuou sJ y from that tl ce up to Apri l 1$ 61 F9P e een eT 19 The ti me pen t 1n t rc 1ning io no measure ot tbe 'l Ul' J ity of t he training of course ond the r e wo undoubtedly a great v uite of time One of the CUbe no t rai 11 ed f'or inf1l trut1on into Co ba vrot e that after he arrived in Pe nllln8 1n D eceober l96o ••• d urins e lmoet tb rcc ' eeks t be only t hineh I d id • •YM cl eaning a small dam and t he 8hoting re ngc n rter that ve j WJt din •t do auy-thingh j t s leep and o t c tha te all When he srri• ed in Flortda on ·18 January 11 1'bere t b e •same hiatol y s1eep eat ploy co rd and watch television The or ly trru n 1ng 1· receveid 4 UI'i Ds that time vas on ·cecret vritting 1 ch i ro s very good b·ut nothing else The ea me asent pointed out serious dcf'iciencie$ in his Jeapons training md his 2 al briefing One of the instru ctor-e in Cua teoo la in the ee rly moDth 8 later cloimcd t hat only t vo 1n 0·tructora knev their business tbe otherc v re chosen from the trainee cadre 'Who b ad -on ly -a background 0 £ t -o xri0ntbs' t ruin1ng the r1s el 1teG e mons Ile 1 nclcded WJM elf the unqua 11t1cd TroJ ning Omiasion 21 'lbe rcmot ene ss of t he tra 1 ni i g $1t e caused additionnl d ti'f1cult1co When brigade tro 1 ning started on 29 lTovember tber vere only t ro compass o f'or 1 l5 troops 1 8 lld these belonged to trainees Compo sses bad f irst been requested on 2 October but when they vere not received t he training in tb c1r u se had to b e olllitted fl-om the program - 132 - · 8 GEC E P- - cp' p 22 SJi'CRfl- I ore serious t here bud ne er been definition of l Ir f -training goal a and the base SI1d l coil qu o rtere wet'c '- Or at croaa-purpo6ea The cllief' of the ·t re 1 ning base in Cuat cmlo never received let t er ot instruction 23 The o1tUAt1oo t t he Jlew Orleans llase 1n March 1961 rao even core c hootic The inatructoro found a tra1ning lll'ea 9 1f owamp and fillc l wit h po1conous 6110kes llemoll t ion -which was cl a8ses had to be conducted a lone ti footpath leooing from a tbeate• tq_ a inesa hall vlth con tant t ntorrupt10UJJ 1 l Oltl pa saer e-b r lfobod y seemed able to dd Lne tµe tre 1n1 Dg that' -Va6 required A de100litions instructor vas assured on m-r1V8 l t hat tho group he hud co to trAin did not need t he instruction 1n any case tbe rc wc ro no cxploo1ve train1ng mater1ol 6 no adequate rang and no gear t o cct on up Another instructor aent to Uev Orleans to tre in a sma JJ raid er group found hlltiselt expected t o train oi gan 1zc o nd equip a 90- guerrilla force A l ee k l ater he 1·ound him self' t r ru n 1 ng a 16o- ian 86sauJ t battalion inst ead The training requiromont ms never spelled o l t end the training equipment never she red up 24 Tre ining a ctivity of various Gort vaG golllg on con tin- uo JJ y- t here vei·e -requ ire ir enta i'or ·everythlllg 'rec counterintel 11- gencc to cm9J l boat handling 01' But t here was no i'ull - ti Se Cb 1ef training 1n tho project to over eee requirement s lefine responcibilitie6 set ey fecilit ea and pro ide s wport ' ·- - 133 - ' · •· TO P S T' i t E r- Consequentl -bat t ruining vas done -es done wit hout control by 1ndividual ce ae of 1 1cers doirt g the best t he f oould Ro · effective- tbis training vas cannot be deter m ihed ot it Much took place in M100II1 where pereoo nel trom the base verc 1notruct- ina Cu bona 1n 1ntelllgence collecti on count erintelligence techniques peychologica l var fare activities or pe ramilitary cubJects a ccording t o need 25 l he tra1n1ng VQ G necessarily conducted in se te houses and required e consHlerabl e expenditu_ ot time on the port of base pet'$onncl other -tra1n 1 ng area usu olly by case officere iro G conducted in the Wac n One me was trained 1n a hotel room t o m4ke o purachu te JUCJI be ma de one su ccesotul ly' ·Maz ly rcqucsto were l vied on the OJ 'f'ice ot Training for 'inst ructor s and training ma teri nl G Many But these vere uncoordinated and vo steful ot the instructorn when ma de av o 1 1 abl e ' ·ere not used in tbe L r spec1alt1c ending up in Dt Ch jobu as s t evedoring incte- d 26 A veil thought - out proJect vouJ d have hnd o t r Uning dllnCX Wich would have lo id apeeii'ic r equirements on t he Off ice of Training particulorly when the t r ain1Dg of hundreds of people was an integral part of the venture Instead the r equirements ver e met 1n -piecemeal and j Joprovi ed f ashion under 6 iff1cul t conditi o l lS and r1th dubious result fl mop M Sll0 i l3' e SECUlU'l'Y The Aosc ult on Cubo 16 gener-o l J y acknovledged to ho· ·c l been a poorly kept eeci-et I t cculd hti rdl y have been other- -1a c cont idcr1ng the complexity of tb e o pero t1on wtd t he number of peopl e invol · cd both C uban and r1ce n 'l'he inspect i on t am did not ODke a de-ta 11 ed i 1tudy of the aecurity ·aspec-t s of' t he oper$t1on bu co me acrooo 100 ly weo kneGses in the protection of information and act1v1tieJJ' from those ho did not need to · know- u 2 In general the Cu b«i J a who lo' Ue in t he operation do I tot seem to be v-c hs d o n y ·roe 1 de rs- - e J' lding ot the need to keep quiet about their · o cth 'itiea more t han t hey n eded to kno· Ma l of them kncv uuch d they were not compartmented fro ea ch other ·Md t rom ric o ru to the extent that wa s neces- cary For ·e-xampl e one fealt by Cuban vbo vas clo c'e to t he oporntion Vt W' being contacted by at l eu st six dift'erent staff · employe s 3 Some sgentr were being band led by two or three different ct lSe officers a t the and l u ck of cont rol Cuba had kno o i t 1 mc vlth confusing results Many 01· t he agents vho ere $Cnt into coeb ot her du rln in 1 ng for example a doz en ro dic- operators had been trained as a group ho vculd kilo ho t he other ones were If one was arreSted One radio o rator inside Cuba as aware of almost every ptll' Ulitar opernticn 1n CUba t rom the begi uninc of 'the proJcct - 135 - -· ' W8f 8B1PRT - - W9P 4 8B 9fl EI Agents ho c re supposedly well trained disregarded e l c t00 11 to ry rulea of persooo l security a nd 'ere e rrcsted because they needles$l y ep ve 8 •ay t heir t rue identiti es by visi ting rel atives who vere under surveil la nce or by ca rrying identifying documents 1n th ir pockets l u rd ill MiamJ 5 The Mia mi area r epresented a pe rticular haza x-d beceuoc ator1e s and ruwo rs spread rapidly through the large Cubo n communi ty • 1h1ch included CQ stro agent -s and people soon became know Movement$ o boa t G One agent I vho bad been 1n1 i ltrated into Cuba by boat reported later that 111 thin three days his fDlllily in ti a mi lmev vben and bow he had lended because one of the crev ioombers of tho boat bad told Jlfe ny ople in M te mi about it let tera fl•Oll the t raining ca up e l tbougil censored managed neve r-the less t o convey UJ for nation t o the M1a m 1 Cubans 6 The Americans on tbo proJect in many cases also failed to observe strict security discipline Ooe senior case officer holdicg an operational lll2e t1llg vith CU'bsns 1n e Miai D 1 motel vaa overheard by a c i tizen vho reported to the Federal aureau of Inve st1gat1on 7 It bs G teen teatii'ied that the cecurity tnNU Uies a t the training ca ops in Guat e la and at lfcv Orleans • •ere t nadeq 1 8 te Furthermore t he t raill ing camps had no adequate coUDte i -inte lligen c e ca psbiUty Except f or an 1 nstr•UCtor borro ·ed from the Office of - 136- Ter SBO'RE Training for a 1'cw leeko the Agency vas m 8 blc to provide counter1ntell1gence officer to the c a mpu t'- 'l 'his lack was serious because in order to obto in n greo t many rec it c for the strike force in $ llw·ry there • 1e o very little screening of the 'Olwi teere and some Yho 1 1ere $ent t o comp ho d been inAdequate ly' checked Poor ll lckBtopp1ng 8 Inste nccc vere noted o paor backstopping of the cover s t ories ot Afftncy cniployees sketchy briefings on cover -wc o k coYe r stories and t'a ul ty docUJ'l eJltation Much o r this can be ascribed to luck o r attent ion t o detail due t o the press or Many of the early d1ff1cul t1es 1n Guo te mala atem red time f' rom the inadviaab111ty of prov1 ding supplies o nd support t o instructors vho vere Ooing o s tourists aod soldiers of fortune This proten ae eventually bad to be dropped because of its 1 mpro cticality A serious vee kues c showed UP ill the poor e rr a 'l gements for backstopp1ng overflights tor exaJJ1ple tl le pla ne tbat landed in Jalt lica 9 5ome nut curiously a strict comparbmnta tion ••as applied in certain l ree s of the U'OJect vhicll actually denied informat ion to ll Ople ifho needed it Those vho e rc eu@ ged in rwm Lng agents in to Cuba vere never allo - ed into the War Room or g1 ven tbe pla n for tllc strike - 13'7 Q SBeR3T c r 8 1 l O s z e-P z x For occu r1•ty rcoaon the resistance elements tns1de CU be were n o t udvi sed of' t he ti0e f the asso ul t and could dly have rioen up even if there had been 100 000 of theta Th enti re comple 1r2nt ot the Mie m 1 Base '-'O-e l ikevise tminfontlOd and vas unpre·pared to te ke acti on when the etrike occurred sto ff employees at the M18J lll Bace vho could have benefited by $l eCie l clearanceG did not get t hem until tr i cb too lo t e Use of Guu ten al a 11 The w re or Cuate mala of sccu rity unf'oo -tllll4te ior training ba es vo s ill terms lt is obvious nov t bo t the training could have been done more s-ecu rel y in t m ited St a tea as for exwnple the tank crev tra 1n1ng1 Which got no puOlicity at e l l The Guatetl' lala camps vere not easily- hidden and Dot easi ly explained Tile air be De 'o s l ocated on a well-trAveled road and in vie ot e railroad whe re tra1 o l oa da of Gua t emahns f're uently halt ed o n a iding 2 · It is strans that tbc tro DUllg of t be CUbans vas und r- taken in e foreign count rr vhere the trainees vere neccssor ly exposed to the oo ti S OJ l d r eporters could pick Ul infom at i on Presu me bl y tb16' _ a c done au grounds of $ecu r1t y and non- Lttributabi l1t however the ro dio operators who vere trained 1n Guate DIJ la i'ere later brought to the United States for i u rt he tra 1nin8- The f0 00 for the abortive d ivereionory XI ed 1t 1on _ as t rained in lfev Or ana re th thau being sent outside the - 138 - -men GB9 RBI country other Cubans were tra ined in bot h parl lJ tl llte ry and e ipionase uubjccts 1n tbe outskirts of Miami and Waohington id still o tbe i ·s were trntned on Anericru t soil o t Viequeo ' tslund 01 ll these training loce tiono only the ones in CuotemnlA become kXl o- m to the vo rld 13 lt 1• acknowledged that »any Cubans and Americans observed strict security diecipl 1 tec tho t the eecurity off'1cero of the project ma de 8ll o o-tonding contribu t1011 6-Ud t hat ir any er range ients and a c t1vit1ea o rc not open ·to CX itici eym resa rd1nl their security Unforlunatcl ' this vas not good enough ror «· project of tbiG Gize «nd importance 1 conducted by p ro1'ess1one l 1ntol11gon of ficcrs J 4 Because ot the opera tion' a l iSguitude t he errors coc mitted resulted ill modus ope1-and 1 to tmllly e·X'pOSu re of' Agency-- persom i el o nd uncontrolled indivi duals both tot eigo and AD rican ·-• 139 - TAP N -- uor1 ew AMERICANS I ll COMBAT l During t he invasion l anding tvo Agency contract employees 1 assigned as opera tioWJ otticers aboa rd t he two LCis -went o sbore to ra rk tvo of t he beaches ond c C banged gunfir w1tb Cu1 a o militia OD ot tbeoe employee• had token part in a sabotage re id on a Cuban oil r fillety a m o nth earlier Both of them engn d in rescue operat icm s a long t bc Cullan shore after the brigade collapoed 2 In l e te 1960 tbe project leoderc were coc l Dg doubttl l of tbe Jl Otivation of tbc Cuban piloto they 'Were training and of tbelr ability t o perto rm tact ical m1cs1ons auccessf'ul cy In January 1961 the -19' - r reque oted t be Special Group to a uthorize t he use of' Ameri an contract pilots Tbe autboriz at ion given vas lilnit ed to the bJ rJ ng ot t l - e pilots e o d reserved f or I ste r decision toe queation ot thei r uctual UGe 'l'he Special Group a Lao granted authority to recruit end hire American ee n t o eerve in tbe 1nva o1on fleet 3- 'l'hree Alrerican contract pilots vi t h l ona A'P'fl ncy e rience were de a ilable trom another project of' A numbe r other pilots and air-ere c bnician 8 l 'lelD bcrs or e x-members of several Air National Cua rd unit s were recruited especi e Uy 0 for tbe project 1n ea r ly 1961 under cover of o notional omme r cial company - l li-0 - 'f0f S' SORB T '8l1 t Bllfil W 4 Through the first day of f'igb tins 17 Apri l only Cuban Uir creve vere UG Cd for combo t or drop mios lon s manned -26c Of' 11 Cuban- lhicb hod e one over the beachhead only three ho d returned to boae 4Xld four of the othe rs had 'been Ghot dovn That night th tl V8 il abl e CUbe D ere ere exhausted and dispirited 5 On 18 Apri l the 'tum pressed exile brigade was calling for 0 1 r support several Cu Two Americon f'liera vol unteored to goJ and crevs foll ed their ex le 'l' he resu1t lnl 6 a bigbl y succesatul att ck E l inat u c ol lll'lll ot Ca t ro'e forces moving on Blue Beach Four rican manned o 1 rcraft •v ere in cOC' lba t over the bcnehheo d tbe tolloving day ond tvo of them 'ere shot do -n by Cnst ro 1 s T-33D- later the arure day t vo American crewe returned for nnother aortie Four All erica n f' lie rs ere either k llled 1D combat or executed by C8 Stro forces after bei lg shot do '2 6 In addition to these actiona e n rican- m9 Il led P BY pa trolled the waters aoutb of CUha f or u totai of 57 bol U 6 during five days on air-cea resc t i nd communications relay duty 7 'l'be 4 m ri ctm pil ots lost 1n combat were a rare oi' Uni ted Ste tes Government cponsorship and p rcbably also 01• Agency ill'terest but bad been lllstruet ed not to infcnu t heir fami lles of' th16 In spite of fide TI sS co ·erage of tbe inva r 1on f ni lure the stor- t of t he American pilots ha $ M ·er ijotten into print a lthough its - 1 41 JfOt Sfl8 R£lI TOP 8E6iilQT ocnaational nature still makes th 1 o e 1 0seib1 l1t y In deal i ng vith t he au rv I v Lng fallU 11 eG it bafJ bceu neceos e ry to conceal connection 1ith the United S ta tes Governir ent ·'l'hie effort be s been complicated by tbe fact tbo t the original cover story 'e- 'J changed and a second uotionai c aubstituted 8 The rcGolutiO l in a Decu re J XIJ lller of the legal OJld moro l claims a riGin g from these fow de tb B hru been ccstl v complt c ited and fraught vith ri ok of dt•clooure Cove nt'o 1·ole or the se problell8 vere o ggro vuted by the iD clusion in the 'lllent con tr a cts ot 7ertain imnece8Ga r11y COOQPliceted l nsu ronce cla l ee and by the project's fail ure tc prepare 1n o dvtu tce an effect ve plo n i o J' dea JJ ng vit b tM event ual le8 tl l and oecu r1ty problems -142 - • • '•• 'I · • '• TOJ J • t £Gi Ri W TCP 0 ---scr IT CONCWSIOKS AIID RECOJ-lME IDATIOl S Ccrtoin basic conclusions have been dre l'n from t his curvey of tb Cuban oporation 1 'i'be Central Intelligonce Agency after s t a rting to build up the resistance and guerrilla fore CG inside GUb8 dro at1co lly converted th project into what rapidly became o n over t mil itary ope ro tioo Tbe t- sency fo 11 ed t o r ecognize that vben t he pr oJoct ndvunced heyo d t he stage of plausible denial i t vas going beyond the area of A ncy resJ O laibUi t y as veil ¼ ency capabUity 2 'l'be Agency beca oo GO 1trO lJ ed up in tb mlit a '7 operation that it fa 1led t o apprai se the chAnces of succes e realist ica lly l w-then nore i t fo llid to keep the national policy-mkero adequately and real 1 oticall y l ntormed of the conditio l 8 considered e s sential t or success and it did not prese suf fi cient I r for prc l' l t olicy decisions in a t ast moving ituation3 As tbe project gre- r t he ncy redu ced t he exiled leadcrt t o the stat us of puppets J thereby l osic g the adva o t ag s of tbei r active part 1c1po t 1on 4 1'be A 'ftncy failed t o build up and si w1-Y a resiste nce orga nize t ioll under rather fa- •ore blc- conditions lt ir and boat o peratio ns' showed up _poor ' - 1 3 · lf6 £ SLG ttl ' 'l 1 9 P S il 0 i1 E T 5- 'l hc Agenc ' failed to collect ad equate infonr a t i on on the ctrengths of t ho Cestro restoo and the extent of the oppooition to it o nd i t fulled t o evaluate the Uvtlilsble informat ion correct ly 6 'l 'he proJac·t w s bs d ly orsanized Comoi md 11llea and 11' anngeioont controlG o-ere 1n tfect1vc o nd unclear Senior Staffo of the App ncy '' er e not util ized air support oto - d independent of the pr oject the r'o of tlle large fonurd be Gt wa not cl ear 7 The project vno not otoffed throushout wit h top quali ty peoplo and o number of people were not used 00 to the best advnnt age 8 The Age ncy entered tbe proJect -without o dequate assets in the vay of boats bases training fo cilit i es agent nets Spanish speakers and s1 mllro- essential ingredients of a succeasful opcratio 1 Rad these been already ill being much tilr e and effort vould bave been 9 Agency policies and operational plane vere never clearly delineated v-i t b the exception of tOO plnn for t he brigade l and iD g but e ven tbia provided no d 1 - tu rter plan no unconvent i onal va rfare axme xJ and only extremely ague plauo for action f ollo ing a successrui landing In general Age ncy plans and policies d 1d not precede the ·rsr e az113 1 various opere tiono 1 n the project but • ere u wn up in r espons e to opera-tiono l needs Qs they aroee Con o quentl y t he 1 cope of tbe operat ion 1 tself and of tbe support required as consto ntly ahift ing T' 'lere were sooie good things 1D this project Much of t he support provided a s· outstandJ ng for exe uple logisti cs and COOllllunicat1ons A number of 1 ndiv iduo ls dJ d $uper1or Jobo t lADY people at o 11 grade levels gave their t and effort without stint vo r king almost unlimited bom· over long 1 0 rioda under difficult and 'rustre ting conditions Witbout regard to pcrson o l considera tiona But thi s ve s not enough It is aeswred that t he Asency because of its exper ience in thi s Cuban operation vill never again engage ill an operation that is essenti ally an o-vert military ettort Du t before i t takes on o notber major cover t pc1 it1cal opere t ion it vil 1 have t o impro· e its organi zation and maoag1 ae nt t 1 ra stically It crust f i nd a -o y t o s et up an actual ta sk forc0 l f necessary and be o Cle to st a ff i t vitb the beet people It must govern its operati on ' 'i t b c learly defined policies and carefully dre vn -plaos engaging in 1 tl l coordin e tion vith the Department$ ot Stato and Defense as appropriate Prev10U$ $ur 'C '°S o nd otber papers itten b • the In spectot° General have called attention to r u8 ll oi' t bese _prob l ems and dei'icie'o ci es and huve suggested oluti ous £Vt sze 12x 1••0 example in ie P ssc n rmJune 1958 a r coromendation vos de in o aurvey of the Far Ea st D1v1 s1on that a higb--levcl Agency stud be made or tlle erl e -lt to vh1eh U c Agency should 'oe engaged 1n llt '1lit4ry opere ions 11 if any and t hat 1 t 1oclud c e n evnluation o'f the capob1 llti e6 of other government depe rtmeo ta to assume p rlilJary reuponaibi lity 1n th field In Januuy 1959 the Inspector Genero l polnted out 1n a memorondu to the Deputy Director Pl c Da that A baaic probl ea 1n the FM field 1 1 tile del 1 oontioc of ttsponeibUJ ty betvee o tbe Agency d t be 1121 li te ry aerviceo Ill our vtev the Cl o nde$till SOrV1ces teI d o to o sswne reopon s ibilitie1 beyond its cspabilittes and does not g1 - e sutficlen conaide ratl0t1 to the ability or other Dcputo ents of U c Goverrur ent to COl duct or 'P lrticipate in those operations 11 A 1955 uurvey of tbe then Psycholosical and Faraml litary Operat 1 Stall _ 4 o g L1nst the by-ponilll of thio $t af'f by the operating d 1 V'isiona vho vcrc Sea ling d 1 rcctly vi th tbe Deputy Director Plans u nd tile Director of Central Intelligence instesd In March l 961 the aun-ey of the Covert Aetico St3ff aeatn waned a gairuJ t 1guor1ng the G'ttl tf and f'a1Ung to utill ze i to servicca The July 1959 S lr'VCY of tile Deputy Directos Pl all organization aga1ll stressed tbe 1 crpOTto nce of tbe fucct i onal staffs pQrticu l ro ly t u Nlation 'to tM c onduct of complex - lh6 ff Q iP 6 v RL men rans O erattonoJ and advoc tcd the uao of a tusk torce fo covert operations ha Ying na Jor 1Elternat1o-ne l s 1gn1t1c t U ce Theoc OP2 rationon the ourvcy 6tated 11 bo a d at tbe OYcrttirov of a hoetile regime i nd ma y require exte ne 1vc pa re ailltary open tioos •• o od cl andestir c log tst ica and air support of oubatf J'l tial mngn1tucl Such operl ltiOno mu st be c00 Td 1ll ated v1tb n tiooal policy on a continu t ng baaia 8 d may require con4tont high-level llaisc m v1tb tl c State De al'tma nt o nd the White Houoc To be ouccosstuJ mJor covert opexatio a of' th1 a nature requtro the effective aobilJ % o tioo of all tbe re sources of the DD P o nd a re clearly beyond the cap tb1lit1ca of any one area division 11 The SNDe s 1 added that the C ribbean taek force located 1n the WB D1V1 s1ct1 vars pl amtin g at a great rate but a cc ompl ishing little boco use it ws a too lo'W-lcvel to act docisi vely' or to obtain effective J Olicy guidance t roc otber d c t s of the Goven u e rt i t dJ d not eveD inspire contidexlce nong oenior DD 'P oi f'icers Such t ask fo rces ithin a siDaJ e division rcpreeeut o voetully IJ adequato response to a problea or cajor ut iOl lal s1gn1 1cance Comm and or 1ruch o ta a ror e JIJ U Ot be e t'u ll-time job u nd t he task fore comi andeJ- ' t be of sufficient stntUN to deal directly vith tbc Under Secretary of St ata or Vitb other senior otf1c1ala of the government oa the need o ri oes 11 - 1 7 • 8 1 889 AB'f T9 P Elli'CP FA The same curvey also discussed the managemeot problem 1n the DD P areo et length 8 td tr'Ade s number ot recommendationo hi h e e on record Among other thingll it pointed out the con fuoion e s to the ielationabip o nd tuoc t ion o or tbc t hre top officers The otudy of the Cu ban o ro tion ahcro1s that these critic iama and ma iy ot bcre discussed 1n p reviou e Inapector General surveys are still val id and torthy of reView But the Cuot D operation 1D ndd ition to demonstro til lg old weakneaseir again al eo ebovCd ncy ves kneeaee not clearly discerned before The Inspector Ge lleral as a l'¢ Gul t or hie stud y of t Cuba ti operation mo kes ·the foJ lO'l inS recommendations regarding future Agency illvolve nent 1D covert oper ations 'hich have major international signitico oce and which ll'AY profoundl y affect the cou rae of vorl d evants 1 Such an operation ehould be carr i ed out by a cat otully s elected task fo rce u nder tbe c of a senior offi cial of Gt ture on a tul l -i1n ie bo sLs an organizatiouru ly outol de the DO P tructure but draving upon all the resour-ce of the Cla nd esti ne Se r-vices 2 'l 'be A D Cy should request that such project s s hould be trnns-ferred t o the Dcpa rtment of O fense t •heo they sho- - signs of becOCllllg O -ert or beyood Agency C3pa'bili t ies - 148 - _ l'QP 3 t i38RB Xhe Agency should steblish a procedure under hich the Board of National Estin ates or other body sim11Ar1 divorced from clandcstin operatious IOuld be required to evaluate all plo ns for $U Ch ltltljor covert opcre tioll 3J dra'Win g on all D vo U able 1nte1Ugeo ce o od estio'ltiug the chances of success from an llltelligence X int of Yiev 4 1'ho Agency should eotabliob a high-J evel boo rd of senior of'ficere t roni its opere tionAl and eupport componenta plus off1oeu dete 11 ed from the Pentagon e nd the Department of St o te to make cold bard e ppruisals at recu 71l'lg interwUs of the ch8 nocs 0£ s cce$S of major covert proJectD from an operatiooal poi nt of v1eo1 5 A mecba1 lu m should be astabliehed for communicating these intelligence D D d operat1ou8 l apprai oals to the l '18 k_ers of national policy 6 In return a Jl f Cha uism should be e$ta011ebed to Conml Ultcatc to the Ago cy the nat ional policy beari ng on such projects and the Agency should not undertake action until clearly defined policy has been received 7 The Apftnc · shou ld improve its system for t he guided eollectio l of infoTI L'ltic i e lsent ial to t he planni ng and carrying out of uch projects 8 The gency should t ake J xt dist e stepa to eliminat e tbe deficiencies 1n its clan destine a i r and oaritime operat ione TSP 8BCJ Bl ' '8P 8B Ji3r 9 The Agency should t a ke 6teps to 1 apro· e its employeeo • competence Ln foreign J Mgua ges knovledge of fore igD geas _aod capo blll ty iJ doeeJ iJ g vitb fore people vhcn sucb killo u re noce$e ry 10 Tbe Agc n ey should devise a aore orderly sys a tor tre assignment of employeeo vltbu tho DD P urea t han that currently in use • 15 • • ' '• ' ·1 ' I ' ' - - i i a i • -' V _ J • etee 01 L COPY -E eti BI 16 Mar h 195 A PROOMM Of COVER' r AC'l'ION AGAlNST THE CAS'IRO REGD-0 1 Objective 1' 'he purpoee of t he program outlined herein 1s to bring about the replacement ot t he Castro regime with one more devoted to the t rue int el'estc of the htban people and oore acceptabl e to the U S i n wch e ttAnner a s to I void any fippeara nce of U S intervention Essentially t he method of accoc rpl iching this end vil l be to i nduce GUPJ Ort arid _Co to r aaS possible direct action both in e de e nd o t ide of Cuba by selected groups of CU bans of a sort that t hey mieJit' be ex pected to end could undertake on theii ow i nit i ative SinCe a crisic 1nevit o bly entailin drastic action in or toward CU bo couJ d be pl ovoked by circu ms·to ncea b eyond control of the u S before the cOvert action ptogl eJo hes a cco1rpl ished ·1ts· ject1ve -· - ' • every etfor-t fill be made t o carry it out 1n such a · ay a s progre$t1vely to improve the CD pability of the U S t o act in a c r i sis 2 SUD mry Outline The p roe ram eontempla tes ·tour major courses of act ion I Tne f'irst requircmc t is the creation of a reeponsi- ble appea ling a d unit1ed Cuban opposi tion to t he Castro r ce 1m- publ icl y decl a ' 'e-d -es· s uch and therefor e necess ari • ·located ' '•'•' k_i q -__ ••••• outside o C l ba It is hoped t ha t within one month u pol i tical cntitY can be formed in the eb e pe o f a council or Junta t b rough the urger of three acceptaole 0PJl081t1on groupo 11th vb1ch t he Central Intelligence Agency 1 8 o l rco dy 1n contact The council Yill be cncourD SCd to adopt e s its alogs n Restore the Revolution11 to develop a J Ol iticel posi tion consie-tent 'W'itb t hnt eloga and t o 4ddreos itscl f to t he Cuban peolll e «s an a t tro ctive POlitico l 8 1 tcrno tt ve to Castro Will Thie vocal oppoa1t1on uen•e as o megnet for t he loyalties ot the Cubans in actual ity conduct and direct vo r1ous op po«1tion $Ctiv1t1ec and provide cover for other c 'l 't ment ed CIA controlled opcr t1ons Tab A b So thet the oppocit ion m 'l y be heard and Castro's basis of popular ouppo rt undermined i t i8 necescary to develop the mcon o £or mw s com1 mi ce tion to the Cuban pcOple ao that a po e rt'ul propo ganda o ff'enei ve can be initiated in the r eme of th'c decl a red oppoe1t1on The mjo r t ool propo$ed to be u ced for t hi6 purpose io o lons and _s hort wave gray broadco oting f acility probably to be located on Sl '9ll Iolo nd date for its completion 1G t o mnths Tho target This vill be supplemented by broadcaoting from U S Co01merc l al facilit i es paid for by private Oubo n groups and by the c l andestine d1o t r 1but1on or vritten mat erial inside the cou nt r y ams OliLT Tab ll SWBE'P• · ' m HB t liLI 3 c Work 1c u J rc ly in rogresc i n the creution of e covert intel 11gcnce and act ion organi ation thin Cuba vbich 1ll be respollllive to the orders ond directions of the eX1lo oppoeition Such e ne twork must have effective collml Ulico t ion • o nd be selecth cly Jllalllled to minin d ze the risk of penetration An effe_c t1vc orge ni za tion cAll probabl y be created rtthin 60 de ye Its role vill be to provide ho rd iotelligencc to arrange tor t he illegal infiltr a tion a nd exf'iltrat ion of individ ua U f to a ssist in the 1 ntcrno l dietribution or illegal propaganda o nd to plan end o rganiz e for t he defection of ke ' in llvidu alc and groups as directed d PreJ Cl rations have oJ ready been rxadc for the deYclop- rnent of o n o dequate paramilitary f'or ce outside of' Cuba together vith ·mec haniems for t he nece sae ry logistic support militS 1 'y opere t ons on t he Bland ot covext Initially a cadre of l ee ders W-1 1 1 be re cruited a f'ter careful ereening and t ro 1ned as r a re militery i nst ructors In a sc cond phase a number of' pa ram111t ary cadres 11 be trai ned a t s cure l ocati ons o -tside of the U S so as to be aY Uo i l • t o r 1 wiedi te leployi ont into Cuba t o organize train e nd lend resistance for ce recruited t he re bot h be fore and o tte r t he e stQ bl1shn cnt or one or more active centers of res ist o nee - The creation of t his capabilit y will lfiltS 011 fu • § CR 'IL_ 4 req-Jlrc a oinilm u r of s ix i X nth c Wld probably closer to ei ght In the mca m hil e a limited air ce po b1l 1ty tor ret -upply and tor 1n ilt rat1on end extiltrotion altttl ly oxilJtn unde'r CIA control ond can be rather eo c expanded i t 1d vhen tb e c1t'Uo t1on req_u ire-e this rltb a 6'QS 1 J Within tw'o montb 6 it 1s b oped to parallel e tr resupply capability under deep cover o s o co mmercis l opero t ion in anotb er cou utry 3 L aderohipt _It is rtont to ·m-oid diJltro tillg end dj n i ve rivalry '1aDng t be outatondina Cuban oppoflition lead er c to r t he s enior role in the o sition J ccoroingly every effort 'Vill be l1l8 de to have- an eminent non-amhitiou s politically uncontentiou s ch o irma n se-J ected The emergence· or a succeaaor to Cru t ro shoul d foll o f caretul MsesSlOOut of the - -arious i eroons 11 ties active in the opposition to i dent L the one vbo can attract control and l ead t he se•'°eral for ce» k the por aibillty •of' an overthrow of Castro becomes more imminent t he senior l eudcr l USt be eelec ted U S support focused upo n h im oz d his buJld U Ulldertokcn 4 Cover All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behel t ot t he- opposit i o n c0110 cil Vill of' course be elC pla 1ned as a ci iv1t1es of t hat ent -ity insofa r 4S t he e ctf ons b ecome puOl icly kno tl at u ll I'J e CIA ·w1JJ howeve r have to p UiiO ettbi 9ft a 5 h4vc direct contocto v l th a certoin n Unber or Cubo no and t o pl Otect tbe e v1ll 2118ke use ot 4 carefully s erceDCd group of U S budnesomen vith a •1 ated interest in C J attain d denire to ul' Ol t t he oppool t ion fJ 'he y vi ll RCt a o and channe l f'or guidance nnd aupport to t hd d 1 recto rate of' tbe oppooition under controlled conditiona CIA per oMe l rlll be documented ae npreGeota t 1vea or _tb 1 a gI OUp In ox-der t o 1 1trengthcn the cover it ia hoped that oubstantie l · fund e can be ra itrcd f rom r i vat e courcec to oupp ort t hc oppooi tion $100 1 000 bu a l rea 4 y been plcdeed f'rom U S ao rce s At M appropriate t llll a bond 1ewc v llJ be floated b7_the council o a o obliga tion on a tutur-c Cuban a overnir cnt t o 1' LL • oildltional 1000 1 000 • 5 fudget It or CIA 1'Und8 vs u J • '1s anticipated t hat approxl mte ly'· tJ lioo 000 be required for tbe aboyc p rogrq • On the usumpt1on t hat it vill no t ree ch ite culmine tion earlier t haX 6 to 8 oont hll f'rom n01 the e till' IO ted eq i ment o tor Fr l960 tunds 1• $900 000 vltb t he balance or $3 500 000 requlred iD P'f-1961 2'l e dhtrlbuU on or coat bet lcco n c l years could ot cour6e1 be greatly alt ere d by pol icy decio _or u ntQrcs ec 1 1 · eont1ll8encica Yh1ch compcl ed e cce cr o d U to ry 9J era tloM'• To b C '- i -Y'J- ' • • • S st R'ril r Eu 8 OiiLI 6 6 Jleeommendations That the Central Intcllige1 ce Asertcy be ai itborizcd to undertake the aboYe outlined progrw i and to vithdrel the funds n qu1red fo r t ll1s pu r pose M set forth in pa ragraph 5 from the Agency 1 i Reserve f or cont 1ngendes Bt£Zf£US lf a5 OHL S ' foll l CIA is al ready in c lose touch v i tb three rC Jl tt tl ble oppo- sit ion groups the M mtecristi Aute o tico Party and the lfetional De n cr atic F ront 'llbette all i eet the t md anlentAl criteria conditi onal to a ¢CeptM ce i e they are for the revollition as or1ginnlly conee1vcd•-l00lly being l o or 26th of' ·JulJ me l eraond are not 1dent1 tied 1th d t her ll l ti Sta or TruJ Ulo 'l'b ey att ant1-Cas·t ro because of his' failure to live u p to the orlg inAl 26th o f' July pls t i Orm und bis apparent ' l l 1ngnea o to sell· out to Cotrm J nist d owi nation and possibl e u ltima te enslaTement Wnese groups theref'ore tit perfectly the planned opposition slog'OJ 1 of Rest ore the Revolution 2 An opposi tion Ccuncil or Junta w1 ll be f'ormed v ithin 'JO da vs from represento ti ve s 0£ these groUJ s augmented by re prese itat1ves of other g O S pota ib It Ls probel ly pi- ml 'Ul'C to have a f ixed platfon for the Council but th e Cro-aco s KrL0 1f'esto oi' 20 Tuly 1 9 5 8 cont o 1ns a nwi c'r ot exploitabl e pointe 1 · ro of tbe CIA grou p l ead ers re re signers of the Maniteato The foUo 1 g points are suggested as a f w possib iities s 'l'he Castro reg l lle is t be ne· r dictator ship of Cu Pa S tbject to str ong Sino-Soviet influence ' - Pr h1lte apposition llroo lco Gto i e purchase o C neeot1o t1ag help WJd prortding GO broo4cact JDD ter1nl 2 J I the major w 1ce ot the O _l OAition it o bllsh o t v lll probebly 1 G pro1 0scd one fP'o y ' JJ S -controlled i rt rt1on Thia be Oll S an I Gland WJ4 vilJ c _ploy both bigll reg lcncy and broo lca st bond equipiumt 6f cubst 1ntisl p0'1er inc J reparat10n or script v1ll be dooc in the U S nnd these v1 U be transdtted electrou l csJ l to tb o site M - er GOme co broed stiag experience and eo the opcrs t1on pro8 ·csseo 1t ma ' be dea1rab1e to suppl ecent the S-J n Lil acd station --1th at l ea ct one ot b w to ensure t'u ll y adequate cover l 6c of O U pro-1 8 ot Cu be D St es_pec1alJ v -the vm a region Su ch e u addi r 1011All ro ri Offfft p gxFS OWY alutW 2 fac111ty m ie ht be instol l ed on o t s base 1n the 30 ilS Jr as oY tenworru-y use might be t l ' e of a shipborne station if it is desh•ed t o avoid 11g -a yll J r G4 -t et1ng f'rom florid a 3 llevs papors a re also being GUpport•e d and further s uppo r t is planned tor the future Avance a leo ding Cuban dn Uy Za y 1 po per ha a been con tiscated o s CUban daiJ y has Mmdo another la M rinn om of t he hc m s here I s outsts lding con ervo t1ve dailieo publ ished in Iravana is ho V' 1 ng difficulty 6Jld may haYe to close soon Arrangem ntc have al- -ready been made to l l·int veekly 'in the U S for introduc- tion int o 9uba cl andest ine zy and ma 11 ing tb X'Oughout the hellli- sphere on a regular basis As other leading newspa pex-s are ex-propriate6 publlco tion of µex11 er1 edit ions vi l l be considered 21 Inside l'uba a CIA- controUed action group 1G produc ing and distributing anti-Ce ctro o nd rmti-Com tm 1nipt p tbl1clltions regularly CI A is in contact with grou ps ou-tside CUbo who will be e so1stcd in producing similar nateri als for cl andest i e introduction i nto CUba • 5 America i -JO prominent Cuba n s a -e on lcct ur tQUl fi 1n Iat1n They Will be folloved Y ot hers of' equal cul ibre mission oC thece men will be t o opposi tion to C£r s·t ro The so in hen ru3pbere SuP POrt for tile Cont rolled ·'h1estern He misphere assets mrns Oil er _ SEtlW t ES OM i 3 press 1-edio t elcrls ou Vill eupport th11J misc1on as v 1U e lected Accrican Journalleto tho v1l l be briefed prior to l 4t 1n ruorican travel --tfiW ONil _ Ji' X Ji TEe ti GE £ I Pol1Uctll Aet io F'l- i 96 support of Oppooition Eleocnt• u d other c oup Ac iv 1t1ea n 150 000 800 000 mc rt o f' t rM Satltters 40o ooo 700 000 Prcaa a d PubUcations 100 000 500 000 I n-Exfi ltr a tion M -ritice sod A1r ipport Material ond 'l'ra1nins 200 000 l 300 000 o ooo 200 000 •·9- 0 000 3 500 000 Propapnda RD dl o Operationa a ud Prosrrullming i nclud1ng est ablich- III IV Pe rr unilitart Intelligence Collection Tot als 'J hese fi gures are based or the asau i ption that m jor action vill not occur until FJ- 1961 - 1 ' by reason ot po icy decisions or other conti sencie over vh ch the Agency ca not exercise co1ltrol -the octlon progr M I abou ld be accelerated at d itional tunds · ' U be required ' • eF n- CR C COPX Q 17 February 1961 l About a year ago the AJ ency vas directed BACKGRWND to set in motiOD tbe o re nniz ation ot e br08 dl Y based opposition to the Gastro regillle and too dev lopc llt or propa8 JldA cbonnol _4 clandestine agent nets vtth1n Cube J Olld train d pare military ground and air for ces vberc ith that opposition coul d vcrthrov tbe Cuban regin e Toe concept WO S that · • possible a Cubo n opora tion though it vao ' M thu should ' be·· Go ·ta r 'fell understood • 4 support in many fonns • ould have to 4conie ' trom the J • • ' t hat • • Uriited Statea Great progress has been n ade in th is undertakillg A Governmeotin-11 xi lc vill coon be tor med embraci n g most refutable opposition elements 4 It vill have a l eft-of - center political orientation and ohould Cotnll 8lld t he s upport ot l ibera4 ·both v i tbin Cuba and throueh out tbe bo misp he re It i'i il eponso a u d 1n a uingly control t l'otned and combat-ready mi litary f'orceG based in Centrt America A decision must soon be made as to the t Uppor t if D Oy tee Unit ed S t ates 111 render t he opposition henceforth 2 Pl 06l'ECl'S FOR THE CI S'rnO RIDJl1E The Cast ro regime is steadily couaolidating its control over cupa Assumi D g tha t t he United States applies political and economic pressure at roughly present levels of se· erity it i'ill c ontinue 'to do so WCF O S0 4 Qtf PQD sae e r regard less of decl 1 ning popular oupp ort Tl ere 1 c no sigo if'icant Likelihood t hat the Castro reg 1 c e vi l fal l of its o -n weight o The regime i s proceeding metbod icall y to solid 1 ty 1to control over ull the major institutions of the society 00 1 a to el lploy t hem on the Comunist p ttern as inctru m ento or reprcsoion The Oove rnment no directly controls aU radioJ television and the preoo It ha a placed poll'tically · depend able l eaderahip in lo bor u niom J s tudent gr ouPs and profecoional orgon1zo t10 productive an a I t has nationalized most inGDcial enterpr1oea and is u ing a Progr n of s o- called land ref'on n to exercise ef1'ective co ntrol over the peasantry It ho G destroyed a U political parties e xcept the Coou m m i clt part y Politically reliable e ld increasingly effective internal security and militS 7 forc s are being bui lt up ' b Cuba is in econocnic di'f'ficul tiee but the Cononunist Bloc • ill almost certain1y t e t e vhatever teps arc necessary to forestall any decisive i ntenoifico tion of t bese troubleo EcoOCY lic dielocatio s viil occur but vill not lead to t he collapse er the $1gni ficant veakening of tbe Castro r e c At tbe present time tbe regulll-r CUoan lnilitory • - 2 TOP ·' - t SRCB •n TAU C Q t' 8 r extremely lov effecti veness Within the next few r ionthc howeYe r it i s e xpected tbat Cubu 1ll begin to take delivery or Jet tlr ro f't wu will begin to MVI e-vails bk trained CUbnn pUot« of knovn polltice J rellabi lit1 llil -ittg 'tl e period t he ettectiveneEta of ground forces Vill be 1 n creaain g '3 their knovl cdge improve the Veq0J10 will 'l berefore e tter aome date probably no re th£m six 11'1 0n tbs it •throv ot nev ly a quired Soviet 'Will become m lito rily 1 nf'eas ible to over- C'aotro _ reg1lw oxcept tbrouah the c 1t ent ·to co bat o a eizeable orga nizedndlltory force -t be optio ot act i on by the Cuban oppositi on rlll no l onger be open 3 THE liA l'PURE 01 'XER I IIREAT Cuha 'Will of coUr'se never p eeent o d1r et milltary tbreat to t he United Ste-tea and 1t 1s un J 1kely tb t Cuba ou ld o ttelllpt open invasion of' s oy ot her IAtin American country s ince the tr S • could tutd s t certtrl Jtly would · ent er tbe conflict on the ai de or t 'h c 1 n'Vl td d c0Ul1tt7 li'evert le less e a Q tstro f'urther stn bilizeo h1s regillle obt Ulil' JEOre phisticated vea pons and turlher trains t he lllil ltiaJ Cuba till prov1de on effective and colidl defended base for Soviet opern tion c l lld Cl JlaJJ81on of ill tl uence 1n the Western Ieml cphere -Arms lllOney organj uitional and other cu port e en be l'Ovidod rro r C be to d 1 6- s dent leader$ and groups throughout I e tih America in order to Cl-ee te polit ical 1 nstab il it encourage C'o mmm 1 tnit veakcn the - 3 • i 8 P S I S ft £ I TOP S' 'CP8 r p rest l ge or t he U s U d fo s ter the tnevi table l Opu l O r s upport tbe t Cu n ro •a coo t1lluo nce of pover vJ ll e ngender BstiD at e at at 'For A Na t 1 ooo 1 Cocnmi t povers Cuba rcpre Se lt 8D opportun 1t y or incal cul oble v J i te • Hore 1 a PQrto t tho a lvont of castro he c provided t bc Communiat n with a f r i base tor propae ocl ond agitat1cn thro w t the r est oI Latin A erica and vi th a b ighly explo1 ta blc e xe cple o r revolut1004 J · achieve ie r t M d ouccene t ul defUWcc 4 ot the Uni tod States POOSIBLE eoulW S OF AfJilOli _For • ch rc re no elaborat 1oa t he overt w e of' U S d litary torccs to J JO'J D t o a invasion or Cuba has been excluded ao a practical o lteJ'1l lt1·1e Rr oo dly defined the olloving three posst ble alterDAtive coursea of act1o o re nain f or coas1derat1oo • Intens1t1ca t1oo or economic and political preG urea cou pled with cont1oucd covert support or a abo1 6ge and minor guer rll l a a ctioo s but exclu d 1og Gub tant ial cc aa itment ot tbe CUban oppositioo's parsailltary force b Rlnploy o ent or t he l aramil1tary force but 1n a meJlller vbicb would not bAve the appM l @ce of sn i n • usion ot Cuba n-ca the outside c anding CCll mitmeot or the param 1 Utary for ce 1n o aurp rlse t he iil$t o ll11 tlon Uldor i t s protec ion on euron $011 of the oppositioo govel l lCnt and either tbe rapid spread or - 4 J8P S B 8'Rrl P @er eronz t he re 'olt Ol ' the conti nu ' tion of l o rse scale guerrilla e cti on in t errc in iU1ted for t bat pUl'l ose i'hese a lterne tivea a re di ocuooed in the fol loving prOl ' 'ag q ha 5- DIPUMATIC AND ECO OOC PRESSURF T'oere ia little t hat can be done to impose real polit ical and economc p rcsaru re on tbc Castro regime and no such course or action no '· under i erioUJ3 con eiderut 1on scc-m s likely to bring about itc ovcr throtf a l Ould A true blockade of CUbo en t'ottcd by the United Stat ea involve tccb nieal acta of VO X Nld hat UO I ·been diamiaae-d ss infeasible b Actioo to balt arms shipment from Cuba into uny ot ber po rt of the hemicp i-c tou1d be cum berooxne nnd eA t ily evaded it a1r transport vere employed Wb lle undoubtedly' o r some value i t is difficult to r ee that the inet tution of $Ucb me asu reo would either oe c wo Tc pT°esstJre on the Caet ro regime o r eff'ect vel y inaultt te the rest of' the herrl apbere from it- castro ' i p rinc 1pal tools of aubvers1 oo ere peopl e i deology the f orce of example andtmoney The f l ov of tbe-s e i tems cannot be Wllllm d up c Further economic sanctio ns e re t beo1-et1e 1l r possible but ca n quite readily be ofi'cet by an increase of trade rt t h tbe Bloc - 5'I8P 8B9 RB l ' p op d 6 C A T In any event it is ost 1 nated tbat t he J t'Oopccta f ol' ettcct lve internat1on o l action ore poor 6 Kl1lDlE COUJ1SB Ca ful otudy a _ been g1 ven to tbc possibility of infiltx-oting the po rwaillt ey r or-cc El ' to M Moe 1 1 point in aw table terrain bopetully avoiding m Jor encounter 1n the proceo• acd coa d ttillg it to exteuive gu erril lo action IJlaio cour ce or action i ul d have the advantage ot rende r- 1 ng UIUJOCCOll IJ Y n cinglc w Jor lancl J ng Yhic h could be deccribcd o e n iAvnaion • The 1nti1tration pbaee vo1 Q d toke on the colora tioo or ettort s by e '11 group• or Cubtma to join au lll ady exist1og reaistance 11iovemc nt Un tortunat ely 1t Wls been found to be 1nfe $1ble on ID1l J tar✓ grounda nore tul l y in a the ll sico lly t he reason ex plaincd e ttocbmcnt a T'f It 10 conaido1'ld '1litarHy infeM1blc to 1nfilt rotc in smnll unito s force ot this oi ze to a aine lo u e l vhere 1t could u elllble recei ve supplies ud engs gc id coo ted x111t ar t actioo SU Ch an opel 3t1on ould have t o be done over a period of t 1Jn o tllld the 1000 or t he e le nent of su rpriac atter ini tie l i nfil tmt1ons · ou ld permit go-venuncnt torcea to frustrate further N i nfOT elll l1tt to the area b Military unite s1gn it1cant mr '1J er than the bstt u ion present ly undergoing unn training wuld fall short ot tbe a1o1mn critical aa 11 required iftel1bood of Gucce o an sigu1 f'ic ant Sme Jier Ca le 1 atilt rat ioDB would not -6 f9f O Jt lCEl to give -· TOY 6 9 RHl produce a psycbologice J e ffect suff' cient to prec 1 pit te general u_p r singa of wide-spread revolt euoong d 1saf1'ected elemct1ts of Ce stro 'o o rmed forces c Actually t he lennt eootJ y u d Mot effi cient -Y to infiltrate the foroe into a terrain aw table ror protr teted and Nerful gio rl i llo opcraUono wul d he b o l ngle ltuld l ne ot tho -001 e for ce o o currently plol m ed and its retirement tram the la nding point into the chosen redoubt 7 • A LAl DIIIG lll FORCE 'he Jo l nt· Cldeta or St41-r' have '1 lusted tbe lllil l t r aapcc t o or thA plan fo lAn ling by the Cuban opposi tion ' bey have concluded t hat this pl ti n baa a fair chance 01· ul timate succecs t hat ii of detonating a mr Jo r M d ul t 1llla tely succee etu l revolt ee a 1nct Castro and tb D t i f' ult i mat c s uoccs6 is not tC ' J eved t here ia every 1 1kcllhood that t be can be t he meont ot es·t ablishing i n tavo rabl e terrain n 0 -er f'ul guerrillA force vhicn could be oustained al moot -indefinitely 'llle latter ou tcoiu e Ould not be o nd need not appear o s o s-erio l 11 defeat It would be the tne8Jl 8 ot exc rt1D8 conti m Ung pressure on tOO regime and voul d be a continu 1 r g demonstration of' illl lbility of t he regime to establisll order It could create opportUJJity for an OAS interventi on t • iJ rposo a ceaee-fire and hold elections o An y c valustioo of the cb a o ces of success of the a-s ssult force should be realistic about tbe fighting qualiti es - T - mo aenz of tbe nt1l1t la Jio dcfUUt h·e c onclu s1ons can be o dvanced b ut j t lil Jst bo reme mbered tr t_the t 1ajority of the militia a re not fighters by instinct or bseke round and are not sllsht tw d they have never been exposed to actual par1 icularly 811 Y neavy j'i - f' ire po r nor to air attack V o reover the 1nGte b11ities v Ltbin Cuba ere euch that i t the tide ehittc ogo 1 o6t the regime the chances are s t rong th at eubetontial numbers tdl l d sert• or - · ClleJJSe aides· · b Tb ere ls nO doubt t hat the i eram l itt¥ Y 'force y uld be widel y Q G$U' lt1Cd to l e tr s GUJJ X rted NeverthelCs·s thls cooclu o1on vould be d fficul t to prove and t he sc le ot its activity '•1 J l d not 'be lneonsietent v ltb t he pctentioJ ities for S1JPIX rt by pr1vst Cub a nd American groups ro tber tb 8 n by the u $ Government It mu S t be mphg 1 d - lll6reoie·r ° ·1 that this enterprise 1 uld have nothing in conm ou a $ vow a the use o U $ IIU11to ' to fo rces -j tb t he Russian suppression 01' lru ngary or the Chinese ouppi-ess1on o f tbe 'l'ibeto ns T'Jll G ·would be a fo rce of d 1Gside-nt Cubans 1 th 9uban polltice l milltfil-' l eadership c There tould be adverse political r-epereusslona Ht o a land 1ne in f'o rcc but i t is not clear how scrio tbese would be Most tetin A me i ·1can Gov-erru ente would a t lea st privately _Tor JSCRE111 approve or unobtru s1ve U s suppor t t or 6uch on opposit ion move especial ly U' t he political coloration of t he oppos i t ion 'io'erc lett-of c enter Ti' e reacti on of the reot of the fref# vorld it 1 c est lla9 ted vou ld be Ddn1me1 1n the ce ae of miobtruaiYC u $ • cupport tor such $Ii at tempt It m gbt p -oduce a goc l deo J of cyn icimo tbroUghout the vorld el oi t t he u s rol e but i f quickly oucceeetul l ittle l astillg reaction Generally speaki ng i t is believed tb e t the political cost vould be l ov in_ he o w t or a f'airly 9 uic k · sucy-c - • pollt1cal do ngera flcnrl ug f' rool lo»g continued large Sca l c · guerrilla vnrfo re vouJ d be greater but there· o x-e diplonre tic p reparations that could be made to torect oJ l extreme adverse reactions in th it cont i ngency 8 DISSOIJ l'l'ION OF 'l'lii MILITl1RY FORCs A d ecioioa not to We tbe ps ramilitw-y force must consider the pl'Oblelll ot d iss0lut1ou · d nce i tu lliooluti on • rill surely be t he only a J ternatiYC J t 1 t 1$ not U$ed vithiD t be next tour to six eks It i s bO ed t t at l east one httl ' dred volunteer co d be retained t or infiltration 1n $lll D ll te3ms but it is doubtful wbetb er m n·e t han t his number 'Oul d be a•milable or useful ror t b1s t ype of act1V1t a There ie no doubt that dissolutio l 1 u and of i taeir vill be o blov to U' S prestige _n i 9 ny' ° it v1ll be Ia tin American count r ies and 7- 9 - ' e lsewhere as · J nterpre a in e videnc e of ' ' - · li'QP S E CRE il' the U S inability to t ake decia ve t Ct1on vit h r egard to C l a t1-o lb ri d '1 ll a gt-in ha -e de rcated Golia th Ant1-U $ reg l mea like that of TruJillo vould gai n otrcngth vhile pro- 0' s l et e neollt't lloul d undoub edly sutJ'er Surely tdigcraa Wo he e been f'll excecd illgly s t r ong ull r •ouJ d uluo be placed ill a very d1 ff1cuJ t posi tion for Ids r t ot a ·4 1 sbMded eff ort • It mwJt be re tnembored in tbia connecti on tltr tt there a re oector11 of' latin Am eric w r ol 1 m on vhich c riiicize the· U S fot 110t deallng oufflcien t $ fo' ' 1 1 lll y ·W th the r o reg 1llte J n fact one rea6on vby many U l tin YIJl' ietic un govei n ments are holdins back 1 n op Osing C-8 utro ia oec o use t hey feel that $OOner or later the U S Vill be coll'll Cllcd to take etrong mct1 slll es b 'he resettl e m ent of the military torce viU t 1Ut'VOi d- ably ctu wc- l ractico J prOblem s Ita 'Jnemberl' l l 11 1 be e s igr y CU$1U usioned a nd aggressi ve Vit h the in ertutble reuul t · tlia t th y v tll proV1dc honey for the press beea ru td the 11 S will lle ve to f'ace the rc sul t1ng ind1e nit 1e s and I nS$ lent s Pe1·ha ps more important h o e ver v Lll be the loss ot good relations 111th the 0P l OS1t1on CubM leaders To ate ilmoat l - non-lilti cta non- Ccatm Ulis t po11t1ca l lettdero have been ' e ncouraecd o r- offered help i n fighting Castro An e band' om ent of the l1tary t o rce · rt JJ ' be coD Bi Iered by the12 a $ e ·-· - l - ' - • m 648RB¥ '-1 t hd r I Vt l or a 1 1 pro eticoJ ou pport In viev o f tbe breadth of the poJ 1t1cal spcctne involved t his vill c l l OC 0-o e ditt1c ll 1 1ea for the C'utme s 1Dce it 1e bard to u agine acceptnble i est- Cutro 1 ederohip that v lll not include • - of th old lea dealt with durl og the 9- 6 J f ' Mt yea r OOlfCWllO iS n ca etro 1 s poo1t1on Je da 1l y' getting stronger and 'Jill soon be connolldated to the poiAt t hat hi-6 oyertb rov Yill onl y • be pooolblc by draet1c pol1tic4ll y Wldeoiroblc actiO ' _such as tm all-out c- tibargo or an 'b orert WJC 01 mil 1t4 f orce A I'a Uure to 1-cmove t ro by external o ction '-1 ll lead iD the near f'Ut-u re to the el 111 l nation of' sJ l internal and external Cuben oppoa1Lion ot any crte t1ve nature Koreovcr the coots nw nce ot the C Btro reg 1 1 c f1 ll be a subote ntie l victory t'Ot' t he S1no-$oY1et Bloc wb ich vtll uoo Cuba as a lx lse tor increased e ctiYit Y t tbe Vestern Bc 1 spbere tb e reby o ccentu ting pol itic e J in Gt o b-U ity o n d 'IICakcn 1 ng U $ prcst15c o nd i nJ lucncc c Tbe Cuban paranU tta ry f'orce it UGcd h s a good ch3nce or overthrov1 Dg Qlstro or at t be ve'l lcut caU$ing a °61Jla c1V1l wr without rcquJ riag the i t celt to overt action agaj nst c a o u s to c ommit Whatever e m l s t-ra s smea t t ie eJJ ete4_ tbougb 4'1niahle 11 S support r s r caw c 1t -11 - TOP ·' ' ta 1 en on s as y- •-ell be cond d crebl y lees than that result ing fl QC t he contim t ltion of tb a C#'----8tro regbtte or trom the lnOre dr U t1c and ll Ol C att ribu t«ble o ctlona ncceeaary to o cc«q liub t be result nt a later dAte d l 'vm thougll t he beet est lJci ltc of likely Sortct rcft Cticn to a s'UCCeoof'Ul movcrc en t aeainst Co t ro indicates J TOble lim to the U S ariuine - from the removnl or cubat ant1a l' or tbe C U t o rcgu e Sorlet p r o 4 pollt1caJ moveo vJ U at1ll be n -Ch loi g- aug 1 utereats ot the o failure to ®IOVC u S le•• preJ 4 lcia1 t o t he than caatro - 12 - T OP 1t1 Ite tLE I ul d the resulto of won cv ·· t z _ APl't' IDIX • A A CI Al lll SI'l iE ll«FIIIIBNl'IOJ BI SE OF SMALL IROOl'S UP 'l'O 50 w N O l ff1c1cot extent ah ru c aa for gucrrillo operu tion G o ro the Sierra Eocaabre y ot Lo VUJ s ProY1 Dce 1n Central Cuba ond the Sierra V e e tro of Orient e Province t the e nstern cxt'relll J ty ot the toland 1'be Slerre de l e• Orgnnoe wcotern Cubcl do not enca iposs eutf ic1e nt area and are not rugged enough to austai n gucrriUa Opel 'fttions ago ill st otrcmg oppor itiOD Of tbc t 'h'o e rcoo ''1th ad equate ten-e 1n on l y t be Sierra Esce abrey 14 -trul y su1ta1 Le for our pu rposeo et nee tbe mountaina in a vailnblo to CIA tor o tr logistical s upport operatioru Primo ry rcl1aocc vould bo ve to be placed oo thU netbod of supply tor guerrillo forcco 2 torcea The COV mment or Provtncee 6 l- cy ot Cubo COC bas cooccntrated large und m Llitia in both 1'la Vi l lao and Oricnte Est 1 ltet' a or t roop t tre ngt b 1n las Vil lo a have • u i ed recently f r n 1 7 000 t o a o high M 60 000 -men vb ilc u p t o 12 000 meD are belle• -ed to be Gtationed 1n Oriente 3 1 'hile of duO iov a effic i ency and morale tho mili t1 by sheer veigbt ot l umberB ba1 been able t o urround Ua d 0 o r e v 1t B r- T O P G EW P'B'f cl iJIJJ ate GJDl Ll l gr-oups of inoursent a t he Mdsferrer C roi -p J n Oriente elJA1nated by 2 QOQ lllillt ll A landing tot ex a irple by 27 n an of' 11ao pureued and A a mil ar groUp of wwgenta in Western CUba was n tto cked Md destroyed by ei x betta Uona o nt1 f and llillti a about 3 000 meu 4 or U A buJ ld- up or f orce l Jl a giYen nrea b y J nfiltration 8l'OUJ S vouJ 4 require a eer ie• o nigbt l Jl the • - gcocral v1c1DJ ty Dlacovery of the · initial lan ling by Go ro r-cea vould 'be ahaost a certo 1 nty siDce secw-i -t y $ta arc locnted at a ll pOOOlble lo ndlng w-ear E 'el i t the lnltinl J ao d ing o-Cre aucceaatu l the OOC could be expected to mo· e troop and naval patrol craft to the area mal iDg turtber landing• diftlc llt it not illpo•sibl e Afl f ow l force lo ncl od e l J Oriooee MO 8h0 '1 v lll be n p ollg ged by forces vutl y superior iD nlIDlbers cnll e OUp $ Tbe re roro it is considered unlikely that land1 o g on w ceual ve occaston s- itOUl4 sucoee4 1 ' JoinJ og forces later A seriel'J of surrounded PocketG of tta 1 aU lce vou ld be tbe result 5 Rcpeatec appr011 Che• to tho Cw an coast by vonael 8 l D rge enough to la nd u p to 50 IICD v ou ld l l oba'bl v pr01i ·oke atte ck by tbe Cuban Rav- e oo or Air Force eitbcr or vbicb is cap lble of deatroy t ng any vesneilo '- 'hlCb cou ld be used by CIA f or tbeoe purposes U'OP o ECf1 C2' Oi' 6 ercr nrr In tbc Sierra E11cambray vhich ifJ the only area o f' Cuba in vb1ch true guerrilla opera t1ono o re nov being conducted ill-equipped end untrained groups of up to 200 to 300 men h 11ve been hard pressed to aurvi ve and hD ve been l Ul o ble to conduct effect ve ope rations The ooJ y vorth -hile accomplishment of these bands ho a been to aerve oa a eymbol of rcsiatanc e Smllcr groups even though better t raJ ne and equipped could _not t-e expected t o be effective • • 7 There ere very te-w s ites on tbe cout h coast of tbe Ster ra Esce mbra y -where smaU boats ce n be landed 'lbese a re· found pr1nc11 0 ll v a t the mouths of rivers e nd are o 11 gu9 J ed by m111t1a pos t-a armed with ttiachine guru A G lWlll group landing at such a point by shut tling frcm e lo rger Ye ael in small boat -- ou J d probably r eceiv-e beavy co sualt1e6 8 Small-sca le in filtr ations would not p rodu cc o paycbological effect su fficient to precipitate general upri sillgs and ''1desprcad l eYolt mn ong d1sat1·c-c ted elements of' Co G t ro' s a tined foi·ccs These conditions lllU lt be produced b 'forc t he castro Cove nt can be ovcrthro n by SIJ'f r ee ns short of' overt 1 nterYention bv United States armed forcco As long as the anted forces respond to CO st ro I s orliers he con maintain • hi msel f 1n po' r ll dof nitely The b iotory of all p l ice-type states bears out t b1$ conclusion JES SECftfl_ iri op tECFl r 9 T V Je CIA Cuban Aase ult 1 -orce cc npos-ed cnt t rel y of •oluntecrs he s Wen t ra t ned tor a c tion o s a compact beavi J y arn ed b ard b1tt1lig military unit o nd tbe troops ure a c'll re of the co cl at po· er vhich tbey posi- ess us a unit They hnYe been indoct r llilted in tbe milit ary principle or mss a ud instructed that dJ epel'Dion 01· -f'o rce lea do to defeat in ta 11 Th ey -will 'oe quick t o recognize the disadvante ges of t he infiltration conce i t a nd it 1 6 unlikely that all vould volunteer f or Piecemeal car nmitaY nt to 1nU it acy action Ill Cuba The troops can be used 10 combat only on e volunto ry basia The Goverm ent of the Unitcd Stat es exerciees no legal cc m Wd or di sciplinary ti uthority over the o COIICUJSIOl S 1 This course of a cti o i vould result in la r ge Dea le J oss of life both t hrough o illtt ry a ction against torceo vastly s u-porior Ln numbers e ud a a result of drum-bead Justice and fi r1ng squad execut too of t hose capt ured 2 This alternative could achieYe no effective millt o ry or psychol ogical resuJ ts 101 seei zT C OPY 11 March 6l l Agency- Stnt lill or Proporatory Aetioo lffl-8 directed to aet 1 n motion About s r ·n t o t ho the orgnn Luition of o broa l ly- b11oed ·oppoo1t1on to the Castro reg u e a Jor co mpaign support i or both pea ce tul 001d violent res1s·tance tieti v1 t1eo 1n Cuba md the levelap rt of trained U ru d lltary ground and air forcOO _ot Cuban vol un teero • A dec lo1on' ollouJ d •hox-tl - be ·JllBd e as to the Mure _of these activities a nd £be employment or disposit ion of e' ssets tba t have b n created Tne s tatus of the X110rc UI'_POrta nt activit ies i s o s follovo a Pol1t 1c'a 1 Over e period o f neo rly o ye or the- 1 RD Frente Revoluc1otl3 rlo Dznoc ratico w'hi cb Vf S c reated 1n thl hope t hat i t '-'O uld become t he organiza t1onol emoodimcnt of a unµ'ied opwsition to Castr o b a s proved to be highly usef'ul as a o •er and adlDinistrati ve mechanism but i Jn porlant political elcmcoto refused t o Join i t Acco rdingly a major effort was undertaken t hree weeks ago to £0 rm a mo rc broadly- -based revol utionary counc il which wou ld inc l ude the FRD' 'ld 'llhicb ould lead to the sett ing up of a proV'isionaJ government Consider e b le progreS$ has been IM de i u COPY# _ _ _ T CP FCB li'dl' i 0 • 0 t C ti B ' nesot1ationo w1 th the priacipal Cu boa leaders in wl1ich great efforts bave 'been l Odc to pel' d t tbc CUl e n8 t o chart their o '1 co rae I t 1Ai - - that tbe clel ired result 1 ll be a Olllpllohed ooort J bat 10 CJJXlrg1ng tran tbcsa ru gntu tiollll i tt pl'OY'l «1onal gov-ermi crrt Y1th a center to lett-or-conter polltic -1 oriente t lon ot t he and a politic«l platrom Y1l g oO rt -ed It 1o ' l1eTed th4t tW goe l s of t ba 26 J - 1110vemout lrl J J CDt• lllSDd the oui port or ' ' v ery la rge Jorlt r ot o uti-c iotro C'uho w · «J though 0 1t 1 ll llOt bc alt OCCO to ti ll re C Onse n1l• l Hi litm-y Tile tollm ing m'1Dlll l 1ts ry forceo hs ve been recruited awl traJ ru d o c4 Vill cbortl ¥ 'be in 811 advanced state oi' readiness l A x-e1D1'orced 'be ttullcm vith a preoont strengt or 850 - bl ch vill be brought up to•a strength ot · · approldJ tte ¥ 1 000 th Ough t ru add1 tlon of or e r illfantry co i aey to be UMd pru u-ily for logj atic 2 A 'br l otly t l Ded puam llitery force GPF Xlaat JJ l 60 1ntt l ded to be w ed for n18ht le 1 8 to be 'Undertaken of the battalion -· · - a ot c 1Temomr 1n a dvanco or ocmid tanent · · • 2 • - - - · ··· -··•· op s r nzm ·_ ' • ' • - e 3 rutd S e C it B I 1 An air force o 16 ll-26 Hgbt bovobers 10 C '54s 5 C-46s • 4 -Shipping nc1uding 2 100-ton ships 5 1500-tou ships 2 LCio 3 rcrJs and LCVl'o A J CS team recent ly insp cted the battali on and the a tr f'o rce at their bases in Ouatel l lla Their 1'1nd 1ngs led tbem t o c·onclud e that t hese ro1·ccs couJ d be ccmba t-r eudy by l A pri 1 dct tiencies v rc indicated Ce rt a in that are in progress of con ectiott pa -rtly by turther training and' partly by the r ccruit nent o f thcaddition i l in fantry c ompa r e f erred to above c It vill be i l'- feasible to bo ld all these 1'orces together beyond earl y A ri l i'bey ere i n large pa r't volunteers some of' • ib on1 bave been in ha rd t raining quart ered in 2-i st ere facilities for a s auch a s s i x mo nths Tbe S r moti vation for action is high but their mor3le cs nnot be maintained if their camniUil• mt to action is l ong delayed The onset of the r a 1 a sea Son in Guaterolc in April vould greatly accentuate this roblem and the Guat ell alan Govermnent is in any event U 'l'-'illing to have th ctn teille in in the country beyond e0 rl y April 'l'be rainy season in C ioa · ou ld also cake their lhl dir on the isl and ll Ol'e difficult 2 us Cuba The Sit1 a tion in C ba tfo est tmte t t t -time iG asa i n st 'l'be C s t ro re-g-1 we is vee ily consolid at1ng its control over ln tbe absense of gre tly inc r -ca sed e erna1 prc su re O - 3 •tof 5 'E 'li'GP srca2rp o ct1on it dll continue to do so regM-dl ess of declining popular support O J the ma ch1nery of authcritc rian control becomes inci -e U31ngl ' crr cctive n Tho regime 18 proceeding met hodica Uy to solidl fy ita cont rol ovel e l l tile major ins t i tut1ono 01· the soc iety and to employ tbec i on the Coimrun tat 1 8 ttc rn as iru rtruments or repression ' 'ho Gover nment nov direct ¥ cont rol a o 11 r-udio tel evidon M d the press rt baa pla ced Xlllt1eally depend Able leadership in l obor unions student groups and prot eoaioD l l organit a tiona It bas oa ti ono J ized most productive Wd t1nanc1a l ente rpriseo And is usine o progro r 1 or so a lled lo ud retonii to e xercite eftec t 1v¢c c ontrol over t he _pc8 Santry I t bas dest roycd l l 1 1 pol itico l part ies except t be Conrnunio t party Pollti o l ly reliabl e and ' 1 o crea slngly ettect1ve internal security o nd mili t ary forces a re being buil t up b There i s still euch a ctive opposition in Cuba It 16 estimated tho t there aro some 1200 o ctivc- gu crri llas and notber thousand ind 11 --id uo l s e ngaging in va riOlJ $ I C tG 01· c onapiracy and sa botae e the teiapo of Yb 1cb bas beeo r1S11J8 in recent veek6 Neve ot lleless the goVernme ot OOc shovn coasidera ble ki ll in espi onage and c·o unte-r -espi oJ 1 0 Se I t is good use of the nil1t1a against guerril l e ectiVitieo and the inf'iltra tion of people a l hardvo re 'l'llo militia i8 relo t1 ve - untrained and - 4 C P 6 _B C ft E TOP SJi'CRE'l- thexe 1s evidence th at 1t6 1'¢r l le iG lo · but tb e go '·e rnment is able to uoe very large numbers fl S 1ntlt small groups of gu errll Jas a nd io o ble to cxercioe ourve1ll tw ce or suspicioua s ctivitieo througbo t the fol and Short ot oooe obook that 'Will d1 oorgan tze or bJ 1ns about t he detection of o1goit1cW1t parts of' the m ll1t1o it must oe ru ticipated that violent opposition of 611 kinds Yill gr l w l ly 1 e suppressed c At the present time the 1-egular Cuban m Uit o ry etto blisbnient especio J ly the Navy and Air Force are pf' extremely lov cttectiVeness Within the next ew montbs b ovevcr i t ia expected tha t Cuba v ill pegin to to kc deli Yery of' jet u1rcra 't end ' 111 begin to ha ve o va1lable tre ined e nd vell indoctrinated CU ban pilotG n tr1ng the aame period t he cffectivet eaa of grou mi f'orces loill be 1nc as1Dg and tb eir knovl edgc or nev1y acquired Soviet fe l ons VJ ll improve Tb ei·etoro after some date pl Obably no tt o re than Gix months away it nu pr obo bly become mil itarily infeasibl e to over throw the Castro regime except through the ectmll1 toeat to cO t ba t of o 1a0rc s1t eable organized military' f'oree than can b recruited from EUI Ong the CU ban exiles 3 Possible Couroee of Action Four alternative co ll ceo of action 1nvo1Ving th cou nitment of tbe pa romil1tary force desc ribed above are diaclJ $sed in succcetling paragraphs 'J 'hey o re a Er l loyment ot the para mil1t e ry- orce 1n· o tl Wller ch ould ln1 n1mize the appef-rMce of o n 1nvo s1c of Cuba fro the o utside - 5plf 6f 8B 8 RE 1 'OP b SEC ' Commit w e nt of the J lu ramilita x·y force in a $1 U prise l anding 1th to ct1eal air support the i nzto l lation under 1tu protection on CU bun soil of the opposit ion governn etxt o nd either the apid opread of the revolt or tbe continua t1on of largo sc le guctt111 a action in t errain suited tor that urpoae c COJIIDitment of the U'nmilitary force in 1 'WO aue- ce$dVC operetione F lbrtrt the la odins of one company without e ir supJ Or-t 1n a remote axeo in vb1ch i t could au sttl ln itself f r some days f'Ull r indefinitely ' a nd o« ond tt e londing or- the ma in force f rty -e1gbt bow- s later i n o Videly- different locCLtioo i n t he sair e o umer as in ps ragre ph 3 H o bovc d Comm itaent 01 the whole force in an inaccessible region vbere i t ould be expected to 'kecp control of o beachhead for a- long period of time t o permit inet 'J l ltl ti on and recognition of e pro - f Sional government and o grad tal bu11d-'U of tt1 11t ary atreogth 4 Covert 1 'llding of the Pa ram ilitery Forces Co rerul stvdy ho t been given to tbe possibi lity of inf'i ltrati t1g the pa l 'a m111 tary- f0l es 1 a night a IIJ h1b1ous ls nding using a an-portable c qui pment Md '1 6 S i1M t aling a•hore only ouch supplies as can be carried by the t roops 'l'he force ould rove 1mlned1e tc 1 y in-land to the itO®toins o nd connence operations as a povertul guerril l a fo rce relying entirel y u pon con'f1nU1ng a1 r logistical $upport - 6 fOP SEORE r Shipping 1'0 ' 1 $J PRB•1 1 ould ret ire from th-e coo st be fo r e davn and n o t e c t i col air oper a tioM tOUld be conducted Unfort unately it i s beli V¢d t M t i uch · a n _operation vould involve W Q CCCpto ble milit o ry 1·1sks n The poramil it o ry fo'f' e - Ould run t he ris' lt of becoming cot'lJ l etely disorg o nb ed and uco tte r ed 1n a night lt nding Such an operation is very difficult r or oven h i tro 1nc l t or ces experienced in amphibio us operations b 75 'l'he force vould not· have mo or t ran$port heavy mort ar mm recoiling r 1f'l es heavy ma chine guo J nor to nko In tioJ ' ·· ammunition and f ood supplies vould be l1D1ited ¥d 1t vould be vhol ly dependent on air logistical support Ir the rainy s eason c ommenc es in April ovel·ca3t cond1 t i ons could prevent eft ect i ve support Ce sualities could not be evacuated c Since t ct1ca l aircrt' Lft vould not partici pate the objective a ree could not be isolated enemy forces could move e e e inst tbe beachhead Wlic rr e9-ea The Castro Ai · Fo e o OUld be left inte ct 5 A UJ 1 d10fi i n Full Force This opcru t ion voold invo lve an emphibious airborne a ssault with concurrent but no prior tact ical e 1 t UWor t to Mi ii Ma hhM d ¢6ilt 1 1 U6U l to t fidiil s iltabl e for guerr1 operations The provi$10ne 1 go_- er-runent wouJ d land a a soon as the beachhead NM l been secured I f 1n1t1 o l milit ary ope1-at1ono • 1ere eucces$f l l and es_i ecto lly if there t 1er e evidence • 7 t p O P Iii S C R B I - @'OP SEC f t t ' of spree din d1saffcct1on against the C O otro regime the prov1u1orutl government could be recognized and a legal bn is provided tor nt leaat non-govermnenta l l ogistic 51Wport a Tbe 1 1111 ary pl en coJJte plo tes tho holding or a peru t r aroun l t he 'be xchhead IU'ca It 1• 'believed tut ioit lal attacks by the Co Gtro militia even if conducted in cO tiGicler«'blc force could be repulsed dt h GUbotantial l oos to the attacking fo reea The ocale of the operat ion and the di8l l oy or p rofcasion l canpetcnee and of determination on the part ot t he B BSauJ f'ol Ce 1 ould it is hoped demoralize the Jtl 1 1 tia and indu ce detection s thc-rof'rci impaj r the llOl ille of' the Ca etro r e and in d e Vl despread rebellion Ir the 1nit1a1 actiono proYed to be UJlDUC- cesst 11 in thus detonat1118 a ru j ot· rcvol t the assault to rcc vould retreat to the cont igu ou s mounta in area 8l 1d continue o pera- tiona nu a poverf'ul guerrilla f orce b Thie course or action ha a a •better eh a nee than 8I1Y' other of leo ding to the prompt overth - 'OW of the Castro r egime because it bol ds t be X SS i'bili ty ot adcd nisterine a demoralizing ohock c t t hia operation vere not successfuJ in setting otf 1 despread revolt f'reedo n ot action of t he rr S voul d be pre- o erwd because t here ia an alternat1ve out come bich vould Jleithe r require u s· 1nterVeut1on r or con ot1tute a seriou G deteo t 1 e - 8- t'JJ 0 8 B llJiltp 1 0 8 H B HE 1 guerrlllA action could be contimlcd on a ei eab1 c scale iu favor l hle terrain -1'1d a v ould be a N CS or exert1ng coi rtiJnd ng pres• oure on the rogillle 6 A D1v r a10nar r Ullld1Jle 1 t voul d be t'ea ibl e to couduc Ao Ynriant pl an divercioamy lenritng Yith a t orce ot about 16o Jaen in an inacceaoiblc lD uil g or the '1il MMult rorco be condooted ot the above dl C aa n prelude to 4 ' 'be in1t1 1 operatioa uld at aioht v1tbout te ctical air ollp lOrt At least part or tbe provinioxw l goTern ent Voul d go 1U v1th tbe Uyor- • i onary l4ll41 o and presumably the eotahllslllllOnt of hlJe prortsional govetl Uilea t 011 CUbo n aoil vould thereupon be o anounced ' he sub- ccquen-t landing or the tntl 1n a Gaault force Yould be carried out a n outlltlcd in parag apb 5 preced 1 oaa -rhi s cour1 e ot action lld gl rt ba-vc certatn J Olltical ndvon •• 1n that tb l in itie 1 oction 1n t he COlllJ l lign vould be of a cbttroct cr tbat cow cl plausibl - bclvc been cturted out hy the C l cnD Vitb llttJ e outside help b There would be n olillt u y advaotoae in t hat t he d1 -e raionary laa i1 ng v-ould di tn ct attention tnd posaibl y d rtde c Cne my' torce c from the o'bJectiv-e area f'or the ma 1 n a otuiult If report h k d r cached the C8 stro gOYer mn eut thll t t roopa t rained in G l atelllala vere on tbe Jti vc tbe d tvers10MJ'Y Jet1 Hng a iabt veil be taken to be the m io ti ttac k thus enha Jl c1og the e lero en t or - 9-' 201 S£8Rt T or es c z surprise for the main assault force 1 These ad -ar tages -ould be counterOAlo necd by the d1 veT6ion ot t roops otherv1se support t n g th mtl1 n unit f la nding and Slow Build-up Under this £ourth altern8 t 1vc the vbole J l rom 1 litary force could carry out landing a 'ld seize a beachhead in the o $t remote and inaccessible terrain on the island with intent to hol d indefinitely an area thus prot-0c t ed by geography ag ainst prompt or well--supported attack from t he land Thie ould permit the 1nstaUa tion there of t he proV1$10nal government 1tc t-c ognitioo by the u S atter o decent i nterval and i f' needed a l ong period of buil d - up during lbich additional volunteel·s a nd m111tary supplies ould be moved i oto tlie beachhead a A oo jor political advar tage of this course of action -o lld be that the initial assault migbt be conducted in auch c wa y as to involve less display of r elatively advanced · 1eaponry a nd or pro1·cssiona l military o rganization tha u the landing i n · force dis cus sed above especi ally so as tb e1·e is a-very likelihood that the lnitial land in W O JJ d be - i rtua lly unopposed by land force$ Recognition could provide a suitabl e pol itic3 l 3-nd legal 'b9 s1s f'or a protracted build- up a1'tcr b the initial assault Such an operation voul d ho ever require tactical air support suf'f 'i cient to e s troy or neut ralize the Ca s t ro Air Force If this ·ere not pi O•tided concu r1·-ently Ji t h t he land ng 1t vould • lO - 'be needed soon t bcrca er 1n order to pen t Gh pa to o perate 1 llto tl1c beochl ead and the planned b uJ ld• IP to go foronrd 1 n itial J and i ll6 could Ir t ho include seirure or A air $trip tte necceea -y ail' tlll porl cow 4 f airly ooon be provl ded rro 1 th in tl e territory contl 'Olled b 'tricndly t'Orces -There is boveve r no loe«tioa vbich both contoJ mo a WleGble o J rotrtp -and 1• oo ditncult or o ccess by ltmd an to pennit protection or a clu • bu U 4-up e ib1JJ tn e or opcr«tion b the very foct of bel ng c landeotine in Mturc and r emote geographicnlly would hs'Ye far' less 1 mtial iJ q Gct pollU and U 11 aU tbAn · tvo OT three 8 Conclua1o a Tb c Ca atro regime v Lll not toJJ of' i t s ovn veight In the abGencc ot e xtc l oal action ogtLinst 1t the gradual vcak caing of internal C ben opposition must be e cpect b Wi thin a matter of mQnth G the ca po bil1t1ea or Caatro ' a uilitary forces v1 ll probo b J iru rease to 8 1 Cb a degree that the overlbrov of bio reg tc e frolrl vi thin or vithout the country by t be Cubu oppodt1on · 11 1 be 'et Wll 1kel y c Tho CubM po n iliwy force it effeet1vcl r used baa a good chance ot ovet ' hrorlng Cast-ro o r- or causi ng a dmragJug civil va r vitho -t t he necec 1ty for t hC Ui tited Sta te3 to co rmdt itself t o overt oct1on age 1 nnt Cuba • ll 8 P S E C 'ft L I R-6P S£t-RE 1 d monJ the e lternetive co cc or action here 1-eY1cwedJ an aooe ult in roree preceded by a dJ versions ry 1 anding offers the best chance ot achiev lng the deoired' result DD P R-IB d Jm bp gb l-l'resident returned - W P ChroJto 2 -Sec state returned Destroyed 3-Y Pres - returned - Destroyed -Adolph Berlo returned _ - lleetroyed 5-Tllome s Ma on St tte returned - ·Destroyed 6-Sce bfense retllI lled - De1 troyed 7-lemnitzer - •retf l ined 9-DD P- W retained 10-1 'Jt lluDdy - rotal nod ll- len Grn y - retained l2-Mx- lbrneo - •reWo e d 13-l D P Sllbj file - Cuba 111 -Deotroyed 15- Deohoycd 16-11 roI - · r et L u ed 17 - Derlroyed 17 0 17 8- McGcorgc Bun ' - retained • l2 '41OP i SQPYT l - - e 1 e B s n s '§ COPY 15 J 6rCb l9 l 1 Political Reguircmento1 Th c plan tpr A Cuban op01·0 t1on e nd the varie nts thercot presented on ll Morch verc considered to be p0llt1coJ y obJcctlonai le on the ground that the contem- not hove the appearwice o an 1n f'i1trt1 - plated operation v ould tion of guerr1 in support or an internal revolution but - rather tbo t of' a R Dall-·ocOl e Worl d Wo r ll t ypc of' l lll b i biO UI' M coult In dertoking to d Ve o 41 te iv ··p · - 1 Judge their p0liticeJ aeceptability it hos been neceooory to · ' · inter troc the commento made on the earlier plo n the chnra c- te 1Gtica vhich A nov plan should possecs in order to a An Unopcctacular Anding ' should be the f°olloving The initial l o nding • CU be 'lltey vould ppeer to p0llt1coJ y acceptable be • • ··' • • ' unspectacul ur as J OG l1ble and shou ld b «Ve neither lln d iatel y prior nor concurrent taet1ca1 tr support It shou l d cor torm a o closely as poosibl e to the tYJ 1Ca l pattern ot' t c 1And1ngc of small groups intended to cat 'b lish tbc Selves or to Join others in terro 1n s u_ited tor guerrilla operot1ons In the o baence or a ir supp0rt and in acr i fit the ttern it • d probao be e t night 101 8B 9RE 'l' '61 b 6LCR A f A 86 oe '£or T ct 1c el Air Operations It vat en pho - 1z ed that ultioa te aucceoa of t he operation viU require tac-tic al a1 r opcrtttiODII le641 ng to the eets bUshmeot of In order to tit the pet-tern the contro1 ot the o lr over Cuba or r evolution theoo o_por ti o ns should be conducted from a o t ir bw e vitbJn territory b eld by oyi oaition forces 1 t is 1Jllpracticabl c to undertake onctnictioo ot on Since a1 r base in the r ainy S-eO COn 6Jld before a uy air Gll J Ort 1s 8Vnil able tbe terri tory c iz ed in tbe original l e ndill 8 ru_at in•• a ·· - - elude o n o tr s trip that con c Slo ·er Teuroo tho t t here could be f LJ · supJIOrt • • _ _ tacttce J Ope Nt1ons The O Cra tion obould be eo de signed appreciable period ot build U'P uf'ter t be initial l o ndi ng betoi-e oa Jor otte11 c1 ve a ction ta tt en V8 S under- 1b1 vould aU ov tor a JrJ n 1m lm decent 1ntcrv'$1 be- tveen tho establishment o nd the recognition by tbc u s of a proviGiona l government a ld 0 1 ld t'it mre cloac the pattern ot a typ1c$ l revolutioo d crr'il a Wartare Alternative ldeal l y 1 the terrain should not only- be protected by geoS 'CLphy against prompt or gucrrU la v e rtare in tho e ent th at an or ganized Cr1 o eter could not be held 2 Al te rnative Areac Pive di ttercnt nree s three of t b em on the oa inl nd of CUba o nd two on 1sl t nd a of'f' tbe coo ut ve re at udied ca retul ly to d otorm1ne vbether they wo l ld pel J Urt an - 2 TO P 9 ECrl B 1' war_ z8ft-I operation it tins the obove co11d1tions Ono ot the aree o il ppee ra to be eld nently suited ror the operation to be rejected either 'becouG-c All the ot bi rO had or unf'e vorel 1o eeograpby uotabl y t he ubsence of 11 uitllble air utrip 01' holt vy concentrat lonJJ ot enea y 1 orce-a or both 'l'be area sclectecl 1 8 located at the head oJ' a we ll protected deep wter 0 tuary on t be Gouth on tt oi' It 10 almost currounded by trVamps lmpenetrable to in- Cube fantry in y llU krc _and cntl re y • treble except nloJ 6 two ° to vehicles o nd e8D1 y defended OP l Oe clxco 0 J lthoue l stre t e gicull y iaole ted by theGe terrain fetLtured • the o -rco is cee r the cc nter of the tel end and the pre e ence or ell opp oa1tion to rce thcr-c vill soon become k tiown to tb e entire populution 01' Cuba e nd conctitute a aertous threat to the g lme Tbe beach- bead ere a contain s olM nd possibly two a i r atrlps adequate to handle ll-26' •· Tb ere o re several good l '1d1og bee ches I t 1• or 1 nt rest that thia o rea ha 6 been the scene ot re s1 -ta nce a cth-1 tiea and ot outright guen-UJ a vartare tor over a hundred yco rs 3 Ph ses ot t hc Operation a 'lM operation Vill begl n v1th n Dlgltt l ru Mng To e1·e o rc no koo't n enemy torcc8 ev n police 1n t he obJee- tiv ar•a t1nd it is anticipated that tbe lan IJ u con be ce rrtcd 01 -t rltb e 1t an ce 1Ne lt1c s and 'Wit h no serious - 3lOF SE CR ET 71 A P combat 8B8Fl81l As many supplies as possible Vill be unlot d ed over the 'beo che but t he eh1pa vill put to see in ti me to l c • ell offshore by davn The hole be a chhea d a reo 1ncl ud- 1ng t he air s t rips v1ll bo 1'mned1Ately occupied nnd approo ch routec dcf'ended in the initial l Ancling No tanlU v1l1 be brought ashore It is b Ueftd that tb1• operation can be e cco np11sbed quite unobtru civc y and that the Ce str o ree 1 too Vill have l itt lc idea of t he ehe of the force in- volved b Sbe second pb a e p-re 'crabl y COIID ncing at davn f'ollowil s the l andiog v11 l in •Olvc the l'Qvement- into t he beachhead or t actical aircrtl fi and the1 r prompt coes d tment tor Gtr J kcs against tbe C8£tro JJ r 1' rce Concu n-enti C-46 s v1ll move 1n vith gas 1n dni m m1 n1mG l ma intenance 1 equ1pwc mtJ and trl8 in-l cnrui ce perGonnol M ral'idly l S _possible the vbolc tactical e ir operation vU l be based 1 n the 'bc ehbe d but init11 tl l · only enough aircro tt vill be bui cd there plauuibly to account tor all obacrvo ble a ct1v1ty over the 1sl tw4 c In the tbird J he3e as oon a s there is ad quate protectSon for shipping f rom enemy atr attack obi G Vil l 13 ve back into tbe beach t o discharge supplies ond cqui Jl- u nt in ludin t '11w It n ot be preOUlled tbo t counter - 4 -- i 8 P 6 fl c l AI 638RB I 15 December l l SUBJF CT ' 'be l n•pcctor G atr l '• Survey of tbe Cul M OJ eration '1o c JC11meot oo tbe sub Jcct report 1D detail ould res ult 1n a poper a pproo ching 1n leagtb that of tbe survey 1-1 f Such a comirento ry vould have to deal in depth vith t he 011'11 or the ourvey 1t-s acope n od the mot hod used in COlnl iling it Such a cow cntary 'ould at o l 8 rge number ot poge s be- tt qu i red to a ate 1 UA cu re c ies ocl ssiona d istortiCl'Ul tmGupported a lJA•ttorus a n d errooeou s conclus icms A detailed inquiry on the Cuban operation on e lcmnt a otbtlr than clandestioe tr decro ft bas aL d y beeI completed by tbe group beaded by Ccnere l Taylor General Taylor ' • report _ be sed o o t e s t by aU tbe principal otticero l Dvolvcd 1n tbe Cuban op ration Tbe rnspector General's repo rt is not bos d on complete testimony G of its concluaionc arc iII conflict vith Cen tol Taylor's conclusiooe It la aot cl-eo r vhst purpose tbe In apector Ccoeral' s report is intended to serve If i t is intended r1 Jta rily es an evaluation of the Agency's role it i s doficient Neither Mr OuUeo oor I vas c onsulted io the prepe re tiOll of tbe Inspector Genc ral ' s report As a rea-ul t thet-e are r Q ' unoeces s r 1 n ccun cies The report triec t o do both too much and too l1ttl On tho one hand i t atteCIJ t t o deaeri't the processes or national ecu ri ty pol1cy Jr 8ki c g ae tbou gb this vcre s procca• 1n logical ded1tctioo 11 ke v orld n3 a problelll 1n geo notry According t o the Inspector General 's account fl Tm J ror os t1ons shoul l 'be laid down 1n vrit i ng and 1o OdV6 1ce f'ron vhieb correct couclusiona a to proper actions U1USt ineVit bly be d r vn In this r eape ct the rep rt goes far beyond an P lys13 of the Agency's role and it 1s »ot accurate It tries to do too llUCh SE'Cltst' Cn the other band 7 the report treats the prcparat ion a tor tbe April landi D gG ao 1 1 these vere the only act1Y1t1cs directed aflll 108t Gastro end bin influence tbrouellout the bem1spbou nnd t be world It cbooaos to ign0 1 C o U other 1'sceto or t he Agency' s 1Jltell1geoce c llection o nd covert act100 a program vbicb preceded cco riJ E' ied twd have folloved the landiogo ln April of 1961 Thus it does too llt tJ e The r eport mieses objectivity by° a v1de n argin In lDfrieodly bl Wd i t can becane o veapoo unJus t i f'l ably to attack the entire rui ooiou orgw1i1 otion a n d f ulctioning of t JQ Agency It faU e to cite t he specitic ach ie -e u enta or per6ons aococi ated v ith tbe opcrut100 6nd pre c o tc a picture or W U Ut-1 ga tcd and e l most villrul bu blins and diaMter In its prcc ent f'Ol Dl tbio is oot a uoetul report tor an 00 e illolde or outside tbe NJ er ey rt co npl ete OJ' la cysio beyond tbat already accompl11bed by Gcncro l To yl or and his gro p ic otill required then o aev kind ot report 1$ called for ----o report vitti clear terz o of reference b6sed on complete testtmocy Such a report could concentrate oo ele odestlnc tradec -att oc asset for vbicb tbe ccy unlquoly responoible '' 'in• I• c P Cabell C P Ce bell Geoeral USAF O puty Director 9 8 H£ 1 December 1961 11 RU0RAhDUM FOR Director of' Central Inte Wgenee SUBJBCT Rep0rt oo the CUbo n Operation 1 ID our conversation on Friday morniilg the first Of teceober you ntioned your concern that the To lpect o r Generol' D Rc Ort 0t1 the Cubo n Operati on takc o o lone might g1ve a o error eous jJnpress1on M to the extent CIA is recyoMible tor tbe failure of th- operation In CJY opinion the fa ilure of the operatioo s h oul d be charged 1D Qrdcr to t he fol lowing fo etors a An over-o ll l o -ck of recognition on the part of the U S GoV l' Dlre nt as to the magnitude of the oper t1on required to oyer- t brov the Fidel C mo reg Lce b The failure on tbe part of the U S Go•renw nt to plan for all cont Ln genci ea o t the tio-e of the C'u'bOll operation U c1uding the necessit 'Y i or uain g regular U S milit ary forces in tho event th st tbe exiled Cubo na cou1d nQt do tbe Job tbo mse l •rea c The fail ure on the po rt oi the u 's Govermient t o be iUin g to colllmit to tbe Cuban operat ion oa plo nned and executed those necessary reeoui-oeo required for i ts eucce-as • LYlll tl l j_rk atrick 4 -man 3 Kirkpatrick In8pector Gencro 1 - ·e e r MB e e I I I I I' ___ _ B 0 fl B l' 15 December 1961 SUBJECI' T Inc-peetor General I a Survey of the Cuban Qpera tiou To com nent on tbe subJect report in dutail vould result 1D o paper approaching in length that of the t w-vey itoelf' Such a c0CJ1« t1ta ry vould hove to al in depth rltb tbe aic ot the 8W'W Y1 its scope IUld be cetbod used in C 'Pil1ng it Sueb a coc ntary vould 1 o t a le re nud er ot pa g ea be required to note J naccuraciea om tosionu dieto rtions unnupported 1 J ege tio na e nd C lDy erroneous conclusion A detailed 1DqU 1 ry on the Cube D operation on elell1'nt otbcr than clazuiestine tro decratt has alretl d y been COllli letcd by the group beaded by Ooner-o l Tu ylor ceneral Ta ylor rs · report vas baaed Oil teo 1J ony by all the prl nciJ 81 otf1cero involved 1D the Cul n operatiOll 'i'be J' 'D ctor General •a report 18 not based on c lcte testimony so m ot its concluo1ons are 1n contlic t 1th General Tayl or's c onclusions It ia not clee r fbat purpose the Inapector Cencre l •s 1tport is intended to serve I t' it 1 s intended pr1 Jrl6 r 1 ly as an e•-a lUlltio» of the Agency ' s role i t 1o deficient Neither Mr Dulleo nor I wa s coooulted itl t he prepe ro tion of tbe In 5pector GeocrL1 l 1s repcrt As a reault the re arc ltllll ' UIUleeeBt ar ' i DAccure cica 'l'be report tries to do both too auch and too Uttle On the ooe hAnd it atteti pte to des cribe the p -occoseo of national cecurity pollcy- r aki Dg u though tbia '-'el'C a proceos la logical deductioa like vorting a problec 1n oaetry Accord 1ne to t he Inspector CcneraJ '8 aeoount firm propooitionc •houl d be l uid down 1 n · rriting and 1n advance from hich cor rect concluG1ons as to proper act tons crust inevitabl y be dravn In thta n s r ect the report goes tar beyCDd e o 3 0A lyata ot the Agency'• role tuld it 10 oot accurate It tries to d o too much aena1 On tbc other hand tbc repor t t reo ts the prepar at iona rQr tbe April landings oe it tbeoo -we re tbo only act1v1 t1es directed aea 1n1t Castro o nd his iotl uence tb rOugbout the hemisphere and tho world It cboo8es to 1 gocxre a ll other taceto o-r the Agency' $ iotclligence collection M d co •ert 6ct1ons progra m vh1ch J ti OC dcd acca pe nicd nnd ba-re tollo d the land l n6 1 o April of 1 961 flws 1i does too littl e The report aucaes obJccthity bi a v ide n areio In unfriendly hands it can 'beec a veapon unjustU'i ebly to attuck t he cotU'e Jll is sioc orgsniz atioo and tunctiont ag o1 tbe Ae ttncy It fails t o cite tbe spe c1-t1c acb1eve meo ts of pori on a8soc1Ated v itb t he operat1oo o ild presento o picture or umdt1gatcd o nd e l most vill f lJ bwnbli og end dJ uoter In i ts proeent tono this 1u not a UGetul report tor anyone 1-ui de OT outc1dc the A g ocy IC complete s i • beyond tbo-t olready accc pl 1sbed by Ge neral Ta yl or and his gr JP 1s s till required tben a oov kind ot report 1 s called f or --o report vitb clear tentS ot re terence based cxa coc ipleto toetiJD m y Such e report could coocentn te oo c l andeottne t radecro tt un aa et tor which tbe Agency relllll1ns uniquely reepons1blc a c cabcll C P C bcll Gener a l USAF Deputy Director