- ----- - - - DRAFT MEr- OR AN DUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT Senate Select Committee Publication of Chile Covert Action Report Th e S en2 te Sele c t Conunittee has conducted an extensive examination £ ' er the fil es of the C e ntral Intelligence Agency with r espect to cov ert act n i n general and five countri'7s in particular Chile Cong o _ _ _ ___ 0 Indonesia and Laos T h e Cor runittee has prepared a comprebensive er ' • study on Chi le vhich it intends to publi sh LLl While it has postponed pu ic 0 i i hearings on Chile it is the Conunittee's int ention to hold s_uch hearir s i 0 Your a pproval of CLI ' s decision not to permit CIA officers or forme z 0 officer s to p a rticipate in public hearings has been comm u 1'1icated to r c the Cow mittee but this voul d not stop the Committee from developing the fa cts as th ey see them by calling non-government ·witnesses or even Committee staff investigators to testify ' The Committee staff study on covert action in Chile is a detailed revelation with specifics It exposes intelligence sources and 1nethods the founda tion of clandestine operations which the Director of Central Intellig ence is required by statute to protect It identifies political parties government entities media private organizations and individuals with whom th e United States collaborated in a clandestine confidential re_I a 4 c irrs hi ii· · ' ' ' It cites the amounts of money authorized the recip ients the purp·oses and the results Committee sources have admitted that t 1· public h earings would be us e d to g ive emphasis to sel ected por ti ons • L ••• • of Lhl Committe e sludy elaborating vith first-h ind knowledge where possib ' J · ·· • • • · • • - ' • '• - 2 - The Committee's intention to make these intimate details public would - - In Chile jeopardize organizations and individuals with wh om CIA ' established c onfid ential re ationshil s confirm a s·ociati n s whi_c h might s ubject Chilean s to pro s cution legally and or by er ci ' co ter r ori sts expose clandestine ssets and adversely affect Cl · er inte r-goverrunent relationships · 0 -- E lsewhere as well as in Chile generate fear and reluctance among potential clandestine associates because of our inability Cl J u l c E 0 u to guarantee the confidentiality of such relations hips subject - i · the U S to a wave cif authoritative 11 charges of local involvement 0 0 J- citing as eyidence he methods and techniques used in Chile O· · r limit the cooperation of liaison with other intelligence services and greatly diminish our capability to conduct covert operations and to acquire intelligence clandesttnely One may argue the e'ffect th Committee's intended revelations might have on institutions and th con'clµ ct of intellig e nce operations but more definite is the potential impact upon individual Chileans who entered • into a relationship with representatives of the U S Government and the faith and trust in our Government this involved It y rould not be melodramatic to say that the Cornm itte'e 1 s revelations might jeopardize the livelihood if not the life of individual Chileans 0 - 3 - · I In th e area f our general foreign relations the ·committee's course would have d ama ging conseguences on our foreign relatiol s in this Because there is no yardsti ck by which to Hemisphei-e and beyond measure the magnitude of the operations described and because the r ct Allende government ultimately fell a docUlllent of the nature proposed even if e - pui-gated would be widely accepted as· official acknowledge- 0 ment of U S involvement in Allende's overthrow 0 -l The last five years have se en forces friendly to the U S take · w 0 E control _in a numHer of countrie in L tin America entirely independento 0 of any US involvement rec ent weeks Peru have u - Bolivia before ·Chile then Argentina and in an· purged themselves i 0 u · of radical and antagonisgc 0 r leader ship and replaced ·it with independent but moderate · i- egi e S c Publication of a case study of our involvement in Chile could encourage irrespon ible elements to make inaccurate accusations against the new leaders lead these I • sar n ieader s to be extremely wa ry of any overt manifestation of friendship or cooperations with us and incline them to look elsewhere for S 1pp_ort an d assistance Any event-in Latin America which appeared to result in favorable consequencc5 for the US would find me 're per s ons willing to believe that improper U - action was responsible for it Thei-e are other more obvious causes fo r concern Publication of such a report would conii rm in the eyes of many in Europe and elsewhere the illegitimacy of the present Chilean regime damaging even - further its foreign image at a time when it acutely needs foreign fin a ncial support It would also be safe to assume that the willi ngness of ·other goverrunents to share confidences wi t h us would be decreased In countries like Mexico Venezuela and Colombia radical elements er would use the publication of details of c overt involvement in Chile to J attempt to c oerce moderate _gove r mnents to adopt postu xes critical ot20 i the U S support At the east any at t pt by moderate leadexs to overtly u s a -l poli cie or J OS-ition s WO ld ris k con-stant ·political unde 0 er cutting by the oppos tion Lt- -- i In the 'face of the Committee's intention to puplish its study and hold§ 1--- pubJ ic hearings on Chile th ree maj__ r options are available 0 r 0 - - The Executive Br anch can refu e to testify in public but · watch ·as the Committee proceeds on its course of ·revelation -Pro -- Confrontation is avoided · Executive Branch involvement is minimized publicity may b m1n -nized or at least reduced from that generated by a confrontation Con Sources and methods would be exposed with the co lsequences cited above the Committee would not be likely to refrain from similar expo of other countries The Executive Branch can pr test the Committee's intention to ·p ublish and hold publ c hea l'ings • 1 · • ' •• • • • • • - -- • •• • - 5 - Pro 1 ·would limit and possibly avoid the consequences of the Committee's intended revelations wo-uld dramatize t he issues for the Committee and possibly influence members to adopt modifications if not completely abandon heir plans would cc put the onus on the Com nrittee for the consequences of its co J a publicity 0 0 1 I on Might provoke an intransigent attitud which would Q J j res llt 'in mo re public j ty more revelations and more damage t Ll ·o i would generate elements of confrontation which might be 0 ·f damaging politically as 'Y ll as substantively 1 I I E e - i 0 v - -Th Executive B_ranch c n attempt o re a ch a compromise which would • 0h Q r protect th sources arid metho ls· insofar a ·s poss-i ble while pz-crv 'iding 0 I sufficient general informati'on for the Co rnm ittee to make its I conclusions and recommendations Pro ·' Avoids direct confrontation limits the degree of revelati_on atte pts to protect sources and xn eLho l-s rt duc es publicity might' provide restraints on further Com mittee I revelations would avoid appearance of lack of cooperation and charges tha t the Achnim stration s hiding its activities in Chile Con o protect itself politically Might w et Committee ' s appetite for more revelations would allow some expos u e of sources and methods which miglit be dan1aging and subject t0 the same consequences as a f-ullrevelation might be breached by unofficial leaks and f revelati ons associates the Executive ·B ranch m re closely ' with whatever comes out in the Committee's publican on or public hearings and could have an escalating effect on · the Pike Committee's desires to make public he det ils of the Kurdish _oper tioj- - or even more sensitive data not a co J yet leaked to th·e public 0 0 ·O A possible ' i compromise was discussed with Senators Church and Mathia s on 5 November -l - It would call for UJ 0 CIA to w6rk with the Committee staff to delete from the 0 0 prop osed report specifics ·concerning Agency employees i 0 c U S Goverrunent officials for ign officials and organizatic@s · 2 b a preface to the re port indicating the unique natur e of the r c revelation reg_a rding covert a ctivities · 3 • a stateµient indicating that the information contained in · • 1 1 7 _- I • • •• • • the report cani e from many s_our-ces 4 a cormnitrnent from the Committee that no other covert action would be-1nade the subject of a public hearing or public re ort and 5 the structuring of the publ c hearing so that no present or - former U S officials are asked to appear as witnesses Committee would also mini me the appearance that the Executive Branch willingly ivulged the circmnstances surrounding the covert actions The · ' •• • - • • l• ••• • • ••·' - - ' I ' - 6 H the Committee agreed to these provisions there wollld still remain rgwnents over what should and should not be deleted and _the over-all thrust of the Committee study_would remain a revealing document the ex u nique ness of which would be recognized by the pr_eface cited in parag£aph 2 of the possible compromise 00 This uniqueness ' -would not rase al 0 0 of the potential consequen es of i he content of the study and would 0 not avoid the d tail that _remain from_being exploited by our enemiesg abroad • c l In addition the proposed attempts to hide the fact that the 0 CIA is the source of most of the information would appear to be a coP out ' i 0 l on our responsibility as a matter of faith and trust to protect those 0 l- vith whom we have e tered into a clandestine relationship and to afford them as much protf ction as possible I ' 1' tf b r c It would also appea r to undercut our efforts to maintain and _e stablish clandestine relationships in the future You have echoed· the declarations ui previous Presidents in dete rmini_ng that covert operations a re necessary and desirable as an adjunct of our foreign policy· in the' national interest and security In order to have covert operations the essential ingredients must be protected and preserved Fundamental is the sanctity of the agreement by which individuals enter into a clandestine re -tionship with a representative of the U S Government as are the methods which are employed l - 7 In sununa ti on T o completely disengage and allow the Committee to carry out its intentions to publish and to hold public hearings on covert actions in Chile is unthinkable Tp compromise before takmg a firm stand on this r e port would mean an er ci c o J Cl abandorunent of the principl_e ·you have so far maintained with regard to 0 0 ' I the assassination report ·It offers some political advantage n avoiding a confrontation ov r what appears t o ·be inevitable but otherwise will Cl UJ 0 E mean r evelations limite9- only in degree over those which would be brought fqrth if the Committee moves ahead as it wishes 0 0 1 0 u 0 To declare a firm Presidential position against any revelations of sources and methods for reasons outlined in 'this pa p er would underscore the ri sk s and consequences involve·d and impress upon the Committee t e great conc e rn of t ose most familar witb the necessity and conduct of covert operations It wou J not r le out a comp omise should that appear desirable but it wou d surely strengthen Executive Branch negotiators in developing the details of any such compromise should one prove workable '-0 r a