S ECRE r TH WHITE HOUSE DECISION I WA SHI N G T O N Nov e mbe r l 1975 DEa A88IFIED e o 13526 a sec 3 3 MR O l-l'JI · tt17 N SC Jj q J MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT FROM JACK MARSH SUBJECT Senate Select Cornrnittee Plans £or Open Hearing on Covert Activities in Chile Cl l BACKGROUND UJ 0 The Senate Select Committee intends to hold an open session on the range of CIA covert activities in Chile from 1964 to present The hearing which is scheduled for next Tuesday is intended as a case study on covert activities and is the only one of its kind scheduled £or an open hearing 0 0 '-'- - l 0 c r- 0 0 c The CIA has been asked by the Committee to declassify certain facts 0 Attachment A for the proposed public hearing The Corrrmittee plans on calling two witnesses David Philips CIA' s former head of the Latin America Division of the Directorate of Operations and Ambassador Korry who had been stationed in Chile from 1967 to 1971 In addition to decla s si£ication of the facts obtained from CV files the Senate Select Committee also wishes to quote from certain classified National Intelligence Estimates in an effort to prove that Allende was not considered to be a threat to the democratic processes of Chile No other classified documentation has been requested for the hearing The CIA has been advised that if Bill Colby wishes to appear the Committee would hear his testimony During a recent e x ecutive session strong objections were raised by Colby to holding a public session on this subject Senator Church wishes to be advised as to whether or not the CIA will comply with the Committee r e que s ts ISSUE FOR DECISION -2- Reaso n s for Opposing Open Hearing I T h e argw nent that much information about the Agency's activities i n Chile has already appeared publicly fails to taY e account ol the important distinction between unofficial reporting n unors and allegations and the of fie ial verification of facts v1hich would be the result of public hearings based on declassified docu_-rnents and testimony f People other than employees including U S citizens and companies as well as foreigners who cooperated willingly with the Agency could be exposed and become subject to harrassment or even threat 0£ physical viole nce The confirmation of CIA covert activities in Chile would doubtless lead to the identification of highly placed political leaders 0£ Chile who we hav e assisted over the years In particular former President Edwardo Frei whose election in 1964 we contributed to and whose tacit participation in coup plotting in 1970 may be divulged Declassification of the facts or the appearance of the Director at an open hearing testifying to a declassified series of events in a covert action operation would have the following adverse results r co J 0 0 0 0 J UJ 0 E 0 0 LL - 1 i It would establish a precedent that would be seized on by the Congress in the future to hold additional open hearings on covert action 0 c 2 b r a 2 It would have a shattering effect on the willingness of foreign political parties and individuals to cooperate with the U S in the future on such operations Finally it should be noted that public officially confirmed rehashlnD 0 of the Agency's acti vi ties in Chile would result according to Colby in a rekindling of the Soviet Cuban and other adversaries worldwide campaign against CIA and the U S Government Advantages in Not Opposing the Open Hearing Sine it is apparent that the Senate Select Com__TTJ ittee will hold open hearings on Chile cooperating with the Committee with respect to the scope of the hearing could give us limited protection In such fashion we could hope to keep out of the public record a substantial number of names of Chilians who co0perated with the U S Government We avoid further charges of II cover-up 11 • I I f -3- I t vould -i ·e an opoor t uni t v fo r Colb y to demonstrate that the Cl • • d l nature of o u r c o e r t acti v ity o ·e r a ten - year per10 w as 1n ge_ner- i i s u pporc o f he demo cratic process in Chile It wo d- als_o g1_ve b i n an oppor t u nity t o categoricall y den y any CL A partlctpation 1n be 19 7 J c ou_ a n d the dea th of Allende r If t n e S e nate publishes t 1 ie assassination report i nc 1u d mg Chile m a te r ial there will be little if anything left to protect F i nall y if the CIA is to appear at open hearings it would negotiate a more accurate statement of facts e g paragraph 4 of Attachment A - - fr o m the Committee - - is in error 0 ' 0 co J Cl 0 Wha t Would Happen I£ We Oppose Open Hearings 0 Cl J 1 David Philips form er CIA officer would be advised that the terms of his secrecy agreement are still in effect and that he could not testify in open session on the subject 0£ covert activities in Chile Philips would likely adhere to the CL re quest to avoid public testimony Although the State Departrn ent does not have a comparable post-employ rnent agreement with _ 1 ---nbassador Korry he could be notified that the subject matter remains class if ed and that it was the State Department's desire that he not testify in open session regarding covert activities in Chile Both of these efforts could be construed by the Conh- n ittee and eventually by the press as an attempt to 11 gag 1 co lllrl- ittee wit esses State Department officials believe that if Ambassa dor Korry is told that you want testimony in Executive Session only he will object to appearing in public heari igs However others point out that Korry could be unpredictable 2 The basic facts relating to covert action in Chile from 1964 forward have appeared in the press The Committee could using non-official sources proceed with Ambassador Korry as a witness In this fashion they could maintain the fiction of not having declassified the Chile covert activities 3 The Chairman could attempt to declassify the pertinent mate rial L½ rough a committee vote While this is not consistent with Senate rules Sena tor Church used this technique in declassif _ ing the Sinai Accords earlier Hus month y lJ 0 0 0 Lt - l 0 c 0 t 0 r c DEC S O I _ g ee to oper h e2 ri ngs o n C hile 2 id - y to scrucn - as b e st as possibl ' Fa Yo - Oppose B u chen Colby Levi ll2 rsh Scowcroft Approve- - - - - - - Disapprove_______ c oi m l 0 o 2 0 Oppose open hearirrgs executive session only J $ Favor Buchen Colby Levi lv ar s h Scowcroft 0 0 Oppose o C t Approve ------- Disapp 'ove- -- l ---- 0 v e Q C -ubmi t t e d by the Se n ate Committee Staff ATTACHM E N T A ECl T TO BE D ECLL SSIFIED FOR PUBLIC HEARI N GS ON CHILE 1 The Ce n t r al I ntelligence Agency acti ng under p ro gra1ns a pproved th e Sp ecia l G r oup sp ent nearl y $3 0 00 OO in co ert e forts to 1 rns u -e th e ele ction o t the Chris t ian Demo cr a tic candtda t e tn the 196 Ch ilean Pr e sidenti a l e l e ctions 2 I n 19 70 the 4 0 C orrunittee - the Special Group's successor -- decided not to s uppo rt a s ingle candida te in the 1970 Presidential elections § Rather i t de cid e d that the CIA should undertake propaganda and other ex co ·e r a c ti vi t ies designed to prevent the election of the leftist candi - date Sal vador Allende $425 000 was spent on that e££ort in additio to ongo ing St ation activities 3 _ llende wa s the narrow victor in the September 4 elections Be ca u se no candidate received a majority the Chilean Congress was UJ 0 to vote between Allende and Jorge A l essandri the conservative ru nne r - up on October 24 During the interim the CIA undertook t i VO line s of activity designed to prevent Allende £ram becoming Presi tL d e n t One line was approved and coordinated by the 40 Committee t It i n '- luded propaganda contacj s _ th members of Frei ' s cabinet and tb use o f militarv aid as an inducement to the Chilean military It 2 ilso included a 40 Co m --nittee authorization of funds to attempt to 0 in fl ue nce the outcome of the Congressional vote It was however cl- termined that the money could not usefully be spent and it was not or a l 8 1 At th e President's request the CLA opened a second track of acti v ity This became an attempt to induce the Chilean military to stag a coup before Allende could be voted into office by the Chi lean C o ngress The CIA passed weapons to one group of Chilean mi lita ry officers who plotted a coup However that group was appa rentl y not the group which carried on the kidnap attempt in which the C hilean Chief of Staff General Rene Schneider ' Vas fatally wolmded The CIA knew 0£ the latter group's plans but several d2 ys before h a d tri e d to d scourage it from carrying them out 4 Between A llende's inauguration in November 1970 and his over 11row and death in September 1973 the CL I spent over $6 000 000 1n support of opposition political parties and media Included in that support were limited amounts of money for private sector orcranizations Proposals for support of private sector organizations pecte d ot inv olvem e n t in s t rike or for direct suu0or' of 5 - -_ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ ve e s s- I -2- ' rejected At the same time the CIA remained in contact through third parties with a ri gnt-wing terrorist organization Patria y Li b ertad The CIA also passed considerable money to the conservative National Party whose right-wing members were known to have links with Patria y Libertad 0 ' 0 co J Q 0 0 Q J J J 2 0 ex c i 1 0 l 0 0 i 0 £EGRET