MORI DoGID 176250 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - CIA INFO DATE JAN 2000 United States Department of Stat Washing-ton D C 20520 t4v C unRn BR EFIRG MEMORANDUM c__ w ISEHSjITIC E suK RPs M MaWmt SmWDic 5 S uu uvuu uL j TO P - Mr Armacost FROM ARA - Elliott Abrams SUBJECT Panama Policy Review Group Meeting July 22 1987 I U S INTERESTS IN PANAMA o Our interests more vulnerable as result of fast moving events in Panama and prospect of Noriega's continued tenure as political boss -II OPPOSITION ACTIVITY o The July 10 demonstrations and human rights abuses by military strengthened opposition to Noriega by Panamanians-from all social strata but particularly of middle class -- Generated more calls for Noriega's departure -- Raised the possibility for increased violence -- Has further eroded PDF's image--before only riot police Dobermans criticized by average Panamanian o More protest activity likely -- Over the weekend PDF clashed with students later cowed proposed Civic Crusade car caravan with show of force -- Opposition has called for 48 hour general strike beginning July 27 -- Despite bad publicity harsh police tactics have had restraining effect but this will probably be only temporary o Government attempts to initiate dialogue have failed -- Since July 10 events opposition stance has hardened no dialogue while Noriega remains S i R'ET' S E 'SI '11 1 YE DEC 'OADR MORI DooID 176250 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - CIA INFO DATE JAN 2000 i --'Government political parties continue call for dialogue III NORIEGA STILL THE PROBLEM o Human rights violations by PDF rising potential for violence increasing calls for Noriega's departure and public opposition compels consideration of stronger policy response o So far little hard evidence that PDF unity behind Noriega has deteriorated significantly some indications that PDF officers believe he may become a liability at what point still unclear -- Still no serious PDF challenger in sight or PDF reformist group evident IV What Is At Stake An unsuccessful move against Noriega will invite response against our military bases intel operations or other of our -o vulnerable points in Panama o However congressional interest and consensus for strong action on Noriega is building rapidly -- Lack of swift response will put Administration on defensive with Congress and undercut hemispheric democracy policy -- Face prospect of an unstable Panama for as long as Noriega remains and a halt to democratization process V POLICY OPTIONS o Status quo Option I -- No longer a viabl e option o Work with Noriega if he promises to leave soon Option II -- Gives Noriega chance to divide and neutralize opposition if he reneges on promised departure -- Undermines our regional strategy for democracy -- Department's initiative may be lost Congress may take the lead on forcing tougher policy response S1EP R ETVST U11 Vid OiN V MORI Doc ID 176250 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - CIA INFO DATE JAN 2000 EU RET aSENS IT I Y E o All out effort to dump Noriega Option III IV -- With Delvalle taking the lead we have a government to work with if effort succeeds -- Without Delvalle greater possibility for tumultuous aftermath i£ effort succeeds and Civic Crusade reformers withdraw leaving political vacuum -- Promotes action -at moment when our ability to apply pressure appears greatest -- Both variations of this option carry high risk but we will have broad bipartisan congressional support support in press and Panama as well as -- Timing is crucial inaction could carry even higher costs VI LIKELY AGENCY VIEWS o r We favor Option III -- We want DOD CIA to take actions that visibly weaken Noreiga's position -- We want a cut-off of intelligence relationships with PDF and an end to Noreiga's subsidy o DOD reps will likely favor Option II -- For example they will probably oppose suspension of military assistance -- CIA will argue that timing is premature for Option III IV L ECRET ES E0 SIFT IVE I 0 MORI DoeID 176250 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - CIA INFO DATE DRAFTED ARA CEN VMay ARA CEN RRWy ougho ARA CEN RHMelton WGWalker ARA JAN 2000