Directorate ofApproved for Release 2022 06 21 C0656 476 htelllgeoce · Tbp Secret ' 6 2 d 1 Q Warsaw Pact Military Perceptions of NATO Nuclear Initiation 6 2 d I r An Intelligence Assessment Q Top Secret 1 0022JX Copy Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 33 0 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Warning Notice Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved WNINTEL National Security Information - · Unauthorized Disclosure SubjectJto Criminal ·Sanctions Dislemlnation Control Abbreriatlons NOFORN NF NOCONTRACT NC PROPIN PR ORCON OC REL WN Not releasable to foreign nationals Not releasable to contractors or contractor consultants Caution-proprietary information involved Dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator This information has been authorized for release to WNINTEL-Intcllieence sources or methods involved 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 I' Directorate of Intelligence Top St uet · 6 2 d Warsaw Pact Military Per eptions6 2 of NATO Nuclear Initiatio · d An Intelligence Assessment t- 6 2 d This paper was prepared b Office of Soviet Analysis Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chie f ______ _ I lsovA I 6 2 d 6 2 d TopSeeret SOVR6-10 I Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 June 1986 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Warsaw Pact Military Percjotions of NATO Nuclear Initiation Key udgments Information available as al 1 April 1986 was USfd in this report 6 2 d 6 2 d I 6 2 d 6 2 d The key tenet of Soviet doctrine for nuclear war holds that delivery of the first massed strike provides a decisive potentially war-winning· advantage Consequently Soviet military doctrine is preeminently concerned with first use and has a strong bias for preemption on a massive scale A decision by the Soviets to preempt in a European war would depend upon their perceptions and observations of NATO activities and their predictions of the circumstances under which NATO would use nuclear weapons __ 3 3 b 1 IL - - - - - - - - - - - - - jthe Soviets lack confidence in their 6 2 d ability to detect preparations for NATO's imminent use of nuclear weapons Hence we judge that the Soviets' perceptions of the catalysts and conditions for NATO first use would be critical to their decision to preempt Analysis of authoritative writings - - - - - leads us to 3 3 b 1 conclude that the Warsaw Pact assesses the conventional correlation of 6 2 d forces as being in its favor especially in ground forces The Pact believes that barring the unforeseen victory in a war is possible without first use of nuclear weapons We judge that Soviet leaders would approve the first use of nuclear weapons for only two reasons to preempt NATO's large-scale use or to prevent general defeat Only the first reason receives serious attention from Pact theorists because the second is seen only as a remote possibility The Soviet General Staff's perception of why NATO might initiate nuclear warfare as echoed throughout the Warsaw Pact military varies significantl in some w from W 1n · · 3 3 b 1 6 2 d Drawing upon their analyses of NATO's doctrine exercises nuclear decisionmaking and defense plans Pact strategists have refined their estimates of the cause and timing of NATO nuclear initiation into four major cases 6 2 d iii 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 6 2 d 6 2 d • NATO strikes early and massively Such a strike typically would occur on the first day of the war followed by NATO th usts into Eastern Europe This is seen by the Pact as an attempt to initiate a decisive surprise attack and is described ____ _ _ as the worst case • NATO strikes to support its first main defense line Such an attack typically would occur when Pact forces threaten to breach NATO defense lines along the Weser River • NATO strikes to hold itsfi nal defense line along the Rhine River Pact planners assume that nuclear use is virtually certain as their forces reach and attempt to cross the Rhine • No nuclear strikes In recent years Pact writings have begun to give more attention to the jssibility of a protracted conventional war 3 3 b 1 6 2 d I Although the Pact devotes considerable effort to prepare against the worst case scenario it expects to avert it and may see a chance to escape nuclear attack at NATO's first main defense line as well 3 3 b 1 6 2 d A number of recent major exercises_ ave_portraye act orces penetratin NATO's first main defense hne without a NATO nuclear response I' - - · ------- 6 2 d Sensitive Pact writings stress how critical the Rhine would be in support of a last-ditch defense of West Germany by NATO No major Pact exercise has simulated an advance beyond the Rhine without nuclear initiation Several major nonnuclear exercises have ended with a suggestion of · imminent nuclear initiation as Pact forces reach and attempt to breach NATO's defenses along the Rhine River I I 6 2 d Soviet theorists recognize the paradox in their expectation that the very success of Pact conventional forces would be likely to trigger NATO nuclear strikes to stave off defeat They further believe that initial limited nuclear strikes by NATO would be ineffective motivating it to launch larger nuclear strikes Because Soviet doctrine calls for launching a preemptive massed nuclear strike once NATO's intention to use nuclear weapons on a large scale is detected Pact theater successes could lead directly to a general nuclear war 6 2 d L__- - -- - --- ---- -- -----' 6 2 d 10D Set1et iv 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 6 2 d I 6 2 d To resolve this paradox the Soviets have undertaken peacetime and wartime initiatives to weaken NATO's will and capability to use nuclear weapons in a war They seek to make it difficult for NATO to use nuclear weapons effectively to demonstrate the futility of their use and to highlight the risks of reemptive or retaliatory Pact nuclear strikes 1 I The Soviets' responses to their perception· of' the probability of NATO nuclear use and the requirement to launch a·preemptive massed strike when ordered could ironically provide another motivation for Pact first use in a war Soviet planners and commanders explicitly trade off resources required for the conventional campaign to support the transition to nuclear war The withholding of additional forces for possible nuclear strikes would reduce the availability of conventional fire support from air and missile units at times when they would be needed to support the Pact assault on NATO defense lines This is precisely the same time when NATO first use is seen as increasingly likely I 6 2 d 6 2 d We believe that the Soviet threshold for nuclear preemption would be lowered significantly at NATO's first main line of defense and especially at the Rhine Confusion and the Soviets' lack of confidence in their ability to correctly interpret NATO defensive measures heighten the risks of miscalculation The Soviets believe that NATO plans and prepares for nuclear initiation at these times The General Staff's recommendations to the Supreme High Command would be made in the context of the staff's own sense of vulnerability to a massive NATO nuclear strike Regardless of the Supreme High Command's decision Pact forces would be at maximum readiness to carry out a nuclear strike at these times 6 2 d V Reverse Blank Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Din Seernt 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 ·' 6 2 d Contents Page iii 1 Key Judgments Introduction Misperceptions of NATO Nuclear Policies Perceptions of NATO Nuclear Decisionmaking Perceptions of NATO Defense Plans NATO's Cover Zone and Forward Defense Zone NATO's Main Defense Lines Perceptions of NATO's Nuclear Doctrine Perceptions of Specific Circumstances for NATO First Use Implications for Soviet Planning and Doctrine Appendixes A · B 4 4 5 5 5 11 13 16 Soviet Definitions of Nuclear Use NATO's INF and Pact Military Perceptions 19 21 6 2 d vii Tnn SN mt 6 2 d Reverse Blank Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Warsaw Pact Military Per eotions I of NATO Nuclear lnitiatio 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 Introduction 6 2 d 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 6 2 d Warsaw Pact analyses of NATO's nuclear doctrine plans and exercises help shape Soviet military perceptions of why when and how NATO would initiate the use of nuclear weapons in Europe These perceptions provide a context for monitoring indications of and predicting the first use of nuclear weapons by NATO Because Pact reconnaissance and intelligence systems would be under severe stress in a crisis and unable to produce conclusive evidence of NATO nuclear preparations 1 Soviet perceptions of the catalysts and conditions for NATO first use are likely to play a key role in advising the Supreme High Command whether to order a preemptive Pact strike I Our evidence indicates that the Soviets have made a concerted effort to understand and predict NATO's behavior For Soviet theorists and planners war is a problem amenable to study using the scientific principles of Marxism-Leninism War and human behavior are believed to be predictable when subjected to rigorous systematic study Consequently Soviet ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - military lea ders can be expected to give more creThis paper focuses upon Pact perceptions of NATO dence to scientific forecasts of enemy behavior than nuclear initiation NATO nuclear responses to initial would be the case in Western armies I Pact use and the interplay between limited NATO and Pact nuclear strikes also evoke qiscussion and analysis in Pact military writings But the key tenet of Soviet nuclear doctrine holds that the side that delivers the first massed strike gains a decisive potentially war-winning advantage Thus we observe a preeminent Soviet and hence Pact-wide concern over first use as well as a strong bias toward preemption on a 6 2 d massive scalej I 6 2 d ·6 2 d 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 6 2 d 1 Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 re 6 2 d ToP Seoret Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 6 2 d The 11' luen e Qf NATO Exercises on the Warsaw Pact 3 3 b 1 6 2 d Sensitive Pact military writings show that the Pact devotes considerable d 'ort to monitoring NATO exercises and is influenced by its observations a The Pact writes specifically that large multinational exercises are a primary vehicle or NATO to work out its contingencies and plans for a future war in Europe The influence al NATO exercises on Pact perceptions and thus indirectly on doctrine can be seen in the following examples • NATO and the Pact both foresee longer periods of 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 conventional combat before nuclear employment On the basis al NATO exercises the Pact perceives that NATO sees a trend toward longer periods al conventional combat before nuclear weapons are employed Whereas NATO exercises in the early 1960s went only one or a few days before nuclear weapons were introduced by the mid-1970s the conventional period lasted four or Jive days and by the late 1970s it stretched to about a week I 6 2 d I • NATO is more likely to initiate nuclear use than the Warsaw Pact NATO exercises analyzed by the Soviets and their allies show NATO initiating nuclear use in every case since the mid-1960s 3 3 b 1 6 2 d Jin recent years Pact exercises depicting NATO first use are even more common The depiction in Pact exercises al NATO as bearing the onus for initiating nuclear use fulfills both training and propaganda purposes Nevertheless the reason or NATO's initial use a nuclear weapons conforms to the Soviets' assessments and appears to reflect their J ercel _tions al NATO nuclear planning and intent 6 2 d 2 er Secut 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Ton Stent 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 3 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 · Din Se ■ et- 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 the early stages of nuclear use These sources state Finally the language of the discussion helps determine the intellectual framework of Soviet and NSWP that the final authorization for nuclear use must be writings about war in general and nuclear war in given by the President of the United States particular Appendix A provides a lexicon of major _ d Soviet terms concerning nuclear war I 6 2 The Soviets as well as the NSWP do not distinguish among the different national nuclear forces' political Misperceptions of NATO Nuclear Policies In describing NATO nuclear policies Warsaw Pact control or reasons for initial indeoendent use see inset nn OP II 6 nrl 7 I military writers reveal perceptions that sometimes vary significantly from NATO's actual plans and intentions see inset on pages 2 and 3 These misper3 3 b 1 ceptions cannot be explained simply by a lack of 6 2 d information To the contraryjs ---- - --- the Soviets and to a lesser degree the -- -N s w P co _ u_n tries have gathered extensive information about NATO's nuclear capabilities doctrine and plans They expend considerable resources monitoring NATO exercises and incorporate their observations 6 2 d into their own exercises and doctrine I 1 We believe most Warsaw Pact misperceptions result from projecting Soviet doctrine command arrangements and intentions onto NATO This mirror imaging is most apparent in Pact descriptions of NATO decisionmaking and the military reasons for NATO nuclear initiation On the other hand Pact writers discuss NATO defense plans and the most likely form of NATO first use without major distortions 6 2 d I I Distorted Pact perceptions do not skew its threat assessments in a single direction Some appear to diminish NATO's nuclear threat but most enhance it It is ironic that the Pact could hardly face a more obstinate and challenging foe in the nuclear arena 6 2 d than its own mirror image I Perceptions of NATO Nuclear Decisionmaking In its military writings the Pact generally portrays NATO's nuclear decisionmaking structure as monolithic and highly responsive although individual national pressures could argue for use at different times The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe SACEUR -always an American in practice if not by treaty provision-is generally depicted as the individual who would request permission for specific nuclear employment from the NATO Council The NATO Council according to Pact writers would grant permission on a case-by-case basis at least in - co ecret I 4 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Tor Secret 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 6 2 d Perceptions of NATO Defense Plans Warsaw Pact perceptions of NATO's defense plans are for the most part realistic and accurate apJJra1sals derived from Pact analvses of NATO exercises - In any case Pact leaders clearly expect to force NATO onto the defensive whatever NATO's initial intentions I I 6 2 d The basic features of NATO document MC 14 3 NATO's flexible-response doctrine see inset as well as NATO's command structure and layout of corps sectors have been portrayed m Pact wntmgs for nearly two decades Unclassified official NATO documents and statements which the Pact would have access to do not indicate clearly what geographic features its covenng force area and mam battle area would rest upon nor what rear defense Imes might be occupied as necessary Pact estimates of these features and Imes are revealing both for what they md1cate about Pact mtelhgence and analysis and because of the role Pact planners believe these defense lines are likely to play m tnggermg NATO nuclear use and shapmg Pact operations 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 6 2 d I The appraisals show a strong bias ---- toward the Central European Theater of Military Operations TMO and toward the northern half of West Germany m particular This probably reflects the dominant role of that region in Pact plans and presumes NATO interest therel 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 Still we should not totally discount Pact concerns about a NATO offensive Soviet Marxist-Lemmst theory holds that one of the maJor missions of the armed forces 1s to deter and tf necessary pumsh those cap1tahst states that resist the mev1table tnumph of soc1ahsm Resistance 1s commonly portrayed m the future when the dymg capitalist ohgarchy lashes out against the tnumphant progressive forces of socialism Pact military strategists analyze potential conflict m Europe withm this context and their doctrinal requirement to examine all military-technical possibilities It is not the role of the military strategists to Judge whether NATO political leaders would order an offensive but they are charged with mvestigatmg NATO's capabilities for offensive action and takmg measures to counter identified threats Soviet mthtary doctrine also emphasizes readiness to defeat a NATO offensive and to seize the m1t1atlve with a v1 orous Pact cou te NATO's Cover Zone and Forward Defense Zone Sensitive Pact wntmgs claim that NATO will deploy 60 to 70 percent of its forces m its cover zone and forward defense Imes These sources usually describe the depth of NATO's cover zone as 15 to 50 kilometers km and depict its forward defense zone begmmng Just beyond to the west of its cover zone see figure 3 These and other Pact wntmgs consistently locate the leading eastern edge of NATO's forward defense zone as running through West Germany from Lubeck Luneberg and Uelzen to Braunschwe1g South of Braunschwe1g this forward defense me is less clear but appears to hnk the cities of Munden and Passau ma gentle arc around the mner German bmd I 6 2 d NATO's Main Defense Lines Pact wnters claim that 1f NATO forces were pushed from their forward defense zone they would fall back on a senes of roam defense Imes that stretch the length of West Germany cedmg each in turn to occupy that to its rear These Imes are approximately 40 to 60 km apart Because the battle for Germany may proceed at different rates m the north and south NATO could 6 2 d 5 Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 T S r t 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 6 2 d The French Nuclear Forces An Unrecognized Wildcard 6 2 d We have no convincing evidence that the Soviets view French nuclear Jorces as separate from or likely to be engaged under different conditions than other NATO nuclear systems The creation of the French Rapid Action Force the growing French theater and strategic nuclear capabilities and the convergence of Paris and Bonn on many security issues may however · focus Soviet attention bn French nuclear capabilities ·and nuclear doctrine in the Juture J J 6 2 d Currently French main forces are located within French borders or relatively deep in NATO's rear areas the II Corps in Baden-Baden although there is one brigade stationed in West Berlin The Soviets might therefore expect the French to feel no pressing need to employ theater nuclear weapons to rescue major French forces early in a war see figure 2 French Army nuclear systems-some 30 Pluton surface-to-surface missile iaunchers-are positioned too deep to be used very near or beyond the eastern FRG border given their 120-km range without considerable forward deployment On the other hand French tactical nuclear-capable aircraft could reach East Eurooean territory rapidly with relative certainty I I We expect the Soviets to reconsider the French nuclear threat as France increases its theater and strategic nuclear capabilities by acquisitions of the 350-km-range Hades missile additional nuclearcapable strike aircraft new air-to-surface nuclear missiles additional and more capable nuclear submarines armed with newer missiles and perhaps enhanced radiation warheads for the Hades a These capabilities must be seen in light of· • Increasing French Army capabilities to intervene quickly with significant forces in the battle for West Germany both with t e formation of the Rapid Action Force and the reorientation of the III Corps of the First Army French Pluton SSMs l'---_ 6 2 d __J all • Planned organizational changes to subordinate French theater nuclear forces to a command controlled directly by the Joint Staff Command The French nuclear release procedure is arguably already highly responsive and will most likely be further streamlined with this organizational change t- • The deliberate effort to link the theater nuclear force to the more threateninl and rapidly growing French strategic forces jL______ __ I 6 2 d The French view their theater nuclear force in war as a means to serve as a final warning to the Soviets that they must cease aggression or suffer a French strategic nuclear strike against cities in the USSR To reinforce the linkage the French have none too subtly renamed their theater nuclear forces prestrategic nuclear forces I I 6 2 d Soviet failure to recognize independent French first use or escalation in a war could draw the Soviets and non-French NATO countries into a nuclear exchange The same possibility could result from independent British nuclear strikes although the British decisionmaking system is re ativelv more inteorated into the formal NATO structure I 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 6 2 d rlfuu Secret 6 2 d 6 Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Tea Seeret 6 2 d 6 2 d Key IA I 2 3 AK-1st Army I II III Army Corps l 9th Infantry Division 2 III Army Corps 2nd Armored Division 8th Infantry Division 12th Infantry Training Division 3 12th Infantry Training Division 4 15th Infantry Division 5 11th Airborne Division 6 14th Infantry Training Division 7 7th Armored Cavalry Divison 8 27th Alpine Infantry Division 9 Rapid Action Force 9th Infantry Division 11th Armored Division 27th Alpine Infantry Division 6th Armored Cavalry Division 10 7th Armored Division 11 3rd Armored Division 12 II Army Corps 1st 3rd 5th Armored Divisions 13 I Army Corps 7th 10th Armored Divisions 15th Infantry Division 14th lnfan Traini i Division 14 I Army Corps 4th Airmobile Qivision 15 II Army Corps 5th Armored Division 16 1st Armored Division 17 10th Armored Division 18 2nd Armored Division 19 FAR Rapid Action Force 20 Ill Army Corps 8th Infantry Division 21 HQ Armed Forces HQ Ground Forces 41h AlnnobU m 1 d 1 62 7 'fop Stcaet 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 'fm Sac1 et Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 6 2 d NATO's Flexible Response Strategy The strategy offlexible response approved by the Allies in 1967 and set forth in the NATO document MC 14 3 is intended to provide a full range of military responses to potential aggression a It reflects the Judgment that a credible deterrent requires a full range of conventional tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear forces together these forces compose the socalled NATO triad According to this concept Alliance forces should be capable of responding to a Pact attack at three levels kilometers farther west where the decisive battles to stop the enemy advance would take place An dfective forward defense is one that could defeat a Pact attack before enemy formations could breach the main battle area • Deliberate escalation U faced with the likelihood of a massive conventional breakthrough by Pact forces NATO commanders may request approval from Alliance political authorities to employ tactical nuclear weapons Use of these weapons would be intended primarily to restore deterrence by signaling NATO's resolve to escalate the level of hostilities if deemed necessary to halt the enemy's advance The timing of deliberate escalation decisions is intentionally left ambiguous to maximize uncertainty in the mind of the adversary • Direct defense at the border area Initial reaction would involve the movement of NATO forces from their peacetime garrisons to their assigned general defense positions in one of the eight national corps sectors upon receipt of warning The primary objective of NATO's forces would be to meet enemy forces at the intra-German and Czechoslovak borders and limit their advance The main geographic areas involved in this forward defense are the covering force area extending from the border westward approximately 20 kilometers and the main battle area extending to approximately 50 • NATO's ultimate deterrent is provided by the option of a general nuclear response employing long-range strate1c svstejs against targets in the Soviet homeland 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 • For a recent interpretation see Bob Furlong and Macha Levinson SACEUR Calls or Research on a European AiM Syster International Defense Review No 2 February 1986 ------------------- 6 2 d Ten See et 6 2 d 8 Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Too Sectet 6 2 d Figure 3 Warsaw Pact Perceptions of NATO Defense Lines in West Germany 100 Kilometers 0 100 Milos Baltic Sea North I Sea AMS 6 2 d 70 7 639 800129 6 -88 9 Top SeeHt 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 'fop 8ec1et 6 2 d link the northern half of one defense line with the southern half of another This appears to be reflected in some Pact exercises in which NATO's defense line bows dramatically before breaking although in most writings this bending effect is not discussed I 6 2 d 6 2 d I NATO's first main defense line which serves as the backbone of its forward defense zone is linked in Pact writings with the Weser River and a southern extension that alternatively connects the cities of Lauterbach Karlstadt Ansbach and Augsburg to the Lech River or swings eastward from Karlstadt along the Main to the Regnitz or Altmuhl Rivers to the Danube Although a northern extension of the Weser line into the Jutland peninsula would be noncontiguous NATO's defense of the Kiel Canal may be associated with it The distance of the first main defense line to the inner German border varies from over 100 km at its northern and southern extremities to less than 50 km in the German III and US V corps sectors These distances conform to Pact estimates of the depth of NATO's corps sectors 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 6 2 d '----s -ov- i-et_ e_x_p_e-ri-en_c_e_i_n _W _ or-ld_ W _ a_r_I_I_h_e_lp_e_d_es _t_a_b_li-sh- a fixation on the role of rivers as defensive obstacles For example Col A A Sidorenko's The _Offensive devotes an entire chapter to forcing water obstacles 3 and associates the use of nuclear weapons in defense of river lines explicitly Pact writings name the rivers that NATO would defend indicate the engineering resources needed to cross them and note that major crossings would be army and front-level operations Their planners believe that river-crossing operations would be especially attractive targets for NATO nuclear strikes1 J In keeping with this emphasis on river lines a main defense line described as intermediate in Pact writings is formed by the Ems River connected through Marburg with sections of the Main Jagst and Iller 'Forcing river obstacles continues to be given prominence in Soviet military writings including the authoritative Taktika by V G Reznichenko 1984 and A I Radziyevskiy's Army Operations 1977 translated in JPRS-UMA-85-016-L 16 July 1985 □ 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 6 2 d 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 6 2 d 'Foo Ferret 6 2 d Rivers Defenses in the nearly 200-km gap between the Ems and Main Rivers would be supported by the rough terrain that dominates this area • Nuclear munitions depots • Important rear service installations - - - -- • State administration centers • Political and economic centers 6 2 d NATO defenses along the Rhine River and possibly its extension along the Ijssel or Maas are described This worst case threat does not dominate Pact analyI rariously as NATO's strategic rear sis and planning In fact most sensitive Pact military or last main defense line in West Germany Rivers to writings indicate that initial NATO nuclear strikes the west of the Rhine are seldom described in Pact are most likely to be writings as potential NATO defense lines Those • Limited or selective rather than massive mentioned-the Moselle and Maas for example-are • Used in support of defensive operations most likely modifications of the Rhine line The Rhine • Restricted to areas near the forward line of troops River is 150 to 350 km from the inner German • Directed against the immediate Pact military border-a distance that coincides with that given in threati I 6 2 d Pact writings for the depth of NATO's army groups It is difficult to overstate the importance attached to Pact planners believe '- c - --- --' the Rhine in Pact analyses and exercises The reasons NATO would conduct limited nuclear strikes in deb 3 ·3 d 1 are clear fensive operations against the combat and support 6 ·2 • Its breach would threaten the last naturally bound- elements of the most threatening Pact maneuver ed enclave NATO might attempt to hold in the forces In those cases where NATO forces employed a FRG static defense nuclear strikes would be used primarily • Most of NATO's main airbases including the mato support forward defense forces When NATO jority of nuclear-capable airfields are just beyond relied on a mobile defense a larger allocation would the Rhine be made for strikes to support counterattacks The 3 3 b 1 • Seizure of Rhine crossings would allow Pact forces most c mmon features of limited NATO nuclear 6 2 d to advance to the North Sea or the English Channel operations foun - - - - - - - - - re splitting NATO in two • Reaching the Rhine Valley would mean that the • Size limited or selective strikes Pact had control of most of West Germany and its 3 3 b 1 J O' pulation and economic assets I I L___ _ _ _ _ _ __ 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 6 2 d 6 2 d I Perceptions of NATO's Nuclear Doctrine · Pact discussions of NATO's nuclear doctrine empha3 3 b 1 sizelthe threat of massive nuclear strikes-NATO's general nuclear response Such strikes as depicted in 6 2 d Pact writings ___ _ _ _ _ _ are virtual mir or images of massed Pact strikes They are on the I sam scale as the Pact's employing several hundred nuclear weapons per NATO army group roughly the equivalent of a Pact front and sequenced in the same manner The targets for such NATO strikes are indistinguishable in type and priority from those commonly given for massed Pact strikes • Means of nuclear attack • Airfields • Troop groupings ' • Air defense systems • Command posts Pact writings assert that NATO '-----roc - tr m _e_ c_a ll s fo-r five or six warheads to be used against an attacking Pact division Pact descriptions of massive NATO nuclear strikes typically include several hundred warheads • Range al use In a period of limited nuclear war NATO is described as using tactical and operational-tactical weapons The former consists mainly of artillery the latter includes SSMs-the Pershing Ia Lance and Pluton-and tactical aircraft that could strike up to about a' 1 000-km range or to the Soviet-Polish border No nuclear strikes against targets in the Soviet homeland are 11 Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Top Sec1et 6 2 d 6 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 3 3 b 1 anticipated before the initial massed NATO nuclear strike Moreover most Pact discussions note that NATO limited use would probably be confined at least initially to about 30 km from the forward line of troops FLOT This is the approximate range of NATO's nuclear artillery and is also the approximate depth of attacking first-echelon Pact divisions 4 • Weapon systems employed Atomic demolition munitions and nuclear-tipped antiaircraft missiles for example the Nike Hercules were often considered the most likely candidates for initial NATO use in Pact writings and exercises but both are being phased out of NATO nuclear planning NATO nuclear artillery would be most commonly used though nuclear SSMs such as the Lance with its ll 5-km range could also be used selectively for strikes on or near the battlefield A recurring point in sensitive Pact writings is that NATO aircraft would have a negligible nuclear delivery role in limited nuclear operations The Pact believes that NATO would employ aircraft extensively in this period for conventional operations Aircraft would assume their dominant role among NATO nuclear delivery systems only with escalation to massed strikes • Targets or NATO limited use The most likely targets for limited NATO nuclear strikes would be nuclear-capable systems maneuver units and command elements The scale and range of weapons that the Pact believes NATO would use initially would not support effective interdiction of the Soviet second strategic echelon or counterair operations Although counternuclear operations would also ap_pear to offer poor payoffs the Pact believes its nuclear-capable systems would be high-priority candidates for limited NATO nuclear strikes 3 3 b 1 I 6 2 d 6 2 d Consistent throughout Pact writings and exercises is the belief that once nuclear weapons are employed an escalation of their use will almost certainly follow The Pact believes that NATO nuclear use on a limited scale would prove ineffective and be quickly recognized as such by NATO leaders Faced with the threat of defeat from the Pact's conventional theater offensive NATO decisionmakers would in the Pact view order massed strikes Fear of Pact preemption and NATO's need to alter fundamentally the correlation of forces in the theater would drive the West's leade_rs towarf the use of nuclear weanonr on a massive scale _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - a limited nuclear war could be terminated before escalation to massed strikes occurs These writers note that several major NATO exercises in the late 1970s witnessed no such escalation breaking a pattern that had been in place for decades Still the majority of Pact writings from the same period have concentrated on the earlier trend in NATO exercises in which the period of limited nuclear war lasted typically one to three days before massed strikes were launched NATO exercises that did not escalate to massive use represent NATO victories or exercise scenarios that stopped short of decisive operations In the Pact view the former are implausible and the latter incomplete 6 2 d ------------------ • In past years 30 km was also the range of the Honest John rocket-a system now used only by Greece for nuclear delivery See appendix B for Soviet distinctions among systems by range as well as some of the eft'ects of NATO's INF decision on Pact perceptions I I 6 2 d 12 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 6 2 d · 3 3 b 1 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 6 2 d Perceptions of Specific Circumstances for NATO First Use the timing and form of ---- N A T O 's fir_s_t _u-se- w- 1--c-'be driven by its assessment of the correlation of forces and particularly by the progress of the conventional campaign Accordmg to Pact military writings - - - - - - NATO might choose to use nuclear weapons at least theoretically for any of the followmg reasons • To prevent an impending Pact breakthrough of NATO defensive Imes This threat is cited m most Pact sources as the dommant mot1vat10n for NATO nuclear use m defensive operations • To support a NATO offensive or counteroffensive The Pact often portrays NATO as executmg nuclear stnkes to support combmed-arms thrusts mto Eastern Europe early m a war or m less favorable circumstances as conductmg nuclear strikes later m a war to support counteroffensives on West German terntory To many Pact officers the ratio of forces is so unfavorable that NATO could not undertake an offensive without supportmg nuclear stnkes to alter the ratio and upset Pact plans and d1spos1t1ons 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 6 2 d • To slow or destroy Warsaw Pact forces before they reach or can affect the main battle area Pact wntmgsl lshow that Pact theonsts believe NATO may use nuclear weapons m its attempt to isolate the battlefield This can take the form of mterd1ct1on stnkes agamst cntical Imes of commumcation and direct attacks on forces m transit or m assembly areas to delay or prevent their arnval • To prevent the collapse of NATO forces in one or more sectors following a Warsaw Pact breakh o h NATO 1s descnbed as usmg nuclear stnkes to cover its w1throm one defense hne to another o • To prevent the loss of key pollllcal economic or strategic areas l NATO's nuclear use 1s mtended to stun the Pact and allow NATO time to reorgamze Its defense Ton sec1et- • To demonstrate NATO's determrnatwn to escalate the war if the Warsaw Pact continues to threaten vital NATO interests Pohtical and m1htary wntmgs show that the Pact 1s well versed m NATO's debate over nuclear s1gnahng to show resolve but appears to place little credence m the hkehhood of a purely demonstrative nuclear shot across the bow Pact wnters note that NATO would be inh1b1ted from such use by fear that 1t would prompt a preemptive massed nuclear stnke by the Pact According to Pact writers at a minimum such a move by NA TO would cause the Pact to take preventive measures that would render follow-on NA TO stnkes less effective 6 2 d 6 2 d Each of these reasons could lead to NATO nuclear 1mhat1on at different times In response to this ambiguous threat many Pact m1htary writings state that the time of first use is mdetermmate and consequently Pact forces must be constantly prepared for 1t At the operatJonal-tact1cal level Pact analysts recogmze that the threat 1s not so open-ended Drawmg upon their analyses of NA TO doctrme exercises nuclear dec1SJonmakmg structure and process and defense plans Pact theonsts have refined their estimates of the cause and tlmmg of 1mt1al NA TO nuclear use mto four maJor cases • NATO strzkes early and massively Sens1t1ve Pact wntings state clearly that scenanos with early massive NATO nuclear stnkes represent worst case plannmg assumptions The Soviets beheve that such assumptions should constitute the basis for planmng For example a recent authoritative wntmg · states m preparmg the nation and armed forces for war one must proceed not from a possible favorable confluence of circumstances but rather place the mam bet on the extended fierce and protracted nature of future m1htary clashes and make all one's strategic plans precisely proceedmg from this 5 Consistent with this approach the Pact exercised simulated massive NATO stnkes on the first day of the war as late as 1979-although 1mtial use that early had not appeared m NA TO exercises analyzed by the Pact smce 1962 'Sec M A Gareyev M V Frunze IM1 rtarr Theonsl JPRSUMA-85-027-L 7 November 1985 • 13 6 2 d 'fop Sec1et 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 r'--_o_o_St_ _ e_t _ I 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 • NATO strikes to support its irst main defense line Pact writings state explicitly that NATO might resort to nuclear strikes to prevent a major Pact penetration of the first main defense line Penetration by substantial Pact forces especially in the British or Belgian corps sectors probably would 3 3 b 1 unhinge NATO's defense of northern Germany in · d the absence of mobile NATO reserves or re ared 6 2 · and occu ied intermediate defense lines 3 3 b 1 6 2 d •'- - --- - exercises confirm heightened Soviet concern for avoiding the effects of a surprise or sudden attack see inset In these exercises sudden attacks on the first day of the war have been only conventional and have featured hundreds of aircraft a large portion of which are described as nuclear capable as well as cruise missiles Significantly even in the face of this threat Pact forces have never been detected responding with a preemptive nuclear strike • NATO strikes to hold its final defense line along the Rhine River Even if NATO forces were able to maintain a credible conventional defense for several • A large number of recent major exercises hav e si m-u la-t- days or even weeks trading space for time and attrition Pact planners believe NATO would choose ed penetration of NATO's first main defense line by Pact forces without triggering NATO nuclear use to employ nuclear WeJi OQ DS ore iuoss ru IruL_ 3 3 b 1 Rhine defense line 6 2 d ---- __-------------1 • No major Pact exercise has simulated an advance beyond the Rhine without nuclear initiation by NATO or by the Pact as a preemptive act Several of the major nonnuclear Pact exercises end with a • No nuclear strikes Sensitive Pact writings note that suggestion of imminent nuclear use as Pact forces war may be termim1tP d before initiation of nuclear reach and attempt to breach NATO's defenses 3 3 b 1 employment I along· the Rhine Riverl --- - -- 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 6 2 d Pact perceptions of 'NATO's nuclear decisionmaking process would contribute to its hope of delaying NATO nuclear initiation Pact military writings note that the West Germans have preferred the prompt use of tactical nuclear weapons to raise the specter of nuclear escalation quickly and thus preserve as much of their territory as possible It is probable that the Pact is aware of the British preference for using Scenarios that resemble each of these four majo -r_ nuclear weapons quickly to ensure the survival of the 3 -3 b 1 cases are considered lausible b Pact tanners British Army on the Rhine BAOR Pact planners 6 2 d believe however that the United States would be e reluctant to begin a nuclear war in Europe and that act assesses 3 3 b 1 probability of the e scenarios r 6 2 d • Tor Secret 6 2 d 14 Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 3 3 b 1 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Top Secret 6 2 d The Soviet War Scare'' 1981-85 The Soviet war scare af 1981 to 1985 focused on the threat af a surprise or sudden nuclear missile attack on the Soviet Union by the United States with or without the cooperation a its NATO allies The Soviets perceived changes in US nuclear capabilities and strategy illustrated by the deployment af the Pershing II to Europe as lowering the threshold at which the United States would emolov nuclear weanons against the Soviet Union I 3 3 b 1 nor to what degree it represented a real fear af imminent nuclear warJ 3 3 b 1 6 2 d Beginning in 1984 the war scare started to wither The factors that contributed to its decline are uncertain but probably included • A realization that the threat was wt as great as initially feared • The death in February 1984 af Yuriy Andropov who may have been one af its early promoters • The increased concern about US technological advances especially as applied to new weapons and the consequent possibility af drastic changes in the correlation al'forces in the f uture I 6 2 d I 6 2 d We do wt know to what extent the war scare was created or used by dll erent elements af the Soviet national security apparatus to further their own ends 6 2 d ultimately the President not the Europeans would control NATO's nuclear decisionmaking process The threat of escalation to massive use and strikes on US territory would in the Pact view strongly argue against merican nuclear release ' - - - - - - - - - On the basis of our evidence and analysis of how the Pact perceives NATO nuclear decisionmaking doctrine and defense plans we judge that the Pact and specifically the Soviet military believe that • An early massive NATO nuclear strike is unlikely to nuclear war Although first use may occur in one of the peripheral theaters as simulated in a major Pact exercise luse in Central Europe would 3 3 b 1 occur at the same time or follow rapidly 6 2 d • They have some chance of penetrating NATO's first and intermediate main defense lines without triggering NATO nuclear strikes • There is little if any chance that NATO decisionmakers would forgo nuclear use to hold positions along the Rhine • NATO's decision to use nuclear weapons would be driven by the progress of the campaign in Central Europe and US preferences for timing of escalation 15 Tod Secret6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 · tt 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 I • NATO's initial nuclear use would probably be limited though not purely demonstrative ineffective and would escalate to large-scale use quickly 6 2 d 6 2 d 6 2 d • There is a small chance that a war would end without the use of nuclear weapons or before it could escalate from limited to massed use Implicatiom for Soviet Planning and Doctrine The preservation of the Soviet state is the preeminent objective and constraint of Soviet security policy To this end Soviet leaders want to limit the damage to the USSR in any future conflict They believe that any use of nuclear weapons in Europe would increase the likelihood of nuclear attacks on the Soviet homeland as well as the uncertainties inherent in a major war The Soviets are taking costly steps to increase their capabilities to wage a successful conventional campaign in Central Europe should war come about and to increase the likelihood that a war could be won without escalation to nuclear use Soviet planners however appear to believe that NATO is not structured to fight a nuclear war effectively and that it does not possess the will and means to win The Soviets believe NATO leaders would realize that a massive nuclear strike would guarantee terrible retaliation and deny NATO victory Consequently the Soviets probably believe NATO's ultimate capability is for NATO a means of deterrence and failing that unishment and denial J J 6 2 d The Soviets have undertaken and will continue to pursue initiatives to weaken NATO's will and capability to use nuclear weapons in a war Peacetime initiatives include arms control agreements that would eliminate portions of NATO's nuclear capabilities and promotion and support of Western antinuclear movements to hamoer NATO deolovment and modernization effortsl I 6 2 d The Soviets are exploring means to postpone limit or ideally avert NATO's first use of nuclear weapons The Soviets hope to take full advantage of periods of conventional and limited nuclear use to blunt NATO's nuclear forces and exploit the Pact's conventional superiority These efforts do not indicate that the Soviets have renounced massed strikes or preemption or that they believe they can unilaterally control nuclear initiation or escalation Rather this approach demonstrates pragmatic consideration of other less threatening scenarios 6 2 d ------- Soviet theorists recognize that their nuclear doctrine and NATO's nuclear doctrine as they understand it lead to a paradox They see the very success of Pact conventional forces as likely to trigger NATO nuclear strikes to stave off rapid defeat threatening the Pact with unacceptable costs They also believe that initial limited NATO nuclear strikes would prove ineffective motivating NATO to launch larger strikes Soviet nuclear doctrine however calls for launching preemptive massed nuclear strikes once it is detected that NATO intends to use nuclear weapons on a large scale Thus Pact theater successes could lead directly to what the joviets see as the catastrophe of general nuclear war I The foremost implication of this paradox for Soviet planning is that whatever the Soviet preference for conventional over nuclear war Pact combat forces their supporting structure and elements crucial to the survival and functioning of the Soviet state must be configured and employed for eventual NATO nuclear use on a massive scale Reconstitution of these assets following massive NATO nuclear strikes is a constant theme in Pact exercises and sensitive writings and the Soviets' initiatives and investments confirm their belief in this requirement ------ In war the Soviets plan to • Monitor the nuclear activities of NATO to warn of its readiness and preparations for imminent use and to provide targeting data for conventional and nuclear strikes against NATO's weapons and command and control systems ' 3 3 b 1 6 2 d I • See DI Research Paper SOY 85-10107CX Top Secret I IJune 1985 Warsaw Pact T a s - - Capabilities and Readiness or Nuclear War - - 6 2 d 6 2 d no Se ■ et 16 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 • Attack NATO's nuclear forces including command control communications and intelligence support with conventional as well as improved conventional munitions 9 • Provide disincentives for Western nuclear use by closing rapidly with NATO forces to complicate NATO targeting operating on NATO territory to increase the collateral costs of NATO use and engaging in costly engineering efforts to protect forces from the full effects of nuclear attacks For example six hours of preparatory engineering work is expected to reduce troop losses by one-half to twothirds • Strike NA' fO nuclear systems preemptively with a massed nuclear attack if large-scale NATO nuclear use is believed imminent or unavoidable 10 6 2 d In the event of limited NATO nuclear strikes r the conviction that imminent NATO strikes would be limited--Soviet leaders might forgo launching massed nuclear strikes to prolong the period of war dominated by their own superior conventional arms We believe these circumstances could arise if Soviet leaders expected their objectives could be achieved without extensive nuclear fire support and were confident that NATO could not or would not massively employ nuclear weapons in the immediate future Urider such restrictive and indeed unlikely conditions the Soviets could respond to limited NATO nuclear use with their own limited nuclear strikes or forgo nuclear use entirely By the combination of measures noted above retaliatory threats and demonstrating the futility of NATO nuclear use Soviet strategists hope to resolve the paradox that their own conventional superiority has generated I I 6 2 d 6 2 d I 6 2 d Still on the basis of their perceptions of the probability of NATO nuclear use and the requirement to launch a preemptive massed strike when so ordered by the Supreme High Command Soviet planners must make force employment decisions that affect conventional operations and the transition to nuclear war Their practices exercises and writings reveal their concerns that • Nuclear strike units cannot be kept at high states af readiness over extended periods without suffering degradation In -their exercises Pact commanders regularly maintain only a portion of devoted nuclear strike assets at the highest levels of readiness-even after conventional combat begins-until escalation to nucl r · · · · 3 3 b 1 6 2 d There was an apparent appreciation that keeping nuclear forces cocked over an extended period would lower their true readiness-their ability to carry out their mission effectively in a timely manner This would be critical in the event of protracted conventional op e_ra_t_io_n_s p_r_io_r_t_o _n_uc_le_a_r_in_i_tia_t_io_nLI_ _ _ _ _ 3 3 b 1 '-----------c----c------ --- -- 6 2 d L-------------------- • Dual-purposeforces withheld for contingent nuclear use weaken conventional firepower Aircraft withheld for contingent nuclear use as well as tactical missile forces and artillery deprive Soviet com' manders of longer range heavy fireoower l I 3 3 b 1 6 2 d • See DI lnteJHacnce Assjsmcnt SOY 85-I000ICX Top Secret January 1985 Warsaw Paci Air Forces Support af Strategic Operations In Central Europe 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 17 Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Tua 9eeret 6 2 d 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 3 3 b 1 6 2 d The attrition of dual-capable aircraft and SSMs during conventional operations would increase the percentages withheld for nuclear contingencies • Reconnaissance would be overstretched throughout a war and the priority task al monitoring NATO's nuclear forces would draw down resources initially intended to support conventional operations Pact writings demonstrate concern over a shortfall in reconnaissance capabilities because of the number character and dispersal of targets that must be covered Reconnaissance aircraft tasked to search out NATO SSMs to update contingency plans for the initial massed nuclear strike would suffer significant attrition Other assets would almost certainly be drawn off to support this priority task leaving fewer reconnaissance assets to support conventional operations I I 6 2 d Soviet planners and commanders explicitly trade off capabilities that support conventional operations for those that support the transition to nuclear war When NATO nuclear initiation is seen as increasingly likely Soviet planners intend to shift resources to support the transition to nuclear operations most probably by increasing the ability to launch a preemptive massed strike Soviet commanders almost certainly would strive for maximum readiness in theater and possibly strategic nuclear systems as they attempt to breach NATO's first main defense line and when they approach and attack the Rhine Ironically resources shifted to prepare for nuclear operations would be most sorely needed by field commanders conducting the conventional campaign precisely at those times they are shifted I 6 2 d We believe that the Soviet threshold for nuclear preemption would be lowered significantly at these critical points because of • Confusion and ambiguity in detecting a NATO decision to launch a nuclear strike • Perceptions that NATO plans and prepares for nuclear initiation at such times • Predictions of vulnetabilitv to a massiye NATO nuclear strike j '------ 6 2 d 18 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 'foe Secret 6 2 d Appendix A Soviet Definitions of Nuclear Use 6 2 d Warsaw Pact writings are confusing and appear contradictory to Western readers in part because Pact writers think and write about NATO doctrine and practices using for the most part terms and concepts native to Soviet military theory Soviet terms and concepts of nuclear employment are presented below as a reference and to provide insight as to how they approach NATO nuclear employment 11 1 I Single Group and Massed Strikes According to the Soviets nuclear weapons can be employed in the form of single group and massed nuclear strikes They define 12 these as mass or massive strikes are composed of many si_ngle and group nuclear stri - rried out against different targets · _ d 62 General Versus Limited Nuclear War The Soviets also differentiate between general nuclear war and limited nuclear war The former entails the unlimited use of nuclear weapons and includes intercontinental strikes The latter is restricted to a given geographic area and can vary in scope and intensity It may feature small- or large-scale use of nuclear weapons throughout an entire theater or in part of it I • Single nuclear strike- A strike delivered against an objective with one nuclear weapon It is used in those cases when the yield of a nuclear weapon ensures that the required damage will be inflicted on the target • Group nuclear strikes- Strikes delivered simultaneously by means of several nuclear devices A group or 'grouped' nuclear strike is used when the desired degree of damage to the target cannot be achieved with a single nuclear device or when the situation precludes the use of a single more powerful nuclea_r device I 6 2 d The Soviets' commentaries on and descriptions of limited nuclear war offer tantalizingly incomplete insights into their ·thinking about an area that has dominated Western debate off and on for years Evidence in Pact writings and exercises from the late 1960s and early 1970s indicates that the limited nuclear option was controversial and generated considerable debate Although a consensus was reached by the mid- l 970s Soviet views might undergo further debate and evolution -as a result of NATO INF deployments see appendix B evolving improved conventional munitions and other changes in factors that influence Soviet nuclear doctrine We have not seen further debate or evolution to date 6 2 d • Massed nuclear strike- A strike made by a large number of nuclear munitions delivered simultaneously or in quick succession The purpose of a massed nuclear strike is to annihilate enemy means of nuclear attack that have been spotted to inflict damage on the main enemy troop groupings and to disorganize the enemy rear areas his economy troop control and state administration Massed nuclear strikes also occasionally referred to as 6 2 d 11 For more details on Soviet nuclear d rin the Intelligence Assessment referenced in footnote 10 12 These definitions are taken from the o v1 et D 1 c1ionary al Basic Military Tt rms which translated under the auspices of the US Air Force They are consistent with definitions found in the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary the Soviet Military Encyclopedia and sensitive Pact military writings I is 6 2 d The consensus Soviet view of limited nuclear war holds that if it occurs at all it will be brief and lead with near certainty to general ·nuclear war Its basic instability results from the potentially decisive advantages that would accrue to the side that launches massed nuclear strikes first Pact writers note that both sides would enhance the readiness of their nuclear forces in a crisis and during the conventional period of war and that indications of likely nuclear use by an opponent would be delayed limited uncertain and contradictory Hence both sides would be trigger happy and prone to launch preemptive massed strikes to limit the damage they might otherwise suffer - - - - - 6 2 d 19 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 · c ret 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 6 2 d The consensus Soviet view holds that limited nuclear war is self-contradictory as well By definition in limited nuclear war limited means are employed to achieve limited objectives The result is that it becomes more difficult to achieve those objectives quickly raising the risk of eventual escalation Furthermore the defeated side can always choose to escalate to general nuclear war rather than accept defeat The diplomatic aspect of limited nuclear war-threatening one's opponent with escalation to more destructive levels-is seen as essentially a denial of the limited character of limited nuclear war 3 3 b 1 Finallyj 6 2 d 6 -2 d 6 2 d 6 2 d limited L_n_u cl ea _r_ w_a_r im - pl ies _ a_ n_ee_d fi o_r_n_e_go---ct ia---- t io-n-s perhaps conducted during pauses in the fighting to bring about its end This contradicts the consistent Soviet line that war between NATO and the Pact would be the decisive armed conflict between the opposing capitalist and socialist camps and fought at a rapid tempo for decisive rather than finely negotiated ends I I We detect an additional complementary view in the Soviets' sensitive writings and exercises that holds that limited nuclear war may be forced upon them but could offer significant advantages over general nuclear war Massive nuclear strikes against the Soviet homeland are seen as the greatest political and military threat presented by NATO Consequently limited nuclear war could offer the possibility of excluding homeland exchanges between the United States and theUSSR - - - - - Massed Versus Limited or Selective Strikes Soviet writings and exercises distinguish between massed strikes and limited or selective nuclear strikes Massed strikes are consistent with general rather than limited war Although in theory massed strikes could be restricted to non-Soviet Europe Soviet writers are pessimistic about exchanging massed strikes with NATO while avoiding strikes on the USSR 6 2 d We believe that the Soviets have adopted NATO's terms for limited ogranichenniy nuclear strikes and selective use vyborochnoye primeneniye without defining them precisely Single and group strikes are operational military terms that focus on weapon allocation for different target clusters They do not account for the political dimension of limited or selective strikes-the need to signal the limited intentions of nuclear use-while still achieving military effect 6 2 d Soviet writings enumerate and discuss NATO's delimitations for limited or selective nuclear strikesincluding types and locations of targets and numbers yields and types of warheads-but do not appear to have adopted them Sensitive Soviet writings dating from 1970 indicate that the Soviets may restrict their use of delivery systems to those under a I 000-km 3 3 b 1 6 2 d None of the writings associated with this view advocate it as a choice among various options They only imply a willingness to consider a possible situation that may be pressed upon the Pact in a conflict and to explore its implications Pact exercises that include a period of limited nuclear war help train commands Limited and staffs to operate within the constraints of such a strikes would probably be directed against forces in war and probably have a major effect u _p_on_ th_e_ _ the field command posts and supporting elementsevolution of Soviet doctrine in this are I especially those that would support nuclear operations I J 20 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 t 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C065684 76 · - I op Secret 6 2 d Appendix B NATO's INF and Pact Military Perceptions 6 2 d NATO decisions in 1978 and 1979 have affected Warsaw Pact military perceptions The planned deployment of 108 Pershing II SSMs and 464 groundlaunched cruise missiles GLCMs --the NATO Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force INF --is correctly seen by the Pact as central to NATO's longterm plan to modernize its theater nuclear capabilities Pact military planners quickly focused on the potential threat posed by these systems and began taking steps to familiarize Pact officers with the nature of the threat and methods to counter it vears bef re the weapons were fielded j I Pact military writings note that INF deman_ds especially vigorous countermeasures because • INF represents a significant growth in the total numbers of forward-based nuclear systems available to NATO in the European theater of war • The Pershing II can deliver nuclear strikes to a strategic depth within seven to eight minutes of launch • The accuracy of the Pershing II and the GLCM are assessed at approximately 30 meters • The warhead on the Pershing II is capable of penetrating underground before exploding thus threatening hardened positions L - - - - - - - 6 2 d Although Pact planners have noted that INF increases NATO's capability to carry out selective nuclear strikes they have concentrated upon the threat it poses as a means of conducting a massive disarming first strike A massive NATO strike could employ • The Pershing II to destroy Soviet command and control by decapitating the Soviet leadership in a crisis before they could enter deep underground shelters • The Pershing II GLCM and aircraft to strike into the Pact's strategic and operational-strategic depth • The Pershing Ia Lance Pluton and aircraft to attack the Pact's operational-tactical depth • The Honest John and artillery to attack the Pact's tactical depth I 6 2 d • The proportion·of SSMs is expected to grow to more than 40 percent of NATO's theater nuclear capability assuring NATO of more rapid and certain strike cap bilities In Pact worst case planning INF appears to give NATO's forward-based systems not merely devastating theater nuclear ·capabilities but even strategic potentially war-winning capabilities Pact strategists state that because the gap between theater and strategic nuclear capabilities has narrowed the gap • The Pershing II is assessed to be virtually immune to interception after launch between theater nuclear war and strategic nuclear war has narrowed 3 3 b 1 • Although the GLCM is potentially more vulnerable I the Pact has interpreted NATO's enhanced 6 2 d theater nuclear capabilities as providing an additional to in-flight interception it has a small radar cross incentive to launch a preemptive massed nuclear section and thermal image is capable of flying at very low altitudes can be employed in massed strike when NATO nuclear use is assessed as immi6 2 d attacks to saturate defending forces and can be nent directed to fly toward its target from different directions • The widespread geographic distribution of theater nuclear capabilities from England to Sicily will make detection of launch preparations disruption by conventional strikes and nuclear preemption extremely difficult I Reverse Blank 21 6 2 d Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 - Tbp Secret · Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476 I I Tep Secret Approved for Release 2022 06 21 C06568476