QA HISTORICAL REVltW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SAN ITiZED 1997 ' INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY of t he CUBAN OPERATION and e SSOCIATED COCOMENTS Part 2 o f 2 Parts r-- - -DD P-Z-0779 23 Febru -ry 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR Aaabta nt to the DCI Mr Cb a pin SUBJ ECT Return of Avalla blc Copies o 11 An Analyst• of the Cuban Operadon by the Deputy Director Plans 11 TS Hl 81884 1 Transmitted herewith are all the compl•tc d copies availa blc to u• of •ubjcct docwnent Included are copy S a Ad copiea 7 through 20 2 To con lrm our original w ldCl'Ot ftodU g Copies 1 z and 3 went to the DCI on 18 January copy 4 went t o M r Dullea on 18 January cofy 6 went to the 1D1p4c tor General on 19 January and eoplea 21 througb ZS a re u nassemblH with the piece• reaidin in the OD P Regl11ry We will de troy the•• Lau er materJalt H you have eu ficient coplea without aeae mblin1 lhe hut live ROBERT W Kl NG Aathta nc lO the DD P Att achment 1 Aa ll tod •DD P Rcginry Y•rga ret Porter dviac d tha t thctc cop1e• were beina deatroyed r em - 'J'OP EiB ORB AN ANALYSiS OF THE CUBAN OPERATlOK BY THE DEPUTY DlRF CTOR PLANS CENTRAL rNTELLIGENCE AGENCY 18 J anua -y 1962 _ r OF 83 SREY TS- 181884 C opy_ _ Te P S 'GQiJ p- T ASLE OF CONTENTS PAGE SECTION IndicMed by Blue Tal s INTRODUCTION Al'lD S UMMARY 1-33 A B C D £ F G 3 6 g 13 16 19 22 A I Organi atlon a nd Execution Errors of Judgment The Decisi ons thai t Led to F'ailure Washington Decision Making Agency vs Government Responsibility Why a n Ove rt Ope ration Government vs A gency Decisions Conclusions Lessons fol' the Future Z3 25 IL THE SURVEY 'S STATEMENTS OF THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 1- 4 IL WHY A MlLlT ARY-TYPE INVASION 1-4 I V 1- 10 THE DECISION MAJ l NG PROCESS i 3 Annex A - Memorandu m dated March 1961 f or S e cretary of S tate Secretary of Defen se Director of Central Intelligence Agency Tasks Paralvti lita ry P lan Cuba v THE ASSESSMENT OF TI-J E ADEQUACY OF THE PLAN A 'lncx A - 1-18 Cable ir m C WH 4 Pa ramilitary d•ted 13 April 1961 to CL He adquarte·r s TS-18 1884 Copy N _J_ TOP SECDOif TOP t'1 CPST SEC'nON PAGE ORGANIZATtON AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS VII Annex A - Mcmot andum dat ed 24 Octobc r 1960 for A DOP A et al Proc edures for Cuban Ovcrfligh Annex B - Memorandum da te d 12 October 1960 for C hief V 'H 4 Organization and mma nd Relationships - VlH 4 and Development Projects Division 1-14 PERSONNEL Annex A - Bio g raphic Sum mar y of Certain Senior Officials Aitnex B - VIII I X Memor a ndu m dated 16 •fay 1960 for Chiefs of All Specia1 Staffs a nd Operating D iv isions Clerical Assist ance for WH Di v ision THE POL T CAL FRONT ND RELATIONS WITH THE CUBANS AIR MARITIME OPERATIONS A Air B Maritime C Training Underground Leaders IOP SC6 £ 1-18 I - 18 l 7 I5 TS- 81884 Copy ii _f _ - ICE SECI EI J NTRODUCT ON AND SUMMARY The pur pose of this paper is t o contribute to an undet standing of tb e nat ut'e of and the reason s for the failu 1·e o f the Cuban operation and in s o d oing to suggest what a r e the co rrect lessons to be learned t here-f rom It is prompted by and is fo r the mos t part a c ommentary on the IG Survey 'l 'bat document give s a bla c k pict ure of the Agency 1 s rol e in U1is operation I t m a kes a num ber of di ferent kinds of allegations First there al'e 1 umerou$ char ges of bad organization and incom pet e execution including speci fically criticisms of command rel a t ionshi ps the quality of pers onnel the int ernal o p erational pl anning process the conduct of maritime and a il o pe ations a nd the collection and e val uation of intdligence T h ese d e ficienc ies are portrayed as responsible for the failur e t o build u p and supply r esi s tance organi ta tions under rathe r favorable conditions • and more serious i s the allega tion o f major errors of j udgm ent not ably a the decision to convert t he p roject into what rapidly b ecame a n overt milita r y o-pe ration beyond the Agen cy's c a pability b the treatment of the Cuban exiles a s 11 puppet s 11 c the inade J_uacy of the military pla n for the inva sion and d t he failu1·e to a ppr aise the chances of s uccess realist ica lly TS #18 1884 l'01P S£lOftDff Copy _ _ -q g p 6JiGilC r - zT hird the Su r vey is critical of the Agency' s failure to insure that the dec ision m akinJJ process in tbe Executive Branch was orderly and e ffective The Agency i t i s alleged failed to keep the national policy maker s adequat ely and realistically info rmed of the conditions considered essential for success and it did not press sufiic iently fol · ptompt policy de isio ns in a fas t moving s it a tion'' As a corollal 'y o this judg ment the Survey att r i b utes the blame fot' incompetence of execution and io erro rs of j udgment essentially t o this Agenc y a lone l t i s almost self- evi dent that some of t hese allegations are true a t least i n pai·t In a ny large and ra9idly o r ganized un derta king there arc c e r tain to be etrors of o rga nizati o n and of exe ution ln all likeli1lOOd m ajor errors in judgment were committed Similarly the d e eision roa klng proces s in the E xecutive B r anch o f the Oove nment oper ated in a manner that left s o mething to be desi ed Neve rtheless this pa p e r argues that a large m ajo rity of the conchtslOns rea hcd in the Survey are mislead i ng or wrong that the Survey i s e specia lly w e ak in judging what a re the im plications of its o wn alleg ations and tlle refore tha t its utility is greatly impa i r ed b'f it s failure t o point out fully corre c tly the l e sso ns to be learned fr om this expe rienc e t in a U c s e s Th5s generaliz ed l eject ion ca n be m a d e m o r e mea ningful by an e labor ation T S #181881 TOP SFCPlt''C Copy _ _ - 3 - at th i s point w hich will a t the s a m e t i m e s e rve the purpose o outlining the s t r ucture of this paper and summ arizing ce tain of its m ain c o nclu s ions A Organi i ation and Execution As t o the first set of allegatio ns tber is not too m u ch that c a n be said sho rt of detailed discuss ion which is con t aincd in lat er sections except to m ake the obvi ous poi n t that perfectio n i n organiza tion and e x ecution is ne ver a ttaine d and that the real q u esti on is whether the- mista ke s that w e r e made were v •orse than tbey reasonably should h a ve been and j ustify blanket condemnation Stat ed flatl r the con clus ions reache-d here 011 the m ai n s ubstantive p oi nts are a T hat Agency command and organi z ation o helation s h ips w e re what they s ho uld h ave been b T hat any shortc om ing·s in the i ntel n al planning proc ess r eflect ed for the most part the d i Uicul ty of securing clear policy gtlidanc e from outside the A gency and prom pt willing support based on that g uidance c That t he faih1r e of most air operations in support of th e r e sistance wa s the res llt of c irc umstances completely beyond the c on tl'ol o the a it arm a nd probably not 1 emediabl e b · any action that the Agency could have t aken cl T hat the int elligence on the Cas tl'o regi me and on t he i nt e i -nal oppos itio n the ret o w as es s en tially accur a te 1'8 SECRET T S V t 8 1884 C opy _ _ TOP 886hEf'9 - 1 The greatest operational weaknesses were i n the early phases oi mal 'i t ime operations and possibl y in the fail ul e to place trained paramilitat'y a gents with resistance groups although it must be recognized chat maj or efforts were ma de to accomplish this result and even with bind sight i t is not c l e ar that a ny different oper ational procedur es o r any greater effort could have achieved greater resul ts The ulti mate test of any prqject such as this is of co-urse i t s outcome but if a judgment of t he effectiveness of organi zation and execution i s to be made the defi icn ies need to be bal anced by the accomplishments As eveu the Surv y remarks 'l'be re We 'e some good things in thi s project After a s low start a sizable number of small boat operations wer e run e f'fi i n_Uy and a large- n lmber of per sons and volu me 0£ ca tgo w e re infiltrated successfully into the $land In the last weeks be lore the i nvasion a political organiz ation was formed which covered a rema rkabl broad spectrum of political opinion and brought together what was desct i bed by a State Department ofCi cer at the t ime as the best group of exile leaders thal could b e ass embled and that l eft o utside e lexncnt ll important politically acceptable In the military build - up a force vas c reated that was twice as lar ge as ori ginally envisaged a n d lar ger than a ny param i lita r ' force ever developed by the Agency It was brougltt to a high state of combat T OP ssr Pclii1 TS 1181884 Copy_ _ TOP rsbAKT - seffectiveness wit h a l etnarkably l ow per centag of indivi d uals who had to be elim ina ted fo r unsu itability and with high m orale l ate r prove n in c ombat T his force was airlifted to a sta glng base the l ocation o which was never revealed until after th finish of the o peration lt was loaded on ships which sa iled o n disper sed ourses i nd achie ved complete surprise five days l ater The Brigade then successfully c a-r ded out what h ad been described as the most d ifficult type of militar y operat ion a landing on a hostile shore ca rried out l a xg ely at nlght F inally as the battle was joined adequate S'1pplie s of all sorts were availa'bk within a few hour s of the bea ches had conditions permitted thei off- loading T h ese varlou s l'esult s were a ccomplished in such a way t a t only a small number of Agency staff offi cers wer e ever exposed to the Cuban participa nts and the true identities of these American s have never been rovcaled lvloxeQver the entire build-up was a ccomplished under the limitation th at it contemplate no 11 1se of Americans in comba t and no commitme nt o American nag shipping As the ev ent proved and the Survey r e mai·ks 'this was n ot enough Neverthelcs$ a recical of a ffirmative accomplishments suggests t ha t what ever shor tcomings there were in organiz ation personnel and execution were not the deci sive r e asons for failure It will be n eces saq to ret urn t o this point lat er TS #181884 C opy_ _ - 6 B Error s of Judgn ent The second set of criticisms those described above as allegations of maj or erro1·s of judgment and the third relating to the Agency' s relationships with th e rest of the Executive Branch are more complex Their validH r is d iscussed in $eparate sections below Section tll on Why a l tilita ry Type Invasion and IV on The Decision Making P1·ocess Section VIII on The Relationships with the Cubans and Section Von The Assessment of tbe Adequacy of the Plan and on the A pprai sa l 0£ it s Success Summariz ed in fla t statements the conclusions t here reached are these a The basic reason for placing increasing emphasis as th e build-up progressed upon t he planned m ilitary oper a tion and decreasing empba s is on the internal resistance i s that for a number of reasons the ca pa city of Ll-ie re sistance to achieve an overthrow without a sig·nificant as sist fro m the outside appeared to be d iminish ing t athet• than g rowing despit e the best effol·ts of vhich ·the Agen cy w a s capable to suppor t it Moreover- preparati on for the military opcr a tion was not intended to r educe support of t h e r es is tance and the two efforts became t r uly competitive onl y in the l a st week before the invasion was mowtted b The decision to d eny the Cuban political leadership cont rot of or close c ontact with the Brigade a 'ld to withhold from the m knowledge ''COP SE0hE i TS #181884 Copy _L_ $fa 8U6RB T - 7 - 0£ the impending invasion was based on two considerations First it was believed at the t ime tb 1 t i£ the ·Brigad e was to achieve unity and e sprit de corps it must not b e split by p olit ical rivalries and its offi cers must be chosen on profess ional grounds Thi s clearly p ecluOed conu ol of the Brigade or e veo £ ree 1 ccess to it by the -politi cal l eaders Second t11e insecur ity of the Cubans was notorious l t was quite i nconceivabl e that th ey could know t he detail s of time s and place s without the g ravest risk that the e ssent ial advantage of s urprise would be l o s t It was clear a t the t i m e that the A gency assumed a sign ifica nt risk i n denying respons ibility· to t he C uban s aocl inevitably a ssu m ing t hi s responsibility itset£ No evid e nce that has come to ligh t during or since the invas ion suggests that milita ry e fCectiveness and s ecurity could b ve been o bt a ined without paying that pdc e c The conclusions oi t hi s paper on the adequacy of the rnilitary plan arc really t oo complex to be summariz ed in a sentence o r two All that can be s aid here is th at l there was solid reason to believe that it bad a good chance 0£ at l east initial $UCcess 2 the last minute ancellation of the D-Da y air st r ike significantly reduced the pro spects of su ces s 3 there was nevc r a t est of w h ether internal s u ppol't for the invasion ·would materialize on the scale and in the manner anticipated and 4 t he m ain deficien ci es in the plan and in th capabilities of the TOP SECPlsff TS #181884 Copy f_ i 6f O fJ6RM - g Cuban force which may ha ve cont ri buted to the defeat have not been touched o n in the S 1rvey d been faul ty 1'he apptaisal o the chances of success m ay well bave The i ntelligen ce was g en e rally good but it may have under est i m a t ed the skill wit h which the C astro forc es w ould be dir Ctcd the moral e of the militia u nits he would deploy agai nst the Brigade and the e fecth•eness of any T - 3 3 ' s that remained in o peration The1 e w 1 s some ex agge ration of' the capabilities of b oth gro llld and air forces of the invas ion It i s lmpossible to say h o w grave w as the er or of appr a i s al sinc e the plan that was a ppraist-d w as modified by elimina tion of the D-Day a i r s t rike Had the Cuban a ir bcc n e limina t ed all of these estimates m ight w e ll have been a curat e instead of underestimated 0 P r obably therefore the prima r y fault lay in having one facto1· i e the elimination of Cuban a i r achieve s o vital a aig niiica nce t o the whole plan Al though th e 0 - Day ail s t r ikes WCre essenti al to the de t r u ction oi the Cuban air no flua r anty of s uc h d est ruction was possible even had there been aut horit y ior the str ikes The conclu$ ions summarized a ove bear on tht corr ctn ess of the Survey•s a llega t ions of de fi ciencies o execution and major errors of judgment but for the p lrpos cs e i ther of under standing what bap pened or oi learning how to avoid such a failure in the futur e it is far fr o m TSP Of enz r TS #l8l884 Copy_L_ - '9 s u icient to know that cer tain a ctivities were o r were notj incompetently performed and cer t a in mistakes were or were not made With many of the deficiencies it is ess ential to W derstand why they existed And with all of them it i s impo-i-t-ant to know what part they pla yed in causing the outcot ne to be wba t it was 'fhe central weakness of t he Survey is tbat it is often misle-a ding in its implications as to why certain things were I done and i t is grossly incomplct c in its analys is of the consequences o mist akes alleged to have been ma de Accordingly before pr oceedi ng rr to the detailed discussion l eginning in Section Uf o this paper which su99orts tl e c onclusions summari ed here it has been felt necessary to make good in some degree these ert'ors of omission by commenting on the nature and causes of the failure in a manner wbic h will be in part alternative and in part suppl ementary to the Survey C The Decisions That Led To Failure It has been suggested not only in the Survey but elsewhere that the ope1·atiou a ga inst the Castro 1 egime sh ou ld never have been alloi ved to take t he fo1·m that it did of a tnilita i·y invasion It ultimately d id take this fo rm h owever and it was in chis form that it failed T he militar - failure has been analy·z cd far more e xhaust i vely and with g1·eater authority· by General Taylor and othc rs than this paper can pretend to do ·•op 6F6RZ I TS HS-1884 Copy i_ a ey JZCREI - IO N evertheless certa in concl usions a s to the nature 0 £ th e rnilita rt failure mu st be r estated h e-re if its causes are to be M derstood The1·e i s unani 1n ous agreexn nt that the pl'ox i mate cause was a shortage of ammunition on the bec c h hea d and that this sho1 cage was dir ectly traceable in turn to the effective b i te r diction of shipping a 1 1 d a ir resupply by the Cast o Ai r Force It has been less emphashed that Castro's command of the ai r deprived the Bl'iga de of its capability for battlefield reconnaissance of the equivalent of fie ld artHlery a od of close a ir support ag ainst enemy ground forces It deprived it too of t he possibility of 11 s t ra tegic strikes iga inst enemy lines of supply and corn munica tions Finally i -elia nce had b een placed on dayt i me and virtually unopposed ail a nd sea resupply as a necessat y condition fo r the activation of r e sist ance group s thl'oughout the Island It is incontrovertible that Without con trol o tl ie air a nd tlle air cre ws and a ircraft to exploit tha t control of the a ir the whole milit ary operation was doo med Even w it h control 0£ t he air it m ight have fail ed but without it there could not have been any -cha nee of s u c cess If t hen one wishes t o learn what actually cau sed the rnilita1·y operation to fail rather than what might ha ve done so t be sta rti ng µoint must b e an inquiry into why cont r ol of the ah was- lost and n eveJ t-egained Of equal signi fic ance TS Hl81884 ran GDCftB f Copy L _ TB B f -11 - for an unde rs ta uding of the whole oper tion i s a n a varenes s of the circ umstances that did not c o ntr i bute to the failur e in the air Fortuna tely i t is possible to list without 1buch possibilit ' o f contr o versy the circumstance s tba t led t o the o utcome i n the a h- F irst the nea r est real estate that could be used was Puerto Cabeza s i n Nic at·ag ua a d ista ce of over 800 mil es from the targ·e t a r ea ' 'he only way to avoid this severe limitati o n on the c apa bility o f any but the m o s t modern a i r c r aft would have been to use a ba se on U S t e rritory Second in ch oosing types of aircraft no sor t of plausible d enial could be maintained unless the project limit ed itse lf t o the kind s of obsolete air c r aft that might plausibly be f ound in the hands o f a privately financed Cuban force T he re was th e foJ t her argwnent tha t it was d esirabl e to use typ e s o f aircr a ft tha t could have d efected i rom t he Castro Air For ce The choice was thus r apidly narrowed down to B - 2 6's Third polic y guid a i1ce t h roughout the proj ect wa s t o t he effect that no U S air c r ews could b e com mitted t o combat or pl a c ed w here they 1n ight be jnvolved in combat T h is restriction was not r e laxed until the second day o f the inva s ion and then only in despel 'a t ion T hi s had i mplications not only for t he qu aUty of the air c1 ews hut also for the 0 1 nnber that could be assemb led s cree nod for security and tra h ed tvithin the time period avai lable If 8P 3ECICE I TS #181884 Copy _ _ I Of 5£2 tE I - lZGiven these limitations the only way in which ther e was t he slight est possibility of a c hieving control an d rnaintaining control of the ai r was by d estr 1ction of tJ1e Castt·o Air F orc e on tJ e ground b e fo r e t he da 'TI of D - Day when vulnerable shipping would be exposed to a ir s trikes T·he one air strike on D-Z was not expected to be and in fact was not sufficient to accomplish this purpose Only one other strike wa s plao ned fo r t his purpose and tha t was cancelled Moreover in the interests of making the air strikes appear to have been done by the Castro Air Force a r estri c t ion was placed on the numb er of aircraft that could be committed to these strikes by t he invasion for ce Even after the very considerable d amage done on D - Day itseli by enemy air it i s poss i ble t hat a determined and majo r strike on the night of D D - 1 would h ave c rippled the Castro Air Force the final d es truction o f which might have bf en completed tbe following night By the vening of D-Day h owever tbe Cuban air c rews were e xhausted and dispirited a nd th e oppor tunity could n ot be fully exp loited Even i' things had gone b et t er on D-Day i t is que stionable whethc r the l 7 Cuba n a ir crews that constit 1ted the a i r a rm of the strike force would have been adequate to accomplish 311 of t be t a s ks or whiC ' reliance was placed on the air a1 ·rn The cha nee oi success would have 5 '0P SECRET TS el 8L884 Copy _j_ 'fOP 6 0MJ T -1 3 been g reat er it h or without the D - Oa y strike if it had been possible co assemble and commit to action more trained Cuban or U S air -rcws 0 Washington Decision Making These then we e the ci rcUJYl stances which together led to d efeat in the air ai d ma de inevitable a defeat on the gr ound notable about them Several things are In the first pla ce it should be emphasized tha t these all trace back t o Washington decisions The defoat in the ah cannot be blamed on b3 d maintenance a t Puerto Ca bei as o t on a- shortage of spar e parts or fuel lt cannot be blamed on a sbox-tage of O-Z6's i oasmuch a s it proved pos-sibl e 1·apidly t o r eplace losses from the U S lt cannot be- blamed on the cowardice or lack of skill of the C u ban air c- e vs who by and large gave a good aee•unt of thci'nsolvcs Nor Mn it be attributed to bad tactical decisions made e ithei- at Puerto Cabezas or i n the Wa shi ngton command post The c1·ucial defeat in the a ir was t o no sign ifica it d egree the result o bad execution It wa s directl y and unambiguously atb ibutable to a long sedes of Washington policy decisions Before exploring th e touchy question of whose decisions these w ere and how the · were made tho implications of this com J si on des rve emphasis a nd e l aboration It sugges ts that the bad organization improperly d ra 'l lines 0£ comn a nd low la lity pei son nel and operational TS #181884 Copy _ _ i Q S S i C Rf I -l 4- inadequacies alleged by the Sur vey were not in the actual event responsible f or the milita r y faihu- e lf o r ganization and e xecution had appr oached perfect ion the in •a sion would s t ill have failed in the absence of more a nd larger pre- D - Day a ir strikes or the use of more modern a irc r aft from U S b ases To be sure this conc lusi on del 'ives fr om an analysis only of the failure to ga in conh·ol o f the I t is a rguab l e that even if c ont rol of the a i r had been achieved maintained and expl oited the beachhead would not ha ve been consolid a t ed no ' the Regi me lltimate ly overt hrown Without arguing that point here however the evide nce strongly suggests that if the Bt-igade llad been de eat-ed by ground a ction under t hese more favorable circumst ances it w o uld have been because o f en ors o f planning and conception rathe r than by e r rors o f 1 ecution The Brigade fought l ong enough to prov e its deter mination a nd tactical skill It appeal S to h ave bee11 ·well handled by i ts o fi c e s There were ample supplie$ at ha nd to support contin ued ground a ct ion has a d mitt ed that the ter r a in was well chosen And Castr o himself Given control o f the air the Bri gade m i ght ultimately have been defeated by a complete failure of any r e s istance to materia l he uu1 der condit ions which would have TS ll81884 Copy _ _ 78 G S61Uif -15- encouraged i t a nd permitted a ir support coupled v 'ltb continued effecti veness in the face of heavy casualties of the Castro militia E i ther of Ule s e possibl e developm ents would have confirmed the e rror s of i nteUigence and assessnient that are a lleg ed b ut vould have given no suppo1·t t o the view that errors of organization and execution in the build-up phase were responsible for the milita ry de eat Despite whatever mistakes of this character ther e were tbe Agency did 3 fte all with the invaluable help of the Department o Defense build up train equip and deploy a for ce that proved i tself in combat to be o high quality ·rs 'f8P -CDG 'R DT #1 s1ss4 Copy I - 16E- A_gency vs Go ve r nment Responsib ility Another notable featu r e of th e decisions that t ogether w e l e r esponsible for failure t o achieve cont rol o f the a i r in addit ion t o the fac t that they w e re a ll Wa$hington policy d e cisions is ·tha t they were all int erdepartmenta l decisions Other e le ments o f t h e Executive Branch were involve d along with the A gency in m aking then--_ This is not to imply that in all cases they w e-r e i mposed on the Agency Rega r dless howevel' of how bl a me should be as sessed b etween t he Agency for a cceptin g rest r i ct ions an d the policy makers outsid e the a gency fo r impos ing them it is ne cessary t o have clea 1·ly in mind the nature o th e decision making· pro cess in a project of this sort in orde-r to unders tand how the ul t imate failur e came about Inherent in this situation w a s a c lear co -ifiict b etwe en t wo goals a conflict o f the so r t familial' in 1·ecent Ame r ica n history One ob - ject ive wa s tha t ma i nly thr o ug h the various activities cornprised in this p roj ect the Castr o r egi m e s h ould be overtlu ·own The o ther Vas tJ at the polit ical a nd ln ora l post u1·e of the United States before the wodd at la rge should not be i mp ire d T he basic m ethod o f resolvi ng thi s c onflic t of objectives that was r es ort ed t o • n a s t hat 0 £ attempti ng to carry o ut actions a gainst C a stro in such a mannet- that the offi ial resp onsibility o f the U S Go vernment c o uld b e disclaime d TS #181884 Copy_ _ X Q - SD6itC I -1 7 - If com plete deniability had been cons istent wi th maximurn effecti enes s there w oul d theoretically h a ve r e main e d no con flict of goals but U' act t hi s couJd not be and n e v e r is the case The m ost effect ive way to hav e organized op erations agains t the Cast ro l'eg ime even i they would have been carried out ex clusively by Cubans would have been to do so perfectly openly on t ¾e la 1·ge s t scal e and with the best equ ipmen t feasible P racti cally every departure f r om this pattern o f behav ior imposed operational diffi- cultiea and reduced effectiven ess Inher eut in the concept of • Oeniability was tha t many of these restrictions woulO be accept ed but at every stage over 3 period of many months questio s had t o be a n$wered in ·which operational effectivene s s was w eighed against the political requirem ent of d eniability As the se decisions presented them$elves week after w eek th e Agency a s t he executive a g e nt for the conduct o the ope ration was usuall y and naturally the advocate o effe ctive ness TI1e S t ate Departm ent a nd with respect to certain m atte rs t he Department o Defens e were the guardi ans ot the cor rectness of the c o untry' s p olitical pos ture a nd thus the advocates of deniability T herc ·was obviously no w-ay in which a gener a l i7 ed p olicy could have bee n laid dov 'll whi ch would have furni hed guidance as co the way the many succcs siv'e decisions ought t o be made l'OP - ee1w I There w a s no qua ntitat ive TS #18 1884 Copy 78ft lvQGPl --'iP - 18measure o either tl e improvement L'l the chances or success tha t wot lid have resulted f't om say permission t o us e American air c ews in ove rflights or of the dccrc a se in deniabilit y that would have r e sulted the re- from Each of ma ny $UCh decisions had to be discussed and made on its own merits and in almost all oi them several agen cics had to take pa rt One of the consequences 0£ this state o aifail 'S was that p rompt decisions we re hard to obtain Another was that like so many hite r- depart1nental deci sions these wt rc subject to differing interpretations b · different part icipants in the process Delays and differences of interpretation were compounded by t 1-ie constantly chaJ1ging situation both of Cuba and the Castro rcgirne on the one side and of t he opposi tion on the other which •o·u ld have rendered rigid and entirely orderly planning d ifficult under the best of circumstances The nat u e o the decision 11 aking -process had other consequences as well t exp lains i n large measure the a ilu re to w rite t idy and com-- p rehens ive plans and have them properly approved in writing by compe• tent authority well in advance It explains why Chere wa-s a long succession of a lte nate plans a n l oi modification to plans Wlder cons id- era tion Above all the constant weighing of costs and benefits in the e ffort to satisfy the military r equ irements £or success without exces sive TQP €B8lt 1 TS #1 81881 Copy _ _ _ 1t0r - cnrw - 19i mpairme nt of the political req ui r ement oi deniabiJity e xplains wh y the fina l plan and most of the var ian ts cons idered in the last s ix weeks was a compr o mis e F Wby A n Over t Operation Against the background of these rema rk s on the way decisioris were m a de a nd on the natur e of policy is$ues i nvolved it i s worth comment ing bri efly on one oI the major errors o f judgment alleged by the Su r vey the d ecision to II convert the proj ect into w hat rapidly beeam e an ove r t m ilitary ope rat ion beyond the Age ncy' s capability In part this decision w as compelled by t he failure of the interna l resistonce the r e asons f o r whic h al'e discuss ed in lat e s e ctions and are n ot germane to the cur rent con text As for t he Agency' s capa- bility enough has alread y been said t o suggest that the operation was not so much beyond t he Agency•$ c apability as it was bey o nd the scope of acti vit ies judged to be accept ably d eniable The que$t ion tha t is h ig h l • -relevant t o the policy making process i s ho w a nd why the project was allowed t o become overt and whe n this had happened w hy i t remained the responsibility of the Agency Tha t i t did become overt in the se nse that t11ere w as extensive public discussion of the preparat ions for invasion and that the rnilit 1 ry action was widely attributed t o t h Unit ed States CoveJ'nme11t both befor e and a fter it took p lace th e r e can be no d oubt a ny myst ery as to why thi s happ ened N or is t her e It wa s q uite o ut of the question TS #181884 TCP FTC 12 r au u 11 I - 20 to i nfiltrat e men a nd arms b y sea and air for months re r u it t r a in a nd a rm a strike force of some 1800 Cuba ns t o organize the po1itical fronts firs·t the F'R O then the CRC and tun a maj ol' p ropaganda campaig n without at least reports and rumors of these activities becoming widespread Nor wer e ther e any illusi ons either in the Agency or elsewhere in the Executive B ra n ch as to the degree to which the facts were surmised a nd accepted as t rue b y journalists and other informed persons Why then would anyone con t inue t o rega xd the invol vement of the United States a s plausibly deniable and why was the undertaking not converted into an overt ope ration wlticb presumably would have become the r esponsibility of the Department of De ense The ans• ve i to the ffr st part of this questi on is that up to and thr ough the invas ion it elf t ry e o eration remained to an extraordinary degree techni cally deniable Funds were disbutsed in such a way that their U S G ove rnment origin could not be pl'oved No Agency case officer who played a n acth•o role wa s publicly r ev ealed a $ such by true name No Americans we re captured although the bodies of an America n B - 26 cl'ew were probably recovered a te r its loss on the second day of the invasion In shot't even t he best infortncd·c orre- s pondents in Miami who published wha t purported to be detailed factual rl porrs c ould substant iate them Only by quoting Cubans who thems e l ves were oftcll not w ell informed TS #181884 c mv ii f8fi @DOR_ - 21Thi s limitcci a nd purely t e chnical rna i nt c oance of d eni a bi lity wa s less important to the decis ions of tbc Executiv e B1·a nc h however than the fac t that no one in the E xe cutive B ranch w a s r eady a t any poi nt until after the defeat officially t o avow U S support this alt ernative s nev e r sex-i ously considered Ind eed E ven tlie most ib - adequa t e fi g leaf was consi det·ed mot-e respc ctably than the a bsence of any cover whatsoever Jndeed the fi nal changes i n the operational plan made in Marc h the official announcement in Apl 'il that the Unit ed States would not give suppor t t o the rebels and the cancella tion of the D-Day striJ e w ere all last minu te efforts to s hore up the p la u s i ble dcniability of a n enterp ris e for w hich Governn-iental s uppo1 t was bound to b e conclusively s ur mised even il it could not be proved These decisions wer e rnadc by the senior policy mak e1·s of the Government who wete r eading th c newspapers eve-ry day a nd knew w ell t o what d egree the proje c t had in fact become overt l'hese m en simply were n ot willing to state officially eit ie J that th United States its elf was about to m ake v -a t on Cuba o r that the U S Covernment was openly supporting a group of Cubans not even recog nized as a Goverrunent in exil e in a 1n ilitary inv siotl In the aftermath of failure t is dec i sion may h a ve s eemed a w r ong one Had the opel'ation s ucceeded reasonably quickly a ncf without too m uch b Loodshed the decision would proba bly have see med a c orrect one TOP f BBftE Y Be t hat as it rnay 'l'S #181884 Cop • ff 'fer tc ez r it was not the Agency's decision a-nd as the above ited a c tions s uggest the pressure to strengthen deniability in the last few weeks ca m e from outside the Agency a nd led to decisions •»hi ch we 'e unwelcome to the Agency To suggest as the Survey s eems t o do tha t the Agency was responsible f or this clinging to denfability is demonstrably false G Govern nle nt vs Agency Deci sions The same com ment applies in som e degree to the three othe r alleged maj or errors of judgment These have to do respectively with the t reatment of the Cuban exiles the adequacy o planning and the appraisal of the chances of success the military They have been touched upon above and are discussed at some length in Sect ion V bel ow In the context oi t he decision making process the m ost important conclusion that emerges is that whether they were wise or unwise they w ere Got•ernmental decisions i n a very r eal sense As to the handling of the Cubans this was a mat t er of the rnost intimat e consultation with the State Department especially in the two months preceding the invasion when the CRC wa s in pr oce ss of forma- tion As t o n1ilitaq• planning the r ecord clearly shows th at t here was detailed c on sultation w ith t he Joint Chiefs of Staff that the J CS considered the successive plans both formally a ncl info rmally_ and that thes e wet e the s ubje ct of review and d iscussion at the highest 'f9F 8i362lEif TS # 181884 Copy#_ _ -Z3levels of Government 'rhe chances of succe ss were a ssessed favo rably by the Joint Chiefs minus o f c ourse tl1e last minute can ellation o f the D- Day strike as well as by the Agency The- Agenc y mu st accept a si a ble s h are ol the b lame for whatever m istake s w ere made in these three are as but t O one who studies the record w itl care can a sse rt a nd no one who has d one so has as s erted that the 1·esponsibility was narrowly focused on any one of the participants in 1hc decision making process H Co uclus ions This intr oductory a nd summary section began with a r e - statement of tll e m ain allegat ions o e 1µ or m ade in the Survey and it followed with a sum mary o f the conclusions reached in this paper partly in the fo regoing· d iscussion bu t principally in t he la ter more detailed sections with re-spect to the se allegations part the allegat ions are r ej ecte d F or the most In conclud i ng this s ection it may be ust ful fix s t to list or comparison and contrast with the Sur vey • hat in the j udgment of t his paper do appea r to have b een t he s t r engths a nd weakne sses of this w d e rtaking and second to suggest some of the lesso ns t o be d r a wn therefrom 1 The list is as follows S m all boat infilt rati on a nd cxfiltration oper a t ions w e r e s -l ow t o s t a rt but by rnd large w re effective and w ell run i ' l the last thr ee months More over due t o the existence of t he lJ S E mbassy TS 18 1884 Copy H_j__ TOF lif1GRi3'f -2lin Havana dcfoccors aJ d lega l tro veL the need for illegal infiltration was compal'atively slight until Janua ry 1961 2 Partly for this reason the eifo-rt to place trained commu- nica tor s paramilitary types and other agents with esistance groups in side the lsla nd and thereby to- create a reception ca p3bility for air and maritime resupply never caught up with Castro'$ i mproving security measures This impaired the build-up not 0 1ly of guerrilla groups but oi intelligence net - It is doubtful howevel ' whether significantly more could have beon accomplished in building up an effective internal resistance particularly in v iew of the timing of the whole oper3tion and the lead tir i e involved in l ecruiti ng a nd training 3 Aside fr om these wea 1 nesses alleged defects of o rganiiation and execution had little to do witl th unsuccessful outcome In pal'ticular the limiting Iacto-r on a ir operations in support of the r e Si$tancc was not bad manageme n t but t l e li mitat ions o f the reception parties a nd competence of Cuban air crews 4 The ah' arzn shoul d have been stronger by the time o i the invasion in numbers of air c re• vs type o equipment availability o f U S bases or some combination oi' all these If relief coul d not have been obtained from any of t'he politically tnotivatcd rc$trictio ns and if a larger numbe r of c o mpetent Cuban a i c rews could not have been recruited the Agency sho1 tld on its own r esponsibility hav TS J 18 1884 Copy f _ _ XQF 878 0R8'P -zsassembled mote U S n ationality air c ew s in the hope tha t their commitment would he perm i tted in an emergeo c y 5 'rherc should h a v e been rnore pre- D--Day air strike$ a nd they s hould h av employed the full strength of the air a rm D- Day strike should Ll Ot TI1c have bee n cancelled 6 The milita t y plan was a good one except for the r e strictions on and p ossible inadequacy' o the air arm tt was p rop• erly worked out a s betw een the Agency and the J oint Staff and was a p roduct of highly com petent professional milit lry planning 7 The appraisal of the chances of success was probabl • faulty for r easons summ arized above para d page 8 8 The important decisions we rc Governmental not those of one 4 gency It was fru s trating but of little practical consequence that the dec isi on making process was at t imes cumbersome and d id not p rom ote t idiness It w as ine vitable that the whole shape of the operation was Oetel'mined a s a compromise between the c onflict ing goals of dcniability and effectivenes s L Lessons For The Fut ure What a r e the lessons fo r t he ture t o be drawn from this unhap1 y experi ence Perhaps the main one is that the U S should not support an O eratio 1 such as this involving the use of force without having a l so TS #181884 Copy H__L_ ' 8F s zett2r made the decision to use ·wha tever force is needed to achieve success 1 the political de cis ons necessary t o facilitate l he effective use of force on a n adequat e scale up to a 'ld possibly incl uding the ove rt commitme nt of U S military iorces are t oo difficult to make then t he operacion should be called oi'f unless the odds in favor of success within the politica lly imposed res tricti ons a re ver y great It is a fact of life t hat the use of forc e by the U S or any major Western nation-- the Commuuists seem to be judg ed by a differ ent s tandard in an effort t o influence the c ourse o events in anotller count r y is deepl y unpopula r with an important body of opini on Most of the damage to the political posture of the U S tha t i s done by such action occurs when the action is identified whethe r on the ba sis of e vidence or of pure s 1rmise -it h the U S Onc e this point o identifica t ion has been passed it will almost invariably be true that ultimate failure not only rnea ns l oss of the original o bj ective but further cxagge1·ation o f the political damage Ultimat e success on the other b uid is the only way par t ially t o retri e ve and offset the political dam age It is therefor e only the p art of w is dom t o reassess an u ndei-taking of thi s s ort when identification of tlle U S Government with it ha s beg H t o occur or appears imminent a ' d to determine at that time either to insure success or t o abandon it TS #181 88·1 'J 9P SBSLE 'f Copy _ _ f£9P 9 Srtl3'f - 27The foe-ling has been w ides pr ead that another maj or lesson to be learned has to do with res peel' to the d ecision making p 'ocess in the Executive Braneh In any m ajor operation involviog the actua l exercise of power b ' the U S Govct·nmenrt i s distinguished lrom the thr eat to exercise power some branch of the Government will be responsible for execution preoccupied with the achievement of success and tllerefore generally the advocate of a massive and effoctive e xercise oi power At the same time the U S will always be in pur$ui t of a variety of ess entially political objectives which v 'ltl impose a requirement to ma i ntain a certain public posture notably in the UN This requirement in tutn will imply limit ati ons on the manner in which and the scale on whic po·wer can be exercised The guardian of the public postur e whose primary respons ibility it will be to devise and support restrictions on action will typically be the Department o f Sta Ce 01· policy makers outside the action organization In such a situation there is almost bound to be a succession of ope r ational decisions that present or appeal' to the participants to pr esent major issues of polic y and since there is a n inevitabl e and in a sense legitimate conflict of int cr ests between departme11ts r flccting the confticc of objectives there will typically have to be an arbite-r who is him self neither the activist operator nor the states ma o--like guardian of the counh y•s political posture cQP 8B8RDFf TS ff J81881 Copy_ _ l'OP 6E GCU3 f - 28- Such issues are continuously brought to t op level s for resolution The result is a very human tendency on the part of the decision makel'S to decide not onl y the pol ky tters which only they can hat1 dle but also operational matteri • i n which they have little of the expertise necessary for judgment and can a rely acq uire through b ri efiogs enough depth of factual detail for a full Ulder standing Admittedly ex pert advisors c an be used but under pressure of time compounded by the unavoidable ambiguity of comrnitt ee considerations decjsions a r c often made by the poHcy m aket's without full concun·ence of tl1e exper ts b ased on an in adequate unde1·standing of the i ssues or their implications These arc of course etei na l pr oblerns o f high level d ecision making and minor changes in governmental s tructu re will not ca use them to dis appear Nor are the ' in any sens e unique to clandestine operations conducted by t his Agency Whenever sornethi ng like the Cuban s ituation arises what s eem to t - e operators to be operationa l decisio ns will in fact raise poli y issues The i ssues wi ll be real because they a rise out of a real confli ct of obj ect ives The decision m a king process could be tidier tba-n it Usu ally i s and a meticulous written r ecord would m inimize recriminations afte r the fa ct but tidiness and a good written record wi ll have little bear ing on the subs tan tive wisdom of the decisions Te P SEGttriT TS #181884 Copy I POif 800RBT - 29- themselves roether in important matters of this sort any one other th an the President himself can resolve the conflict between the reql1hen e1tts ior effectiveness of action and acceptability of the r olitical consequences t 'em ains to be sec-n Perhaps the most useful lesson about Government decisioo tnaking to be lea rned from the Cuban case is that one must be prepated for and pbilosophic al about this process A third lesson of lesser ger aerality J as to do with the covertness 01 denia bility of paramilitar ' a td other large scale operations An ope-ration can be said to be covert only so lot g as the knowledge that it is being performed ca n be restrict ed to authorized individual s This is possible if an activity can r eally be concealed e g photography o a document w ithout the knowledge that the document has been rep't oduced or if t h a t -part of t he activity vhich is obse vable by unwitting people can be made to d pcar to them to be perfect ly normal the black movement o O•dies or cargo from place to place th rough the use of false documentat ion Unfortunately a good many large projects i ncluding notably r nost paramilit ary operations -cannot be covert in this sense Journalists and other unwi tting peopl e ar almost certain to learn that sor 1ething untoward is afoot T8P 8B0t Li T he only TS #1818$4 Copy L- 1 er 3iJCltCI - 30 - aspect in which such operation$ can be kept cla dcstSne is by tuccessfutly concealing hi part playod b • the U S Oove nmcnt It is a necessary condition for the preser vatioo of such deniabilily that no unv ritt 1 n individual acquire bard evidence ol Govei-nmental participation but th is is by no means a auffici cnt condition l it comes to be w idely bellie ved even in tho absence o hard evidence that the U S Government is assisting or pa rticipahng in a n i llegal cti vity tbon a considerable part of the benefit that accrues from deniability has a lready been l ost After all the effect on public opinion d e pends on wha t is believed by th at part of the public with which the policy makers are for the motncnt concerned There may at ill remain however a benefit to be derived from deniability alter the public has decided that the deniala are fals e becituse the Government can Atl11 maintain 3 forrnall ' correct11 poature The Soviets frequently der •e advantage from '1 this limited o f icial den i ability A s a rule however the advantage• that accrue to a Western Covernment with a lively nnd at least partly hostilo p ress and with statesmen who s lr ink from the utterances or Oat untruths are limited •rore seel E - TS 1181884 Copy_ _ 'QR SEGRDi - 3-1 - The lesson s 1ggcsted by these 1·emarks is t1 at i n future clandestine operations of any size it behooves all concerned to assess realist i cally the degree to which tb e operation is and i s likely to t'emain clandestine If the very scal e of the activities makes it i mpossible to conceal them can they be mad e to appeal' to suspicious journalist s and others t o be pe d ectly normal If it is becoming apparent that something newswot thy is goi ng on can suspicion of Gover nment involvetn ent be kept to an acceptably low key Or is the only· option that r emains open that 0£ fb·m repeated public official disclaimer 0£ a responsibility which will generally be a U ributed eo the Gove1·nment a nyv •ay A cot-olla ry i s that the advantages oi whatever degree 0£ deniabi llty tha t rema i ns leasible shoul d not be overestimated With hindsi ght the U S did not buy ve r y much politi al advantage with all tll e restraints imposed on air activity in the Cuba _ operation Aad it been decided e ve n ten d ays before t he in vasion that r e sponsibility £01· the ope1·ati oo would be unanimously attri buted t o Ol e U S and that only official de-r iability c ould be preserved c onsider ation might have been · gi ven to recognizing the Cuban Rcvolutiona1· y Council as a go·vel'nment in exile a nd a llowing it to make as many and a s powerful TS Dl8l884 TOJ SE'ii B'f Copy i _ T81 szc2a1 -32 - air strik s as it could Anothe1· possibility might have been to use U S a it'Cl 'a ft fol a night strike action at the tim e No one proposed either com·se ol T hey are m-encioncd here as theoret ical poss ibilities only to illustrate the kind of c onclusion that might have flowed -rom a more l 'ealistic assessm nt of the achievable degree of covertness and of the benefits to be obtained by maintai1 ing only that limited deg1·ee of covcrtnc ss The te may be a fo urth l esson to be drawn with respec t to the assessment of the chances of success of any inherently risky oper ation As stated above a concl usion of this pa per is that the assessment m ay have been faulty Gen eJ ally this has been attributed both in t he Sm·vey a nd elsewher e to the c i rcumstance that those responsible for c onducting the operation w ere doing t e appraising and exhibi ted a predictable bias But this diagnosis ignores ·t H role oi the JCS who were dir ected by the Presid ent to review the p rospects for the operation prhtcipally so that there would be an independent a nd professionally c ompetent j t dgrnent It is also true that in j udging the temper of the Cuba n people principal reliance w as p laced on a National Estimate Ne vertheless i t is probably t rue that the views TS #181864 '--TOD €Ei9 RB'f Copy _ _ 'f'eH seenzr or men deeply invo lved in tho oper i tion r eceived loo much weigh in the a s scssment of the probable outcome though it is far £-rom clear where and how additior al skeptic• could have been introduced into the proce ss of judgment without sim 1 ly adding to t ho confusion Tho only clear lesion is that policy makers should not make mistakes which is scarcely helpful F inally there arc va rious lessons to be drawn with respect to Agency organization procedures and Yesourcc• No attempt will be made here to elaborate them pa rtly because to do ao would req_uire rather detailed exposition and partly because thc•c a re not among the really importnnt lessons lt must be ·r epeated still a gain tht t errors of cxec ut ion did not have much to do with the f ailur e and it must be emphasized that v •ays were fou 'ld of bringing to bear on the conduct of the operation professional t alent of a high order especially in the military ield 1'h6 m ist a es wore mainly those of judgment which a dilforent o-raanh acion would not have forestalled ron crcawr I 'S #181884 Copy_ _ ' zJi'QF 80 6ft13Ef 11 T HE SURVE Y 'S STATEME NTS OF THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT The Surve • q 1 1 ite accur He ly refers to c ha n ges in the military p lan which occurred on a number o f occasions prior to the adoption of the final plan i e the Zap- · ta pl an 1 'h c inal plan howeve r is the only one here c onside red except that earli er p la1 s w ill be discussed to the extent that they a r c relevant to it As desc 'i bed by the Su rvey the attack involved about 1500 comba ttrained and heavily a rmed soldi ers i n a n ovett ·as sau lt-type amphibious l C ng page 46 par a 4 o n c e rtain e i ches on the Zapata Peninsula on the south coast of Cuba The troops had been moved by air on th r ce successiv e i hts from a Guatemalan t a • bg camp to the staging area in Ni ca Tag ua where foey embarked- 1 ships which h ad been pre- loaded at New Orlean s T h e s hips had -- ovc ·1 on separa te cour ses from Nicaragu a unde r uno b t1·0$ive Navy escort to the rendezvous 40 miles offshor e in ordel· to avoid the 19pearance of a convoy From there th·c · 1a J moved in olumn u nder cover o f d arkness to a point 50 00 ya · d s fro n the landing area where they met the Navy LSD T hese comp lica t e d movements were appar cntl ' accomplished in a secure l' lanner and wi thout aler ting the enemy P ge Z9 p ara 87 The intenti on was to s ize a co astal strip bout 40 miles long separated TOP SECRJe T TS #l8L884 Copy_J__ TOP Bf16 lEY - 2 - from the interior by m irnpassa ble swamp penetrated Onl • by three roads from the north and flanked by a coastal road from the ea st '' Page 30 pa a 89 The landing which occurred during the night stantially unopposed o A pril 16-l was sub- In addition sho rtly after daylight an airborne infantry company was successfully parachuted from C - 46 ai rcrait to four o the five s cheduled drop zoncG where ite elements were given the mission of sealing off approach roads Page lO pa r- 91 Afr s ppo rt prior to the landi ng was given by raids by eight B z6 1s on three Cuban ah-field s on 15 April and destl'UCtion of half of Castro 's a i r fo rce was estimated on the basis of good post- strike photogra µhy Page 27 para 81 Air 3trikes planned for da wn on 17 April i n order to knock ou t the rest of the Cuban air force v e re 11c i lled o • late on 16 April Page 28 para 83 Early moT ni· enemt ah- attacks o n 17 April res llted in sinking a supply s hip a l beaching a transport as wcll as damage to an LCI Page 30 p ua 92 Ground a ttacks by Cuban militia occurred duri ng the day oi 17 April While arrununition lasted these a tt '°t cl s were beaten off with hea ' ' enem y casualties and several of Castro's tanks were halted or destroyed by g round or friendly air action On the mor of 18 April the Red Bea ch Force nearly out of am munition retired in good orcl -r to l 01 J tCHD'f 'l'S #181881 Copy_ _ _ TSF ClCZi - 3 - Blue Beach wiLl-iout being pres8ed by the evening l age 3L par a 94 Adequate resupply whetl1er br sea or air became increasingly d Hfi cu lt and finally impossible due to e 1 emy ai r action page 31 para 96 with the inevitable collapse resulting The Survey reicrx ing to air aupport attempted for the Brigade on I $ and 19 April ln spite of th is air action how vcr and in s pite of a reported 1800 sualties aufiered by the Castro forces the 1 B rigadc s ability to resist depended in the last resol't on resupply o ammunition which had now become impossible 11 Pag e 32 para 98 @B No ment vn has been m 1de o f a separate landing planned for a ta point 30 mile s east o G ant anamo n z Nino Diaz who had a following in Oriente Province was to land w ith 170 men with the idea of star ting a fairly large scale diversion by drawing to him his followers and the resistance k nown to exist in Ol iente Although the Diaz g roup put to sea and reached i ts Cuban landing a rea s chedule it nevel' in act landed O due to a number 0£ factors b e yond U S control Since the gtoup played no role no further discussion s-e ems warranted JNa By letter dated 22 April 1961 the President chat ged General Ma xwell D T aylor wit h t he responsibility of inves tigating among other thL' lgs the Cuban operation and of 1·eporti ng the lea son s t-O be learned therefrom Gene ral Taylor in associ 1 tion with Attorney Genet- al Kennedy Admiral Burke and Mr Allen Dulles known as the Cuba n 'FOP 8EGRBT TS #181884 TSP sse o·r • 4 • St1Jdy Group immediate ly held c01 tln l OUS hearing s receiving testimony from all possible informed w1lnc• •c s including a number of individuals who ha d been on the Zapata beoc lthead Gener Taylor filed no written repor t but g ave the P r e s i dent a a l •tteri m oral repor t o n 16 M a y 1961 and wrote t he P r csidenton 13 June l96l that he waa ready to make report orally which he did thereafter by fo J1· h i1 final The oral reports wcT e 1upportcd m emoTanda whic h are here ref e r red to a• they pl 'ovidc a ar mor e compl e te review or a ll a s p ect of tl e military portion of the opcratlon than elven above or in the Sul'vey Bric references to certain or thcac memoranda arc ma de he rea iter eF Sf SfU3 11 T S # 181884 Cop y _ _ _ • · TCP 0 Bettz 1 W WHY A l I I UTARY -TYPE INVASlON The answer i s based on a numb r of factors Ffrst it becam e cltar throu h the summer of 1960 that Castro was more firmly settled afl Chief of Sta ce than ad oT igl n Lly been hoped M oreo ver it became apparent that he was receivini and would continue to receive eignificant suppor t from the Soviet Bloc including the Chinese econonticaJJy in military m teriel and in much needed adviaers 1 c g • military intel l l security poaitive inteJUgence and communications to oa mc the main iclds Thus it was recognh ed that it was becoming more and more difficult to oTgani c and maintain internaJ opposition and moreover lt was daily becoming mo ·e apparent that forceful evidence o outside 1uppor1 was needed to c a use the internal opposition to show ite hand Ou1·ing the summ e 1· and fall of 1960 some guer 'i lla resistance continued in the Escambray Mountains and in some o the provinces Although poorly fed o nd c quippod this r esistance was respec t ed by the l-i ilitia which deapiie vast superiorities in number would not engage the resistance iri direct combat Rather the militia surrounded resistance pockets staying on the ma in roads away Crom the hills kept food a nd aupplics out o rcsisiance area a and captu ed the auerrillas when they came out of che hills singly pr ln small m 1mbe s acckirlg ood or other 3-id Nevertheless until the morale o the mi htla could TOP 6i3 Ott£ I TS #181884 Copy _ _ roe cceatl - z be s en it seemed clear lhM due t0 its vast cuperiorit y In numbers it could continue o t least -to contain the resi stance Moreover it became evident through the fall and early w inter that the outside force to be successlu l needed to be self--aust i ning s iitce small bands or elem ents would due to nu merica l inferiority in all likelihood be cu t o f surrounded and overwhelmed or rendered harmless by the olilltia ln addition dUHcultict o supplying the opposition soon bee a me apparent Air drops were rarely succcstful whJch is not an unusual operational cxpe riencc Under mu ch simpler conditions approximately the first 12 or 13 drops in support o1 Castillo Arma s were wholly unsuccessful in Guatemo la l'hereafl-er •Hght improvement occurred but mainly due to th e fa ct that the drops were m3de in daylight and directed to terrain held by the inva dei a who were in open confJict and not in h ldlng Even in France during WW ll a t 3 ttmc when experienced pilot were dropping to experienced recep tion committees in vastly more a• · ra ble terrain than available in most of the attempted Cuban d rops the rule of thumb was that only 50% auccess should b e expected At any rate the lo ck of succeoo by ah and the difficulty o distributing with in Cuba th e substantial ap ount of materiel landed by boat plua of cou rsc the r tlrictions imposed by the const antly increasing and impro ving internal $CCurity made it clear that no internal -r_esist ancc buildup could achieve a dequate size to elin'rinato PBP SCP S'J' TS I 181884 eopyL TOP 66©R 8'1 - 3 - the regime w-1thouL subst 1ntial outside support Ai ea rly aa November thcr-clore lhc Government decided lo continue to aid the internal rcsisto nce as tnuch as 1 ossible bul to beg1n to plan or the iot roductioo into Cuba o a tl'aincd force from the out side Unquestionably Castillo Armas in Guatemala was an analogy and precedent Over the period lrom November until April the postibilit · - indeed the prob3bility of a m ilHary type i wasion was continuously a gcnernlly approved pa t' t of the concept In addition by common car sent of all involved the 1it c of the Brigade was increased bit by bit tultil the rinal 1500 total wa s reached Page 6S para 54 There was no magic ln any p 3 rti cular number Nevertheless £actors such as ea tures and size of lcrrain t o be attacked desired ire power a nd logistics were care ully weighed by officers experienced in auerrilla rnd spccio l force tictions wit h the result th IJ a minimum basic force of 750 was decided ln December l960 to be the proper -aiz-e for the requirements Ther ca fteT 1hc increase was undertaken to pTovidc extta st rcngth on the simple- theory that as long a s Oc-xihil ity was retained more men nd guns would inevitably he usc£ul Although the decisions involving size and use of the Sri ad were in general based on its em1 loyrnent as a single fo r ce tho pose tbi lit y of piccemc al use through inlillratio ia n sm31l group was seriously b diec Obvious political ttdvanto 4e$ would ha vc b len gained with such use ruhcl' than the larger invasion•• type landing Nevertheless the considered T S N18 l884 C py 'FOP cc ca rep - 4 - military jud mtnt i e or both Agency and JCS •ta £ f and military officer• waa that oma 11 groups would not be able to prevent the Jai-gc number• o f militia from e ither isolaLi ng ox gro dually eliminating them Moreover it w • elt that the stat e 0£ the in ter-nal oppo$Hion was such lha t they would not respond aggressively to the undrarruttic and at be-st slow impact o email bands ol tkie eor L Coneoquently such a plan could only re1ult in i watti ng of a11ets a nd a la ilure to u1c effectively t he trained m3 npowcr o the Bl iga de The military- typ e concept ol introducing the entire Brigade i nto Cuba a s a el nglc fo7ce thcre o1'e emerged as the m oat lca slble po115bHity - rer saeft E'l - TS 6181884 Copy_i__ t -• - -- TOP SECRET JV THE DECISION MAKING P ROCESS In order to pla ce the Agency •• role in the proper perspective and lO i ndicate the general pa rtidpa tion of the Execu ti ve Department it is essential to examine the planninu process that w•s involved The Survey h highly critical o this a s pect but it should be noted Uiat the Survey is particularly incomplete in the di s cussions of dcci aion-makin g and planning Regarding th e planning proc css for example the Survey comments that in January 1961 the Agency w as driving o-rward without knowing precisely where il was going P gc para 13 What is m eant is uncle a - partieul rly as in the no xt para graph the Survey sta tc1 11 At this meeting 2 8 January 1961 there wa s a presentation la gely o r al o the status or the ope 'ation and President Kcr J edy approved their continuation Page SO para 14 In the same connection the Survey states that a t fhe end of Novembel' 1960 the Agency p resented a revi eed p lan to President £iscnhown and his advisor• and President Ebenhower orally directed the Aaency to go ahead with its prepara tiol l with all speed 11 Page 48 para 8 Some direct ion therdo1· c 1 was visibl e lo two President• even though no definltive decisions w ere made until the very last minute The act however thf l the Survey could make suc h a statement and a the ea me time foclude only the ba rcst facts suggeau a lack ol understanding of the decision-making process TS Nl8J884 1'OP Bf 0fW5$ Copy_ _ e or srcssx i The-Spcc i a l Group prior to 20 January 1961 Messrs Dulles Gray Herlcr until appoi1llcd Secret ry then Mer ch•nt Dough s w ith Irv -irt sitting lot him On o ccasion reviewed the entire sit 1 -tion on numerou11 o ccasions and considered special issues on others Cuban discusslon in the Speciaf' Group star ted in 19 59 w he n c oncerns about the po litical situation and the undcsil·ability o Caauo were aired Covert a cti one e g ra dio bro dca s ti ng economic actions possibl e s aboto ge wcro discu1ced a t 1evera l m eeting• in January February and M arch 960 inc l uding the cxa-m inati on of a detailed 11Gencra l Covert Action Plan or Cuba 11 on U March 1960 Th is plan was approved by the Spocil l Group then partially -rew ritten and lnally approved by Pr esident Eiacnhower on 17 March 1960 Page 4-6 J ara 3 and the Su1 vey 1s Annex A Between mid-March nd ZO J u11lary 1961 the Special Gr UJ had discussions of Cuba o t 37 m eeting s of which a t least 8 to 10 in the period du ring and following November 1960 w ere detailed diacussion1 Go rdon G ray a s th e Preside nt's r epresentat i vc on the Special G r oup r eported to the President r cplarly on su ch Specia l Croup activities Moreover at a general briefing o n the p r oject a t the Special Group meeting of 8 December 1960 A s sistant Secretary Man o and Mr J61eph Scotto State also attended a11 did G eneral Lansdale from Defense ln addition C WH r egular ly h e ld wee kly meetings w ith 1he A sstS'ta nt Secretary of State at which Cuba was often diacuased liaison with M r Scott' oUice 'POP aoeft• s TS # 181884 Copy_L fOi JESPGT 3 in State by A DDP A and otl ers was almost on a daily basis on Cuba alone a nd members of WH 4 also had subst a ntiallt daily contact on Cuba with Genera l E r skine 's oflice in D efense General Lansdale tlie Deputy regardin g Dclense support and details of the preparation for the pos s ible ''invasion_'' President Efaenhower i n additi on to the 29 Novemtrc r 1960 m eeting re fe1 'l'Cd to i n the Survey held a further detailed meeting o n 3 J anuary 1961 so that wi1h these p lus the repor t s whic h he receive d from Mr Cray and others he was personally familiar with the- s ta rus of the p r oject at the ti ne he l eft office Also as the r esult of a n unders tanding finn worked out wi th General Bonesteel oI the JCS and lat e r adopted by the S ecretar · of St a te the Secr ct ar ' of Defense a nd the DCI a Task Force or con·unitt ee was created cha i red by Ambassador Willauer with representativ es of State Assistant Secretary Mann and h is d eputy Mr Coerr JCS General Gray and o ther m ilitary mem bers of his st3f and CIA A DDP A and C VH 4 Ol' when absent his de puty Later William Bundy of Ass i stant S ecretary of Defens e N i t ze 's office j oined the Task Force The T ask Force was responsible for e xamining the project with a view to d etermi •·l ing what actions shou ld be c onsiderefl whi ch were either not covered by existing p la ns or iecessary to su1 port existing plans Ambassador 1 ViUa uer repor t c d to the Special Group at its rneeti ngs o 12 and 19 J anuar • 19 61 - fJ 90 SECR 6$ TS #181884 CQpy POP 8BOttz I -4The work o lhiS Task Force re suited in the creation of a special JCS team headed by General Gray discus6ed b low to review military plann»lg and a committee to keep t r ack of non -mili tary· aspecte of planning consisting of Defense General O ray State Mr Braddock· la st Charge in Havana p rior to the break LY'l r elations and CIA A DDP A This latter com mittcc n1 et regularly from about mid-Febru3r y and prepared a list of tasks to be discharged by the Agency and each Department ' his pa per wat approved by the Secretary of State Secretary of De ense and the DCI and was used as a check list 1s a ttached as Annex A A copy As noted i t contained no reCer ence to the m ilitary or •B rigade action The new Ad ministration wa6 br ought into the picture as soon aG possible P resident K ennedy wiis given a general briefing by the DCI a nd the DD Pon 18 Novem ber 1960 and Secretary of Sta te Rusk was briefed by the DCI prior to inaug uration on 17 J anuary 1961 a gain briefed 01 Rusk was 2 2 January by t'he DCJ and the DD Pin a group induding the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General Thereafter the re were a number o f meetings with the President at which the Secretary of St ate Secretary of Defen8e the Chairman of the JCS the Attor ey General the DCI were present In addition Messrs McGeorge Bundy a nd Seh lcsingcr from the White House Sta B erle and Mann fro m State Nit e nd William Bundy from Defense 1'QP 8£ Oft 'f TS R 181884 Copy_ __ I JEOi i -5General Gray from the J CS and the DD P were p resent Sitch meetings were held on 28 January 17 Februa ry 11 March 14 March smaller mc ting LS March 4 April l2 A pril Special communications regarding action under the Plan we re al So held wi the President on 14 and 16 April vi a McGeorge Bundy and the Secretary of State I n addition to the foregoing the President on 7 Marcll met with the Ambassador from Guatemala t the U S and the Ambassador's brother 1 a special emissary from President Ydigoras who presented President Ydigoras • views Numerous meetings also w ere held with Messrs McGee Bundy Berle and Mann and Mr Berle m et with M iro Cardona resident o the Cuban R evolutionary Council Also in the secald week in April due to attacks in the UN by F oreign Minister Roa of Cuba and stories in the press mainly the New York Times a substa ntia l amount of time had to be ispent with the S tate Department preparing m ate rial for use by the USUN del egation including a briefing of Ambassador Stevenson It i s fair to say therefore that the senior m cml e rs of the Administration were persona Hy and i nti rhatel y familiar w ith the status o f the pro ject and the issues a nd problems involved 1'9P fJi'CPli T TS #181884 Copy-'- _ _ -6 On Lh milit ary side General Lemnitzer wit h the a pproval oi the Secretary of Defense design3tcd G coeral G ray of Ute JCS oo 4 January 1961 as the chief military l iaison for the project General Gray the i ea fter became c losely associated with the militaq· planning From 31 J anuary to 6 February a complete detailed r e iew of the operations plan wa s m ade by Ge ne ral Cray ar d a tea m of officers Thi6 involved a thoroug h briefing by Esterline Chie£ WH 4 t nd Colonel Hawkins Cltle WH 4 PM a nd officers oi their staffs plus everal d ays of study by the JCS team T he Trinid a d p lan was the one l'eviewed on lhi s occa s ion Dur ing the review a memorandum was prepared by the team 3 pproved by the JCS and sent to the Secretary of Defens e JCS Memo S - 61 0£ 3 February 1961 1 to Secr etary of Defense Subject Mi litary £valuation of the CIA Pa ra-Military Plan Cuba Th is memorandu1n rea ched a f avorable a ssessment o f the p lan lt stated however that it was unable to evaluate the combat capabi li ties of the Cuban Brigade and A ir Force except on the testimony 0£ othei·s s ince the Team had not seen these themselves As a resul t a team of 3 officers a Special Forces Colon el a Marine Colonel and an A i r For-ce Colonel were selected by General Gra y rom among the officers briefed and s ent to C u at e ma la from 2S t 1 -rough 2 7 f 'eb ruar y to exam in e the air and ground f rces per 8onally A s u bsequent report to the S ecre ry of D efense confirmed their finding that the forces w e r e capable JCS Memo 146- 61 of 10 Ma rch 1961 to Secr etar y of D efense Sllbj ect E valu t i on of CIA Cuban T S d 181884 q ep BE G fuCT Copy 'T'Q£ i G 'r -7Volunteer Task Force This latter report rccom rncndcd that an in Gtructo - expe r-ienced in operational logiStics 11 be aS$igned to the training unit 11 immediately or the final phaae o f t r ai ning A Marine Colonel with these qualifications was so assigned Th ere after General Gray and his team were intimatc ly connected w ith aU p lans and moves of Col mel Hawkins' PM Section In f act it woul d 1 ot be inaccurate to say that CcneraJ Gray and his tean'i w e re the equivalent o a full partner o the Agency in thi s phase from mid-February 1961 until 17 April This did not of course aaect the primary CIA respon sibility During this period General Cray briefed General L emnitzer at freque•1t intervals and also b riefed tlle J CS at forrna l JCS meetings V hen DD P headquarters elements went on 2 4-hour duty on 13 April l96l General Gray's staff did likewise and assi gned a lull time liai son oUicer lo sit with Colonel Hawkins I sccti on in order to be a bl e to brief General Gra·t full·t ea ch day Gec eral G ray in tllrn briefed Genera I Lcmnit zer The Trinidad Plan was alw ays tlte plan prcferi·ed by the military i e the JCS Gener al Gray and Colonel Hawkins and his sea££ It wa s· however considered unacceptable in cerWn aspects for political reasons· so that on or about 11 March 1961 President Kennedy decided chat it should not he executed A further study of the e Ltir c Cuban shore line was them conducted by CIA miinly WH 4 from 13 throug 15 March As indicated i n th e Survey this study r esulted in a shift from Trinidad to Zapata ' TOP SFCSFT Two alternate concepte TS #181884 Copy I 'F8P SBSM I -8w e r e sketched out bu t the Zapata area concept was the only one wh ich met the political requirements and provided a re asonable cha nce of success 1'his concept was fully d escr ibed to General Gray and his team and pass ed on by the JCS as the best a lte rnatc to the Trin idad p1a n JCS Memo 166-61 of 15 Mar ch 1961 to Secr etary of Defens c Subject E valu ation of M ili tary Aspects of Alternate Concepts o f CIA Para- Military P lan Cuba The cov ering memorandum from General Lemnit er as Chairman of the JCS sta tes in part 11 3 The conclusions of the evaluation of the m ilitary aGpe cts of the three a lternative co ncepts are as follows c Alternativ e ill substantially t e final Zapata P lan 11has all the prerequisites neceasa ry to successfully establis h the C uban Volu-tttar y Task Force including air elements in the objective area and sustain i tseU wi th outside log i$tiC suppor t for several ·w eeks however inaccessibility of the area rna y limit the support fr om t he Cuban p opulace 4 It is rec ommended that a the Secretary of Defense suppor t the views of the J oint Chiefs o Staff as cxp r•c ssed in tbe above con clusions Afte r 15 Mar ch the JCS r eviewed the Zap ata plan a s a body four t iln es 'the fina l pl an was r cvicwcd by individual Chiefs since it w aa only -lCI SEC t ST TS ii 18l884 Copy_ _ _ 1'0 ll l GP Iii -9 presented to the JCS on 15 AJ ril which w3s too late for it5 review by the JCS • a body Tbe only re crence i n the Survey to JCS partidpation tates that 11 m mber1 o the JCS ha e nt atcd in the course of an other inquiry l that the final plan was prcaented to them only orally which prevented normal staffing Z that they regarded the operation a s being solely CIA 's with the military cl LlCd in to urnish various typca of support and the c bie £ interest o the JCS being to see to it that every kind of support requc1ted was furni hed 3 that they went on the aasu rnption that lull air support would be urnhbed and control of the air secured i nd on the Agency's ast ura ncoa that a 1reat number of inaui-g mts would immediately join forces with the invasion force• and 4 tha t in the event the battle went against 1 hcm the Brigade w ould a t once 'go guerrilla I and t 3ke to the hi Us Nel1her the member of the JCS nor the other 11 inquiry a e identified nor is there ny citation suppo1·ting the alleged tear imon y · Being u nable there ore to loeat the full text rom which the quotation was taken il is not possible to o nal yz c or clarUy the points ma de Pre- tumably th e inq uuy refeTred to was that conducted by General Taylor although no verbatim minutes were kept report o At least no transcript or full these hearings is avail able 1 0 the wdtcr In response therefore it can only e repeated that the JCS a• indicated did review the Zapata T9t 80Gfl Br TS #181884 Copy_ '---- 11 'J •D SE¢PF't -1 0 - pl an and onti nued to be closely associate cl through their r epr esentatives and b iefiogs with all actions ta'ken thereon It is quite clear from the f our memoranda supporting General T aylo r 's oral eport mentioned above that the Cuban Study Group con - sidered t he operation to be one by the Uni ted States not by the Agency e ven thoug l he AgenC ' was the Executive Agent Memora ndum No Z entitled ''lmrne iate Causes o Failure oI Operation Zapa ta0 says on this point 'l'he Executive B'ranch of the Gover nment was not organizationally prepa1·ed to cope 'Wi th this kind of £_a r ami itary operation There wa s no single a lthority shor t of the President capabl e of coordinating the act ions of CI A S tc Defens ind VSr A Memorandum No Z Para H page 4 As fa r as the concu rrenc e of the JCS is conce rned Menlo-ra ndum No 3 1 entitled 1' Conclusions of the Cuban Study Group concluded 1'hc J oint Chie£s of Sta had the im portant r esponsibility of examining into the history of the opet 'ation By acquiesdng in the Zapata p lan they gave the imp r ession to others of approving i t Memorandum No 3 pai a 1 h page 3 q gp CiB SRDif 1'S H 8188 Copy_L_ I o· • I -' - I I •g iI o I X I • IV - A nnex A xon ssc -'J 23 Match I 961 EYES ONL Y MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Director of C ntral Intelli gence Agenc y SUBJECT Tasks Para-Military Plan C uba 1 l'he Working Gro uy assign ed t o work out the detailed tasks for the p lanning a nd conduct of the CIA Para-Milit ary P lan Cuba and ac t as members of a Ccntral Office for the ope r ation has a greed upon the tasks to be accomplis hed by the representatives of your reepective d epa tmente and a g·c ncy The tasks are set forth £ or thr ee pha$es P rc-D-Day Phase- D-Day i nd Post-D-Da y Phase unt il Recognit ion and Post-Recognition Phase z The tasks fo r the P r e-D-Da y Phase are set forth in £ nclosur e A hereto ' 3 T he tasks fo r the 0-Day and P ost- D- Day Phase until Recogl ition ar set fortl in• Enclosure B h ereto 4 T he t asks for t he Post Recog nition Phase are set forth in E nclosure C hereto s 'l'be p ropose d t i me scbedu le for the Pre- 0 - Day Phase i s attached 1 as Enclosure O her et o Department o State Repreeentati vc Department of Defense Represent a ti ve CIA Represent ative Atts Enc ls A-D a s stated TtaP 0nen e1 TS 18 1884 Copy# ENCLOSURE A PRi -0-DAY PHASE L Departmen t of State r e p resentatives will a Prepare White Paper for Presidential approval b Provide assietance to Mr Schlesinger in preparation of matel 'i a l for Presidential statements c Provide Working Group with Policy Statement as to wha t 11 recognition 11 really rnea ns d De te rminc action if any to be taken regarding discl osu1·e$ to t atin Amexica n count des - e g • 1 Guatem ala Z Nicaragua a ad othe r countries e g e I United Kingdom l ran e Provide policy guidance fot · a U aspects of the developm e nt of the Free Cuba Covernment £ Pr epare pla 1 s for overt moral and ot her possible nontnilitaq• support prio ' to recognition ol the Free Cuba Goverrunent of the objectives of the Cuban Volunteer Force and o the Revolutionary Council including possi ble act ion in the United Nations o r in the Organiz tion of American States g P r epare plan s or o vert moral and other possible nonmilitary support of the objecttve oft he Free Cuba Government when established h Provide policy guidance to USIA to support thi s plan i Prepare plans for Post-D- ay actions P9F CE€PE1 TS #181884 Copy# I SLCHEr - zZ Enclosure A Department o1 Dcfom sc repr escnta tives will a Continue to provide traini 'l g and logistic support to the Cuban Volunteer Force as requested by CI A b Prepare logistics plans for arms ammunition and equipment support beyond the capa bilit ies of the initial CIA logistics oupport c Prepare plans for pi·ovision of support from opera tion 1 l forces a s 1·equired d Prepare letter of instruction to the Services CINC LANT a nd GONAD for su1 port of this operation e 3 Keep·CJNC LANT planners informed Cl A representati ves v 'l 11 a Establish a Central Office from which· Execu_tive Department and Agency repi-esenta tives will coordinate planning and conduct oper ations b tequired c Continue to supply guerrilla force s iu C lba as feas ible and Assist in t he organization of a f'ree Cuba Government d Conduct an in terrogation of two or three metnbers of the Cuban Volunteer Force to determine full eA-tent of their knowledge of actual facts and provide in for mation to the President as soon as possible e Finalize eta iled pla 'ls for the employment of the Volunteer Fotce in Cuba and follow up pla ns Execute these plans on order f Continue to recruit train and equip the Cuban Volunteer F'ol'ce- g Prepare detailed plans fol establishing contact with the· inte rnal opposition establishin g such control coordination and suppor t of this opposition as ma y be desirable and feasible h Exert effort to arrang defe ction of key Cuban personnel N B The dcfoction of the m i litary commander of the Is le of P i nes or at least offic e1·s who could control the ls'le would be particularly desirabl e o 'FOP 980ftBT TS 6181834 Copy N I if9P 6S8itEf - - Enclosure A i Continue detailed intelligen ce collection on Castro a ctivities throughout Latin America particularly bis efiorts t o export revolution j Support the preparation of a Wh i te paper to be iss ied by the Free Cuba Govetl ment k Review cover plans 1 Coordinate with DOD repr 'entatives logistic follow- up support requirements m Revie w and implemen t a pr c-0 - Day psycholog ical warfare plan n Review Psychological Warfare P lan for D-Day and Po D-Day o Intensi£y• UW activities in Cuba p P -epare contingency plan for the dispoai tion iI necessary of the Pba s e Cuban Volunteer Force q P epare final briefing on e ntire operation I eF 8B'ei1Ei' TS #181884 Copy If I or-eoeRzt ENCLOSURls B 0-DAY AND POST -D-DAY PHASE UNTIL RECOGNJT ION 1 Oepar t med of Stat e rep resentati ves w ill a in Cuba Take such steps a s rnay be easibl e for the protection of U $ citizens b Execute p lans for sup port of the Revolutionary Council or Free Cuba Oovernment in Ule United Nation S or Organization 0£ Arnerican Sta tes and to count er communist and or Castr o charg es in the United Nations or Org-anization of Americ an States a s appr opriate c L-end support to the objectives and actions of the Cuban Volunteer For ce and the Free Cuba Gove rnme nt 2 d Revise plans a s necessary fo r s upport o f the Free Cuba Governm ent e Recognize F'ree C lba Government as appropriate Qepartment of Defense r ept'esentatives w ill a P rovide follow-up logistic suppol't as requested by CIA and or in acco rdance with logistics plan b Provide support fr o m operational fo rces as directed c Prepa-r e detailed plans to support the U $ a id plan fo r the Free Cuba Government for impl ementation when overt suppor t is giv e n d 3 Coordino te suppo rt b y DOD agenci e s and commands CIA represent atives will a Execute and support over-all paramilitary plan b Inform DOD r e present atives of logistics r equirements c Contin ue execution of psycliolog ical t• ar iare plan d Be-·responsible for tbe continuous operat ion of the Central Office and pr esent b riefings of tbe situat ion as required or directed I 01 JECK£ TS #LSI 884 Copy # I xor SiB ezcer - 2 - Enclosure B e Intr oduc r eprc6cnt ati v s of the Revolutionary Cour cil and of the Fre e C uba Gover me nt into Cubil at an appropriate ti me JFeF 6LCRE I TS #181884 Copy N 1 QP 60 6Ri3 f -- ENCLOSURE C POST RECOGNITION PHASE The Departments and the Agency wi ll prepare coo rdinate and execute as appropriate euch contingency p lans as may be requir ed and will moreover plan fo r the resumption of theh· regularly aseigned functions in r elation to the new Cuban government -40 SE0FET TS Hl81884 Copy# a OP SBOftLl ENCLOSURE D TIME SCHEDULE D-14 a Oepat tme nt of Sta te Represent tive s l Complete White Pa per for Presidentia l approval Z Provide policy guidance for all aspects of the Free Cuba ' iovernment continuous b Department ol Defense Repr csen at ives l C ontinue to provide t ra ining and logietic suppor t to the Cuban folunteer For ce as requested by CIA c CIA Representatives I Establish a Central O fice 2 Continue t o supply guerrilla forces in C uba as fea s ible and equired continuous 3 Assist in organization o f F ·ree Cuba Government 4 Continue to train ar d equip the Cuban Volunteer Force S Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-u p upport requirement-s cont inuous 6 Intensify UW activities in Cuba D - 11 a 'Department of State Repr esentatives 1 Provide assistance to Mr Schlesinger in preparation of material for Presidential statements continuous Z Complete plane for overt moral and other poesibfo non -r rilitary suppor t o f the objectives of the Free Cuba Government whe n established TS P 181881 I Cl SECRLJ Copy# • r eP crcssg - z3 E nclosur e D D- 1 0 a DOD Rep resentative s l Com plete let t er of instruction to th e Servi c e s CINCLANT a nd CONP D fo r support o f this operati on 4 D- 9 a D epar t ment of State Represent 3t ive 1 P rovide Working Group w ith Policy St tte ment as to what rec og nition r eally means 2 Have appr o ved policy position regarding act ion if a ny to be taken regarding dis closu res to foreign countries 3 Complete plans for overt moral a nd othel' p os s i ble nomnilit ary s u pport prior t o recognition of t h e Free C lba Gove rnment of the objec t i ves o f th e Cuban VoLuntee r Force a nd of t he Revolut iona l'y Council etc 4 b · ppi R epresent a t ives L c C omplete plans fo r Post - D- Day a ctions Compl ete logistics pla ns fo r DOD follow- u p s up port C IA Rep T-es'enta tives l i 1- ina li e d et3 iled pl ans ot t he emplo yme n t o f the Cuban V o h 1 ot e er F' orce 2 Co p l e t e c eta ile i pl ans for c stao li shing c o n t a c t w ith the i nte rnal opposition 3 nd fo r e sta blishin g such ont ol coor Oiuatiou an d s upport of this opposition a s -nay be d esirable and fe a sibl e 3 Initia te e Cor t to a rra nge defe c tion o f k ey C u b a l p ei s onncl 4 Co nple e re v'iew and l m plem e1 t Warfa re P hm f o r D-Day a nd post-D Day p h -s e a l'e- D- Da y p s ychol ogical TS Hl 61884 C op y # I xor oectczsr • 3• EncloGurc 0 S Complete r eview of P sychological Warfare P lan for 0-Day and po t- D - Day phaee 5 D-8 a CIA Represent ative 1 Complete support of a white paper to be i11ued by the Free Cuba Government and a rrange to have that Government issue same 6 0-7 a CIA Represent atives 1 7 Complete r eview oi cover plan a 2 a CIA Representative 1 Conduct an interrogation o two or thr ee member s of the Cuban Volunteer Force t o determine fu11 extent of t h eir knowledge of actua l facts and provide in ormation tQ the f resident as soon aa possible 8 0 -5 a DOD Representativ s I b Br ief CINCLANT a nd GONAD planners CIA Roprescntative 1 ll Complete contingency plan or the dispoaition if neccsa ry of the Cuban Vohmteer Force 2 9 Complete p r epara tion of final briefing on entire operation 0-3 a Depart ment of Sta to Representatives 1 Pro id e policy guidance t o USIA to support this plan TS 1181 881 Copy ii 'f6f' SECR£1 - 4 - b Enclosure D CIA Representatives 1 C om plete deta ile d int elligence collection on C astro act iviti es througho ut Latin Amer ica 10 £3 a DOO R epres entatives 1 Complete plans for pr ovis ion of support from operational fo rces as required b C A Repre sent a t ives 1 Present final briefing on entire o perati on if not given prior to this date 'f6F Sf 191 ET TS 18 1884 Copy# r- -'ie1 scg - V T HE JISSE SSME1'T OF THE ADEQUACY OF 1 H£ PLAN As st ated above one or the cons1de-rat ions rai sed by the Agcocy's capo bilit y to perform the ope ration is t he question of what i t thought the chances o success to be and if a• was the case thc t1c w ero thought to be good how reasonable this conclusion was in the light of the known fa cts An exam ination of the a dequa cy o the military plan is esse ntial to a res olution of this l attc r 1 o int Whatever conclu sions or inferences may be dt'awri from the dc cat oi the Briaade no one can deny that- in the abecnce of the pla nned D Day dawn air a-trikes the oper ational plan was never tested Perhaps these air s t rikes would have had no s ignilicant o ffoct but in v iew o the e5 set tiality o eliminating Cas tro' • air force St can be ass erted that withou t cs- air t trikes the plan never had a chance No i ssue h31 received more t i orough a naly sis s ince the n i lur e o f the ope r a don thon the decision to cancel Although the Survey fa ils to tell the foll s tory i t it fe l t that oothlng can be gained i-om further review There ia no doubt however that the in o r med militar y vie w without e xc cption and at all ti mes was that compl e te control o f the a h- wa e absolutely vital N B The Survey 1 s sta 1nen t indicating that 11 two o the President'• military advisor both members of the Joint Cbiefl ¢ id not unde rstand thi s p rinciple is conside -ed i naccu rate aeP 9SCSST TS f 181881 Copy _L_ ·ran Si6E R ZL - 2 - To the extent th at there w aa a failur e to c omtnunica te this co the appropriate political level$ blame ahould be attached Quite candidly it is unknown where this foilurc occurred if i n £act it did Before analyzing the reasonableness of the v--icw that the D-Day air strike s could have changed the result it i s impor tant to examine the b uic theory ol the opera tion and what was accomplished what failed a nd what was no t tested A s to the last the only possible judgments a r-c whether the theory based on existing evidence was scnaiblc The operational theory in o utline was a To dc•troy U e enemy air force Not tested though partially accomplished b To land the Brigade on the Zapata beachhead achieving surpdse Accomplbhcd succcsdully c To maintilin the Brlg de o n the beachhead perhaps or sevoral weeks Not tosted d To persuade the Cuban populace both private U'ldividua ls and governmcnt3 l including military acLively to oppose the regime It w s never expected that this would happen until U e populace w as convince i thM an opposition force supporting democratic lcadct'$hlp recUving out1ide suJ port was abte to maintain itself o n Cuban soil How long tbi• would t o ke was unknown Not tested TOf' D OR elf TS #181884 Copy_ _ T QP 6 Cit£ t - 3 - T h e faHurt t o knock out Castro •• airpower particularly his T 33 jets wa s fatal How l'cason3bl e w3-s the a ssumption that the D- Day strikes -ould bave eliminated thit a irpower o r at l east m ade i t non -o per atio nal or a period of time The bes t estim a tes b o sc d on all s ources including photography la te r coniirmcd aa substantiall y accurate were that prior to 0 - Z Cu ba n c ombat air cra l s trength waa 36 oir cra ft i e 17 5- Z6' s 13 Sea F u rie s 5 T-33 ' 1I F-Sl AU of these we l e a t th cc a irfield s San Antonio Libc r tad and Antonio Maceo Th e i n- com m isi ion ca tc wa s a s lmed to be SOt believed to be s lighUy h igh $0 that p r e•umabl ' 18 combat aircr a t were operational a t the time of the initi al o z tr ikes Bas ed on all •ou -ce repor ts including CO MINT a nd photog r aphy the C ub Ul5 sub s e que nt to the D- 2 s t rikes we cc a ble to launch only 7 3 J'c r aJ't again S L the be achhead namely Z B -26's 2 S ea F u ri c• 3 T-33' • Photogra phy o co urse cannot de tatminc servicc3bility but photography o air c r a lt movements post D--2 were consiste nt with a nd it is fair to sa y confirm the above fi gures res i3 e cz 1 • TS #J81884 Copy 1 _ - 4 - ln o ddition these operational a irc rait we-re concentrated by ihe Cubans 3t San Antonio w ith the possible exception of l B - 26 at Libertad Wi th U e potent fire power car ried by the B-Z6 1 s flow n br the Brigade and based o n the re sults o the D-Z ttr ikcs the elimination of the s e sc •cn att'cr aft could re suona b ly h v c been a ntici atcd assuming s urprise SU'lcc the Landing achieved su rprise and since the C ubans had n o e iect-ive ant i- air warning s yste m aur pri se would almost ce rtainly have been achieved With r e gar d LO the ability or the Bri gade to maintain itse lf once ashore assuming the e limination ol hostile a ircr aJ t the theory was th at the Zapata 3 rea wa$ so diCfi cult of a ccess via on l y three expos ed re ids across swamps that a s mall force could easily de fend it t ga inst vastly supe rio r forces roe II several w eeks a stated by the J'CS Hostile concentrations and a rtillery woulJ have been ol rr Ost i mpossible to conct Al from the air due to the terrain and the 6- 26 tire po wer would have been devast ting against these Th is i t confi rmed by the one actual encounter o B- Z 6 1 aga i net C uban tanks The B rigade 's lire power w 11 s also heavy and could have prevented passage of any Cuban troops o r equipm ent down the narrow access roads At long a• the am munition bsted t h c Brigade a ctually s ucceeded in doin this '£ 0 P i' EGQi tf Supplies absent TS I 181884 Copy L__ ·tor SD Oft£ I - 5 hostile ail' could hav e be en la nded in l arge quantiti es s ince ships could have been b rou gh t in to the beachhead The accuracy o f this conclusion depends of course o n technical cons iderations and mua t be based on e x perienced miUt rr judg nents asses sing s uch matters I ts tho te r rain U1vo lved the size and capac ity of friendly and opposing weapons invo lved and the ca1 0 c ity par ticulady o the attack ing force LO maintalo lo g istic auppOrt Such a n analysis could again be m e de bul it w ould s ec m sufficient co support the reasonableness o the judgme nt re3c hcd in A pril by refereocc to the judgments reached by the Agency military p la nners and suppor ted by tJ e JCS and it s s taH Alcbough i t was be lieved that the Brigade under the assumed conditions could mainta in i tself on the beachh ead 3lrn• s t indc inicely still for ultimate $ucce1s internal support wa s obvio usly needed T he conce t of the pla n waa 3$ indicated that at some point not immediately the exis tence of the Brigade would be recogni zed a n d Cas tro ' • q uiescent opposition would be o me active As far as internal opp0sition was concerned there was essenti ally general agreement rega r liilg the situation S uch disagreement a s h as exi sted ha s been with c spe ct to tl1e a cc u·acy o the p1·ogoosls r egarding internal support the Brigade might expect after landlnr ifOJ SLCI BT T S '181884 Copy _ _ _ TOP SEC B t - 6Tho Decembe r 1960 U S cs tirnnte re garding th e i nte'rnal situa tion wa s th3 l Cae tro was H rmJy in contro l th at his r egime ha d consolidated i ta h old tha t Cuba n inter n al sec urity w a s b eing r apidly built up that B loc ossls tanc c in the for rn of military technicians and instruc to r • was about 200 that C ub an pilots and o ther specialis ts h nd b een ta ken over seas b y the B loc for t rai ning that the C uban Com m uoist P a rty c o n t rolle d koy position• and that no one g roup or combination of the r e g i rnc 's enemies s eem ed w cU e noug h o rganiz e d or • ufficiently strong to oHc r a a erio us th reat without o u tside help t o Castro's authority SNIE 8 S 3 - 60 Prospects for the Castro Regim e Es1entia Uy the s a me facis wer e p r esen ted in the pam p hlet released in e arly April b y lhe Sta te Depar tmen t on C uba the fac ts in which wci·e '- 'Orked o n jointly by all inter esi cd departm ents and a gend ee Dc pal t men t of State publica tion 7171 lntcr •Am rican Series 66 entitled Cuba pas•• 19-25 Again the s ame conclusions w ere staled by the Agency in i ts pre$entations A n exam ple i s the mernorandwn dated 17 Febr u 1 r y 1961 Annex B of the S u r vey whi ch sea forth the view on these points cons istently presented by the Agen cy thro ughou t this per iod and u p co 17 April 1961 Wha t the n wn s the Agency p r ognos is The Zapata plan took the view that the re wa s evidence to j ustify the conclusion that once it could be TS 6' 181884 Copy _ _ -ra r a eette 1 - 7 - s hown to the Cuba ns thal a Cuban for c e in opposition to C•stro h ving C uban political le aders of political s tature and democr atic views was c apable o maintaining haelf on Cuban soil there would be substantial defec tions from the CastL·o 1·e gin'le in all walk s o lile pri vate and governmental In Dece mber the USl B had estimated that despite th hold eaLablishcd by C as t ro and h is regime Internal resistance to the Ca st -o r egi me h tt1 r i sen s har ply in the last s i x m onth s 11 The Catholic Chutch the o nly rnajor institutio n no1 brOughl to its knees by the regime has ta cen an incr e a singly firm st and againll Castro 11 Thc middle and p i•ofos sionat c las ses are now for the most par t disa iected Some campesinos are discru ntlcd notably over the regime's failure to redistrlbutc large l andho ldings as it ha d proml6ed thus far only token allotment s have been made 11 A number o f anti-Cas tro guerrilla g roup are operating in the Sierra Escambray area and in Orientc Province but the l egime has demonstrated its a bility to c ontain these bands 'V lithin the Army Navy and Air Force the r e pcobi bly r erna in s n measure of dissidence and probably con1iderablc resen tmcnt at the regime ' s deci ded prefere nce Joi· the ivili an mili tia but this may decline as more Bloc equipment is made available to them TS HIS 1884 Copy _L_ 1-76 SECR c - 8 The a bove quotation$ are all Crom SNIE 8 -3 - 60 page S The militia numbedng ai least 200 000 was estimat cd to have been drawn largely rom the lower income peasant$ and urban workers Thus fa r the militia'• overall combat eC iciency is low many UJ its a re still on a port ti me training baais However a basic cadre o well organized well equipped and trained units is emerging acld on a number oC o c sions the militia has been used c ectively to control mobs and to perform o t her occuric y duties The rcgula r for ces a re s ti ll disrupted as a result of A 1cccssive purges and r ehabilitation ha• been delayed by the employment ol subatantlal army and navy detachments in conll ruction and other public works At prc1c1 t the combat cfiectivo ness oC the o lr force is virtually nil t hat of I he navy poor and that ol the army at best fair although it probably now exceeds that o all bul the bc•t militia units Above quo cs from $NU 85-3 60 pages 3-4 conclusions a pproved by the USIB Ort F o r similar 7 February 196 l sec II A report prepared by an Ad Hoc Committee of the USIB OCl No 0592 61- C Part I para 0 page 3 a od Part I para 8 page 4_ Furthe r evidence o the lnstability or the Castr o rcgimo was apparent in the constant1y growing· list o f indlvidu nls once cloae to Cnst r o who w ere detec ting from him Many ol tb ese were referred to in t'hc St ate TO P Sii6iftr't TS 1181884 Copy _ _ T 8 I 6lSC tL I - 9 Depar tment pa mphlet r e ferre d co above Some sign l icant examples and only e xamples are Dr Jose M iro C a r dono on ce Prim e M inister of the Rcvolulionary Government D r Manuel Urrutia y Lleo hero of the Revolu tion Pi -ovisional President o the Revoluti ooar-y Government nder house a rres t tl-fter b e ing forced to re sign Manuel R ay River o organl% ed tlJlti- Batista undergroWld in Havana CastC'o's Ministe r o f Public Works Humberto Sori M n in Castro's f irst M inister of Agriculture Major Huber Matos Benite z hero of S ierra M acstr o r evo lutionary com mandante of CamaguO ' P r ovinc e then thro ll l i n j ail Manuel Artime Nino Diaz Sie rra Ma eatra heroc Justo Carrillo Raul Chibas fund r 3isc r for the Revolution and fough t wit h C a stro in the hills F e lippe Pazos c-epr e s cnt e d the 6th ot July on the Junta o Liber tio n and wa s appoint ed by Caitro a s Pre$idcnt o f the National Ban k of C uba Pedro Di az Lanz chie of the Cuban a i r or ce and Cas tro• • personal pilot OP 9 - eitt t TS i 181884 Copy_ L_ TSF £CR£ 1 • IO • Dn vid Salvador labor leade r 11 anti-Ya nqui '' pro -CJ stro secr etary general of the Cuban trade union fe deratioo Castro intervencd on the Communist side again at Salvador's free labor movement and j ailed Salvador Miguel Angel Ouevodo editor or Bohemia l uis Conte AJUero radio and television commcntMOr Jose Pardo Lla da radio oHicial Camou s for •ttack1 against U S on Caatro' s behaU Further available evidence suppor tin8 the conclusion that internal support would be fo rthcoming if an e Ue tive i ' lternal opposition force could be established w _s a Many reques ts for aid during the period ZZ March to 17 April were received through Agency communications channc l s some o which a re noted in the Survey at pages 108-109 The iss ue discussed by the Survey as to why aid was not given i s not here illvolved The messages h wcv-er do ernphas ize e number o groups anxious to engage in ac tive o pposition o r example between 22 March and 17 April there were 15 unfulliUcd drop requests in support o a claimed total of S 000 men Even after the landing between 17 and ZZ A pt' il seven croups totaling- about 3 350 m en begged or support in order to fight The s e groups wer e in Orient-e 2 500 men C Oi SZCR£1 TS 1181884 Copy _ _ 78P SB SRCT - l L- C amaguey two groups totaling 400 men Laa Villa s three groups totaling 400 men and Pinar de Rio 50 men b Manuel Ray Rivero the o rganizer of the anti-Bat ista Wlderground and a m ember of the Cuban Revolu bon aq• Council too k the view that tl e intern31 r esist a nee was so s troo s that Castro could be overthrown wi thout an 11 invasion from the outsjdc His view wa s not o iciatly accepted b ut represente d the i o o r m e d view of a n individ ual e xperienced i n th $ He l d regard in the opposi t ion potential The d ia agreetl le nt with h i s c onclusio n bad to do with whaL a tlon w•s neces1 ary LO per suad e the oppo s ition to r ebe l not aG to its exis tence c Sabotage fr om Octobe t 196 0 to April 1961 was evidence of in cr n t l oppo it lon a¢tivlst1 even though a side Crom psychological benefits to the o p po s ition the sn botage c aused insi gnili c a nt darn age in and of it sell to the regim6 Examples w e re l App'roxima tely 300 000 tons of sugar c ane d e stroyed in 800 different fires Z Approximately lSO other £ir es including the burni ng o 42 tobacco warehouses two paper pla ois l sugar refinety two da iriea fou r store t-went y -onc C ommunist ho mes 3 Approximately 110 bombings i ncluding Com m uni s t Party O Cices Havana power s t 1 tion two s tores r aih·oa d ro e SE Gf i z x- TS 118 1884 Copy _ _ 1 0 12 8lJCiCLI -12- terrnio a l bus ter rnin a l militla bo rrncka r ilroa d ti -ain 4 Appr ox hn 1tel y 200 m tisa 11c c bomb s in Havana Province 5 Derailment of six trains d c1truction 0£ micr owave cabl e and statio n and d e struct ion of numer ous pow e r transformer s d T h e view of mAny o the B1·iga de who b a d been members of the militia w h Lch c onfir med the offi cial estlrnat c ment loncd above i c that o n ly a small perceotage o f the m ilitia would fight against a res olute opposition with strong fire power T hie hard co re was c onsidered to num ber 5 000 - 8 000 at Lhe rnos t The Axm y was c onsidered to bave bocn loo disr'Upted t o fight c S t udents a nd their pr ofe8aors were in Cvolt e g • two third s of the facuhy of the University o the Orientc ir D ecember 1960 openly condemned Castro in a public sta tement Oth e r students were actively engaged in a el s of disruption and subvet'sion working with groups supported by the Agency Labor wa• in opposition Not only was D avid Snlvador in jail a• indicated above but open acu o oppos it ion occurred e g the e lectrical w orkers in D ecember 1960 rnarched fr om union headquot'tcrs i n H a vana t o the Presidl ntial Palace 10 protest reductions w hllt on 1 8 January l 961 workers' wives wer e attacked by Castro's stron g arm squads or dem onstrating a gainst the execution of wo rkers T OP JiiGltsePf T S 1181884 CQpY -t-OP SE€rtE I - 13 - as trai to r s 3 lle ged to have sabot 3ge d Llie Hava na power p lant Since the i ssue 0 £ what the intern a l r eaction would ha ve been wtdc r tJ e co nditior s assume d n e cess ary £o r e ffoc t-tve internal s upport n ever l ose it i s impoeaible to evaluate tlle accura cy of the prognosis lt can be s aid tha t no one e xpected an imme diate upr i sing no a d vance warning was given to the inte rnal r osiuance a s a security precaution to avoid any disc losure o D-Oa y runple s upplie s exis ted to suppor t uprls ing h ad gr oups showed themselves com mu nication1 existed that could have ident Uicd a re as of res i s t ance though no com municatol' w as a ble to j o n the res istanc e n the Eacambray n o on e expected the resistance to join the Briga de on the beach in a nyLbing but ve r y sma ll num bers a nd i t w a s c s ti m a t c d th nt the psychologieal impa ct 0£ unopposed h eavily a r-rncd a z 6 air cra t flying up a nd dow n the i 8htnd wou ld be signi i caot - an 3sswnption base d of cours e on control o the air Wh a te ve r the cor rect conclusion in fact n1ight have b een the tiruation was $uch as to render the judgment mentioned above -egarding inter nal s uppo1·t o rcasono bl e- one S urely it w a s one painfl i lly rea ch ed by m any informed observers Poet-invas ion plannini did exi ot -con tr a r y to the Su -vey' s contention Some of it has been dis cussed above # ln addition plane for a breakout from the be achhe ad had been ge nM ·ally wo rked out r e c ognlzlng that precise dt tails TeF eec u - TS I 181884 Copy _j_ ct - L0ft8T •1 4 had to ' Wtiit kno w ledge of tho exact situotion As indicated the J31'igad it w s considered could maintain itseU on the beachhead for a aubsta n tia t per iod a ssuming no hostile air Consequently laz -gc reserves of supplies and matcnel could h ave been landed air atta cks against enemy concentr3tions could have been I own n d an a ttack follo wing hoaxy air s trikes could have been executed when the time was considered nost propitiou s Such attack could also have been supported by concurrent air St t-iko1 plua H desired the dL·opplng of a mall a irborne for ce back of the en cmy lines to cause dt sl'uption Similarly air drops of indlvidu lls or tcan s plus supplies could have been made to any acti- •e resistance throughout the islan d A fu rthel' possibility was o vert U S suppo rt i n the fo r m of supplict on the batis tt at the opposition govC'rnme n t the Cuba n Revo l utionary Council would have landed on the beachhead declared 1tsel as tho rightful govetnmcnt o f Cuba and requested and received recognition from the U S Such re ognition could have been acco rded o Lhe theOl'y that C astro ' s r egime was a Soviet-dominated dictatorship and 1 hcre orc not r epresentative o or the choice o lhe Cuban people while the opposition gover nment was den- oc ratic as 1·eprc se ntative a s pOS$ible and oHercd a progr am for choice by the Cuban people if it atta ii- ed powe r Conve ra cly the Castro rCg1me by its d 1etaoorial actions had removed from the peoplo TS f 181884 Copy_ _ l oee c t i 1@t2 _ - 15- all rncthctds o e f ec Ling a Ch 't n gc 4 ' XCe pt fo ccfu l o v c1· tln o w Soc U S recognition it wa believed would jusi iJy U S m ateriel support if J Ot active upporl to an offensive I t should be cr -lphas i ed that U S l CC• gnit ion w as n ot c onside red an c sse ntbl p a r t of the plan use ul a s i t would h a ve b e en s ince m ate rie l s u p por t could ha ve been p r ovided anyh ow •- The planning or fa ilure w 3s it is b elieved aU that w i p o s Gible li a s happened the failure occ rred befor e the consolidation of the b eachhea d there was little that could be done except a n e C ort to salvage wha t little was pos sible H ad the b eochJ ead been es1 ablis h c d a nuYnbcr o possibilities were planned r1on e too s a tisfactory b ecause a failuYe ol the beachhead was a t any time a s exioi $ b low If the Br igade or part thereof covld move tog ther they were to attempt to reach the Es cambra y sa uming some help h-om t h e country peop le c his might w ell h a ve been j eo Gible -Ano ther pos s i bi li ty was the r e mova l o ind-iv idu 1$ conceivabl y Wlils by a ir a n d sea whil e lcam$ a n d m3t eriel could b ave t c e1·1 aird ropped i in other par ts of Cuba ·u rcsietancf had beco me ap1 a ren 1 As to the Agency' s capability l nd the dequacy o the plan the best ans wer - s ince the military aspe cts are the $Ol e con side r ation - is to r efer to thi Guppo Ung military j udg m ents wh ich er e based on lull kr owlcds e of the facts Sc 1 c e viO nce o f a 1 1 ii udes j 1st p rior t o D- Dny T S f l 81884 Copy L__ ·rep GLC E -16i s lhc m essage sent by Colone l Hawkins from P ue r to Cab e a• regarding the desuabHity of doapatc hrng the B l'igade Attach ed as Annex II -Bt This messaae is sigru icant as it r eceived wide circ ulation oL the time in Wa shington including the White Ho us e a nd wa s acce pted a s esseuxin lly accurate T he allegation o failur e to appi· aisc Ll-ie chances o s uccess l'eali1tically may be accu ra te b u t it is submitted that th e available fac ts a t le ast m3de the j udgments rea1on Lbl c M oreove r what actually occur r ed support s these judgments The B rigade landed with the b enefit of surpnse it held i t s own while ammunition l asted even though h ailed to land some o its h r e powe r ' the B -2 6 ' s when they go L a s hot at tJ e Cuban tan ks demolish ed lhtm AJ d the attitude of many of the militia during the early sta tes o the fight w 8 favor a b1e to the B rig ade including defecti ons br m1-h1ia men to the Briga de even at this ea rl · indecisive moment of the e ngagem e nt All s erious d amtl gc was i nflicted b·7 the C uban'• a ir e s sentially the thrtc T - 33 jcta The suppor ting me m oranda to General Tny lo r 's oral r eport are J e l evant on cJ1c se point s expresses tho vie w 1n M emorandum No I in discussing th e operat ion paragraph 7S on page 26th al the beachhead could not have surv ived long wi tho ut s ub s ia ntial help fr om th e C uban populohon o r w lhout Overt U S a s s 1stance Two o tl1e Cuban Study Group 0 2 8£ Cftb l' TS N18 l 884 Copy _ _ _ £OP SEC tL I - 17 - Admiral Burke and Mr Dulles howevel d i ered with this stn tem e nt o n Lhc g r ounds that dti re was 11 insufficient- t vide n ce to sup·p or t the conjectures Of this para groph A foo tnote OXL thetr viow5 o t the foot of page 75 went on to say The well m otiv3 ted agg ressive CEF fo ught extremely well w ithout ai t' cove·c and with a shortage o f a mmun i tion Tbey inflicted very Devere lossea on the Le s s well trained Cu ban Militia C o o sequcntlr it is r easonable to belie ve that if the CEF had had ammunition and air cover the1· could have he ld dte beachhcaad for much longe r time des lroyed muc h of lhe ene my arti ll ery and tanks on the r oa ds be for e they r eached the beachhead prevented ob se r vation of the fire o f the a r tillery tba t might have been placed in pos itio11 a nd destroyed m a l't ' more of the lbca l Militia et1 route to the area J local success by the land ing par ty co upled wi th CEF aircrl t o verflying Cuba w i th v i s ible control of tbe ai ' could well h ave caused a ch lin reaction of success throughouL C u ba wit'h re$u ltant de ecci o o o som e of the M ilitia inc r easing support Irom the pOpulace and eve ntual succes6 0 f t hc o p e ratio n Therefore eve n in -retrosp ect the 8dgade's inabi lity to hold t he beachhead fo r sorr·1e time was n ot c lea_r to wel l• tnfor med individuals who had soaked themselves in au the tvai la bl c evid ence A p r o s pective ju dgm en t LO favo r o l lucccs s prilor to the even t wo uld there fore seem underata ndabl e TWP 6£9i1B' TS 118188 4 Copy _ _ J 'ii'P lft H nu l -18Finally regarding the qu cst1on of inte l lige nce ailure• Lhe supper ting m mora nda io General Ta ylor 'a oral rcpOrL ata 1e lhu the f'lffcctlvene • s of the Ca• t ro mihtar·y Corcc• s well a6 lhat of his police measur • was not cntuely anticipated or foreseen J i emorand1 1 m No 3 however setting forlh conclualons aaya ' Although thti in U igenc e w a• not perfect parac ularly ev•luation o t 0 Lhe the e Coclivenea a of the T - 33'•• we do not feel tha t aJ Y rai lure of int elligence c ont r1butcd • ignilicn Jl t ly LO tl e dcle 1l Memor ndum No 3 • para l i • • page ll TS I 181884 Copy_l_ rar LCClCCI - Anne x -e A 1'1 DE 519 I N 3197 l 3 Ap r ll 1961 I MY OBSERVATIONS LAST FEW DAYS HAVE INCREASED M Y CONFIDE NCE JN _ BTLITY 'rHIS FORCE TO AC COMPLISH NOT ONLY NlTL' L COMBAT MISSIONS BUT ALSO UL fIM A'l'E O BJECTIVE OF CASTRO OVERTHROW 2 REF ARRIVED DURING FINAL BRIEFING OF BRIGADE AND BATTALJON COMMANDERS THEY NOW KNOW AL L DETAILS OF PLAN 'lD ARE ENTH USIAST IC THESE OFFICERS ARE YOUNG VIGOROUS INT ELLIGENT AND MOT IVATED WIT H A FANAT ICAL URGE TO BEGIN BATT LE FOR WHICH MOST OF THEM HAVE BEEN PREPARING IN THE RUGGED CO NDITIONS OF T RAINING CAMPS FOR ALMOST A YEAR T HE LA IC UACE I HAVE TALKED T O MANY OF THEM IN WITHOUT E XCE'PTION T HEY HAVE UTMOST CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILIT Y T O WIN T HEY SAY T HEY KNOW T HEIR OWN P E OPLE AND BELIEVE AFT ER THEY HAVE INFL IC TED ONE SERIOUS DE FEAT UPON OPPOSING FORCES T HE LAT TER WILL MELT AWAY F ROM CASTRO WHO T HEY HAVE NO W ISH TO SUPPORT T HEY SAY IT IS C UBAN TRADITION T O JOIN A WINNER AND THEY HAVE SUPREME CONFIDENCE THEY WJ LL WIN ANY ANO ALL NGAGE iENT S AGAINST THE BEST CASTRO HAS T O OFFER SHARE THElR CONF IDENCE 'iOO GFCP ST Copy L _ _ ' GP 8 8GRLr - 2 - 3 T IDE 519 IN 3197 THE BRIG DE IS WELL ORGANIZED AND JS MORE HEAVILY ARMED AND BETTER EQUIPPED IN SOME RESPECTS TH AN U S IN FANTRY UN IT S THE MJ N HAVE RECEIVED INTENSIVE T RAINING THE USE OF T HEIR WEA PONS INC L UDING MORE FfR NG EXPERlENCE THAN U S TROOPS WOULD NORMALLY RECEIVE WAS I M PRESSED WITH THE SERIOUS ATTITUDE OF THE MEN AS THEY ARRJVED HERE AND MOVED T O THEIR SHIPS MOVEMENTS WERE Q UIET DISCIPLINED AND EFFIC El 'T AND TH E EMBARKATION WAS A CCOMPLISHED Wt'l•H REMARKABLE SMOOTH NESS 4 THE BRIGADE NOW NUMBERS l400 A TR ULY FORMIDABLE FORC E 5 l HAVE LSO CAREltULI Y 01¼ iERVEll T HE CUBAN AIR FORGES THE AIRCRAFT ARE KEPT wrr H PRID E ANO SOME OF THE B-26 CRE WS ARE SO EACE R TO COMMENCE CONTEMPLA f ED OPERATIONS THAT T HEY HAVE A L RE AD Y ARMED THEIR AIRCRAFT GERMOSEN h'1FORMEO ME TODAY THAT HE CONSIDERS TH E B -26 S QUADRON EQUAL TO 'rH E Bl S'l' U S AlR FORCE SQUADRON 6 THE BRIGADE O FFICERS DO NOT EXPEC ' HELP FROM THE U S ARMED FORCES OF SUPPLIES T HEY ASK ONLY FOR CONTINUED DELIVERY THIS CAN BE DONE COVERTLY T 8 P 6ii 6 R8'f COPY _ _ _ L OF OZ SiilZHI TlDE 519 lN 3197 - 3 - 7 T HIS C UBAN FORCE 1S MOT IVAT ED STRONG WELL TRAINED ARMED TO THE TEETH AND READY l 6EJ IEVE PROFOUNDLY T HAT IT WOULD 8E A SERIOUS -UST AKE FOR THE UNITE D ST ATES TO DET ER IF FROM JTS INTENDED P u aPOSE R equ e sted i£ experiences th e las t ew days bad in any way changed Colonel HawkinM eval 1ation of the brigade ilBF SZCREr COPY _ _ _ --- VI ORG ' NlZAT ION AND COMMAND REI AT ONSHIPS The Surve r eaches the Hat co e lusion Lbat the p1-o j ece was badly o r gan iz ed ' T he ren o n s given a re Command ltncs and man l lgcment con tro ls were inc- fective ond unclear Seaior Sta s o tOte Agency were not utilized ai r suppot't st ayed independ e n t of tbe p ro j cct the ro te of lhe large f o rward basis ''as not clear P3-t a b page 144 The Survey djrect• these c ritic is ms exclusively at t he Agency s-o·uc t urc making essentiaJJy no effort to rebt e Agency organh ation and rnanagerio_L p r o blems to the p n dcipation in the project by other elements of the Govel'nn e11t Before respondlng therefore i t sho uJd b e 81 atcd lhat we s hare the vie w s set £or Lh in one of General T aylo r ' s s uppo r tU'lg memor anda a nd quoted rn liOthct section o f this pape r lhal the Execodve Brand o f the Cove r n ment waft 1 0t o r ganizationally prepared to cope with this k ind o 3 paramilit ar • ope ration and that there wa s no sinsle authority short of the P tea1denl cap able o f coordinating the actions of CIA Stato Delense and USIA Lh o n i' l 11 Jn o lhe r words it wt1 s a U S cathcr C J A proj ect The r e 'l l organb o tional p r o b lem is one of r he ba s 1 c dilemmas of the U S Gov ernment name ly ho tt m a nage mi litary o r quJ si -mili t a ry operationi in peac clime - a d ile rnma a ee o t ua ted in tho se instances FOP EEGHY TSil8 1884 Co py_L r ep JCCRZJ - 2- - involving a n effo rt ll maint ain clandes t 1mty Since most o the o pe r l tion i l nets lnvol ved in pa romilita ry p rojec La o th is nature C aisc o r cou ld under certain circumst ances raise ng nific m polit ical issues thc1• no r mally require hlgh leve l political cle arance prior to beiog undertaken Such clearance involves t1L l c asL lhe Stal c Ocparlmcnl o ten the Whtte Hous e a nd due t o m i lita r y i r'r lp lie o t 1ons the Defense OcparLment plu il o ne o r more of the m ilit-a r y ser vice s T he d escr iption in another section or thi s i rnpci oJ the extensJ ve partlci p a tion by and whh other elem ents o £ the Governme n t indicates that the Cuban project was clearly of this troublesom e type T he Su rvey ' a failur e to ex amine or consider these relationship• m e ans that most o its c riticisms limited $ they 3-l'e to Agenc y considero tion a lone aro too loca li e d or pr o vinda l to be rc lisuc o r full y understandable An a na lys is will howeve r be a ttempted Tbe criticism of command lines is ii p r operly unders Lood directed essen d ally at t wo majo r d cfocu o ne that Lbe projccl lacked a singl e hi h•lcvel lull t ime commander posse ssing stat ed b road powers a nd a bUj t ies Sl l Ji cient or c arry1ng out the m i ssi on the o ther that the r e wa s a fr agmen tatio n of authority between tho projccl ehiei the millta f chief of the project's Pa ramilitary SUJ ff and seve r al hlgh e ve l 0£ ficials whose - v ldc rcS J Ondibillties e l sewhe re in the A gency ptcvented th em from giving the project the a t tention it r equir ed Para 5 page 37 r gp SEGPr P--- TS N181884 Copy _ _ -01 SECR£ J· - 3- The DCI allegedly de lega ted hit r-esp0nsibility for major project decis io1 S to a conside r able exl ent Pa rn 4 page 37 T he Survey appears to supporL Lhis statement oa Lwo g r ounds first th-at the DCI l'elied o n the DDCl fo r policy ma tters involving air o p eration s and for military advice he relied on 1 hc military o icers detai le d to the project The con$equence of this relianc-e acco rding to tJ- e Survey w a s that the OCI was deprived o f completely o bjective counsel nReliance onH accc rding to norm3l u $age dOeti not mean the same thing as 11 del ega tion o respo·o $ib i lity11 • W'h at ver the Survey i ntends to say in this connection it is a £act th at Lhe DGJ delegated any portion o this r esponsibility· aL any m oment during the project Natu cally he r elied on o thers for many things he could hardly ran the entire project h imseli and h e even delegated authodtv not respo1 sibillt y in some limited respects He did fo r ex amp l e authpd zc within clel rl y wider stood limi ts the DOCl to pprove « c r tain a spe cts of Cuban overflights for him h should be noted in this connection that tbc clearance o f ovedlight-6 resided in the rtr t instance with t h e Spectal Grou p or the White H o uae aud wa requested th rough briefings by the DCl or the DCI plus o n e o h is people no rmall · the DDCl the 00 P or both The r ea fter whet her or not a n overflight -r- 9 P 6£ G-A 1 1 f TS N18 1884 Copy _ _ IOI SPGKE I was within the te r ms o the top leve l appr ova l iu 1d was opcrationrtlly sound was cl cared by the DOC on beh al of and i l the di r ect ion of the DCL Tbe DCt neve r r eleased the autho r ity r ega rdlng over-all air planning ·r -ecomraeodations J'he word ' ree omme ndatiom u is J6ed because final air plans decisions lay at a higbcr leve l outside of the Agency Before p retentat io n to tiuch ou tsi de au tborlty lhe Special Group or lhe White House these t ecom mcn d ations w e r e first pau ed on with in the Ageucy by tho DCJ As ar a s r e li ance on military o Hc e rs i s concerned the DCI obviO ls ly re celvt d b riclings which weTe maJnly given b · the DD P b1 1_t often the 00 P presentation was expanded by sto temente from C WH 4 tht Task Force Commander his Param ilitary Chief or other individuals con_1lected with the project as approp·r iate Both with r egard to air and ground the OCl a l so uisisted upon and received the advict and judgment o air and ground millta ry ofiicers assigned by the P entagon to study proj ect plans and o ctivitiea of the JCS as a body and oi individual members of the JCS Thia entire· process has been expl iiUJJed elsewhere in this paper and ts deve loped in conside rable detail w lhe suppor ting m e moranda co General T aylor's oral report -PSF acsrrx TS § 18 1884 Copy _ _ POP S E CP B f - -5 Mo reover the DCI a lmosl wiLhoul exception held three staff m eetings a week attended b ' his s enior o rricials including lbe DD P COPS and A ODP A Wben any significant n atter re lating to Cuba needed approval or c lariJi cation the DC I was br iefe d after one of these m etings These briefings and m eeci_ngs plus continuous telephone communicl'ltion s plus c abl e traHic kept the DCI cun co t on all but the sma Ue s t details The D0 P is critici ed by the Survey for in f act d i recting th e project although this was only one of hi s mo ny responsi bili ties 11 Par3 1 page 36 Presumably the Survey did not mean to suggesL that tho 00 P should have g iven up his other duties to be full time Task For-ce Commander Con sequent ly his aUeged fauJt muat h a ve beon a failu r e to m a ke a broad cooug b delegation o authpci ty 'tb c Survey defines the li rni tlons on the• DO delegated authority by s tating that CfWH iJ had to apply constant l y fot- the decision of policy questions and i m poTt int operDt-ional problems to the 0D P I t is isuggcst ed that except in very l C'lU U l o r cet t aln hor war 11 situations 5 lch reservat ion of a uthority is the normal one between any un ft c omma nder and his next higher echeloll Moreove r- un til 17 Ap ril 1961 lhe Landing d te u rgencjcs altho gb great were never aueh as to m ike chis sort o·f r eview imposs ibl e Undoubcodly it was irksome to C WH 4 T OP so e rF T 'fS # 181881 Copy _ _ ----- - - 6tn the same wny 'at ru 1y hlghc r aut h o rity ts con d lde r e d a p roblem to a commander who h anxious to pueh ead without hurdles o r ouuide restraint Ouite a part from the$C conai dera tion s ho wever tho 00 P because of the r cqui r erne nt t o cle tr ouLaide o the Agen cy m any i ssue• including det l1 as poUcy qu estiona bad LO maintain a close control over the prOJe ct in order to guard ag ll 8 omission• o euch out aide clca r anc e e l' l nd to be in a J 0lli tion to r e quu• L I hem through lhc OCl To avoid de lays in commu n cations between WH anci the 00 P the A DOP A pent 1ubstanti ally hall titne o n the p r OJCCt His poehlon was Lhoroug hly understood by all involved though a p urllt ehar •maker might have felt some conce rn as t o 1 h c p r o pe r deaign alion oC the job on a ch• n t A OOP A w a t in Ca ct an e xtension of the DO P • rm He w 1 • phyaica Uy loca ted next to the DD P 1a w him const antly had immediate a cce•• t o him whenever ho was vailable lll lld therefore knew instinc tlvcly what Lh 00 P r eact io n to most probltms wa s a nd would be_ Conaijqucntly hct could a ct or him in many 1 0•unces while at lhe 1 une tune be ng fully aware of those 1hua tions which ahould be bro Jghl LO the DD P o r d ciis ion U c hart terms a r e nece s sar y h o was a senior apec1al assiata nt wit h a 0 perlectly c lear a nd undc r1tood de legation o a umorh y on maL r• '1 hich he could declde or the 00 P Thia 1n diV1dual'• availability plu1 the pgp alsJ 'f TS I 181881 Copy _L_ e r 01 r 1 l l 'Ja - 7- amount of time accorded Lhe project by U1e DD P personally meant t hat t he Task Foree was able to o btain decl$iOns from the DD P level rapidly provided that they we r e in the DD P's jurisdiction3J competence The m ' ny lecJsions already rnent loned wh ic h required o uts ide clear ance bad to be obtai ned eithe r in o ccor dan c c wi th regular pro cedur-e s as in the case o the Speda l Group or b y specfa J arrangeme n t iJ some other tribunal s1 1ch as the White Ho se was involved T h e 0D P and the A DOP A wer-e both poai tioned effective ly with respect to the senior Agency or non- Age ocy offiters involved to be able to arran sc on the most expeditious basis po3siblc whatever high level consideration might be -required in given situations All existing dec-ision-mak ing procedures were it is believed well u ndcr st ood o r Ha new clearance procedure wai i needed for a C urring activities a sp dal p r oced1 1re w as c rcat ed An example is the p roecd ure for clearance o r Cuban ov-c r fli ght-s da ted 24 October 1960 which is att ached as Annex A The Survey c ri t iciz ed C WH becau se he was in the ch rln of command but only in a partial sense Pa ra l pa gc 36 Be sitned ma ny outgoing cabl es supervised s taffing a c tiviti es and attended some of the meetings oC Ute Special Group But tht DD 2• and h is deputy dea lL directly with the project chief and gr 1 d uaUy the Ohle of Wii Oiv ision began to pl ' y only T9 P occns p n TS I 18188 4 Copy _L_ T8J fliii BftS i -8a dim1n t sbe role 11 Pal a 2 p agc 36 All o Lh is is essentially tr ue C WF I however was not in the chain of com mand except o n cec- taizi specified weU understood matters alt hough the Survey fail1 1 to s ta te that C WH also sat in o n aubtilantially U L o f the DO a nd DCJ rne t tings on the p r OJocl attended by a ny WH p e rsonnel m_d b andled many or the p0licy negot ia tio ns wl lh the Sta e De par tmcnt as well as some or the more difficult specia l problems with the Cuban po li t i c ta l l eaders and some ot bcr special r egotiatio ns i e those involving possib le economic sanctions with the Treasury and some leading U S bus inessmen and lawyerl and tbose w ith particuJ a - i ndlviduals such as w u1 a1n D Pawley tso oI course inter relationships with the many Agency stations througho ut the Hemiapherc and thei r activities w ere supeT vLsed by C WH Eveti i n £ tr os pect this ar-r eroet'lt with C IIH is believed to have been organha tional ly sound and would aga i n be adopt cd under si milar circums tances Black a nd white o r g anizational answer often do the c omple x inte a -play of prob lem in as the C u'ba11 o ne 3 t Ot meet p r oject imro iving as m atiy I a e l s Granted cacb e c helon star ting with the DCI should have Or e individunl i n the n e xt lo -wee e chelon to h o ld ree ponsibl fo r all dec u ions of that echelon but such individual r es ponsibiUty wns q uite clearly idcot Uiable in the pro jec t TS N181884 Copy _j__ 1 08 SEfiRwT -9- C WH could h avc been the Task Force Commander but tJ-1e OCI having d i•cv•aed the matter with C WH decided that 1lnce C WH could not be the Commander n nd also ru 1 tlle rest o WH Oiviaion it wa preferable for him to do the latt c r Neve r the lese C WH had long a nd wide experience in the WH are a conn•ctlons with many La tin American• a well a• Americans whh Wli ssoci otlons intimacy with the WH Division ll• pertonnel and a ctlvitiea a nd h ad bec o tor m ny yea rs at a policy level 1n the Agency ConsequeotJy his advice and reaction• we r e wanted in the Cuban projec t n nd he w a s asked to stay ae c lou1 to proj ect au1vhLes as he could while perfo r ming hi• other dutict The matte rt lllled above were t hercfore covered by C WH pursu -i lO Lhis concept Actually C WH h ad ubtt a ntiaJly Lhc earne co latlonshlp to this project as he had to the Cua temalan a nti-Arb cn% p roject wh 1 ch worAed well The Chi cf Nothing new there lore was involved o the Task For ce t c C WH 4 ls not cri ticiz d but his •upe riora a re c ritich ed ror aelectina ror thh pos t only a GS- lS at the fourth ec helon i o the oraa nu atioo of tho Agency Whh regard to arado the C WH • was a sen ior CS-15 or in other word the equ ivo leDt aenior full colonel in the Army o a More aradc could hardly be requ Jred for the top operational comma nd job At to competenc e and experience for Otc pott iL is fe lt Clio the wi1 l com1 a re favorably Y 'lth any o Uieer in the CS 1 01 ocer - x TS I 181884 Copy_ _ ·rsr __1 c1cz 1 • Jo Perh aps the echelon waa too lo ·bu t lh1• it a matter of jucJamenc AcLu alty 1 he C WH • was a t the third not Lhc four th echelon ho frst being lbc DCl and lhc ODCI and I he second the 0D P lt the Agency alone i i considered it i s believed that the echelon wa• not too tow ail ot 1 the Exec utive Oepartn e n t c lem e n ts lflvolved are consi dc r cid nurner ou• ot he r actor• a re lntroduced wb lch involve ao difJerent an o rganizat ion al c oncepl as to rnakc aJ'IY relative a naly- • impossible Th is ove r all org anizatio na l problem haa been entml ioned and ia now under Goverrunent $1 1 dy ao d'u t it would seem pre lera ble here to diacu11 or Jy the i nternaJ Agen cy re lationiJMP•· At any rate C WH 4 for reaaona aJ rea dy dis c u1•ed '9 ·as obviou aly cot free to mUe all dec ltions on hi• own what •ve r lhr Survey m ay •dvocate in thi 1 re•pect He w•s howt vcr very much the •t·a•k For ce Commandu AU element• o Wll 4 m and out o Wa s hington r esponded to hh command The extent to wb ic h he had to cJci'lt decisions wii h higher a u thority has been indicated ll h a matter o l Judg mcnl whe the r or not t he dclea uion of authority was adequate b ut 1t must be re-e mphasized that the J tadgment of most non- dclcg te d hems 1• y o utside o Lhe Agency U e as General Taylo r '• memorandum a a id the r e wa s no nngle 3-otborlty s hort or thC P-re•ldcnl c a pable o f c oordi1t o tlng 11 a nd within Lhe roP sscesr TS I 181884 Copy_ _ - II• Agenc y once the prob1om of non-Agency clearances is reeogruzed a nd a cccpr ed the power• reserved by the 00 P and Lhe DC1 were in kceptag w1lh nor m a l r elationth ips bet-ween c ommand echcJons Moreover Lhe DD P s upplc rnenlcd by the A DDP A wu able lO expecl lle dec i1lona o delay wae held down as much as po111Jblc Ad1nitt edly Lhe U S orgaau ationa_l a truc tu re as a -hole wa• not sati1factory or Lhia type of ope ration The Government • • indic_1H ed u lly apprech tc• t hi1 and s a llempting to rtnd a eo lution T h e S1 Jrvcy make• another point regarding too many ech lon l I namely tha t the top l evel had I be brlefed by brie ere who them1elves wore not doin Ule day to• day work Para S p•ge 37 'this con- c lu1ion is another s ta te ment o a croublc1ome pi-oble m of 1cnior governmental management in the complex modern world How can the individuals ln Cormcd on dctatla communicate to the top pohc y deciaion- rnakors tbe r elevant pa-rt so their k l'lowledge in a timely and Cully informative way ln the C ub p r oject it can only •a id th t the top level aaw m o r e of the deLai l peo ple th an l1 usual The DCJ and th e D0 P broucht C WH 4 or Lhe project• • P ramllit1-r y Chief u 'll h them to aubat-uti ally all the P re1identi al meetings o n C u ba Moreovcc the Ch Urm a n of the JCS brought Gene ral Cira y and o hen another member of bu team w ith him Detail knowledge waalt there ro re represented TCP GWOft £ TS 118 1884 C pyL_ eCi S 6JCL1 IZ Moreover- oC cou r aC' brteflngs el m nt were numcr ou • r eceived daily brieling1 -ilt 111gh lf'lve ts Adthu e tch interested Genera Lemnitz er and the Sec r cla ry of De ense in the p-- rao l i mmechately pr o r to 17 April The As ttstant Secr eUHy o f S L ate A RA a nd the Sccr eu ry bne fed througbou 1 t 1te project or S ta te w e r - cons tantly cGeorgc Bundy Rostow and Schle sin cr ha d almo i da ily contact with t he 00 P o r the A OOP A DOC of cour se abo we r e kept curr ent on detai l 1 T h e DCI and tht In view o f this and the extensive inte rde pa r tmcntal coor di oi ion involved n W• pi-ojecL and de1c ribed ln another ae ctlon the a mount o top l e el d r tailed m orrnation complete W -$ unu1ually Adm l t 1 e dly how cv• r t htl d oes no t m ean that ll wo 1 a atie acto rUy complet e o n all 111ues and th11 1 1 o ne o the pToblems i nvolved in the obove- me ntione d Govern me -•n a1 study on ora- niulion for projects o r thl1 nature T hree o ther W11 ahington t e0dquar 1eu fa c to r s a re d escr ibed a extra ord Jna ryu by L1i e Su rvey narnelyt th at I COPS p la y l only a ver y minor pa rt 1n L'°le projec 1'' COPS lso allca edJy d eclrncd to invol ve hims e lf with l h e projec t 11 although on a t Leu l two oc c a aions he wa s given express war-rung t hat lhe project was being pe ril® aly m ismanaged 2 The OO -P Senior Sta Ifs the Aatncy'• Lop levf l Lcc hnica l - dvisor1 were not con 1ult ed fully but they all owed thern1e l ve• 1 0 be more or les1 iJr ored' and 'J QP $ r e'JLC J TS 1181884 Copy L__ JP 3 T he Projcc L Roview Coml'niu e did not r eview l h e p roject fPa ra 6 P• • 38 These I Jlegation• are so 'extraordinary to borrow the Survey 1a word that It Is dil icu l t to a ecep t a serious intent o n the pa rt o the So rvcy'a author• Qui te nal lt'a lly COPS spent litUe time on the project The DIJ P o ffice- • a lhrce- Tna n oUlce one ol wh o m A DDP A -o ras apcndJng el' se n tia Uy full Umc on the proj eel a11d another o w hom OO P was spe ncU nt i very s1 tb1tantial pa rl of his t lmc Con • equenUy it••• only Joa lc al i1 not essential that COPS dewte his time lO the real of the world aa well al to the numerous rem a Sning 188 les of l nieTJ'lal ma ni gement A1 co the statement about e xpreaa w r-nins• of perilou• m l1mangc mcnt it i• b1decd strange that such a c harge should not be identified at teasl aufiidcntly to pe rmit tome rt B essment or how r c 1ponllible the wo Tni ttg 6 were and of wh 'l t they c on sisted COPS remember• receiving no • uch warniJ OI co lrac COPS a swell a a many other people wer e told on numerou s occasion th t som e mlttmanagcmcnt a• well as 0 1i1cr misto k e1 w e re occurring tn tb c p r oject ln what pro jec 1 doc this not occur partieula rly I lt is u_ra n complt'Jl a nd lisn rpUvc of normal procedu es ''warnings we r e giv en such attenti on and rccognhion These a• the f a cu ln each i ns tance wa t'ranted Ac rually the Survey l• u ndca r a1 to what it believe COPS should Mve done Lhough the infe rence is that he •hould have used tl e Alleged ' warnings as 3 baa is Ior taklrig Lhc p roj ect 1way Lrom the D0 P fOF tUHiAi0'f T S - 181884 Copy_ _ The criti cism reg ardin g consulla tion with the Senior Stalfs o b viou 'tl is directed 8t a failur e to o b tain avo il a ble com1 etent a dvi ce Undoubtedly t h e S enior Staffs had good o ficcr a w ho could h 'lve been hclpful The j udgme involve d however was a l w1' a t poi nt clo you draw the Line w hen rou have ope tatio nal activities to be accomplis h e d officers to woi-k Y ilh the p roject ataUs Each or I he Senior Sta U s assignc No Sen io r Sta Cf o icer not fi assigned cou ld have been kept i uHicienlly w-eU- informed without full and constant briefings In view of lhe b riefing o bl igation already in cxit tcncc it was decid ed Lhat a dditional b rlellng burdens w e re o n acccptabl e Moreove· as indiC ated t hove a lino J ad co b e dt' wn and it was el t tl at su Ificic nt seni pcraonnel were uUy in vol v ed The Survey 's cr iticism in this connection LG ba s e d on a concept o a n o rmal OD P project rather th --in a n extraordinar one llke Cuba Ln this con n ection il S hould ag3ln be empha si zed tba t p rticipation by other e lcm l hts or t he Government is w holly omitted by the Survey The P r oject Revj ew Conunittee 's PRC clearance al the most under PRC proced UCG w ould have i l vol ved a review o1 the p roposed p roJect in its e arly tages with a view t o determining wl1ethe r or wJ t it shou ld procc • The peculiar n a tur e of the Cubl n projec t r s ulted as alr eady· indicated in ole r o nces L¾rougb o ut the Covc r nme r t a t l eveJ a which make it hard to com • prch e nd h o w the P RC wouJd h ave affec te d the pro cess -a cn SFGPE4i Moreov e r even TS K 181884 Copy_ _ _ -'IF DISOR@a 15 internally in the Ag nC '• the PRC i s only advuory l o the OCI and i i h doubtCol li lt1 no-r-ma J p r o c cdur ea _ -e r e intended to a pply to this type of projccl The A g ency f a r·ticuta rly the 00 P ls critic tzt d €or faillng to deprive the Development Projects Divi 1ion OPD the A genc y'• air arm of it• i ndep ldcnce by pl a c ing it within the or ga ni z at i onal •tructure of I he proJe Cl The proper orga niza tion _J posili oni ng o an 1 i r commander in T'elati on to the ground commandc r ha a long been a m iutu· of a raume nt in the Armed Se rvice • Tbc aa me difference evidenced St1ell in the Cub3-n proj ect with WH-4 favor l ng the Marine view o comple te wb• ordjnation of air conflicting w'lth the DPD air view adYocAti ng a separate com tnJ nd with J'espon1ibU1ty to support Thia coJ Cllc t w 1 t never full y settled and did cause fr iction a nd probably in a broa der 1entie never will be LO lhe full 1ati6fa c tlon of a ll Lhc serVICes lt ii not eJt that it c rea t ed any more 1crlout d i Ulcultiea At any raLe the 00 P de a II with this d il erence in t he only pot sib1e pract tc al way in ear ly October 1960 On 5 Octo ber the Par a mjlttary Chief sent '- 1tudy through C WH to DO P expressing ac lens tb his view• on the command relalion•hlpl for a Jr operations On 12 October 1960 the 00 P wroie an answer- whic h aet or lh t he con t rolli ng dc c s i ona a e Annex B A copy o l this mcmorancb lm i f attached Opera don a l contro of a tr lorc c• a nd aclHrltH required tor the project w • a11igned Lo Chie o the T a ek Force •02 szePtBCJ1 An air at fi TS fl81884 Copy _j_ 16 acction £or air operations wa1 created in Lite Task Force The Acting Cb idol DPD w 3e dc•lgnatcd chief of the new a lr section which waa to include oU OPD pen1onncl w hen actually employed on project buafr eaa Since DPD had rna ny Jr com nutnlent s to aervice out aide or the Guba n project AC DPO w as direct ed to report to the 00 P in th usual manner•• to th le non-Cuban bUatlnes 1n view of the foregolna the Survey is simply wrong when it say The p roject chleJ had no com mand au tborhy over air pla uni ng and a Lr opeza tiona The OPD u nit eat abllabed for ihl• purpo1e wa s completely indepuden t '' Par 3 7 page 3'9 The Survey i t also wrong in statlng that thero wa 1 oo d a y-to-da 1· continuing atafi rc l dOn$bip Two D PD o tieer• me an air oper tion officer wer-e as lgncd 1J U - tlrn e fror n OPO to the project and were physica lly located '--ith it ln addition a se nior ai r operation• officer atteoded daily u C mectinga He also apent all o Ma time wi lh a nd on the project ConsequentlyJ L'ic Nr u n it wa 1 o rga ni•ed to be completely rcsllonsive 10 thci requl rement1 of the Ttuk Force w-alh the exception of air safety considera tions l n addition OPD fac ilities c g w ee O or cornmurtlc a tlon n tappina a ml plan ni C a ir opera dons ph otocra phic iotelligience a_nd re lated intcrpret3tion cervices w ere m ade avai labl e as needed physically m oved u M The were not they were mo r e effec tive in pl c c nd we re abl e by remaining to •crvicc other Agency requirements al welJ In fa ct t ae DPD • T OP SSGtm Y• • TS IL8188 Copy _L- _ F81 SLCitC I 17 relationshjp w it h VtH w as much loser than quite e fecLi - •e r el 1tion sb i1H• hich i t had with other Area Divisions having similar re ftti 're mcnts ' the Survey devotes se·veral page$ 10 criticism o r the WR-4 in te lligence coUec tlon pages 75-80 covering a number of poi nls T he most t crious allegation i s that the lnterprc ta tfon of intcU igenc e w3s 11 ent -rusted LO o fficers who were so deeply engaged in preparations for t hc invasion that thei r j udgmen t s could nol have h e ell expected to be aJtbl ether ob1ective PaC'a 1 3 page 78 One or We essential items referred to ls t he estimat e re garding the eilect of the strike fo r ce landing in triggering an uprising-3mong the Cuban population page 78 Para 13 The SuJ'vey ' $ lack o f 1 1_nderstanding of 1 he project's theor-y on this poinl and the evidence o r t he judgmt n ls r ea c hed has been dis CU$Sed in detail e l sewhere It might be not cd again that one of the auppot ti ng mcmorand3 to Cet1er l Taylor 's ora l report conclud ed ••we do not e I t hnt any aJlu l' e of intelligence cont ribut ed s 1gni1lcantly to the defeat Moreover two members of Gene r al Tayl or's four man Cuban Study C r o up even i n retrospect stil l fe lt i fter hear ing all the evidence that the operation m 1ght have been successful had the Cuban air powe-r been eliminated Probably H any simila r effort were to be attempted l 11 the future a n even ir eate r asso cia tion between 00 P and DD I should be w o r ked out T QP 8@ 81¢1E1P TS f 181884 Copy_j__ 101 -S·ZCIL I - 18- £o r eva h 1ation pu rpo scs Ln view of the 1bove conclu sion s howe er i t would seem fai r to s3y tlH l t a d rru tt i ng failure wlti c h i ndeed ts done they we r e not as obviOu$ as the S u r-ve suggests 1n fa c l a c a se can still be made that the estil'nates wer e right The S urvey-'s other c ritki s m r ega r•dlog WH 4 lntelUgt oce activ ities will be dealt with bTiefl y T he c r eation of o c 2 in the pa r3_1'r'i iHt a ry unit rather thao w i tJ1 the P r oject F l Section is strol g ' c ritici zed Pag'eS 7 7-79 The alleged bad conseq 1en c o f this er r o r i e • improper e £ timates has j u st b ee n diSCIJSSed Jn o ther r et'l p ec ts on thi$ point the Survet is inaccurate The C hief of the J- l Section did Oltcnd WH 4 s till meetings PO--l'a lO page 77 Ther e was lfaiso a between the G- 2 and Fl Sections Pa_r a 11 page 77 both saw ables Para J O pa go 17 Th T he y exchanged int elligence a nd g e nerally suppleme nte d ea ch other Par3 l 1 page 78 T he remalni ng c ntici sm r e g a r d ing i ntelligence is d irecteci at a failure to suppOrt L Miami B ase Since the Base r a i ses a numbe r o othe r con s i de r ation$ they wi H be dis cussed t ogeth e r T he Survey in e1Ccct commen d s m any of Lhe o p e r ational results achie ved by the Miami Base T h e FI a nd CI activi tl cs arc m e n tioned in para g r aphs l O and 11 on pa ge 70 and it is believed that these accomplishrncnt s ilr e con·troendable -i GlF fECPST TS i' 18188 Copy _ j _ TOD £CC91 'T - 19- The P M • ide involve• a m ore complicated pi ct-urc The Survey 1• c ritical o f the fac t that HeadqoarLert i n W ashington kept too t ight 3 coa lrol on M 1Ami Con1equcolly too little authority was d elea ated to enabl e Miomi Lo runc don e1Jec t tvc 1y T here i • no doubt that a number o r M iam1 o Jic r • felt that lh cy were bet ng over-controlled No aood operauons ofiicer e ver eels di fforontly o r if h6 does lie b not d o l ng h i job Con1 equently the normal healthy ope-rati na 4 fo-r-t to ah k e the bit and run fr ee waa p• rt of th e tn1 itude held by 1 J 3 mi operaLOt' S eln tion to Wat hington Wuh ington on the othe r b and was a wdous to avoid moving Headq_uarter• function s to M iami o r Lreatinj Miam i a • a tield station which h clc a rly wu not Miami was n ot Cuba Comm ltl icatioq 1 from t i r aet a r e a• could be r eceived and handl ed jlln as fast In Wa shin ton a-1 in Mia mi M ny aspecu of O e ra tion al pla noi ng could be handled just a s w e ll ti not b etter in WotJ1ing t on Lhan Miami Coordination wiU1 othe C o perating area • wa s better h an-d l cd ln Wa•hincton T here were of coui-se ex cepLion s Some o r the mor obv1ous exc e1 t ions were Lhat M h mi was a center fo r Cuban• and a 1 active lnterc h ange by sea b etwf'Cn Mia ml a nd Cuba wu a £a ct of life The project o r ganiz ationaJ concept therefore wu to p r o lde M ia mi w lt b people and L e authority needed to iak - adva otagt of thcae potential s Mai nly or course thia mca nt Fl a nd C l activities ft if 8fi iP r' ' TS H181884 Copy _ _ - AP srttner -zo torne propagn oda activlde1 tome apiecial t r aining and lhc handling o Ute Cu ban c Cllt leader• The Survey appar ently doe not find major fault exce pt n• noted in tbe ollo wi rtg pa r ag r nphe wi th rc1pe ct to H eadquarte r s• M iami organhalion al relaLlons i a th etc fie lds whatever the Survey m a y • ay about lhe • e activiltc • in olhcr r eapocta The Su rvey does Lo 1ome ex t eot crltJcbe th Lr3inlng run b y M loml by •aying that ther e w as no Cull- time c hid o t r aining no o-a iruna objective or plan a n d that much of h wa s merely a case oUicer doing the boil he could Pa ra1 l -t-26 page• 13 3- 134 he r es1 1lte alleged ly wore h3phaz a rd F or example • one man wa1 trained in a hotel room to make a parachu le Jump Pua z s page 134 Obv1ou 1ly a full ju mp cour$e would havo bee n p r c fert1 b le b uL the Su r vey 1 a commeu t indica tes t'I lack or undcr 1 ta ndlng of the problem 1n WW ll many officers did 1ucce11ru1 opera tional Jump• with only min i rnaJ around tra uJ na air cre w 1 1 when for ced ln a hot el room t O Comb al pi lot • and j ump di d 10 without hnvlng even been t ro incd Any how as the Survey eays the hottl• Lr uncd Jumper made one Jump succe•afully I t m•Chl ilio have been stated by the Survey thaL the man li1 quc1tion w aa Ln his earl y lh lr l ies in e eco l e nL physical condltion a nd an e x pe r t tumbler Ju mp wa s the only o ne he wa 1 asked to do Moreover his one •ucce11£ul Tb ut ca• unim por I ant in Luelf h c er r ed to because it b r ing• out several 1·clevan t po in t e L c eeP 88 en o• TS I 18 188 Copy_L_ l fiH l l i Gfl l -2 1- in projects of th i s kind ope r a ting i e cess it iea a r e h a n dled in the best possible wa y A11 cnt s arc o ften used w i tJ1ou t -ade q_ua t e tr dning in the hope o getting s ome benefits t r aj o ir'lg s ites a re oft e n ini ldequatc b ut arc accepted -as the only available o n es in view o f - l l l applicable c o ndition$ o p e r atiooaJ equip tne nt is- not selec ted as b eir1g the b e st for the job but the best or the j ob in the lig ht of applicable limi t ations drop %o0nes r eccpLion commi ttees and inte n1al orga nizati oo are rare ly wha t wo uld be described a ideal in Lh e t r aining text book Communications arc difficult z ooes ha rd to identily 3nd agents are on the run and harassed Since tile Survey at no poiot 1uggests the exi stence of tbesc p robtcros some reference 1 0 their presence seems essential The hotel room as a training site Lot parachute Jumpiog is only_0 1- e of many exa mplcS of Lhe S urvc ' applying unrealisLi c d teria Vie repeat what has been prcv iou sl y sl-at cd thaL the projccl surely had man • raults but the • should be tested against what was pqs ib le not agains t a theoretical and lmp0ssible idea l Mo ri o •e r the Surve • pro v ldes some evidence inconsistent wiUI th-1 3 Ioi cio hg 1n paragraph Son page 12 6 the ca r e ta ' e n in· eleelj oo and is ere ening o Useppa ls I and train ees is described Para graph l 2 on page 12 9 sets forth the t rainmg g1ven t o 178 raLnee l originally prepared or infih ratioA ln all 11 the s 1 ·ve • s tes 11 178 men including 23 t' td10 T S f18 1884 Copy _ _ '01 SCCi d H• zz opcca lora had been trained i n security inW lhgencc collecuon and 1·epo rling propasa nda and agl ta Hon sub vet'1lve activities tt•i•tance organhat1on reception operations exploalve• and demolition guerrilla achon n nd t1imi lO'r matters Thia f 'Ould aeem r ca aonably comple te a nd organued Granting a normal complement o faulta and failure• it 1• a till beUeved th M t he M i t1m PM operatiot• l and tTa lning record i 1 a good one and that I his will be supported by the rcsulta Aft r November 1960 the P M focus wa• aw a y rom M ia ml Under lhe inv•s1on concept train1 ng air operatt0Qs and pla n ing wer e the major problem• ttnd cheae were prlrnadl y locfiled out1lde of Miami NevcrLbele11 Mia mi h ad much to do in coMect i on wltl porbon• of l beae activi tlca Recruit m ent w•• large ly done in Mia mi Despatc hi n_g of materiel and recrulLI took place rom OpaJoc ka PM agents were mfil trated fr om oUld cx iltri1 1 e d to M ia mt c ommUDJ cation• a nd certain other limited training wa s handled in Mi mi and the c oru LO ind and mu olatn maritirno aijsctll cen rC d in Miam t At between the two olhces Keadquartera retained the final decision a c m an y ope ration nccivtty d Jrectly involving Cuban eoll or territorial waters The conce 'n or non Agency element a o the Executive Department already described meant that it wa ipad vi1able to pen nit operational deciaiona t nvo viog Cuba to be made outside of Washington Moreover witli Uu1 speed o com mwucM'ion the extra time required was no rmally TS I 181884 Co1 y_ _ -Zl· accepQble si nce not ope rab ouHy la tat vcn though aggrava Lmg LO tho• inv olv e d I e mainly Miami o ficcTt 0 cour ae ovcr Hght deci aion a to come to W'a1 h1ngton a d id land1n1• o any aubatant lal amoun t• or mater iel Sma U ex Utra tion and Ul illrat ion operat1o ns could have been decided in M iami but polic·y llrnitation1 t uch a a t crritonaJ water• o tlO c n t ry lnto Cuban boau having Americans aboard m a de cloae Wash ing 1 0n s upervieion adv i1ab le Moreover de l•y in obt alning dcclaioo a on Lhcs e latter type operallon1 was c apeclally m inimal sinc_e in subata nuaJJy aU o tJ oao caac1 WH 4 wa a author i cd to make the decision A ctually as pointed o ut by the Survey Headquarter• seldom had any d ilfere oce of v1ew with Miam i iPa ra 27 pagell8 As fa r a1 PM r•au l u w ere con ccrned r bc atatlttica were lb at in mid•Apnl 196 1 43 tr ained PM agents Lhe•e a r e in addition to the 31 F l agent I m nl ioned In Pa ra 10 page 70 o the Sul' vey were o n Lhe ground rn C u ba of which 13 were regularly fun cuoning non•doubled r dio operrno s and four mo re we r r a dio ope r ators but in resei-vie a ince they h ad no lets o their owu The aeog-rapblc dindbu tlon of bo b Uleae a gent• and radio o perator• w3s pre lly good covering m01ill or the h la nd The maritime o peration• h andled b y M iami hod by m1d•April landed 88 000 p0unds o ma te riel whi ch witq t h e l 7 800 Jbe aetua Uy delive r ed by air provid d th e r e sist nce up co l7 Ap il with a total of I lS 800 lba 138 12 88 i R f'T TS i 18 1884 Copy _ __ T9P SE Sfl E f -24 - had infiltr ated 79 bodies and exfiltrated 51 bodies Admit t cdly much o the material tho lgh by no means a ll of it wa$ landed on the north shor e in Havana Province since this was a reSi$tance center Consequently those who wanted it and those who could handle it were concentrated there - part icularly i n the early days Of the 88 000 lbs tot al h o wever about 4-5 000 lbs was i n provinces othe1· t han Havana i c about 19 000 i b s in Matanzas and 26 000 lb$ in P ina 1· del Rio Las Villas and Camaguey n addition e om e materiel was landed on the south coast a t both the west and east ends i e a small amount perha ps 800 lbs in Oriente a nd 20 000 lbs in Pinar del Rio In the ear ly days after a ship with the r ange wa s availabl e a fow e Corts were made to lan d some materiel in t lte central p art of the south coa-s t but connections were never made with the rec epti on part ies For a substant ial pcTiod at least two months prior to the la nding the central south coast was intentionally a voided since it was felt to be vita 1 not to provide even the slightest suggestion of o perational interest near possible landing areas Some of the specific c ritic i sms of the --Ham i Base should b e mentioned 1 Conflict and confus ion between Hcadq ua rters and Miam i was saidto e x ist resulting in duplication of effort para 5 pag e 68 and divis ion of contr ol as to both agents and in the foa ritime field as well as high phon e b ills a nd unnecessary cables The dupli cation of effort undoubtedly exist ed to some TS # 181884 Copy ff I • OP SEGL'l9'f xop sscnB'Ik - S - extent partic llarly in the summer and fall of 1960 as the organization was being set up but the Survey d es not give enough specifics co enable direct answer and undue or serious duplication is not rcmcmbc r ed As to confusion of channels there was surely some confusion jn the early days on Washi ngton- Mia mi calls but in the fall of 196 0 rules were established which it is be lieved adeq uat ely clarified this p roblem The division of control on marit ime assets was int ended namely the s rna 11 boat were considered tactical and were under Miami cont rol the big boats strategic and were the1 e ot e kept under Headquarte rs control in ord er to keep them available for and rea dy to supp ort the main landing As far as is kn o 1' ll this division of contr ol which is cons id e red to have beel s o und caused no real difficul ty 2 Miami allegedly r e c e ived almost no intelligence support paras 15-1 8 pages 79-80 The ge neral nature of these allegations plus a failure t o indic ate what the alleged conseque nces of th e e rrors were once more make it d ifficult to answer directly_ Obvious ly th ere was no intention t o deprive Miami of needed suppor t and no Miami operation is kn own t o bat•e failed becaus e of lack o operational intcllige-n ce Beach are as a11d the in- tc roal Cuban situation wer e as welt known to Mia mi as to Washington See para l 7 page 80 U- 2 photography did not go to Miami but it was not needed for any o the Miami decisions Also it was available in T S Nl 81884 Copy# I TOP lsECK@l 'P8i 5SG REi'i' -26Washington to Miami officers As to Special Intelligence para l6 page 79 the Miami Bas e was suppo1 ted by a whole Staff O unit at another location Mia1ni did not it is true have a Staff D offi cer in Base Hea dq_uartcrs An Fl ofJicer howeve·r was give n the responsib ility of di gesting a ll Special Intelligence mat erial in ord er to paos i t to operations officer s if import ant In addition h e briefe-d the Qp era tions officer s on this ma t e rial twice a week 3 Secu rity is attacked para s l et seq • page 1 35 many asp ects of the C uban project wer e public knowledge Obviously With the r equi red r el ations with many C ubans p oliticians military and otl i erwise r ecruitment efforts press· magazine ra di o and other p r opaganda pTograms a s ubstantial amount of undes ired publicity along w ith chc de sired was unavoidable Otherwise it i s belioved that the security record of the p roj ect was not too bad 11 For e xample it is now known that any cas-e officeY was ever Qlown'' by true narne The Usepp a l sland operation was never discl osed 0 S t r aining sites w ere ment i oned in the press but not located specifically and were not it is bdi e ved i denttfieC The movement of the bTigade from Guatemala t o N icaragua and from Nicaragua to Zapata was n ot di sco vered In view o the effort s t o find out ev erything by the Cubans and t he press these w ere significant accomplhhm ents · S Sending agents to C uba who had known each o ther in tra i nin g is c riticized a nd bla me is regi etet'ed o r one radio opel'a tqr who knew almost ever y· paramilitary operation in Cuba from TS § 181884 Copy I T9Fl OB g fl£1 - 2 7 - the beginning of the project In r ply it can b e said th i t eve ry e ffort was made to send agents trained togethel' to different parts of Cuba Adtn itted ly there were cases wher e they may have move cl toge th er ait e r arrival e g working their way into the ci ty of Havana N o case is known however where two agen ts trained together were de spa tched togcthel to the sa me p lace A s to the kttow ledgc ablc r a l o oper-ato it iS quite true tba t there was a man with exclu s ive knowledge of o perations He served under t hree retJiata nce ch ie fs the fi rst two having been k ille d each of these chiefs chos e h im as th ir comma11 l cornmuriicat ions channel thereby evidenc ing the utmost corUi dence i n iro and is now an i nstructor fo1· the Agency the belief in h im was not ju s tified He manage d to escape No 1 eason is known as to why The d isregard of security rules b y t rained agents para 4 page 1 36 was rcgrctcablc but Cuban ot- indeed human discipline i s fallible No instance is repo rted o r known where such indi s cipline was too serious or could have been a voided As t o American lack of discipline the Su'l vey cite s only o ne case i e that of a cas e officer i n a iiami motel para 6 page 136 The Survey might a lso have said that tl1is case w as tl1oroughly investigated in1mediately and report ed on long hefos e t he project w3S comp leted HaO the Survey men- tioned this it m ig ht also h ave indi cat ed that unfort unate a s the incident wa s the DCl on the recommendati on of the DD P dec ided tltat in view of TS #181884 C opy li I a ll the circumstances th e of Cicer lad m3de a mistake but an unde rsta-ndabl c one and not one requiring action other than a warning to il'l C re sc future safegu n ds As to screening rec r uits it was i m po ssible to use the same precautions r egarding recr u its t o t' he camps particularly toward the end when the recr uiting rate was high par a 7 page 137 as w its used with individua l a gents In camp howev·e r they were members of a group roa- ing individual act ivity difficul t and wen if they had know o something t hcy had no means of c ommunication The pre landing movem ents and the la ndin g it must be remembe red rem ti ned unknown br igade m ember-s d is cha rged their duties well Al so the Ba d c onsequences the re- for e of the loose r procedures w re - not too evident TS # 181884 Copy ii TOP ' £CtCLt I en-• I I I I n- ' i i 0' t II _ _ _ ·l SECPFT VI - Annex A 24 October 1960 EYES ONLY MEMORANDUM FOR • 1 DDP A C WH Division C WH 4 AC DP Divi sion - i t- · - • ·· p The following pxocedurcs sh all applx to ·3 ll Cuban Overflights Wldertakcn under the Cuban Proje ct with ·-exC e ption o · any 'Ur-2 ' - reconri 1isiH1 nce missiona Approval £or the latter· shall be obtained ins-tructions i ssued in accordance w ith s t andard U - Z procedures the· ' ·'• ind 1 Prior to scnd ing any notiiication to the fi eld the D'D P and A DDP A or one o them if e ithe r is unavailable shall be briefed on he operational plan If possible DDP EBM sha ll be incl uded in the briefing i n o rde r to be informed W hen the matter is presented to the Special Group Iv· ·r · J J_ 1 2 WH 4 should be r espons ible or a nanging thie briefing As a rule i t should cove r at least the fo llowing aspce a of the propos ed ope ation a Status and mean s of corn munication with reception party b Detailed fligh t pl an c Comm unications plan A reprc cntative of DPD should a lways b e included to cover the second aspect 3 The DD P or A DDP A on his bebali s hall mal e arrangem ents for an appropriate briefing of the D DCl on each such flight NorrnaU such briefing wilf occui- after a DD P plan has been decided upon following the bri efing referred to in para graph l 'above J n case o1 urgen cy however the DD P or A DDP A OJ' his behalf m ay decide to combine these briefings into a single briefing in order to save tim e f J B All bri ding·s of eitner the ·DCI or the D DCI on Cu'b an-P l-'ojec t m atte re including the above s hall b g h the i _f5 J a f 't i' - •f S E G R F ' t•• 4 F ollo wi ng the above b riefings an approp tiatc message or rnes ag s will be- s ent to the field S ince an approval of the operation and of specific o pe t-ational plans will have be e n obtained in the bdeHngs m essage s roa y be released by C WH 4 and AC DPD as appropriate provided they comm unicate pl ans reviewed at the briefings If however any m essage incl udes impor tant ins t ructions the $ubs cance of which has not already been reviewed then it should be relea sed by the DD P or D DCI a s appr o pria te 5 No fligh t shall be di spat ched until the Special Group h as beon ad 1-•i scd of the plan or the DCl has specifically waived this requirement R CHARD M l 3ISSELL JR Deputy birector Plans • 8 rp L_ II ' S EC ill I VI - Annex B EYES ONLY 12 O ctober 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR C hief VH - 4 SUB J ECT Oi-ganiz ation a nd Command ReLa tions hips VI-1 -1 and Develop nt Projects Division RE FERENCE Memo fo r C WH- 4 dated 5 October 1960 from C WH 4 PM subjec t Study on Or gani zati on and C omm tnd Relationships of Cuban Task Force CTF for Air Oper a t ions l Comment on Reference The refer enced study I iind penetrating and well express ed The facts set forth in par agraph i are accurately presented and the considerations elaborated in p u·a g1· aph 3 have great for e On the other hand cer tain additional considei-ations bea1·ing on the problem appear to have been i gnored Whcm these are taken into account the tonclu$ions as stated in paragraph 1 require slight modificati o n and the recommendations set orth in par a graph 5 must be substantially modified i n order to be acceptable i Additional Considerations BeaJ 'ing on the Problem a As stated ln the reference present- command relation ships do not give the Cuban Task Fot'ce Commander C 't'H 4 control o v r all the maj or assets committed or proposed to b e committed to thi s opexation In parti c ular air capabiliti s are under the control of AC DPD a sep i r te component subject to no common command below the level of the DD P A lthough the referen c ed paper doe-snot specifically refer 1 oother resources xequired fo1· the CTF wh ich are not under the command of C WH - 4 i t is important to e m phasize chat this project will requir e extensive support from o ther organizational compone1ltS and that no co 1templated • arra ngements will giv e C WI-1- 4 cotnmand a uthority over all the resources an i supporting activi ties upon which the success of the pl 'oject de pends Accordingly th e _issue raised by the pape r is w hether ' 'ith r espect to air assets the d i viding line b etw ce-n assets @del the command o f the C WH-4 and 0th er assets remaining under separate c0mmand but used i n s u pport of the Cuba n Project s hould be drawn as a t p r esent or should be r edrawn in such a wa · as to place par t of np-o unde r co mma nd of C WH-4 8 J36' PS T SECPS1-2 b The r e e rence 3rguce that the pr oper p l 3ce to draw the line is between the Air Support Section o DPD wh ieh should be transferred to the control of C WH-4 and the other elements of that component It is b elieved that thie judgment is c l'roneou s J n actual fact the Cuban P roject will requi re at o no time or another the pcr o1·mance of operational and eupporting activities by most of the branehcs oC OPD The r eason is that DPD has been developed as a large ly eell-su1£icient intergratcd orga n i ation which include• st a if sections for oot only operations but logistic personnel fina nce security and administration all of which may have some part to p lay in the Cubo n Project Specifically it i ll p robably be desirable fo r logiutic support of air operations to b e managed by OPO A s for op erational planning 3 nd Headquarters monitoring of oper tions i t may well be desirable to u s e the DPO contl'ol room and commurticati oos facility The DPD Cover OUi ccr cer t a inly bas important contri butions t o m ake as does the Security Sect ion Even the- Ai r P ropriet aries Branch will be conce ned with the Cuban Project because o the need for tome of i ts rctources In order ther efore t o place u nder the command of CJ WH-4 a ll o the a i r asset• he may require it WOuld be necessary to transfer a 1ubstantia l part of DPD c The fo regoing suggee t s that the p r oper dividing Hne between the a1 1thority o C WH 1 and that of AC OPD should be redr wn in su ch a way t hat per haps hall of the latter com poneni would be under the command o the Cuban T ask Force Comma ndcT In fact h owever it would be ine Hcicnt and p robably wholly infeasib le to d -aw a dividing line i n t hia Ca sh ion AH of the Branc hes of DPO which have r esponsibilities fo - the Cuban P roject and moat of the p er1onnel who will disch Lrge these responsibilities also have concurrent duties which fall outside of the rctponsibility o C VfH -4 1£ DPD were a lar ge Headquarters it would al least be fea sible to spl it each Branch into two pieces but s u ch is nol the case Moreover t he burden o the Cuban Projec t activi ties lnd of other bueiness will v r y from day to day and w cCk to week Elficient utilization of personnel r equir s that in man · cases the same individuals pel orm bodl seas o duties -ee e ttz f E C fl E · rm 3 3 Supplementary Conc lusic ns It i s concluded that DPD as an organizational unit cannot be split into two parts one of whi ch would ha ve fu ll and exclusive responsibility for Cuban Project activitie$ and be pJ -iced i tnder the con una nd oi C 'Vt'H-4 Taking this conclusion in conjunction wi th those stated in paragraph 4 of the re ference it vould appear that 3 solution must be sought net by splitting DPD but y placing the whole of that Division under the control of the CTF Commander with 1·espect to air activities which are i n fac t Cuban project operations This sol ution will have the added 1od ital advantage of making available to C WH-4 s a senior sea £ officer AC DPO who is the ser ior air commander in the Agency 4 Phys ical Separation The ccnsi Crations set forth in paragraph 2 above suggest that no modifica tion of command ret ttionships will overcome the major olifficultie tha t grow out of the p lysical sepa' 'ati on o wH 4 and PD lt i s ma ni1estly infe asible to house the whol e of DPD in the Cuban Project headquarters The physica l location of the DPD Ai r $upJior't Sect-i on with WH' -4 ma ' be d s irablc but obviously v ill l eave the DPD Operations Control Room and its Logi s tics a 1ld Administrative Branches in a remote location Accordingly such matters as the devising of covc-r stories the working out 9 budgets 3-- ld funding arrangement s certain securi ty bu ainess and the clearance of many cables will still have to be done between officers who are housed some distance a yart It should be em phasized that this is inherent in any arrangement whereby the lull resourc es of DPD are employed in s u pport o the C uban Project Perhapa the most serious probl e m is tha t presented by the r e mot encs s of A C OPO•s office from that of C WH- 4 This can only be overcome by reasonably frequent meetings between these two individuals The inconvenience which is the cost oi this solution is the p rice that must be paid for t hc employment in the Cuban Project of the best technical talent ava il ble to the Agency under cil'cums•t ances that v ill permit that talent to be used pal t time for the performance of other essential tasks 5 Task Force Concept A solution along the l ines outlined in para gr pb 3 above is in the main consist ent with comments £E G I B r- S 3 8 ft L I 1 on the military task force concept contained in paragraph 3 b of the reference l n particular the p roposed solution will permit unity of command It fnU$ t be recogni $ed however tha t this solution w ill in effect provide C WH - 4 with a l a rge air section and w it h the ser vices of a senior staff officer fo r air a ctivities I t is the si e and competence of the air sectioo thu8 provided tha t precludes physical integration as expl a ined in paragraph 4 preceding 1' 1oreover 1 if such an air section is to b e used efJ cieritly and to make its foll contribution C WH-4 mu st p r actice s ubs tant ial delegation t o his air section and s hould recognize that i t i$ competent to hand le d e tails in the im p l e mentation of broa d i nstructions issued by him I t is e specially desirabl e tba t foll U$e be m a de of DPD in its capacity a a t be air section of the Cuban Project along wit h other sta ff sections of WH- 4 as approp riate in th e development of military pla n s It will be necessar y if high pro fessional standa1•ds are to be maintained for several military specialists o which air represents one to be made-use of in planning a s well a s i n operations Appro ved Action a Operat ional CO lt1·ol of all air forces and facilities required and employed in the Cuban Project will be assigned to Chi ei CTF b Chie CTI- will exercise this col tt ol through a newly created s W section for air operations in the C 'fF' c AC DPD will se rve as the Chief of che CTF Air Section The staff of the Air Section will include any and all DPD personnel w hen actually employ ed on Cl man P r o j ect business d For D PD bus ine s s unrelated to the Cuban Project AC 01 'D will conti nue to repor t in the u sual ma n ler to the DD P When a nd if questions arise co n-cernJ ng the a lloca tion of DPD resources a s b etween the Cuban Project and o ther i iquirements a nd acti vities such questions dl be r e-s olved by the DD P 9e£CICZ s The C uban Ta e k Force as presently constitut ed and when it should seem desirable to establish 3 forward Headquarter s or a Field Conunand having responsibility for militar ' operations i-n wh ich air and other fo r ces will be employed UlC constitution of any such Field Comma nd and i ts com mand channels to CTF H eadqua rt ers will require careful COn$idcration T he desira biHty of such a combined F i eld Command and re lation Ghip between the CTF Air Section DPD and ail· assets committed in Field operations will be conside-red when m i litary plans are m ore nearly comple te e h 35 a unified force w ith a sing·l e ·feadquartcrs If signed RICHARD M BISSELL J R Depu ty Di rector P lans see1tzt -- 'Ii • •-• l r- 'i'@ll B@Ott l3J VIL PE SONJ 'Ei The 5 lrvey is critical o the Project 's personnel m anag ment in two major respects 1 Th P roject was not e t U ed throughout with top quality people a ld 2 Pase A nurnber of people w e r not u aed to the best advantage 144 par 3 7 1'he-1·e o 1·e three ba s ic di Cicul ties common to the entire Su rvcy which arc equally and perhaps especially applicable to the sections on pcr6onnel and wh ich m3-ke spcciiic responsive answers abno st impo sible l They a re the exiat e ncc of Unsuppor ted J Uegations oi fa-ct a s in par gra ph Son page 'IZ which will be discussed furtlltr below 2 Concl usions unsupportod by fa eta as in paragraph 13 on page 45 where a n Unbcr of 11ob t a cles a re stated in such eneral termi as to make their u nder sta nding diJ'Cicult or in p t ra graph 3 on pa e 42 where it is stated tha t as a re sult of a number of actors • of the most expc rienced 1 s enior ope-rat i ng of£i cers o the Ag ency pa-rti cipated lull time l n the project UnderUning supplied 3 An admixture or allegations some oi which apply to the DO P generally e g la k of Spanish linguists pa ra 9 page 4 4 detective nature of cntlre CS stafiing system para ll page 44 120ft 8136RE TS ffl8188·1 Copy N I TOP SECR ET 2 $On le of which apply to the govetnrnent or the Depikrlmenl o De fen e e g pToblems wjth Armed F o r ces para 13 page 45 and some relate to the P rojec t An dfort however will be mo de l'O be s peci i c i n 1·eply md where this is impossible lO indicate the difficulty Regarding in - adequate comp etence in st3f£in g it should be stated that the Sul'vcy mentions no names A •om ha t genera I TC-Spon•e i s therefor e una voidable but to be reasona bly s peci Cic i t h a s been felt th at the names and the backgrounds o a number of the senior off cers in the project exch 1 ding thi DD P A D0P A a nd C WH wouid be helpful in det crmining the m anagei-ial judgments in thia select ion See Annex A 5 u port peraonnel including corn muniu tions have not been included since the S ur •oy is rightly compllmcntn ry of thoi r performance Page 4 S ra ll page l4S line• S· 7 A major c riLic Sm by the Survey in conn ection with pcrson el aesignme nts was an alleged failure to carry out a statement made by the DCI in AprU 1960 that he would do anything nece ssary to provide the per sonnel needed ior auccess In act this w·a s given subs tanUol recognition On 15 April 1960 the practice was est ab• Jithed t hal i the Proj ect wished to secur e the services of a parHcula r TOP SECRET TS '181 884 Copy§ I FOP 8A61X 1 3 individ 1al a bou t whos e rel eas e the re wa s some ques tion CiWH woulci a dvi s e the A DDP A who woul d exarnine the c as e with the DD P O bviously ca rte bla nche could not b e given but a rapid proe durc was established for resolu tion o di icul t c ases In this conn ection i t is not c l e ar if th e Survey in para graph 1 on pag e 41 i s critici ing a fa ih l e to give carte blancbc but i£ so the condusions suggest a n organizational con cept with which we disa gr ee The Chief of the Clandestine Se rvicc Personnel Offic e CSPO a l s o had m eeti ngs with the A DDP A i n which the DCI 's vie ws vere disc ussed at l east one of whic h is recorded in a Memorandum for the Record date d 22 April 1900 a od t h e CSP O arra nged a proc e lu re w i th W H-4 whereby personnel r equests w r c brought to him e ither by name 01· by skill req'4irement then by hint to th a ppro- priate Pane l and finally to the e le m e nt in question The under• standing was a s i ndi c a ted a bove chat d ifficult cas e s would be brought to the DD P via the A DDP A tbc purpo s e of this 1 ro - cedure x •as to a void the need for WH-4 negotiating dir e ctly with other clcm mts regard ing personn el thereb elimi nating a ny potent ial divisioo al conflicts On 16 May 1960 COPS sen t an EY' £S ONL Y m emorandtun to S taff tnd Division Chiefs and Chief Ope rational Service s i ndi e a ting the need of WH for cler ical assi stance as well a$ i n p osi og TS #18 1884 Copy# TSP fJCCi J 4 certain requirements on the addressees fo r help in th is request A copy is attached a Annex B Again on 25 Augost 1960 a t the DD P weekly st a meeting attended by Division and Sta Chiefs of the CS COPS in o dcr to re- empha size the above a nnou nced that the DD P wanted to be sure that VH-4 was receiving enough first class people to i ssu re success in their efforts The sol ution aru Oll ' Ced was 11 Y• e have sta £ed Wl•I-1· thus far without seriously int er fc ring with other operations and activities The s e riousness o the ·s ituati on demand your most sympathetic consideration of reques ts for temporary assistan ce LO them They now have about a dozen critical officer vacancies W c have agr eed to having WM- 4 uggest the names of those ofiice rs wh-om they w oul d prefe1· to hav e pa i-tic 1lar jobs l'he CS Pex-sonnd O lice will be in tou ch with you on the narnes produced by WH- 4 and on o thers identified as being qualified If you can possi bly s pare them for the next few months I urge you to do so H you focl you cannot spare them pleas e tell the CSPO your reasons Mr Barnes Mr Bi ssell or I w ill then attem p t to judge the relative p r iorities and mak a decision l' especting such assignments 11 ln view oi the o regoing th ere can be little doubt that senior CS officers knew of tJte CIA policy to suppon WH - 4 in its personnel r equ i reroen ts The s uccess or a ilure oi the applicati on o the policy· is of course a mattex o judg·rnent Obviously no personnel roster '8f 0C6 P Et TS i 8 1884 Copy# I TOP S CRBT 5 is ever wholly saticfac tor y Conversely no proj ect can ta ke oflicer r egarcilesa o J other cotnmit-m nt s The attached r oster it is believed e st ' blishcs that on an impar ti al j udg ment the projec t· was s er ved w ith officers o experienc e and competence Obviously the requirements of the Project wer e unusual and urgent bu t a review of the pace at w hich o fiiccrs i e atall not coO tra ct were assigned and det ailed has revealed no mor e tha n the usoaJ problems e g a re-que s ting officer wanting hel p mor e r ap i dly than provided a nd some junior officers being less qua lilied than desil ' ed On the whole however assigmne ot s and details were kept prett · w e ll up - to -date and t he calib er adequate tn a numbc r of cases t he p erform a nce 0 £ many officer s res ponded to the challenge o the p roject and consequently was better than m igltt have been anticip ated In this co nnection it might be noted that despite the enorin ous time dem l nds inconveni ences famj ly sep a J·ations and other difficulties impose d o n p e rsonnel the p roje ct's record for $i Ck leave o r abs e nteeism was so good a s to be spectacular It might be not ed th at the Cs PO o ne of the f ew seni o r office rs w i th whom the LG o r hi s representatives had a ny dis cussions on thi s matter a$ked the chic£ inv e stigating officer what ofiicers a'9I SL Old 4 TS #181884 Copy eI •f8JO SESHtsJ- 6 were conaidel' 'ed poor One PM officer was named The CSPO then d ¢monst3•a t ed tl1at althoug h this o Uicc r was di$ liked by some people he had been spcc iti cally requested by WH-4 had performed extremely well and in fact wae cont inued i n WH- 4 alt er the misfortun es of April 196L because of his pcrlormance in the project No more was then said about this individual but no other e xam J le8 were oLCcre-d despite a specific req ues t for names 1n view of the foregoing it is sugges t ed that t be Survey a llegations be a t the very l east aet a side until specific evidence be l ntroduccd to which an answer can be addressed T h o Cew m inor points lls tod by the S- 1rvc 'Y r ega rding per sonnel are discussed below l A basic mi take was ma de by filling key s pots early without Tealizing how much the project wou ld g row with the r esult that oUicers often cndad up supervising three to four times a s many pe op le as orgina lly a nticipated The inference of supervisors beyond t heir depth is dear l t c n only be said thal s upervision during the project in no place seemed to require c hange due lo inabiliL'y Moreover it must be T8f 0 88lit00 TS # 181884 Ccpy # --cp 8fl 8ac x 7 rec -ogniz ed that in a fast moving situatior an informed junior olficer who h s Jived with the p r oject often ie more cffcctive ihan an uni nfor m e d t1cnior o flicer At any rat e fur tMr factu a l suppo rt o the criticism must be produced before any more thorough answer c an b e provided 2 None o f the throe 0S- 16 o£ficers 3a s igncd to the p roject was given top-level managerial r caponsibilitiea Page 42 para l Actually there were four CS-16 oiliecra with the pr oject One however was deto iled r a special assignme nt One o the other th rec was Chie C of Station Havana until the Embassy was closed i n J u'I Htry 1961 when he l eturned and became the senior 'M detling with th e C bon poli tlcal c lements Ano1her GS-16 was Deputy Chief of Station in Mia m i The Cbid in Miami wa 1 junior to him i n grade but he had been with t he p Toject from the star t having initially been the project deputy he w s a n old hand in the WH area and W'al pcrfonning well All including the GS-16 a greed that the Deputy Chief o Station Mia Tli w a e a ppropriate Cor the GS-16 oi nce it w as a high e nough post to permit him to be effective and still did not upset a situation by changing pur cly for rea sons o g rade an officer performing well in favor of a latio Z QP G 0H£t TS 1181 88 Copy I I '1f6 SLCKEI 8 comel ' v •ho was not an a1·ea expert The thh·d GS- 16 was a DD I offi cer not a DD P office r who performed well in a responsi bl e overt post T o have made him a manager w ould ha ve c reate d problems s ince he did no t ha vie operational experience 3 Of the 42 officers ''ho3ding U e principal operational j o bs in WH- 4 in Grade GS-lZ thr ough GS-15 a la rge p ercentage v rere ra ted in a low position in t h e Re lative R etln tion L ists Paras 4- 5 page 42 Without analyzing s p ecific cas es it is subm itted that these statements a re compl e tely deceptive a s possible evidence of poo1· quality of perso nnel a The Tea sons a r e The t nking o individ uals undel' the a bove procedure in m any c ases ha d nothing to do with competence or abilit in giv c n assignments Rather the c riteria w ere the needs of the ser - vice over the y e a r s to come A h i gh g1 ade s pecialist in a Little needed fieJd the t'efore might be ra ted very lo w A specific ex ampl c is a paramilitar y office-r as s igned to WH 4 from another division w ho served in the project with distinction N eve rtheless s ince bis par e nt division had no foreseeable need or su h o ficer s be was r anked low in t h e list More generally a similar r esult rnight well be true of p araroil ita 1·y officer s s ince the feeling is that the A gencyJ partic llad y 01 sz ett-err TS #18 1884 Cop y J J I 8F 9 181 ls i' 9 post- C uba will in all likelihood have few similar proj ects in the futu re Su -el y this view would be reflected in initial lists prepa red by Divisions and would tend to be correcte d as necescary during the elaborat e policy level r eview of the lists b Ranking i s •c ompetiti ve and since many of the project 0£fi ce1·s were not WH £H eers they were ranked i n the retention lists initially by WH o llicers in competition with WH officer s or long term Wl-l assi gnm ents O n thia sealt they might well c ome out badly regardless of their compc t c nce for the Cuban Proj ect In the firsc pla c e i paramilitary o ffi cers th eir speciality is not in future dema r'l d and if not WH area specialists they would be po6r C 6mpe i1or s with a rea specialists looking to a long te rm foture fhey m ight howevei have been e X cellcnt office rs in many Cuba n P 1 o j ect assignmcilts withou t a tea knowledge c T h e lists were substaQti ally revised fo r the above and othex reasons in subs equent review s Consequ ently by tl 1 emseJves t11 ey are of little validity Again ther efor e i t is recommended tha t at t 1-i e very least the Survey's all egations in thi s respect be set aside until a more et ai led e xamination i s possible c overing the specific individuals il' l que$t ion 1 hy they wer e ra ted low on initial l ists did th eir ratings change on TOP SEGP il'f TS #181884 Con ll I 10 later li s ts and mo r e speciCically what r cla tioo the r ating for retenti or purposes bad t o t he p erfo r Jnance on the Cuban P roject Obviousl y t he reverse might also be true i e an offi cer could r eceive a top ratiog or rete ntion purposes but still h ave poo r qualities or the type o f Ut'- geot rather peculiar requir ements existing in the Cuba n P r o ject 4 A ve1·y few proj ect per sonnel spoke Spanish or had L atin - American background knowl edge Pa ra 9 page 44 Obvious ly i t would b e d esirable for most o£ icel'S in a project of this sort to ha v e botl the lan 'Uagc and a rea knowledge A dmittedly the Agency has not achieved t his c i pa bility to the extent d esired and pJ ·oba bly never will It must also be r ecognized that in special p rojects like Cuba the p erso mel detna nds must b e m e t in s ubstantial part by assi g-n ments ba$ed o n functiona l experience e ven though th e individual a ssigned l a ck a area Ol language qualifications A s to the P roj ect i tself the nee d £or Spa ni$h s houl d also be a nalyzed Obvi ously it was nece 8sa ry primar il1• fox thos e dealing with Cu bana Not a Jl s uch officer s howe ver needed Spanish sinc e fo r example P M inst ructors were quite abk to perform eJ ectivc l y w i thout the language s i nce they taught by showi J1g and xample Actually the re were Spa nish $pea king t r ainers in Cua tern a la s o thi s point is made on ly for purp ses of analysis Moreo er c he training j o b both on the ground a nd i n the air was nev e r an issue as it was gene ra lly conceded t o have been excellent 'Q P 806R 2ft T S il 81881 C opy# I oef' SEC £ i 11 As to others dea ling with the Cubans the officers workin g with the Cubnn politicians wore aU l1 1e nt i n Spanish wHh one exception a s enior officer who had no difiiculty dealing v i th the Cubans in E ng• lish o nd who was relied on ver ' h e avily by many o the senior Cuba no His lack o Spani c h therefore did not p revent his achleving a position or peraona l conCideocc The of£icers in propaganda had native Spanish and in addition the pul licationa the newspaper s a nd the radio scripts wer e w·rit-ten and produced by Cubans who in t he e a se of most o the n ewspapers and publications had run a nd produced the s ame items in Cuba immcdio tely prior to defecting T he senior Fl and Cl oUic e rs had fluent Spnnish ln Miami a l o liccr with native Spanish orsa nized a corps of 3S to 40 Cuban s into 3 CJ organhation of considero ble competence Even the Survey called this a rc1ponsivc and usc ul instrument Para SS page 19i paras 57 - 58 page 20 C WH-1 and Jut Paramill ary Chief hall fluent Spa ioh as did the Chier in Mia mi 1·0 ge o er•Hze o the sixteen senior mana- gerial officer s list e d in Annex A eleven had fluent Spanish During the la at four m onths tJie P roject opet 3-tcd its own Sign al Center and its own Ca Ole Secreta ri et providjng 24-hour c overage 1 o o the th r ee post - duty Duty Officer s had fluent Spani h Also a 'fra nslation TS HI 81884 Copy 9 I r c a 02 1 lZ Uni t of seven people wa s d e veloped to p rovi de 24•hour cove-rage o dir ct communic 3 tions h ca n be as ser ted t hat Spanish s peo kcrs were available or all needed uses Some inconvenience may have been caused on occa s ion due to not h aving even m ore Spanish s pea kers bu t a lack of adequate Spanish speak ers cannot honestly be alleged as a ground for any majo failure in the project 5 Some of the people who served the p roject o n contt-act w e r e incompetent Para 10 page 44 Undoubtedly th is $1 atcrne ot has some basis in fact but sine ' r o more ia J So id and the consequences to the P r oj ect not explained a reply is not possibl e in any m ana geable context 6 Regarding the improper h 'ls little to say Ufle oi skille d p e rsonnel the Survey Inadequat e use of GS- 16's i di s cussed above The only other comments in the Survey are a In a rtumber of ins t a nces Uioue e enior operating per• sonnel in the field stations that di d spci k Spanish had to be interrupt ed in their regular duticg mer ely ir1 order to act as interp reters '' Po 1·a 9 page 4-4 This is answer ed above b ln m 3-ny insta nce a ease o fficers were usod as 'hand- holde rs I for agents and tecb nica l $peci3list8 as 6tevedorcs Surely any case officer does some handholding 11 Wherein this was particu l3r ly serious in the proj cc't i8 not known nor indico ted by t ho Sul vey J'QP CEGCt T 1'$ #181884 Copy f T9P SECflET 13 The stevedore referenc e is elsewhe r e expanded by the Su - _ ·-ey to the effect thot the technical and U-aiu ing abilities of several Navy Chief Pett - Office1 s who we re borrowed in connect i on with wo rk in certain or the Project's ships were g-x-ossl - misused as much o their time was spent at st evcdore or deckhand labor Paras 33 - 34 pages 120-121 It is quite true that som e N a vy personnel on duly with the Agency were made available b ' their components to represent the Agency interests and keep an eye on maritime tepai rs and modifications Unquestionably they w e r e not folly employed though th eik' presence at m oments was very i m por tant In all likelihood therefore this was a situation where some inefficiency of employment resulted One C hi ef Petty Officer was upset by the assignment and asked to be returned to ltis regular duties Others b o wevcr accepted the situation s spetial and hu gely unavoidabl e and sel·ved without complai l' lt as l ong as their e x p eriencc was needed c The Navy Cap t a i n assigned at Ag ncy 1·equest to the P r oject to l lnd Je maritime activity w as r eported to have been not entirely h aPP ' with hi$ brief Agency tom· ln any event J1e was another example ot poor l ndling of people i n this p x-oj ect and he was not 'given a cha nee to solve the problems of m ritime operatiol s Paxa 40 Page 123 It is not know who 11 reportcd 11 the N a vy Capcain Ca ptai J Scapa as not entirely happy but we are surpri$ed a t the statement s i nce Agency TS NISIS81 Copy CI OP SE €Pi 6Cf 14 officers close to him thought that he left in a pretty good frame of mind Of course it mvst be remembered that his experiences might w ell have caused $Ome discouragenient He was flown on shor t noti ce from bi$ shipboard Na vy a$8ifJnmcnt to deta il with another Agency with whi ch he had no previous experience He arr i ved in February 1961 so that th e proj ect w s well a long a nd be had and under p1 essure llO fit himself to it in a great hurry He was however able to provi le substa ntial help and his ass ignment was distinctly wor thwhile He examined such ships a s tbe p toject had w ent to Vieques and inspected the Cuban cr ew train- ing spent a substantial amount of tim e at Project Headquarte r s working on the maritime a spects of the Trinidad and Zapata plans and finally at companied the Par amilitary Chief to Puerto Cabezas to p i rticipate in the final b d efing of the B1·iga de aod the ships 1 re ws Therea ft e r he returned to Project Headquar ters and spent night and day in the --wc1 r and opera ti ons t ooms working on all maritim e aspects of the final days of the effo rt Such employ mcnt of Captain Sca 1 a it is i ubmitted was sensible and constructive l'OI SL 3-R fi'Ii TS #18 884 Copy ii I I' w I I I ' a 0 I i l l I I l if Tl VII - • ANNEX A BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY OF CER'rAlN SENIOR OFFICIALS Jacob D Esterline E 0 D February 1951 Chief Cuban Task Foxc e Mr l ' sterline's prior Agenc y experience included an assigwnent J S a senior offi cial on the auti-Arbenz p ·oject in Guatemala and · • Mr Esterline had He has 01 nce · een assigned as hief of Operations WH Division During World War 11 he had 2 0 months with OSS including two tours b ehind the l ines in Burma He was a Captain and commanded guerrilla units up to battalion strength 1951-5 2 Chic Inttructor a t G lerrilla Warfare School at Fort Benning 1953 Chief Instructor in Guerrilla Warfare · Edward A Stanulis E 0 D September 1952 Depu9 Chief Cuba D Task For Ar Stanuli s served in s u ccession as Chief Plans and Programs Chief of Operations a nd oltim ' ltely as Deputy Chief of the Cuban T a s k Force Hi s military service v ·as with the U S Army from 1942 to 1950 wherein he p r ogressed in rank from 2 nd Lt to Major leg He is now permanent ly retired for combat incurre d disability loss oi His a ssigri ents prior to combat duty included i' sst Reg Intelligence OHicer Eas tern De ense Command R egimental Adjutant lnstructor Intel School Asst Plans and Ops Officer Training OHicer ln Ia11try Tactics in combat ETO with the rank of Captain and Major lle serV'ed as Comma nding Officer of an Wan tty C o Rifle with tactical control oC battalion att acking eletnel ts H aving been w•wi ded h e was a POW or six m onths On r eturn to active duty· in Washing ton he stuved as a · M ajor in Public information Divisions of the Army and the Department o De fense unt il his disc harge in 19 50 ron sscnacr TS i 18 188 Copy UI · 1'9 F 6U 6R £I z He b ia a lso had broad e xperien cc in p ublic allairs wr iting editing and publishing His prior Agency experience incl uded n signmcnts to OPC PW P P Sta £ nd PP Sta t Assigned as an instructor and ultimately Chbi6bf H 3dqua rtera Training Ops School CTR Mr Stmulis i nstructed i n and ssisted in the r evision of PP Fl and PM courses R ichal·d D Dr ain E 0 0 Mar ch 1 951 Chie o Oper ationa 1 Cuban Task F orce Mr Drain reported to t he Project from an overseas as signment in where h e was Chief of lnteroal Opcro tione o nd on o ccasio n Hi$ military record include• service aa an o Cicc r w ith the U S Army F'iol d Artiller y Armored His acti v e duty extended from April 1943 io Ma' · 1946 His tra i ning included the Grow d Jt o rccs Intelligence Cout'SC IJ 1 with special emphasis on 0 B and the Artn0rcd Command Hqtrs Combat lntelligence ·Cou rse An ong other assign tr'ltmt s he co11ducted Basic Training servod as Assistant and Ac ting Batt a lion S-3 was an Instructor at the Arroorcd Schoo l and was Batte ry O icer in Advanced Training In combat ETO he aas Forw lrd Observer with a Combat T eam and a P latoon Commander Ni d ecorDtions include the Sllvet' Stal ' and Bronze Star He is a lawyer and practiced in D C prior to Agency EOD His Co erramcnt experience illso included Agency assignmen ts as• Execut ive Ass t to the DD 1 S OUiccr for 0 lC Office o lntellisencc Coordination Scc et a ry Intelligence Advj sory Committee a nd h e wa 3 detached from the Age ncy or two extra•Agcncy assign menu ln the first he served on the White Hou s e Swt of the Planoing Coordination Oroup under Mr Nels on Rockc eUcr In the aecond he served with the Depart ment of State aG a Special A st M ul tilateral Affa ira J ohn F M3lla rd Col 1 USMC E 0 D Augusl 1957 SA Milit arv Cuban To sk1- 'on Prior to his assign mcnt with this Agency Col M allard had served with me 0 fi c or the CNO Assistant Head Na val War Plans Sc c ion His per orr 11 n was outstanding wi th comments iudkat 1 ng an excellent background o staU experience and profes sional capabilities Noted as diligent thorough and posscasing mature judgmont He ha l e a t lier served a a Aa is tant Plnn i O ficc r on the x OP s en N P TS i 181884 Copy N - - p £rGRLt 3 staff of tl1e Commander 7L -t Flee l where he also received an outstanding rating and was looked upOn as a 5 urce o strength on the st a ff H3d earl it' ' he en a Battalion Commande r and was r a tcd an outstanding Artillery Bat talion Commande1 Col M t Ua -rd carried the brw1t of Li aiso n with the military services and h eavy rcsponsi bilit with the State Department on military matters £ 0 D June 1951 Chief Intel PM Section Cuban ·rask For Cl reported to the Project from the FI Sta if H i s earlicr aseigi ments bad included that of senior Fl C ase Offi ce in Chief and Ch ie lJlstruc to t Resista o e O r c OTR •He has r eceived numerous commendations or h is pel'formances in Headquarters in the field and in Agency liaiso o activities a His military se rvi ce was wifh the USMC where he served overseas as Bomb Di$pos t l OH i cer from 1943 to 1945 at New Caledonia Guadalcana 1 and Nor thern Solomons He i s a Major in che USMCR Albert C Davies L t Col • USA E 0 D March 1960 DC Intel PM Section Cuban Task F orce At the time of his assignment to the Project Col Davies a regular ir Ianfry o icer had been serving as A rmy·G Z USACARJ B fr o m 1956 He is rated by- his service as an Infantry Staff Officer Sel'ved in the Europe an theatre during Worl d War lJ and in Korea He holds the Silver Star and the Bronze Meda l with two oak l eaf clusters Pt ior to his assignment to USACA iEhe ba d bee n an i nfar try in structor a t Fort L eave n worth Battalion Executive O ficer and Ba ttalion Commander in the Far East and had been a student at the Army Command and G eneral Staff O ice r s Course in Oklahoma Col Davies 1 assignment with the C uban T ask 1- 'o rcc included tl1at o Pos t Command at et ••'B Jnao l-pb '7iiffit1ate''r ity 'lG i nef In tel Unit• PM Section He has broad area fardlia rity'7 ith L a tin Ame rica a nd has some fluency in tile Spal' i sh l 1 gu3ge He i $ currently serving a$ Chief Inte l Research an4 ReporW WJ-l 4 · E O 0 -- ebruary 1952 C Fl Section Cuban Ta k Fore Loter DC WH 4 experience it'l Cludcd ten years wiL'l the Dep trtrncnt of State w i th whom he se r vcd in 'I'egu cigalpa Madrid 1 nd Santiago Chile the r op SC or l '1 'S Ii 181881 Co r y UI I BB ar z x i - 4 latter t wo aa Second Se cretary He has fluent Spani sh Po rtuguese md Fre nch a l d has wide e xper ience in Lat in American affairs • ith a thoi ough knowledge of economic m atter s His WH Division ass ignment s include the o Uowing He is n ow p reparin g to asswne duties of Ralph G Seehafer _E 0 D August 195 DC FI Section Cuban Task Force · i Mc Seehafer CJtte red on duty with the Agenc y in A ugusto 1952 an d h 1s served exclusive l y with V H Divisi on Hi s overseas tourG o dut included an as$ignment as _ He possesses fluent Spanish and a l s o speaks Portuguese and Get·ma n Mr Seehafer took his undel'graduat e degree in Hispanic studies He is noted fo r his deliber ate and untiring e iorts a nd was a source of strength to the $CVC1 '3l seni or officers who served as Chief of the F I Section David A Phillipe E O D Aprit 1955 Or iginally a contra c t agent and _c o ver t ass o cia te inf Mr Phillips became a sta £ employee with the Agency on assig nment to P P S and PP Oper _tions He the n had ass ign merits to the H avana Stat ion and Noted as an outstanding propaga 'ldist with e xceUe ut supervisory qua litie s Mr Phi llips has fluent Spanish w i th excellent area kno'1-·ledge as e videnced by the fac t that he of ten s p ak s publicly on the area including having been on the n r o ' 'O Hall of the Air0 • Phili p A 1-'oomev E O D D ecem ber 1951 DC Pr o p aganda SeCtion Cubau Task F'orce E ntered on duty wit the Agency in Dece m ber L95 1 a nd has had prio r assignment w ith OPC VIE Pla ns and Ops served abr oad as a PP O ps Office r returne d to the l P Staff in Headquarter s and was sexving T QP TCrx T S N1$ J88 4 Copy NI '€P 6i381CL I s with WH 3 a t the time of his ass ignment to th Project He has native Spanish nd poss esses abil ity to h a ndle a tremendous am• u nt of work Matur e j udgment and skill in the p ropaga nd3 f i eld a'r'e only a couple of his a ttrib lt es Jack Hawkins Co1 USMC E O D Octob er 1960 C WH 4 PM Col Hawkins was s e r ving on the Sta ff of M a rine Corps Schoo l Qua n tico Vh·ginia at the time o f his a ppeintment by Commandant USMC to the Cuban ·rask Force tic is a Naval Aca den i y graduate and saw s e rvice in the Phi lippines at Bataan and Co rregid or until taken prisoner Havi ng escaped from his p rison c i mp he j o ined g uerrilla forc es 3nd led r aiding parties in attacks agai nst the e nemy or which a c t ion h e was a warded tho DSC He was l ater awarded a B r onz e Medal Cot ' the O kinaw a cam paign F o llowing World War ll he se r ved as a member o tbe Na val Missi o 1 to Ve nei uela and later as Command ing Officer 1st Battalio n 1st M a ·d ncs in comb at in Korea He was theTe a warded the Silver Star S rve d as an instructor in Oua nti¢o fo- r three years and then as G aJ at Catnp L eJune where he was promo ted to his present rank o f C olone l Col Hawk ins p0$ Sesses nativ e flu ency in S panish He was pel' 'so nally selecte d for the assignment by Ceneral Shoup C -y -tJSMC F r Ml J Ega n Lt Co l USA E 0 D June 1960 C SPU PM WM 'l Col Egan r epor ted to the Cuban 'l 'ask F'or cc with a background of expe tience in Special Forces U S Army He had on ear lier occasion worked in a liaison capacity witlt this Agency and a l ways sho wed a true appreciation of the p eculiar r equir e ments of c vcrt act-ion Serving o riginally as Chief of the S trikes and Plans Unit PM Section Col E gan later p roceeded to Guatema l whe re he assu med command oJ all indigenous Brigade training He held thi s pos ition 'i th the he lp of 3 e w sta £ a nd cont ract e mployees u ntil the a r r ival o f the g roup of Special Foxces Tr a i ners His capaci t • fo r work was o u tst Uld int and the -rating he r eceived by h is senior officer Col Hawkins 1· efle cts Col Hawkin s • re spect for his ab i Litie s Com men ts particular l y pertinen t refer to his ability to influe nce and i J1sp ire the co1'J idence and l 'espect of troops Ernes t Sparks E O D August i 95 4 S r Cuban Task Force Re-p Cuatema Ent e ring on duty as Ops ln $ l ructor in 1952 Mr Sparks departed or Korea with the USMC a nd remained ther e as an IO P M and Maritim e Office r T9P £DSPET T S N181881 Copy# I 6 t·@i§4 UJ'l lil 195 4 Ire lhcn SCJ' ved UJltil 1958 Clrs l as a n Inat 1•uc lo r then Chief o I he M n- itime Or nch latei a i lntHructo r and ultimately Chier of the Ops Course He was commended a 11 aJl outeta nding instructor t nd c pablc administ r itor Prior to hie aGsignmcnt to the Cuban Taak Force he crved as Chid Cover TrahW g where he eel up a nd ad inini tte red a hi hly competent t utori a l o cility His pc dol mance was noted as b elnc outat a ndfog Jacob Scapa Capt USN E O D Februa y 1961 C M ritimc Opa CubM Task Force Atsigncd to the Cvbart 'l a11k Force 38 n Specia l A i Glant for Military Mo tte r e by the CNO Capt Scapa a ppea t d o n the 6Cenc l 11 the late s tages or Project de ·clopmcnt He w as a t the t ime o hi$ assignment on the Stall o lb e Commander Amphibiou6 ·Training Command Atlantic Fleet He had earlier ccrvcd as Comma nding O Hccr of tl e USS W lke and s erved aboard the USS Wisconsin and had b eeu o o lltc S tai of tJ1c Supreme Allied Comma ad At-laoli c Cnpt Sea pa quick ly reviewed o nd rnade hlm $eli fam i liar witlt all m 3ritimc opcrl'ltions and plttns He pa rticipated in pre-invasion bdcling$ and added 3 s igni icant touch of pLofossionali$m to maritime matters TDY visit to Miami Base o review problem of Maintenance Focil ity or LCl 10 and Small Boato On return recomme nded and a asioted in o cqu isition of Na vy CPO's Machinist s Then ascigncd l0 Plans and Strike Operations Uni t where he assisted greatly in liaison with Navy componenU and In preparation o sailing instructions e tc He pattic ipated in final briefings of Bri g dc nd maritin e pcrsonne A c tive during actual strike in War Room Headqua rte r s C 1ban 'fa k Force Currently Cbld ol N a val Mi ssion E c uador E 0 D September 1951 C CI Seclioo Cub u T a1k f'orc Entered o n duty with tho Agency as w ins tructor tn the Ops CourflC n 19S J He re m a ned w i th o·rJt h is asa ignment H e ser ve d Lhcro as a Training nd In·l cl O tce r atid Director o lt l Opc rat t0n$ Returning to OTR in l 956 as on in str uctor in the CE Cl Training Course he was rc$pon ible Cor the training o two G2'1cr vices He became Chief Instructor in u c Agency Ori ent ation Cl Familfarlzation and Secl lrity Ot icc r Co 1rscs AU r epOrts indi cate he wa G a superb ins t ruc tor a good eJt' ccutive nd t upervisor He has be e n no ted a s b etns ll e out stoLi'ding in s truc tor o o t he Hca dqu ac ters Operations Schoo l ac ulty until to 4 SJ J§ ffi@#fuW TS f l81881 Copy I I 7 Ctt'3od Dro lle r F 0 D Sc1 1cmbcr 19 9 E xtremely cap b le PP O Hiccr odgina 1 entl t as ia stic iggreGsive Require• c halJcngc Outstanding PA man Lonf tlmc E E OHicer Ente rCd on duty willl the Age u y in 19 9 in OP i o ur Jn 't- SZ-54 excellent r t e Rc • pect lvc ly C Opo q C _ __ DC 3 c Bernard' E Reichh irdl E 9 D Novc lnbet 1917 P P OHi ce r C lban Task F'orce L i tet C Fl Section Mr Reichhsndt 1 s earlier Agency JSSignmcnts included that o Finance OUi' c er l ater Chief Cover Divis ion He served F'J- Division in and as Chie Bt'anch 1 Headquartero Latc 1· u stgnmeota were to the PP Sta £ and w ith Bro nch 3 WH Di vision Hi s as sign ments wilh the Project i ncludcd a stint of duty at Miami Base before returning to Hcadquart cro a s DC PA Sectio 1 Cuban T ask F o rce He was then moved up a s Plana and P olicy Offt cer and ultlmately served as C hi cC Fl Section Mr Re ichh - 1•dt h as oa tivc flu c oc y in Spa oish Ile is curre ntly i'§tW ' P dor ass ignments included Depa t tmtnt o State Mexico 1931- l comm ended for extraor in ry performance as dependable and ·csourcefvl and h w ing the em ployees • J- Howard Hunt i E O D Novemb er 194q PP PM Cuban Task F o rce Mr Hunt' s bi ckgrOWld prior to his $ervicc with the Age ncy w as workiog 3S a writer and as cor re spondent I or Time lnc He was 1 ssigncd to OPC and served in three 3 year s -was then r eassigned to SE P t t PW Sta H e was then d ii a PJ' OUicer to be ore being el ected 36 He was rated be fore his as s lgnmenl t o t he Cuban Taak Force as having outstanding ability U the coverl aclion Ut ld He is exceptionally talented a nd imagin livc in the PP field His assignf' 'ltnt ln B drew o 1Ut3 nding r eports Mc ha s fJ Jent S panish llll9 or fiW-- - J 70 ' ESGi se TS C 18 188 1 Copy i I rex szcKE 1 8 B H Vandervoo rt E 0 D Septe mber 1947 C Sl Unlt F l D Cuban Task Fo r ee Mr Va ndervoor t•s outstanding military background is well known to all in the Clandestine Services He possesses area knowledge in WE FE a nd WH Divicions and he has good Spaniah He is a competent reporter Eadier perso nnel rcpOr ts not e his cxccptlonal quaU fkatioos for partlcipaLio n in contingency task orcc o peration s He had nlso earlier b een recommended as a Senior War Planner U S Army service rom 1939 to 1946 and w us dischar ged with the rank o f Lt Col He gave out Standing acrvice in the •E'l'0 and was decorated by Gencra G C i vln and flidgcwa y au outstanding WW D B atta-lion Co ' 82nd Airborne Deco rations two DSC's two Bronzc Sta rs three Purple Hea-rts plus Freocb Dutch Belgian Decor ations Robert R eynolds E 0 D 0ctobe-r 1949 COB Mio mi Bas e Mr Re ynolds ' career has been spent l argely with YtH Division i nning w ith his a n OSO He served in • • and later as - Mr Reynolds had returned to WH 3 at lhc time of his assign ent to the Project and was one of the fir st senior o Ci f r S so asatgn ed Serving i r s t a - DC Cuban Tai k Foi ce he wau b ter 1 ransfer-1•e d to Miami Base ns Chief of Base M r Reyuolds posses ses £lucnt Spanish abiliLy TOP 8 13CiAET TS 1181884 Cop ' N I c r cnc r VU AnnexB 16 May 1960 EYES ONLY l iEMORANDUM F OR Chie f s o f A ll Special Sta Us and Opera ting Divisions SUBJ ECT Clerical Assistance or WI-I D v jsio n L C ert in activit ies of the WI- Division requi•e experienced clerical personnel It is desit'ed that all CS componen ts cont ribu te to this effor t to tlle ma ximum e x ten t possi bl e 2 Requir ement s no w exist fo r £irst- cl3 ss st-enographe r s and typi sts 1 grade lnnna te r ial who have h ad -enetal experience in the Clar destine Services £or tempo ra ry detail to WH Oiv isi• n £o r an indefinite period It is request ed tha t yo pr o vide at lea st one s1 1e h person from your component Please notify tl1e C landestin e Ser vi ces Personnel O iice Ext 454 1 of tour selectio1 so that the necessary arr angements m a y be made The CSPO will notify you several fa •S in a d vance of t he da t e when your nominee should r eport to WH for dut y Rich ard He lms C hi ef of O per a tions DD P 6 BC KL f ' -- · ' · I • 'i'9 SJJC -£ VU1 THE POLITICAL FRONT AND RELATIONS WITH THE CUBANS One of the c onclusions of the Survey as stated i n para- 3 on page 113 was 11 a s the project grew the Agency r e d uced the exile leaders to the stab of puppets thereby losing the advantages of their active participation This swnma rii es the Survey 1 s general crit icism of the handling of the Cuban leaders ·rwo more specific criticisrns a r e made at least by inference in the discussion o f this matter in the body of the Survey The fi rst was that the decision in November 1960 to co1lsider requeste for paramilitary aid from groups other than the FRD complicated relations between Proj ect case officers and the FRD leader s have resulted i n some diffusion of cilort11 • 11 and appears to It aho 11 scriously hampe ted progr e ss eowa rd FRO unity s harpened i ot ernal F RD 3 ntagonisms and contributed to the decline in strike force recruiting efforts 11 • The second criticism is that th Agency prevented close cootact bet ween tbe political le-a ders fi-rst of the FRO an d lat e of the CRC and the military forces in t r aining in Gu a tem a la The Survey states para 36 page 92 that 11 th is w as probably a mistake and an w u eason abl e i nte rference in tbe Cubans' management of t1 eir o 'T'I afiairs Controlled cont-act between the FRD a nd the troops w ould have done much to impl'ove morale and motivation o f the troops and make the training job eaaier0 • TOP CSiiRL TS #18 1884 Copy _L_ ·an SP 1h o Ji z A s will be shown in the follow ing paragr aphs the gene i -alized criticism that the exile leaders were b -cated a s pupp ets has little i any b asis in fact A f i t o the two more specific c r i ticisms the facts are corr ectly sta ted but as explai ned below t here w e re plausible reasons foiboth decis ions and even wit h the benefit of hindsight thes e d e cisions appear t o have been wise att ached to them This does not mean that no disadvantages T he Survey is correct i n pointing out that rela t ions wi t the FRD were strained by t he deci8ion to support c ert ain non- FRD gt oups and that the lack of contact b etween L e polit i c al l eaders and the Brigade gave dsc to d ifficulties on both sides ¥that is omitted from the SUl'vey ' s discu ssion however is any expl a nat ion of the consi derat ions that made these two d ecisions seem n cessa ry l et a lone any a ttempt to balanc e the risks and costs of d iffe r e nt courses of a ction against the disadvanta g es o those act ually pursued The press has carr ied n ally stories especially after the events of April 19 61 citing the sent iments of Cuban exiles t o t he effoct that t hey w ere dis enchanted wit'h their role in the afia ir It is understandabl e that a fter the de f eat thes e Cubans would look for scapegoat S an alle ge t at they bad been used as puppet s lt is on the other ha nd disturbing that ·ran SP91EDI TS 1181884 Copy _ _ 3 these Cuban utt erances in the press arc accepted a s fact io the Su l 'vey parti culat ly when considerable documeot at y evidence to the cont r a r y w as ava ilable t o the Sur vey team Before analy ing the S·ur vcy 1 s above concl usions it is important to ex amine arious aspects and compl exities of what tbe Survey ca Us exile Leadexs 11 • First one roust d iUe rent ia te between the politic al and milita r y leaders Second one must r ecog nize the pr essures w hich existed witMn each of these two groups what the t e rm 11 Third one s hould und erstand l eadershi p 11 meant within t he Mia mi C uban exil e community From the very b eginning of the Project it wo s evid ent that there w er considerable diiforen ces o o p inion- - o n a l most all imp-or tant quei tioo s a mong Cuban ex ilea of va r yi ng political hades and leadetshi p c apabili ties Clea rly there was unanimity ou t he desiJ a bility and need to overth1· o w Castro but d ur ing the great debate on bow to accomplish this two main t rends be came dis cer nibl e the activists principally the military c l cmen1 in this category w anted to light Political conside r ation$ mc a ut little to this 8egment o exiles wh o believed political s olutions w ould evolve a uto m tically after Castro ' s demise As a matter of fact they had the g r eatest cont e-m pt for 'the pol icia ns 11 • rrer SEC t er On the o ther hand the TS fl81884 Copy_j_ ran t P lon 4 politically- m i nded exiles t'e ai ized t hat the o v rthr ow of Castro wi thout speci ic 9lans and p r eparat ions t o fi ll the V lcuw n created by his d e par ture would be an im mense e rt'or 'I hey agreed with the a c t ivi $tS that the over- thr ow could only be accomplli shed by violent a cij on b ut they feil red that during tl e fighting one or mor e ol the military leaders would emerge whos politico econo mic p os t ures were unknown quantit ies and who- -in the exuberance of victor y - -might be accepted b y the popula tion ae the new polit ical chief of Cub a Consequent l y th e p olitical and m ilitary exile e lement s grew a part despit e the existence of bonds of lriendshi P and loyal ty betw een ind ividuals i n one element and p eople in t he o ther T hus when speaking of c xile l eaders a distinc t ion must be made between politic al and m iUt axy l eadership Also wit hin the po lit ical and militar y g roups a h i gh degrNi o f competition existed Per sonal a mbition8 wer e rampant E a ch individual claimed large r followings in side a nd o ut side Cuba than the next man each tried to be little the pot enti al and capa bilities o f the other each proselyted the oth er's a sset s In the earl y autumn of 1960 over s i xty different anti-Cast r o polit ical g r o u ps were act ive and ocal1 a lm os t a 11 of them in the Miami a r ea T hey r anged in s ize il'om an individual exile with three o r fou r p ersottal henchme n to s i zea ble bodies with 'FGP OD BR ST T S Nl 8 1884 Copy_j_ T O P SiBG t I 5 Gubst aJ1Ual organiza tions s tUl active wi tbln Cuba it$el The Agency representatives were in cont n ct with ma ny oC these and its con t a nt c- Uor t was to Induce as many groups and individuals a s possible to support a broadly bated unified rno roment which would exclude only the s upporters of Cas t ro on the left and U1 c Datistia nos on the right T h o Agency e xerted pr e ssure on the Cubans throughout the whole period f r om ruid- 1960 up to the invasion in only two way• to promote the greates t and most inclusive unity of effor t and to promote the greatest f easi ble effectivene ss Dccisiona however as to who ahouJ d be the dominant leader n nd what Ute political plat form of the opposition should be were studiously left to the Cuban themselves D espite the p resvurc fot UW t y it r om n c l true up t o the olection by the Cubans of J ose Miro Cardona as prc1ident of the CRC 1n March l 9• that exile Cuba n le adersbip--i ta ken in the broadest meaning 0£ the term-- consisted of tlH spokesmen o a great number of anti- Castro g'roups whose p rom inence irnporLa n ce a nd capa billtics for active pa tlcipation in the operation varied greatly o nd whose claim for leadership remained highly controversial I the term i s to collllote the F RD Ex ceutive Com m itt ee then it is highl y pertinent t o keep in m i 1d the b arrier between the Politicta ns and the 11 M illt arists 11 mentloned above and the very TOP GDGfl8lf TS #1 8 18S4 Copy_ _ TOP ss c an·1 r emarkablu chec ks the FRO Executive Conun ittcc membe o i mpooed on e ach other For rather obvious reasons they attempted to m3kc the F RD an Exclusive Clubtt by rcstTicting i£ not cloaing r 'lembcrship la i t and the r insist ed on a system of parity throughout all FRO w orking e lements that is to s iy that eacJ1 Executive Com mitt cc member placed the same number 0£ hi• olJowers as did any one 0£ hit fellow member on any working group This concept o f leadersh ip--not surprising in exile politics and aomewhat rcmh U1cent of pact Cuban history and practices- bad 0£ course its efiect on dynamic o ction and puts the term leade s bip in a somewhat dillerent context Moreove r the U S and Ute Agency did not feel that a different concept could be forced on the Cubans As the pace oi the build- up a n d ol curron t opet-ations i cceleratcd in t he autwnn o 1960 it been m e increasingly apparent that aoy approach to the ef ectivencss which w 11 the second of the two o bjective a 0£ Agency pressure would require a hiuher degree o control over and direction ol the anti Ca1tro movement by the Agency tl1t n ha d rigiD lly be en hoped T he Cuban• n e ver did succee d in creating a Cuban organization sufficiently free of internaJ divisions and competently enougp staffed to perform tho rapi d ly expa ndlng operational t n8k6 Radio bro i d casts had to be organized publica l on• rranged and propaganda ma t c r ia 1 i 8 P 060fi'f TS #181884 Copy-t- T OP SEGPFT 7 prepared trained Paramilitary p e r so1 J el h i d to be TCCru itcd screen d and Boat• had to be procured crewed and maintained Air crews had likewise lo be selected a nd t ' Ued and air operations mounted bases had to be built in Gualemala t sk of logi1tlc support Two 'there was the large a nd continuing All o these tasks wo lld have Md to be performec in one orm or another even a the majot cmphaais had continued to be on the internal re • istao cc rather than on the preparation o a atrikc force The FRO never ca me close to 1 cbieviug the capability to take the maj or initiative in planning directing or conducting these activit iee The hope cntc rta lned in the summer o 1960 that the F RD would soon evolve int o an orgWzation 1 •bich could take incrcaaing responsibility o the dit-ectioo 0£ tho effort relying on the Agency mainly £or fioa neial and logistic support and for some help in trainlug prove i completely illusional It ia fair to say that by mid-autumn of 1960 the choice was between a dcg rec of initiative and control by the Agency recogniz ed at the time to be w1dcsirable tt-ad as the on Ly eai ible alternative the abandonment of any serious e ort to accomplbh the end in view Againal this background one can exa mlne whether tbe E RD's political a nd military c lement s were r lduced to tb e status of puppet$ o nd whet her the advantages oi their active P lrlicipation wa• lost by this TOP £'i CPET TS b118188 4 Copy _L JJE P 6E€RB 1t' 8 1 The FRO e lit lca l e lerncot a From the oulSc t the basic principle was established to respect the i ndepende nce of the Proj ect 's C uban collaborat or a and for n ll in tents and purposes t o treat and de al with them as equals no orders wc-r t o be iss ued r esults wer e t o b-e accomplished by pe't'S uasion and by th e application oi normal gene rall y a cc eptcd practice o political int e rcour•• The 11 - 12 May 1960 New Yo rk meeting which r esulted in the ormat ion o the FRO is but one exampl e of the applica tion of tb i e Agenc y• - postur e Agency repreaco tives served as ho u or the a1•embled Cubans stated unequivocally the view that ormatioo o a uni a ed opposi t ion to Caet o wae strictly a C uban affair ra nd then wlth lr cw leaving it to the delegates to enablisb their organi2 ation in terrn 1 upon wlticb they could agree l The sta fJing of t he F RO working e le ments and the initiation of activities via those elements v •as in he hands of the Cubans who wer e n ot obliged to check their m oves with their U S contacts 1n fa cl tbc inclusion 0£ Aurcle no Sanchez Arango i n the E x ecutive Committee on 10 June 1960 which took place without Agency consultation and w l s at tha t t im e a t l e a s t c onsid e red an undea rnbl e development i s another example of the freedom of action the Cubans enj9yed It might also bo s aid that Sanch ez A r ango n ev er had any a scts of any kind to oUer T OF SZCR l T' TS 1181884 Copy_ _ 'l 8 12 Bir GP E T 9 He bad a 1o ngs tn nding fricndahi p with Pepe F ig ue res of C s la R ica a nd re s ident Betancourt of Vcoczuela whlch enabled him to muster some pr essur e in the early d ay• or a high position ln view however of his tack of followi ng his r cslgn at lon was of no 1ignificancc w hnboev e r c ontrary to the statement of the Survey Para 16 page 85 c From t hc mornent the FRO was formed io M ay 1960 in New York the Cubans were awa re o the impor tance attribut ed in the early stages of the Project b ' the r U S contacts to having FRO Hcad tuartcra moved to Mexico The Cubans oppos ed this move £or a variety of reasons--moatly person al and some from their view -point political H ad the Agency tre a ted it s count e rparts as puppets t his move could have been a ccomplished within a matter of weeki However i n oplte of considerable p re ss es on the Agency the p rinciple of tactful persuasion was relied upon and it was not until August 1960 th at the FRD got to Mexico and then it was only for a s hort time d fhe e 1ta b lhhment of FllO bra nch offices In nu rncrous La tin American countries was accomplished by the FRO Executive Committee with U S conta cu merclr playing an advisory role e The a o1·c mentiooed seJJ imposed s ystem o f parity and c t'unning the FRD by C ommittee resulted i n lees d ''tla mic ac tlon than was TQP SECRET TS #18 1881 Co1 y_1_ TOP SEG t'f t 10 des i rable A partne rship with di vel'g ent vic wa among th e f O rlncrs i s not the best mecha ni s m Cor dcclslve action Thus U S conta cu uggestcd in September l 960 the crea tion of the position of an f RD General Coordinator a suggestion accepted in principle by all Cubans conce rned Tlte Cub ans how ever wnnt id their U S coUe a gues to dccla1·e th1 ir p refe reoec1 £o-r a particular person Again Lhis was not done because of L ae principle of non- U S incer er enc e in strictly unilateral exile Cuban affairs The exile internal wa rfare on thi s l eadership issuo n ssumcd rather r emarkable propo rtions bot finally the ltRO Executiva Comxnit tec selected Antonio de Varona at General Coordinator on 27 September 1960 The concept o permjtt ing the FRO Cuban to run t heir own show ru • much as possibJ o coupled with t heir own preoccupation on mending thci-r political Ie ncc1 and creating their own political machines caused m ny tact ical dif icut1les to those Agency cleme nte ehargcd with daywlo-day pt opaganda a ctlv1des whose successful i m plcment itioo hinged on immediate net ion without pnot racted ncgotl3tfons on each deta ll Thu$ of necessity unilateral Agcocy operations bad to be created lan substan tia 11 all the action fiel d s e g propaganda intelligence collection param i litary which were impoea lble t o concea l from the FRO •n e FRO leadership resented what the y ons i iercd competition and demanded 'J 90 $138ULI ·rs n1s1aa4 Copy _j_ TOP t 'sP T II exclusive control of these acfr· -itic s they also d manded thal the FRD be the only cha nnel for U S de a liogs with any segment of the internal Cuban oppos ition o r the C uban cxH communit y O n the latte r point the Ocpar t mcnt 0£ State did not agree on th e former the Agency could not acquiesce beca use or operational considerations Moreover on the or mer poiot there wo a a stroDg foe ling t oughout the U S Government that i t would be wrong to permit the F RO to be in a positioo to r ule out a uy Cuban elements which might h ave usable int ernal Cuban assets It was clear at l eas t by D ecember l 960 tha t tho effort to b1·oad en tll e membeJ s hip of the F RD to the point where it Included aU political cceptable elements of the oppositJon had failed ind that the c fori of i ts members to uso it to advance thei r o wn poliHcol for t unes within the exile comm unity was resented All c l ements o the U S Government were agreed that it could not be an exclusive chosen in strument with a monopoly of governme utal support Th ese pro b lemo were cer tainly not the product o coercion g The iuability of tha FRO Cuba n1 again-- becau se of their in ess a nt preoccupation wi th political advantage to est a blish an e fecthre param ilitar · recr uitiog mechanism within th e Project deadline called or the uliliz 1 tion of Cub n oi'ficei-s and men outside t he FR D c b anneL T9P iii'Pt'T TS ii 81881 Copy _ _ TOP EOR S 12 T his acLion w o e in line with tbc t ealltl es oI the sit uation Le • tho in ability of the political elements to t ick le the rnilita1 y tasks as speedily and e J1cctive l y o s neccs u · y and the a or emcntioned unwillingness of the military o r activists to accept the poUtica l l eader1Jh ip Only a tor the •lection oJ Miro Cardooa ae CRC Prceident did the Liber allon Army t rnpport a nd accept the politic l st ru cturc Thus political persona litiee retained their independence i n their apecialty and the milita ry and activist worked --with the guidance of U S military specialiets -in their s If closer coordioati on bad been possLblc b e twc m tho polit ical and the nill ltary it would clca1 ly have been desirable Only the political urge ncic1 o an act ual attack wore su llicient to achieve any real unity and this was in many wo ys a mirage and a Hsometi m thiog 1t is true as stated in the Survey that the Agency interven ed o ctively t o prevent visits bt the polll lc n l l ead et s to th e t ro inlng c amps In December and January and that this was deeply t'esent-ed by the political leaders lt is also true that th i s lack of contact with the polilica l leadership l eft tbe Cubo n military personnel unsure of w hat and for whom th were golng t o fiCht even though being acti viets not political scientlets ihey- w ere gcnc 1·ally satisfi ed w i th 3 mere Down with Ca stro 11 slogan There were howeve r the most peci ic and u rgent t'easons for following 4 0P SFCRF P - T S 1 181884 C o py_ _ _ 1O t C 0iWi 13 this policy During these months as t hc crucial role of the s trike fotce wa$ rccogni z ed by all concerned the competition between the political leaders r o secure control of It was at its max i rnum V i rona used the FRD recruiting machinery to try t o insure a preponderance of loyal pei soo ncl that w ould be accep 'lable t o a nd have some loyalty t o him Other members of lhe CRC were eqU JJ ly a nxious to insure the inclusion of rec r uits loyal to tbcm Moat but not all of the FRO leaders resented the inc lusi on of men who had not been supplied thr ough their i-ecru itaumt machiner y ow1 The FRD leadership and later sonic members of the CRC were determined to t r y to dhplace the senior m ilitary offic ers of the Brigade with f o litica 1 appointees acceptab le t o them During the £out months before the inva sion no one of the politic a l leaders could bave been aUowed to vi sit the C J mps alone without accusations of fa vorit i1m Meanwhile the Cuban military leaders ln train i ng and the Ameri can t raim ng offi cers who were endeavor ing to fasbio-n the Br igade into a cohesive and power ul for ce feared a bove a ll a ny encouragement oi factionalism in lhc ranks Moreover although tbc troops needed indoctrjnation in Lhe ideology fo r which they- were golng to risk tl1ei r live s it was known that some members of Llie FRO and later o the CRC were unpopular 1 n the camps There w u a real po 1ibUity tba i there TS 1161884 Copy_ _ 'J'OP SECRE T 14 wer e many visits of tlH polktical leader ship u1d if these vhhs were not car e £ully controlled when they were permitted a real cleavage would have opened up between the military iorcc and the political conunittee witl the p Ssiblc disrupti on of the Brigade the ooc cs ential atset at the time T he decision to i s o late the B r i gade from the 1 oliti ca l l en derw hip fo r a consi derable period w as obviously a di icult one and oo one can stat e with certainty that the cow-•c of action actually followed wa1 the wi- est It di d howeve r produce a situation on D 0ay in which the Brigad e w as 00 uni ied and the polit ical l eadership bad at l ea1 1t s u perficially accept ed their relation ship t o it h As the deadline fo r the Project approached the need to broad en by democr atic m eano and strictly by Cuban action the FRO ba se and io evolve a pro i 11 onal government became p reati ng Con tinuou 1 negoticLtiont were conducted during February l 961 and March 1961 and oc ZZ March 1961 the CRC was creat e d Every Agency p osition pap er pi epa r cd on this m atter etr ased the need for letting the Cub ins have their own 1a y Indeed it waa felt that only Cuban selection could h ve any real value Thi s policy had the approval of the Dcpart' 'ent of State ind w as carried out to the letter address by 3 1 The fo llowing e xc e pt s Crom an Agency rcpreee tative to the Cuban Revol utionary Ass embly TOP SECRE T TS fl81 884 Copy -I- 15 on 18 March 96 1 j uot prior to the sta rt of the sel ection o the CRC exetnplified this 11 Na turally the procedures employed in the election of you-r lea de o r Provisional P te idcnt m ust rem a in entir ely in your hands O bviously we a r e not t r ying to t ell you whom you should elect- -th at is you r respons ibility and yours alone up to you l o m confiden t you will ma kc the right one The de-c isi on is 11 Thus act ing in dependently the Cuban exil es elected Miro Cardona a s their provision al Pres ident i It is quite true that CRC members we n t into isolation during t be l 7 April invasion i t is also true that statements on the invasion wel 'e issued in their n a i nes On the form e r CRC rnembera were b riefed and counseled by two high r anking Agency official s and the Cuban a g reement was given vol untarily and without coercion and in recognit ion of t he demands o f the hour 1n fa c t Mi t 'O Cardona w as told that he might stay in New r'ot·k City over the fateful weekend o f 14- 17 Apx -il He however asked t o be isolated wi th the other member s of the CRC j In sum m a ry the facts prove tba t FRD and later CRC membei s were o ot r educed to t he sta tus of puppe t s - - r egard less of their feeling i n the ice cold reality of efea t- - and that their a c tion c apabilities q op 5£i6flF P TS 1181884 Copy £__ TOP 8_ CR£ 1 16 were exploued to the fullest an out11 -anding example is t he g r eat number o l ows and plans whic h wet e rca dy o r prom ulgotion and impleme1n a tion upon the assum ption o f power in Cub by the Provisional Government Such limitations a s existed o n ac tive pa rticipation by C ubans in post- Caatr pla n s for Cuba were created by their own preoccupation with mMtcrs relating to 1 crsonal ambiti ons l o ng-a La nding personal bi 3ses and exile politics Caribbean s tyle Indeed a · pointed out above politicians had little t o do w ith the militJ t'Y 3specte o l the operation sj nce the · lacked by their own admi • aion technical competence J ust before the landing however t he politico- m ilit ary underatandiog was at ihJ best 'L'he Brigadt and its leade rship recognized the politica l leadership o the CRC and Mn nuel Al tirn e a leading memb er of tho CRC sta yed a nd land ed with the Brigade as a cpresentative of Ille CRC 2 The FRO Mi llta ry E lement a 'fhe m ilit ary clement similarly cnJoyed freedom of n c ti oo consonant w i th t radiLionally accepted rules of military diec ipline a nd order Although American advisors o necessity directed the planr ing of the troop traiJUng fro m the basic ta ge through a v3nced larae W it exercises and maneuvers the Cuban ntiUtary l eadership pertieipated in this plon n ing and was so lely csponsiblc for the conduct of the training a nd for the control of the troops 1n this latter conn ection the C uban tt8f S EGRE TS #181884 Copy_ _ r or BIJ¼@ liT 17 military leaders were respon1ible for the m lintena nce of law order and discipline o nd in the discho rgo of these responlilbilitics meted ouL dls c iplinary punJ shment ranging from company puni sbment Lo incarceration b Without coercion on our part the Libcr 1tio11 Troops pledged their l oyalty to the Cu b 1n political l cade't'ehip a t represented by the Cuban Revolutionary Coun cil c The traditional cleava ges of military veraus political leade tship na 1 ura lly were evident in this opori tion as they arc in almost an organi zed state in the world ·l'here is no evidence howev r to support any contention that the gap between their re1J Clive objectives and method s to be employed to achieve these obje tives was any 'idcr than would be expected given the circumstan ces that exi sted Merely because tliose like Manuel Ray who never favored an invasion said alter the defeaL 11 s0 11 told you to all available ncwsp 'lpere did oot mean tbat the D - Day unity was not sufficiently stro g to have provided a ptal orm or wh icb to build Failure qui Le natU-ra ll y ptovided the most potent fue l to the flames of dissension which lay only just below the surface 3 Miscellaneous Other than the main conclusion mentioned ab_ ve there are aome minor ci-il ichms in the Survey criticised f or not 1 peaking Span i sh P 1·oj ect o Hcors a r e Th is point it discussed else- where but it might again be noted that o the a x senior 'i'Of 6ECftB'f TS N181884 Copy_ _ IS officer• dealiog with he Cuban leaders five had Ouent Spa nish and the ooe o lLccr who did not succeed ed nevertheless in achieving a dose rela tiooship with a number o the top Cubans including M iro Cardona Paragraphs 42 -50 on p-1 ges 94 to 97 0£ the Survey contain a series of c riUcism s and preachments which a re GO genel 'Ol unsupport d or unconnected to some specific consequence that we can only comment that they have been nor ed with d is may a o d that we regt et that until more detail is fu rnish ed an answer is not possible The remainder o the Survey•• section on the political front and che r elations to the Cubans star ting on page 8 1 i s m i ioJ y D ctu al It is only -u nfortu natc that it treats so complex a problem so supcJ ficially and fails to include any o the extensive Agency relationships with the State Department and the White House with respect t o lbo proper line to t a ke with the Cuban leader• a nd the correct interpretation of the political views of these leadc rc Also w hat political attitudes w ere the most dcaira ble from the point of view o the U $ 1n addi tion the Agency did consider a bl work on the pre pa ration of politic3l docwne nts Moreover some non- Agency e xpe r ts w e r e obtained to w ork wicb the C u ba n l eaders at their requelt in the development of the plaoks £or their political plat for m The a bsence of tbia whole s tory and the problems aced as it unfolded makes it difficult to h 1ve any real under tanding of what was i n volved on the polit lca side '£OF 3DGP l 'T rs 111 Sl 884 Copy _ _ TOP C 6'lb I IX AlRMARlTIMEOPERATIONS T he Sut'vcy only has a one sente nce couclusion regarding the c ar ry- ng o ut of paramili ta ry operations as dj s ting u ifihcd fro m the b sic miliQ -y concept namely up pootly '' Para 4 page H 3 11 A i r a nd boat operations showed T he body o f the Surve y how e ve has three ch3pte' s on this point dealing with Air ' 11 o nd T ro lning Unde r ground Leader s P a gc 98-134 J aritime 11 T he major points i n the se chap t er s will be co nside r cd b el ow _NB Three maps have bee n kept and a r e a vailable if desired which show all n ir and m aritime d eHver ies into Cuba plu s a ll P M a sse t s on Cuba n soil a a o l7 April 1961 T h ese can be examined a t any tim The y are b elie ved rele va nt to these paramilita r y points A AIR 1 a ew Before discussing the many specific criticierns oi the Survey ba ckground points h U Id b e presented a not b used For reasons a heady discus sed U S bases could Consequently drop mis s iona had to be flown the l onger distance rom Guatemal a t h e only fo reign iOil within range fot whlch pe rmi saion from Lhe local g o ve rnm ent w as po ssible Conc eivaQly P resident Somoza miaht have approved Nicaragua but for many r eas oris Cuaterna la was pre erab l e for these missions e g a u sobJ e b3 se in Nicar agua w S not r eady u n til l a te in the proj ct Nic a ra gua TOP FFGDET TS #181884 Copy_ _ from the U S the tr•inoes were i n Cuatemala so that by using the Ga me country the log ifi ttc suppo-r t w as simplified i nd a separate country £or the a trike has-e wo s tlesil ed M oreover it w no advi sabJ e to keep pre- st ri kc a ctivitie out o the c ou nu-y providing the c trikc base b U S airmen could not be used The Cubans ' r ec ruited had extent ivc cxpcl'icnce and wen given a lot of training Their 3-ir background however -w s conu'Dercial fiyi ng which aa i t • • • - ' turned out did not provide«' im· With the kind o night flying navigational p r ecision desired M oreover being C ub an and erootiona 11 • invol ved thei r discipline -as not good For example they often violated orders by r emaining over targets too long in an c Cort to find the DZ and help thclr countrymen c Reception conunit tees were either unt tained or pedormed under difficul t conditions Even a trained individual other th an perhaps o ur veyor c m make a Glight e rror in figuring the coordina t es ol a OZ particularly in rough terrain A small mitt a kc i s enough cc r-destroy µic e ecti vencss of an a i r drop d TJ e recent a nd productive exrier icncc of makfog drops in diliicu areas such as has convinced us that com - munication1 v r-ith the recci vi ng group including ground to air communi- cotions from t he DZ to the dropping o b·cnUt whetl cr b · l'adio W Tor TOP cn n ·12 TS 1181884 Copy_ _ TOP SSORLT 3 beacon i o essential to o ny ssur mcc oC success uation communications at best w e r e dlHicuh In the Cuban Blt- F or exampl e although contact w31 established with groups in the Escambray by courier effor ts co in filtrate trained radio oper tor wit h equipment were never auccess Cul l n other cases it was advisable Hnot necessary to keep the radio opc_i ator wa y from the DZ in order to avoid risking 10 scarce a commodity T his meant an unavoidabl e dolo y with r espect to Jast minute messages bet l •ccn the senders and the actual receiver s 1n no case were the desired communicationc mentioned above ever po1c1ble e The Cuban lan d m ass ls not ea sy £or drops Ei the the terrain is rough and DZs a re f cw as in the Escambray or the areo ls relatively crowded m i king an isolat d spot diflicull to find In a ddiliol' Castro a s a forxne r guerrilla leader ho d s urveyed pos l ible DZ a and was Ll- orough ly fam ilia r with their location £ dHiicult Orop operations without all aids a re inherently A s tlready s tated even toward tJ1e en d of WW II s ki Hod ci·ews dropping to skilled and experienced reception committees were accorded as a rule of thumb on the basis of lesions learned only a of success so r chtrncc The tcchnlco l fa cilitiee in Cuba were l ci 1 good than those in France in 1944 4 5 ar d the h una n capabilities much less good Having ma de the Coregoing cbmments it should then be admltlcd tl- n the drop r ecord i n Cuba waG poor E£Corts to improve it howovor w ere en sacns po TS 1181884 Copy J___ TCJ o eeta I 4 _n oi successful no1• is it dear that any permis s ible acti o 'l would ha ve done any good Some 27 800 lbs 0£ m a teriel were actually delivered somewhat more than stated by the Survey Sec para 9 page 101 The major deli ve ries ho vc r as a h -eady expl ined were by boat Only one body drop w as made The reason for this was that drops were obviously going ba dly a nd in dividuals could be infilt'ra tcd rnorc successfully by boat 2 Specific allegations oJ the Su rvey follo w a The fir st drop was close but missed by 7 rnil es as stated by the Survey pa ra l page 98 A contributing factor was an unknown da m con struction mal'ked by lights No U-2 £Lights had b een app roved at this stage oi the p r oject and k ' owlc dge of th e construction w as not availabl e On r eturn the plane hit the prop el ' coaat-in point in Guatemafa a nd the er ew capt ain then tu rned the p lane o ver to tht c o - pilot The l atter took a short cut climbed a bove some cloud co11er 1 was los t when he ca1ne dowlJ and landed on th first fi eld he found i e in Mexico even though he still had s ufficient u el to return to Guatemala Obviously this was bad procedute a ld poor crew discipliqe b The J-ice a nd beans dr op pa ra 4 • et seq page 99 is an ex a ggera ted case in order to i ill out the load the Dl Cl decided to drop some food a s fo od s hortages were clearly a pr o blem with the 'f6f SJ Cit ET TS 1181884 Copy_ L ee1 JECitE I 5 resistance Probably too m uch food was dxopped and the agent was di e turbed and angry He continu ed however to work for the resistance and with the Agency coming to M iami at a later date and returning again Co C lba thereaf ter c Reception p ro cedures para 11-12 pages l0J-102 were the best tba t oould be devised in each instance given the circum• stances i e t the 02 the local s i tuation the communications and the materiel available or th a t which could be used e g bonfires often we-r e impossible thereby makin g flashlights necessary As to dif- ferences of view there is no doubt that be ore a final fl ight -plan was de ided upon in particular ases there w ere-often varying suggestions a s to what should or shou ld not be done 'I'he clearal' ce procedures alread r described were folly understood however a nd it is believed worked In view o f all the cir cum stances they were not cuxnbersomc as alleged by the Survey 11 The Specia l Group gave the over ill clearance the Ta-sk Force made the reques t for a drop and recommended the time the place and the load DPD ha ndled the preparation o-f the Hight plan and suggested a ny c hanges prompted by air safety considerations and the DDCI gave t 1-tc specific flight plan and final operational clearance c r ews w ere briefed in Guatemala The 'l heir air discipline as already indicated w s poor b u t how to c orl-ect it was diUicult were bard·to find so that they could not be fired T8- SD8f i'C Pilot s and crews Navigation a lso was TS Vl81884 Copy_ _ P8F SCCIWI 6 fa1 1 l1 y though usually miSt ' kes occurr ed iJl the diJficuh ar a a tcr hitting the Cuban coas1 -ln poinL d Pilott wct'e often told as indicated by the Survey t-o dr op H they ha d any reason to believe that they were close co their targets O te n the need w is so urgent tha t an e iort to deliver supplies was j us tiiia ble Mot-eover capture of rnatcriel by Ca 31 ro'a forces was a matte-r o no consequence as tl•e Cubans had more equipment than bey could use Also there were cases where recovery was by non-res istance Cub I O s w ho then passed the materiel to lhe resistan e Consequently t ltis nCbwas a l-waya present tf the blind drop theory was wrong at least it was consciously adopted by all c onc e rn d o t the time c 'the so-called ta dy corrective action para 33 page 108 wa1 misunderstood b - the Survey In late February or early March a review of drops was ma d e to u·y to see whnL ii anything could be done to improve r esults T h e findin gs mer ely confir med the problems but really provided no solutions i n effect were mer e ly Some suggestions were made wh ich a resta t ment o existing pro cedures Blind drop s as a Jrca dy iodicated 1 w e r e conllnucd a s a matter of policy when conditions were urgent even thoush the review recommended their eliminatio The othcC' s tudy made in January 1961 para 31 page l07 wa s stopped by the Paramilitary Chie as he knew thl t a solution by use on SECRET TS 1181884 Copy_ _ _ 'F8P fiE 6lt£ I 7 o American pilots was politically u lacccp tabl e J' O matt er how desirable operati ona lly In concluSion it might be said th at the DPD ov rall air d r op l'ecord is a goo d one and will stand close cxami natio1t The ai lu1·es in Cuba we re not the result of lack of competenc e nor of poor orga nization 'They were· rather the r esult of m any complex factors sorro b e yond Agency control som e undoubtedly w ithin Agency contr ol During the p1·oject the o nly real solutions wer e believed to be in the a rea o political infeasi bili ty a lthough an improved r ecord might have otherwi se been achieved Surely i b ette r communi catio ns cou ld have been provided w ith t he res i stance elements at the ti me of d xops there would ha ve b¢en g r eater success It mu Gt b e rernem bcr e d in this connection that during the early months i n l9 l tll communications picture improved mate rially Mor eover during the la$t two or thr ee weeks before the invasion some 15 drop requcs ts w ere received which cou ld not Io oth e r r easons be fulfill ed The gro ups m aking these r equest s wer e however w ell equipped and capable B MARITIME In the m aritb n e fi eld it $hould be noted that t he Su rVey makes no mention o t he opCrati ona 1 atmospbefe or difficulties This of c ourse is true t hroughout th e lurvey but b eca Use of t he particular difficul ties encountered i n connection with ships and c1·ews and the aroo lnts -ren SFbFI FJ'l ' TS #181881 Copy_ _ TSP SElsM'f 8 of moi ey invo lve d the omi ssio n of realiti ea seems p erhaps more conspicuous in the maritime fie l d4 One rnajor 01 nission for exa-mple i s the e Uort made by the Agency to £ind boat s i n the Navy and the Coast G 1ard A l th ough such effort was roade and both Services were thoroughly cooperative no usabl e boats could be found C onseque ntly although the Ag e n cy fl¢et was not what m i ght have be en desired_ it was of necessity obtained out of what could be found Another omis s ion is any ' view of pcrforrnance i J'I relation to difficulties For example under the circumstance$ i t is suggested that the ioiiltration of 88 000 lbs of materiel plus 79 bod ies and the exi iltra tio n o f 51 bodies is perfectly r e asonable perfor mance Moreover the tr ansportation o1 the llriga ie to the bcachhe d without hit cb wa s surdy a comrnendable o p e r ation As to supplies the Si nvey criti ciz es the limited di stl 'ibution achieved geographically in Cuba but the fa ct i s tb i t the distribution was fairly good This has been explain ed in ao earlier section a long w i th the reas ons why the central south coast wa s not covered 0 As to the condition of ships a nd the m oney re tui1 ed or th eir purchase and repair • no detailed discus sion seems jus tified although the Sur vey d evoces considerable space to these ite ms The only s igni- iic ' nce o f ihes e a Hegations ' it i s fel t would be ii ln the light of the -X9F s - cPET T S Ul81884 Copy---' _ _ xcn sscn o1r e Qsting r equi rements u rgenci es 3nd a va Uab ilities i e of b o th equip ment and peop leL the j ld gment s exercised w ere t epYeh ensib lc Admi ttedly the Agency fleet cos t 3 sub s tan tia l a m ount o f money Moreover as stated the c raft w e r e not idea l is w hat el s e '' o ssible The issue h o wevet· Tt 'i s dol lbted th at anythit'tg coul d have been d o ne at the time whi cll wou l d h ave materially- ltered the s ib lation Admittedl y 3$ indicate d in the Sur ve y pa ra 41 pag s 12 3-121 the Agenc y capability i n the m ri time field a t the start o f th e C tbao project w as not very Substantial This however i s no great surpri se i o v iew of the unlikelihood pre- Cuba that t he Agency would be comt i nvol ved in a project requiri ng this typ e of mari time c apability It should be noted that fo r two yean pr ior to Cuba DD P Q lic¢r e xamined all o spects of P M requirements including maritime to dete rmine what preparatory St ps if a ny cou i be C• t'ISLruc tively ta ken in advance o f an actual p l oject r e q uirem e nt A lthough a number o actions wet e t a ken the C uban maritim e needs we e not a ntid pat ed I n this connect ion in · re1tros p ect i t wotlld prob ably h a v e been w i se to have reque sted Ca ptaio S cap a or some other sel' licr N avy o ficer earlier in the s roject A Ma1· i ne Colonel was of coursct the P a · 1military Chief and had charge o m -t rHi -ne pe -- u nn-s we s·-- cnr- 1 -so contln 10 S liaison TS i 181884 Copy_ _ lf6£ SEGRE 10 - w ith the Navy and Navy officers i n Defense was taking p l ce Nevertheless a full time Navy C aptai n in the p r o ject c ould h 3 ve r es ulted i11 the adoptio n of m or e imaginative m e thods wh i c h mig h t p ossibl y have produce d g r eate r pe rfo r mance Even in i-etrO$p ect howeve - it i s not k nown what th ese would have been J The m ain specifi c c riticisms o f the Survey are a Difiiculties w itll crews particularly the 1 'Bar bara J There is no ques tio n that troubl e was expe1· i e nced w ith the C iban c r ews One problem was that the Cubans w hen r ecruited thought that they were going to control the ships This i mpression c ould have b een g iven by Agency offi cers in goo l- faith At any rate it s oon b ecame apparent t hat suc h control was impossible pa rticularly or the landitlg ope I t tion Clearance was therefo r e r equested ·by th Agency and obtained to hire American masters plus a f ew A m erican o ffice-rs for specia l pos ts e g chiel engir eer communications o n the main landing ships The head$ of M$l 'S w ent to extensive pain and troubl e to help the Agency find s uch officers Wh en hi 1·ed however chcy wer e resented by the Cuban seam en who felt t hat they h a d b een d eprl ved of their own comm i nd a11d control and time a n d cir cumstan ces did not permit shake down c 1·uises The consequence particulady when the crews w ere firs t 1 ut o n board ship w as trouble par tly for th e reason given and partly Of $ECKEi TS #181884 ·Copy_L_ li i P OLCttz II beca use or dilicrences be1wee n the Cubn ns themselves Tb ese Jat tcr conflicts were unJortunatc but it i• unknown how they could have been discovered or anliCiJ a ted during th rect'oltmcnt unless more time had been available These problems moreover wet'e ironed out beiore the landing movcmeo t in which these parlicular ships were involved In addttion the crew s were cffocti vel y gtven good tra lning a t Vieques as evidenced both by Captain Scapa 1 s examination and the later performance of lhc crews b The Survey rn tkc• a great deal o the case of one of the M uters of the Bar bara J 11 who wa s diacharged a-1 d 1ub- scqu cntly h a d bis name incluicd in a letter of commendation Paras i 4-2$-26 •ges IJ7-ll8 Tlti case had a long hlltory known to he insp eclor1 which unfortuna tely the Survey does not choose to mention Br i efly the Master was consid ered by MSTS as one of their besl men 1n act be wa s one of the youn1cst of their men about 35 to b-e made a Master A strong p ersonality dil erence arose bet ween hi m a nd one o the senior Agenc y contract employees who was to be a cent ral fig ure in t he landing This tm ployee m ade c h rges a g t inst the Jl fasleT including a charge that the Master bad been drinki n3 on 3n operational trip He therefor e dcmatd ed that the Master be di • c har ged · The ca se was s uch that u 1d e r the cir eum s w nces th e Agency TOP Slt£f E 1 ' rs 1181884 Copy_L__ 'f G@ BE GRJilf 12 e m 1 loyee ha cl to be back ed or lost Due to the emplo yee 1 s impo r tance to the mission th e act that he was a ver y good oHic r an d the shor t - nc$s of tiJne he was back ed and the MaGter disch r ged On forth er investigation it w as found that the Master not only denied all the alle ga tions against him bu t clai med that h e coold fi1 d men to $Ubstantiate his story and asked in writing to vindicate himself In view of his supe -ior MSTS r e cord and faced with serious iss ues of £act plus obvious security problem s and with no time o r oppor tunity to hold hearings to resol ve these i ssues it was decided to give the M ast er his contra ct pay and to expl ain t he facts to the fndu strial Relat ions OUice of 1 f STS •rru s was done Thereaft er at the last mo me nt it became essential t'O obtain a l-1 astc r for o ne o the r-eserv e suppl y ships Due to the urgency of the sib lation th Ma ster 1 s background an d tlle very good impressioll that th e M a ster had made follo win g the othe1· inciden t he •a s i s kecl to take the job Knowi ng of the probl em s at the beach- head including the daogers fro m enemy a i r a ttack and desp ite his su·ong disagreement with the decisi on r esulting in his discharge the Mastel still imm edia tely accept ed took co mmand of the s hip and p ut to sea Due to subsequent even ts beyond his contr ol he w a s r called ln view of all thes e facts his name wa s later included in the general l etter t'o MSTS commending the peTfor m ance of the more than 2 0 oificel s provided by M S'l'-S O n ti ti s reco rd foe a ction taken still seerns c orrect q 9p 6 IJGRBFf TS # 8 1884 Copy_ _ TCP G E P Jj c As to 1n filt ratio n of t ea t·ns para 11 page 128 there were s o me di Hiculties but ag n the situa tion must be examined in regar d to all the existing fac t s In the first place tlnou gh the s umm er fall aod ar•ly-· win ter of 1960 the Havana Station was in existe nce the E m bassy and thu s the Station was c lo s ed ln early J anuary Cons equently internal Cuban contacts and communications wer e e xcellent More over lega l travel was r elati vely ea s ' a nd as pointed o u t by the Surve ' so rne 8 radio operators were put into C uba l egally ln a ddition defector s as indicated i n ro e arlier section were ex il tratiog in l a r ge n umbers Many of these held r esponsible positions in the Ca s t r o G over n ment or iri the community and w ere in close touch w ith r esistan ce g r oups Moreover the Mtami exHe community many of whom were U S r e presentative s of inte r nal resistance gToups had th eir own c ommuni-cations through CO riers O · otherwi se Conseque ntly the six marit ime ope rati ons m e ntioned by Ute Survey in Sep t e-mbcr Octob e r and Novemb er must b e assessed in relat ion to this bac kgro und Al s o jn a ddition in the s ummer and Call o 1960 ending in Dec ember the RIO ESCONDIDO was u sed tc i nii l l'ate a d ex filtrate as many J S 16 people T he ship had a sn uggling compa rtment in tlt e boiler r oom which co uld take two individual s preferably o ne T he Surve y does not mention these movem e nts probably be c ause they were not conSi lcrcd mal'it irne o pe t·a t ions ra the-r arrange m ent s with t he ship's captain F ive of the 16 people l nliltr ate d during this period were key r e sistance Lcade t· s and their V T opera to rs Another actor d u ing this per iod was that TS Ii 181884 Copy U_L_ 8 GLOR- I 14 legal m ovement x1as relat i vely easy for ind ividual s lega lly in Cuba s o tho t the desirability of putting in indi -iduals who had O live a nd leave black was reduced In view of all these factors i t was decided to keep out m any 0£ the teams originally planned fo r infiltration The reaction of trained t ea rna to such i nactivity was what might have been expected anger discourag ement and lowe red moral e Oo tor o thiS the i ll-fa ted trip o the Ba 1 bata J was unfo rt mate si n ce 3 teams were aboard who were not put a shore i n C lha t11e Consequently attitude of this grou p of Cuban tl'ainees was at times bad After the Havana Station was closed however the infiltration effo r ts pi cked up despite b eing thwarted by bad wea ther th rouiJh January By tl e end o March or early Apri the paramilitary agent inCiltrati o n had achieved factory number although it i s prob-ably fair to say that there is no suc h th i ng a s too many communicators d 'the Sut vey alle ges that small boat operations we re not planned para 17t p a ge 114 P robably under the p·r css of events t h e pape r work was not as tidy a s might be f ou nd in normal charter partie s P lanning howeve - was t it is believed what was poss ible l aritinie operat ions can only be planne d in r elation to known facts such a s an available reception an availab1e boat and a moment timely for a mission OVerall pla ns a Te obviously possible and i t is bclicvc d that l o r Bf Oi T TS #181884 Copy_ _ q- gp CGSRQ I 15 i i can be shown that such plans exiucd dcsi ed in the way o l n the sa-mc w ay what was boau was known bvt actual purchases were only fea s ible ao pa rticula r e ro t materialized on the mot·ke t C TRAINING UNDERGROUND LEADERS The major criticisms or the training w ere that the sites w ere ina dc quat e and in some cases too remot e trai ning on for eign soil would have been bclter accompli Shed in tre U S s ome o the U S trai _ning w as with haph l 0 rd facili ties and tra iners and the trainlng was piecem eal without plan Before responding to the par li Ular alle3a tions it must be noted that with all due reapect the Surv ey 1s criticism suggest I the atti tudes of o dweller io a c c1 1 re o nd wcll order ed academic No vcr never Land who a ssumes that all trainiog must be similarl y con ducted or i l is poorly managed I t is the H arvard Law School trying to comm e nt on the adva ntages o i aandlot training for Oa s eball pl o ycrs The only d Ucrence being that the HLS wou 1d be judiciously ar- alyllc wb ich is a point of view neve r a chieved by the Survey The facts are that no ne of the pro j ect's tr tuning s ites were ideal or picked solely fo r t he accomplishrncnl o the training in vobred Security considerations •or in o ther 'W r-ds political con - c erns pl ll •ed a vital ro le P8P SZOKE TS 1181884 Copy_ _ 16 Moreover 1f results a re any CJ'i t e1·ia the trai ni ng s i tes were adequate As far as the B r iga d -e and its a ir arm are conc rncd the conclusions of i mpa rtia l ex perts i e • the JCS tea m l'ega rding the co mpetence achieved are reco tded in writing T he performance of the trainees on the beachhead is furlh r r roof The trai ni ng of the l anding ships I crews at Viequcs was good and effective i n operation The training in Panama v • is exceUe nt OJ all report s as w as the screening and handling o p ersonnel to be trained al Useppa Island T he Nino Diaz group a t New O r tea ns was a ording to all ot Gervcrs w ell trained and ready to fight lts failure to l and w as d le to poo r leader shi p a nd not the fault of the troops T he communications training ha $ always been r epor ted as e xcellent and the Su r vey itself commends the communicatio ns effort P ractice also es blishcd tha t the trained ageot cornrnun icators i n Q 1ba had far fewe r garbles in th ir messages t ha n no r m ally fou nd i n such fransm issions The age nts w ho ve re tr a ine d and all those who w e r e infil trated as a gents were gi ven training received courses in how to iivc blc ck so -ne weapons and dem oJiticn c tr3ining some Cit air reception aod how to handle drops resi stance o r gani zation a nd ho v to contact undcrg1·ou' O group s 'the teams ·ho were t o be infiltrat ed received ·19p 8136R£T TS ii 181884 Copy_j_ ' 'Cf OLCICEI 17 3s st itcd by the Su vey p3r3- 12 page 129 a nd mentioned earlie r training in security basic clandestine tradccraft i ntelligence col - lection a nd r epor ting propagan chl an d agitat ion su bversive activities resistance otganiza tion reception operations explosives and demo- litions guerrilla action and simila r action 11 T here was therefo re o o lack of training doct1 ine or p lanni ng Incidentally since it ha a been raised by the Sul'vey para 11 et seq page 101 the air reception p r ocedures taught to all agents were those t 'lught in th A gency School on this subject Regarding sites it $bould be point ed out that w hether good or bad the G uate mala sites wer e the only ones available The O S was politically unacceptable and the Guatema la government wa s the decidi og element as to tho s i tes in Guatemala that could be used The Survey says that the ground tr ining base i n Guatemala obviously could not accorrunoda t e 500 individua ls Para 10 pag 127 Th fact was th i t i t did p lus many more and worked Similarly the initia l situat ion at N ew Orleans was difficult P ara Z3 page 133 Again howe vcrt the probl e ms were adequa tely corrected to provide a dequate training I t took wotk and some help from the Armed Services to ge t the base fu nctioning but both occurred and prevailed fer 8' l SilL t ·r s H1a1as1 Copy _L_ Of SLCICLI 18 The Survey as indicated also alleges th t tn1 ining c-0uld have b een more effective and se o t e if don e in th United Stsl-tes Paras U 12 page l3S The Si rr ve r point-s t o tank a nd COr'l ' tnl J ication$ traini ng w hich did take place i n the U S to s 1pgo rt it s co nclusion What is not $a'i d is that the tank train ing o nly i nvolv -ed 25 men and was done at a U S b3-$e accustomed to tl'a i'ning foreign groups and quite abl e t o assimilate a srna 11 g roup of this siz e Simila dy communications could b e 3nd were taugh t i n small c lasses P o li tical cl eal aoces the t e ore were grant ed specilically for these clas s es i e f a U S b a s e fb r tanket$ and U S s a fe houses fo r c on'lm ll 'ricatoi-s but as a recog nizc l ex c eption to the basic rul e of generally denying the u se of t he U S or any kind o tl aining The Nino Diaz group at N ew Orlea ns was obviousl y a nother ex cep tio n and one which w as sornewhat i nconsistent w it h the general rule 'but the clea ran ce was given J'l evexthel css because time w as shor t th e i nvasion was immine nt and a n atteJ'tl pted diversionary opera1 ion w as considered impol ta nt Mo reover no othe r site wa s a vaHable tha c was either bet ter o r usable ta king all acto ts into accou nt The qu es tio n of hap hazard iacil ities and trainers has been discussed earlier Obviously t here i s a good deal o adj ust ing to the need$ of r he noinei t io a project of t his sort l t is believed how ever that the record will show that the tr a i ni ng p lans wel'e reasoo bly detail ed a nd compl ete Moreover that where •er a training course of any l engt h was involved there w s 3 specific training plan 'J ' OP 86 GRE f TS 181884 Copy _L_ ·1 -i1 'i I I ' ll l D CFCPJ8I 19 Januo r y 1$162 Dr Jameo n iC lllianJ Jr Chair man Pre6ident • Foreign Int-e ll 1 e ence Advisory lloo rd 2 ·hecut1ve 01 fice Buildil e · 11Mhillgton -25 D C Dear Dr K1ll 1an Attached is copy of the CIA lnapector Oc ners 1 1 s Survey O CUbao Operations 11 togeth r·v1tb co mrient s thereon by Oeneral c P · Cobell Ilep y ·Director qt •CIA an Arull Ysia •O f Qu t ' · · r Opcrnt on' b y Jlet uty D_l rector Plano Tb lo latter ·report l• intended es · C01Sl ellt on the Xnppecto r Gen eroJ o rcpa t · As you r eud1J y Ulderstand I mr not 1n a pos 1 t ion to render a peroona1 opinion concel n1lle the vc lid ity of t he 1 0 1 s l eport Ol the 6te temente by t he DXCI and the DDP becaUGe I ao not 1n CI A a t the t ime RO'i·eve i · i t 18 nry personal opinion a a ll l esult of exmn1 n o t1ons l have made ot t bia operation a ttcr the fa ct tbat both the report o nd t he rebut Cals Bl'e extrec e I b lle -e an s ccurate ppra ieal of the Cuban cttort ·a ld the reo oone fo i · failtu-c rest col le plc oo ill b tween the two points of 'icw e xpresseA in tne rei 'rts l believe i t 1o 8a f'e to sey the failure ot t he CubWl 'O™ati on wae Gove rl Jtent-wide and 1n t hill r cape-c t the J ency mu 8t beru- its full •hnre though not the ent ire r eo pons ib11 ity For tbio reason I vould r ecom ni end tho t your board 1n r evieving the Inspector Gene ro l ' s Survey o lso rev1ev t be OO O IChtG and analysis of the DDCl Md tbe DD P Xours very truly 1 • John A cCone John A Y -cCone Director · At tachll elltS Ae stated ·s r B ca a ·w SF$iili E_588 8 1fft 19 January l 962 M WRANW FOR Deput y Director pi SOBJlllC'l' Survey ot CUoao Operat ion l Hy vork i n Gul'l o r t o t ycru r An o 1 -sl s of the Cuban Operation ga'Y'C' ce an lllUGual ol p rtunity to otud y vitb care the d oc uocnt vhich ca uced the Anal yei a to be vrittco Ilfltae y the Inepector lrenerol' o Bu n y ot tbe Cuban Opere tlon October 1961• 2 H y consid er tion o r t be survey has forced JI to reach certo iu conclUBiooo vh i oh I f eel tho t I oos-t record I do r o in T iti ng bccau se t hese concl'U Si ouo ore in 'tJJY opinion of' ufficient o J sni '1cance to dcm '1 t b d1ac1pl 1De ot e written e xpre saioD M reover I h e l that tbo4e vbo d1 c gree 1th me should baft tbe opportunity to di reet e n y repUeo tb t t hey may cbooce to ake to ci «1 '1c i d e llt11'1 a ble COJ D' -»t 3 I Jt l ly se y tba·t my dec1s1oo to v rite this cv morandw reached vlth considcr Lble r-elu ctoncc and only a tter long dellbc-r ation 'l'hc d eciding t ac tor vao ey belief t b•t tbe UggesUooo tor e ction 1n peresraph 6 beJ o are vorthvbHe and bould be submit ted 'Bley vould ve been 1¥ll Ulingl ess o •1thout t bc reasonG set forth n t he CA'rlier po ro gro phs The 'e s vie'lle cx prcoeed arc ncedJ eos t o iiay1 exclusively 0100 4 In r f o piaion the I G Survey 1£ l Ost unfortunate for t ree re680 lS a It 1G e n incoapct@t Job 'l'he MJ thors never 1nde r Gtood the prob1 elllS 1th ihicb t hey were deul 1 ng O ld t a11£d to expre ss their vlc ws rith ony precisi on or proper us-e of relevant fo o ta b It U biMed DMically releYNrt e -idenc e on vital issue s '-'AS not c ll y lcrt out but ocver eve a meat toned i be' SUrvey undertook only t o prceent tliosc i tem a vhicb sue ecated ta1iu rcs or i uadcqusc1eo These items ho ever vore not f lll y depicted so t h nt a t D l Gc picture 'e s given Adr td ttcdly an I G w et expose f a ult but it 1-s also hia Job to do so accura-Uly SFCRF ZrT 8U i c It is ra l J ciouG o r to pJt 1t a1terD$t 1vely- it 1• 1nt llt1oMll y b1ued Admitt e th1• is ocriouo cbo rge and 10 a t best merely L otat emeDt of opinion · r con only so y t hat I hold ouch opinion fl rnizy In IIIY viev it couJ d be GUJJ ' Orted oolely- on the basia or the 5u rvey' tot l Di aion 1n lllWl pl aces or 81gnli1cantly relevant cv1dence lcb olli 1 oiooe are GO exces sive d one cided on to GUbeto ntio te t he cone l u sioo thAt tb oy J11u6't have been intent ional In uddition howcvcr I vould like to n cntion four other points l The root that tbe inspectors l n mok1og their 1nvcetigat1o n omitted o ny d1o'euse1onn of their 1 i nd1nga ·v ith the senior otticer o reopoosi ble tor t he proJect Alt hoogb tecbn1c 1 ly tbc I G ca n accurately st4te that he t ill ri to the ro p a t d th then A 11DP A obout the SUrvcy the ta ct is tbet t thooe d1scuGG1on vc re cxc eed inely ·briet 'and COYered cone of ·t he real 1£cuco in the Survey opoken to at all 'he AC DYO vas not i'be Security Ot'ttoer or WI ' vao not s n to at all OtMr senior ott1ecrs ouch M C 11 md c w 4 v ere oovcr ·stven n n opportunity to txpres o their vievo i n r e lo Uon to t to temente in tih_e Survey 2 Some otricera vitb ·sbO n the inspector h d di cu GG1oas felt o fter they bo d o chtL ce to GCC t he survey that 1t did not iu parti a l ly CX• pre as t he intonoo t Lon vhicb tboy he d pro·rid ed o nd left out m 1 ch of tb c releve nt in fon iat1on given breover some ott1 cer a h vc reported tbot t he ottit de ot the ins pector• end their l i ne of queot1on1og ind1oa ted o dea1re to ob'tain facto or vieva to support J·udg ncnta already fonned 0p1cioDB cootro ry to thcae Jud i acota vcre not only dlsreg a rded but reo1 s ted 3 The listrl b utl on o r the t1no1 SUrvo r vo o so peculiar And contrary to normal practice tbat it r uaec a 1 U crence of intended p rtiallty or The method d 18tr1but1on is tncNn end v1ll not bo repeated here lt might be added that there SJiX'R' R'J' rn e c c1 Oi@i£ fBS 9 f t¥ -3vere other raetu w th resl Cct to the d1$tribu tton of the Survey vorthy of mention c w 4 c ed one day tu1d askC l 1 r he vanted to read the Survey Re a id that he ould like to do s• but S ince both C rWll and DC WR were ave y he could oot 'ieave Gince he vuG Acting Chief of t he Diy1 s 1on Pnrticulo rly be coul d not meet t b c l CquircmeutG of' tbe of'fer -which we re tbe t he voul d only ho -e 001 hour from the tiJ 'oe of' t he telephone al 1 to see the Survey inc1ud1ng trawl tJmc o l nce it then had ·to be Gent to tbe printer Wl y the urgency v as co great is not clear AJl f'o r os ic kll o· ro only one indiYidu eJ outGide ot the r G Sta N' e v the SUrvey in final or substantiul l y final form be i'or it vaG d ictributed n ly an 01'1' l cer 'I ho ·tile Ch l e f of Open tioos afor ·Wlr 4 Loe ·t ne project lfhY ne 1wa oelectM inGtead ot Jlc ot 'h 1 G euJ e riox-s vbo vas onnec rtth the proJect Lo oot lwovn 4 Since tlu j part 1 UltU ope r ation vithout qu eation i nvolwd more pollticol interest a nd dynamite tho n o rr t in v hich tht Agency bas ever 1 8 rti cipa ted t h rc va s eYery reason for folloldng regular procc urc• mcticulousl r In addition to tho distributi on point n eotiolled above it seems releva nt tQ wond er hov Dr K Lllio n and the Atto rney Genere l knew or the SU rvcy 1 s exieteuce so as to request l cow 5 I shoul d sa y that llha tever t he appearance of th e foregoing I ht Y not been trying to I G the I G The 1nfortol t1on r eported c8ll'l2 to me ur solicited o o d i n the oo onal cou rse- of rs rork wit h you o nd your Anal yd$ Maybe there is addit i onal evidence of 1nporte nce but I h ave oot l ooked for i t und do not plan to do so 6 The e ignif'ico rice ot the toreeoing 1s to provide the reaeorui for the main purpose of thi $ metl ' randu_i L e t he submission of' the foll O'-i ng recomnendat i dns t or action GJ X f'CP IJi'B6 ema e C £_ ff r 01·· a e DCI GhOu ld res olYe to hie o n se tilif'actio the conflicts on ma Jor issuea bet een the I G 1 a i rvey and your Anal aia Since both t hese doCW Jente ore internal to the Agency t here is no Ageocy J OSit1on on the 'Cube n opera tion unless the confli-ctu a re resol ved In Vicv ot t he importance or a nd the cont inuing 1ntere t in t he operation u t high levels of the Government an Ageocy posit ion seems esse nt1o l Such a position it el co •llll_portant for the future 'l'be operation is bound to be studied fo r •various reaconc und there sbou ld be an Agenc • position at l ea st OJ to vho t hblJl encd Yhut -ere the miatekes and vhat Ye re t he les sona Moreover t he re I having assuired oN'1 cc ai'terthe operation vas thoroughly finisb ed haG everJ ree sou tor vanting to have r om' definitive findings end conclusions b If th DC s vith e · e bo'i-C ·ca ch recipi nt of t he $urvo r and ·Jlnol 'oia e nd it 18 understood that tb c - vill only be · distri buted t gether should be advioe of' tlUl £a et that 6UCh an ·As cne r PQSition is beiog sought Th is lllie ht 'help t o avoid independent ·conclusions out$ide ot the Agency being ocb d first c l'hc following requireroento ohou1d be i1apooed on all J'uture·I G su rvey o ot least on any aepectc of t h e rm p orea of responsibility l No 5 ll'YCY oho 11 be undertsl en Wit hout s pocif'iC written term a of reference a pprov·e i by the tcr 2 Tho DD P shall be satisfied that in each future eurvey eo• -er'lng o ny 'JX rtion of hie o roa of resp nsibility the I G or bis staf'f will interviev nt J eas-t all officers having ho d respor- sib Uity for e n - part of the oct 11 1ty insr ec te by t he I a nnd prior to t he d1etr1but1on of the i u rvey t he ITO P and ee ch such off icer rill be given an opportunity t o express his v l S on pointG included in tb e Sur ey •bviou13ly · th e I G need oot accept these SU ch procedure hovever vill save an eno noous Wl' Q'Ullt of time r equired to answer v1e s 1 -Eil S li-4Li «Bal I Bi mmc lfflY -5GlU 'eYC i uch o o the Cuh6J one v h1cb fail to precent c full fO t uoJ picture r cga-rdlc uc ot the conclusions reached 7 I o a o ddrescing tbio iaeaorandu n to you s o rr il lllCdiate superior I hope hovcver tbo t- you ViU e grcc vith -cquest t hot the memorandum be pa seed t o t he DCI t or hie consi derotiori I do not of course aek tbAt you asoociate yours cl t Vitb it or e rrJ po rt ot it me rely bccauGe you t r aru a1't 1 t s c T B C TRACY B t JmJ $ Or151nal l • DD P •• • •-J t ·- - · L• - '- f 1J ii fl R I PERSO f ' L OONFD EifHAL FOR Mr C Trac l3a r nce TbD nk you for your courtesy 1 n setld 1 ng JQC a copy of YOl l r - - of 19 Jwwary concern1Jla the IMpcctor Gen r 1 • • Survey o r the CUb m _pcnitlon I do nope t hat Di ck for arda i t to the DCI and I am oadooloa a cop-r o ' th1a note to you in case you VIJh to send cow to Dick I bllvo not bad time to 1JtUC Y 1ou r cmot'8Jl du or even in ra ct do re t bll o glance at t be DD P aoaJ ysis in Tie- r or t be llleetloa 1th the Prcs1dent's lloo rd all dtlY Fr1d4y nnd t be foct thll t I o m goin e t o be away all th11l w-eek However I rt U mDJce tho tollov1ng coac eat ie edl ese to sa y I ca a plete J y d 1 sagrCC vJ tb your stot-eoeDt that it 1• eo 1ncocpctent Job I e l tb t it 1c t ent o nd I belie· c the t the more tbao one file cabinet dzaver Ul 1 ot bacltQound document t1J l pron its cOOQ cten ce I do not bel lcve t hat 1t 10 biased lie O lde it very clear nt tho etar of tho report tbat lt 110Uld only d eal vitb 1Dadc q ue c1es er id 1'81 lurea and vOUl d not puJ'POrl t o be o thorough anal 's1s or the opcro t 1on ' ost or all I ObJect moot stro081-r to your thll'd observation i a cJ ¥ that it lo alloiou s and 1ntcnti0ll lly bl Aoed I have a sked t he cncn vhO d id t tuc survey to review- your tnemoro Dd 1 l lt a nd C ' Xllment on the reasons you belle ve that it 1 s bi aced 1 should perbaps ck Dcrdedge that oo time should ba •e been spent vlth you or l3issell but l 1 u 1r ucb o n this devolved ou roe it the t-e 1s a f a uJ tJ it 1• m i ne persoos 1 1 y' But to i J Jply that ror $ l C reason UD1mown to that ·e vow a el e J rt this report is an unf'aiJ ca nncnt You aP OreDtly feel there ws somc thins unuDU'll 1a the distribution 01· the t1ooJ report 'l'hc only thing un l$ua l in 1 t 3 that ve had tvo D1rectore at the t1 e a»d Mr McCone hav ing asked tor 1t rece1ved it as be w s le ' v1D6 for tb c We s t Coast on the d J y before ThD nksgi vJ ng a ad everybody cl se got their cop1 ca on -tbc day e ft er 'l' ban ' sgJ vlng YOQJ' concern as to hcv the Prcsideot 1 s brd and the Attorney Gencro l kncv of the s urvey ' s ex Latence can be an6VC red very s ly I n 1 956 tbe Presi'dont' s Board ln ·-Titlng ad Vised l l 6•nc1CG tmt l l EC- R i1 inspector gcncr l report cho-uld be to nro rdod to t hem outOOllltico ll y I don •t believe 1t '- U8 a vcek a fter t he Cu ban opel S tiou tbcLt the d i rect question came f'roa that £loo rd as to whether an 1nopc ct1on WM going to be done to vb1ch an o f'flr rative reply vas gtvc D The Attorney General' e courcc I do not know t i nully o c far o s to dl elt ehould be done next you a nd Dick should knOW' tbO t at the conclusion ot xy d1scuse 1 on vitb the Pre11deot 1 s Boa rd I urged that a group or 1DdJ Y1 d U ll vbo had not 1n any wy 'been U1soc1ated vith the operation be cMrged 1th toking t he l lylor Report our r eport and your c nt o D nd e ll backeround materlo l a od vrit ag a truly mtioM l a nd det o iled r eport I believe that vow d be A far better 1olut1on tt u try1og to develop a CIA positioG vh lch reeJ ly 16 oot very practical imsnuch a t bcre ere so tnlley outo1dc fnc toro a ff'ect1ng tb ia opcro tion s Kiri SBCF ' T I_ I l'' l' I EXBS OIILX M' EMOOA NDUM FOR Di rect or of Centxal Intell 1gcnce Mr Da rnes • M emora nium on t he lG SU rvcy o-r the Cuban Qperat1on L l J you are e vare I Mr 'I-re cy Darne-s did a mJor t he lOrk in rel QrioS our ca nmcnts on Mr Klrkpe trlck ' s of the Cu ban Operation At the eo clus on of the task Wl'Qte me the attached ll emorO OO um which I hereby pess on part o t Survey 114 '- Bar nes t o you 2 I may tay t bl l t I am in agreement witb J ' r • Ba roes that the ·Su_ -vey l e J •ge y by re a s on of tl le om1SG1on of rra terial relevant t o it conclusions constitutes a high l y- biased document and t hat the M a s 1c or uch o ch 'lracter that i t must have been 1 ntentio 3- I vtU be glad to discuss this 1th you if you so desl re s Richard M Biseell J r RICJlARD M BISSELL JR Deputy Director P1'1ns Attacllmcnts 1 Barnes ' 1- '- emo 2 IG Heoo to Mr furnes c-E €R B lZ 19- 1_ _ ' bBCRJ MEflOPAm OM FOR Mr• llrkpotr1cl SUBJECT The I0 1 s Cuba n Sur -ey o nd DD P's AJ 41 ysis of the Cuban Opere t1on 1 1he cco_pe or the IG Survc r is briei'J y 8 nd clearly ot ted in the Introdu ct on _The SUrvey 1 8 intent w to i dent11 t o nd dcc cribe ve akD cGGcs vithin the Agency 1 coot riP - h fl ml rec µt s nd to lll'ke c0llllllel le t1onc tor 1 hcirl tuture -avoi µ ce· · i he -ro ljad ZJ O authoritr to conduct a •urvey of the -clwro y for meJdJig deciaiowi ru id pol icy at otqer Levels of _gove meut • 'llµ p field · '• covered by the eroup beaded by Gen · Taylor 1he ·SUrvey xpr essl y avoided detailed anaJ rsia of the purely llli 1 ltary b i t e of the operetton 2 Much of t he DD P ' e Aralye 18 is devoted hOW'over to a dJ e cutei on of _goyerJ l'l l1 Cnto 1 d ecision- mk ins -and to a rehash of the m1 1 l tru-y o perett011 rt cr1t1c1zec the Survey ror l m uf£1c1eut l'ttention to tllcsc mttero puttl llg ·t he or blolae for the o ero tion's tailu re •OD factors beyond the •C -rol of tbe Agency 34 The lllAl ycis attempts to refut e Jr Ost of the w e-$Ge G descr ibed by the Su rve-y • The e f which i t e rdts vere it conte IIO e not s1go1i'ica nt to tbc f'iml resu 1 t 4 I t rejects the Survey•c st at ementa that 1ntell 1ge qce was 1n8 dequ tc- a od m i sus ed and t starting was 1 M dequa te It bl Ames the f aUure of the air d ropG on the Cuba n recepti on crevc and a u- ·crc vg It st a tee that si 21l boat o e ration could not ve il have been band led 1n any other lolU Y And i t stat es tha t ot her vea k Dcsses vere not important because they vere not t ne deci sive reason for failure 4 'lb ere is e i md aceuta l dlt'f'crenco o i' approe cb bet -een the tYo documents • While the An aly s1e is preoccupied 1th 1nt rdcp-l J t1 0ental policy- zald ng ·a nd mll1t £Lry i trategy t he Surve 1e minly concerned 1th tb e failure to build up 1 nterna 1 resistw ice 1n Cuba tl rough clandest1n e operetiono The Analysis fall to Gbed any further cigu11''1cant 118h t oa this f'undamento l issue t Ct' B 5- nic Anal y'Gia s4o· ts o OOrer gro p of ''b ot - mo going on a t the case- -ofticer level tha n ot eveOta in pgl1cy -1tl'lking circle$ 'liµs in o _pparent i n o nu nber of ·1 ooccurtlci¢s in t he An-l 1 yeis For exaJa Ple the diecucoioo of act1vit1ee in M1 ararl 1 ina ccuxa te ao 1 DisleQfilng Conduet of trn1tl 8 1n Miami is defended altl ough it wae not cr1t1 cized by tbe ·Sur- i--ey The 178 tra1nees uJJ uded to 1n t he llM lyo1o ao tre 1ncd in u ai J vcre in faet t ral ned in Guat a Xl e Fl-I oectiori in M am f -being built u p besinniag in l ove ber 1 960 rather tb Ln being de hasized These OJld otb er ip Occura c1el3 cuggeot that the ADP J ycis ohouJ d be· read with caution where i t · · deal 8 vith events OD the vol'ld ns level of tl- e ProJect · q · ·' · • - The 10 1 X iS OrG - d ·t¥ r 'h i es· which a re cignit t 00 nt to 11 e· ·q 4ccteS' o rat i9n o nd of the Al en 9Y' 8 over-all • ••1 if ' ·f• ' ' 11'l ••· QN l o- a l' Y Just becaw ' P f-- mdc outside t he Aeel cy ' • • '- ' ·- men oeer E 'f 15 Februa ry 1962 J ©t RAlmUM 1- 0J t Mr John McCone Director of Central Inte11igence Tbe Il1spcctor General 1 c Survey of the Cuban Operation SUBJECT 1 Upon receipt of the Inspector General rs r eport of October 1961 o n the Cuban Ope r ation 'Which reached my desk p r1or to t Y rco1gns t1on as Dir 'e ctor of Centro l Intelligence I j _d iately t ransmitted a copy to the Deputy Director Plano for his con DeJ1t Thia vas iJl llne v 1 th the practice I bad cons1etcntly follov cd in dea 11 ng with the 1·eports ot the Inspector Ge neral nazoely the Oftice - -hieh is tbe subject of the inspecti on is given an opportunity to ccm rncnt on t he I G report before the Direct ol determines tbe action to be teken thereon Toe reply of t he Deputy Dlrector· Pl 11t1s J dated 18 J l lu u-y 19 2 of llilieh I ba• e received A ee py ws eubmitted to you follo 1llg y r esignation 2 Y ee nllhile I have al r o received and considered ·the comments of tbe Deputy Directo r of C'ent ra l I ntelligence General Cabell 3 1 remai n at your disposal for - oo msents you ms y vish De to sub t on rJY Dasos ot t his matter relating to C I A rcs ponsibilities Hence I v 1 ll not ci lbm l t detail ed -written connnent on the Inspec or ceneraI-16 re port 4 At this t ic e hoveve r l Wi$h to make certain general comments s As a oe nber of tb e Teylor Co mittee appointed by t he President r -port 1c1pated f'ul ly in tbe w rk of hie Co mlitt ee en d joined in hi$ folrl rtUldwn and ora J reports to the 'Pres it cnt on tb1s ubject While I do not no- hav a copy of these documentG I mad c enly one or two resen t1on$ to t he general concl u1 i0D$ and reCO'ml lCndut1ons of t h ese report I consider t he m to b e s ound and believe tbey sbou1d be ccepted as the be5t avail a b le sur ey of t bi pa rt iculo r oyere tion QOP SJ CRETr- lO 8B0Rl1i b 1'he 11spector Gcne ru J 1 s rep rt suff'ers f' rom t he fact tba t his iJ lvest Lgo tion '-'aS l it'11 ted to tbe ·o ctiv1t1co or one segment of One agency nWi ely the C I A Opinions based on euch a 8 rtie l reYiev fo 11 t o give the true oto ry or to provide a t ound bs8ia ·to r t he sveeping conc1usione res clled by b iJG c Judgments could not properly be rendei-ed in t W G matter d thout a 1 ull analyois _ as - Be made by the TOJ'lor COmmitt-c c of actions 01 o 11 ot the i o rt1c1po t 1ng el ements in the operation and the influencef brought to bear outeide of the Age ncy which ai fected t he operation 'l hi e _pplles po rticulm- y to the participlltion of the Dcpo rt JGCnt ot Stnto the Depa rlment of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff Slld to certain clcmcnto ot the · E rec CA t1vc Deportment or t he · covenurient d At no time d J na the J reparation of 111• Te Ort did tbe Inspector General request o uy illformt1on from me · nod he makec certnill se rioUG error s in ' area here responsib111t y e s clearly J lvol ved 1ey direct 5 Two major areas o-f crlti cisn i i n tbe I G report covc r 1 the Opct-at1o uo l arrangements for the organizat i on tl ainJJ1g traruiportation and deploY llCXlt o f t he Drie adc and 2 the relations ot Agency peJ so nnel to the CUban emigration and t bc1 r pol1t lco l orgmuzntlon As to these points I ·submit t he f ollov iJJe a Fire t vhile certain orgon1z o t1onal matte r s 1 the llght of velo1 11 ente may be open to some cr1t1c1cm tlle Bri nde vith 1 ts entire co nplement of l le-'l and equ tpment retLcb ed t b e landing o reo O l schedule and under c1 rcUl l9ta 11ccs '·hich achieved complete surprise Tbe s i t uation in t he landing o rea oubotantial 1Y ao predicred- The en bottle order ill-tolli- gence vas essentially correct l'he failure to get t he aJ' l ' llIU n tion and oupplic ashore vns due to c1 rcum st 8Jlces beyond t he control of t he Brigade cor DSDder ·or ita personnel o Second with reapect to t b e orgo uiu tion or n CUban emigre political committee in s upport of t he operations I vould point out that prior to e ngoaing in the opcrnt1on a broad coullt l on of CUban leader8 81 ld one acceptable to ow· State Del 8 rt i c ent 188 realized These t vo important achie 1ement s covered ms Jo r areas of -C I A rco i on ol bilit y T g· P a·B a n Jft-6f S CCH ' I 6 As Directo r I deCIOOd i t deoirable and necessary in view of mj' ot her dutie s to de1Esate certo 1n reeponi ib1 llt1e a Vithin the ency for the d uy- 'ey-day me-' ager ient of the ope1·a t1on o nd on m J ll t o r ' mat ters Sl' ld judgmenta I rello d bcav'l l y on milita ry personnel assigned to C I A end on Dol Lrtment of Def'ense personnel and the Joint CW cfo of St af'f However 1 a saw Ped t hroughout i ull responsibillt y for t be Agency'e partic1pnt1on Bnd actions and kept currently nd v1Ged of all important develox 'llentG Du ri ng the c o ncl ud l ng °' Ye ot tbe O erat1on-' I Yn S particul arly mfl uenced b the Judgment• in col Ba ldru d l •p•tcll dated April 13 l 96l rel at ng to t he high s tnte of readiness of the llrigade Annex A to Chapter IV ol' DDP report 7 Whether or not tb e O er$tion wuld h n·e succeeded it t he· llrig lde had lnnded 1th ts e i tJ re personnel and cqUipment 1a a mo t ter ' lhich can be dcbate d and on m ich e •en t odey militro-y r t s di ffe r Cert4 1 1ll ly the resPQD Gibillty for Zailure does not lie prilrorily in tbe mo in areas of critlciem etreesed in tbe In £ pector General 's re Ort 0 Qt cou rse there a re lesoons to be learned as point ed out in t he Tn ylor Reports These Reports I be ll ve choW d be t ake n o s the main bucio for · revie· of tbe gency ' s action in support o f the operation s Allen 11 Dt1llcc Al le u W Dul le x o r a e a s · p I Il 'I I ' l • 8B CHL I 19 February 19 2 1' be Ronorab1e Allen Washillgeon D c w Dull es Dear Allcu I hav·c r eceived yom· ma mora ndwo of 15 February 1962 cont o inirlg y our COt lll1CJ1t s on the Inspect or General I s Survey ot t he CUban Operation Copies of tbie memorP- idum together vi th the · DI P e nalysis of the survey tbe c uts nmde by Gener-al Cabell Mr Ki rkpa t ·ick a nd the · person al vie i ls and t bere for e · till be cno' 'n to anyone '' ho night have occa s ion to reud i t S ince -ely s igned Jobn A foCone Direct or rt J t -