12 SNIE 11-16-88 CX November 1988 Soviet Policy During the Next Phase of Arms Control in Europe Key Judgments only Top Secret Director of Central Intelligence Soviet Policy During the Next Phase of Arms Control in Europe Special National Intelligence Estimate This Special National Intelligence Estimate represents the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance af the US Intelligence Community SNIE 7 I - 76-88CX -SC9377 1 fl Ii November I 988 Copy 221 19 3 12 Continued Director of Central Intelligence 'f9p eeFet' M3ffJR1¥ NSGQNfflf CT· SNIE 11-16-88 Soviet Policy During the Next Phase of Arms Control in Europe U Information available as of 1 7 November 1988 was used 1 Ire preparation of this Special National Intelligence Estimate ·The following intelligence organizations participated n the preparation of this Estimate The Central Intelligence Agency The Defense Intelligence Agency The National Security Agency The Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of State also participating The Office 'of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence 'Department of the Army The Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence · Department of the Air Force The Director of Intelligence Headquarters Marine Corps ·'f'flis Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board Tep Se ret SC03771-88 November 1988 Handle via COM NT Channels 222 12 Continued rei i Seeret fflt7ll' l' tl liJ1'F1'NIV-IV1'CCnofff 4 - 6AMMllrein Figure 1 NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces Within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals Zone µ l Barvnt s Norw 191an So Hf ' '· _ ' 1 _· J ' GJ 1ied Ireland Kli1eck m -·• ' Porlug• Spain D NATO D D Warsaw Pact Neutral and Nonaligned ndlpenOllS For ei StolioDlld Fol - Belgium Nethe ands Solgl- D•nm•N France NorwaY Portugal Canaclii Franco Gree 1e Spain Iceland Italy Tutktiy Luxembowg We t Gertnanr CeRAdeHtiAI u - Klng- 14•- --- °' ln pleit t _ o hll 0 0 sovi - 9altlc ·Unltod ICI u -- 11e1o - · · O rpa ' ' Kl leningrocl rUral · - · · · V91UI -'ICUllllt #Ml · Mooco 7149Hl S4Hltl 11·118 MaWRN 223 12 Continued •Top See1et Mf f0 9N NF¥JG A'WIACT em Key Judgments We judge that the Soviets and their allies have a number of interrelated military political and economic reasons to engage the West in conventional arms control • Military - To improve the correlation of forces and to reduce what they perceive as NATO's capability to launch a surprise attack - To impede NATO's force modernization plans and to prevent or impede NATO's deployment of advanced technology weapons • Political - To demonstrate the new thinking in Soviet foreign and domestic policy - To appeal to foreign and domestic public opinion in a generalized way while adding to Moscow's overall arms control posture and enhancing the USSR's image as a trustworthy rational player in the international arena • Economic - To reduce the threat from NATO and thereby reduce the urgency on the part of the Soviet Union to match or better NATO's hightechnology modernization programs - To make it politically easier to allocate economic resources within the Soviet Union from the defense sector to the civilian sector to carry out perestroyka We believe the Soviets and their allies prefer to negotiate with NATO to achieve mutual reductions of conventional forces Militarily it makes more sense to trade force reductions thereby retaining a balance in the correlation of forces However the Warsaw Pact probably realizes that negotiating an agreement with NATO that is acceptable to the Soviets could take years-and might not even be possible In the short term up to two years we believe the Pact will pursue a strategy aimed at reducing the West's perception of the Soviet threat in the expectation that this course will make it difficult for NATO governments to maintain or increase defense spending The Pact will engage NATO in the Conventional Stability Talks and probably will introduce sweeping proposals for asymmetric reductions Mm1tiie VI 8€J J 4lfi T Chaw o € - iii fop Secret SC 03777-88 224 12 Continued fop Sec1et PJOfe qo n1qcqNTRACT tll f8 We predict that when formal negotiations concerning conventional forces in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone begin the Warsaw Pact will quickly present a formal version of its public diplomacy position and might even table a draft treaty very early in the negotiations It will probably insist on an initial discussion of data regarding asymmetries between the two sides' forces and will probably suggest establishing a working group on data The Warsaw Pact states will not accept the current NATO proposal which in effect calls on the Pact to take gigantic cuts in tanks and artillery for minor cuts on the NATO side so that there is parity between the Pact and NATO For example this would mean the Pact would have to withdraw or destroy about 25 000 tanks while NATO would withdraw or destroy about 900 tanks Outside of the negotiating process itself for political effect the Soviets may also take unilateral initiatives • We judge the Soviets could garner significant political gains in Western Europe at tolerable risks by unilaterally removing some of their forces from Eastern Europe especially all from Hungary The evidence on Soviet timing and conditions is insufficient to predict with confidence when and whether a withdrawal announcement might be made • Given the West German concern about short-range nuclear-capable forces it is possible that the Soviets might make a gesture by unilaterally withdrawing some short-range ballistic missile launchers from Eastern Europe however we judge the likelihood of such a move to be low for the period of this Estimate • The Soviets may attempt to portray force restructuring as a unilateral force reduction however we judge that the ongoing restructuring of the Soviet ground forces is intended primarily to make units more effective for prolonged conventional combat operations against NATO We judge that among our NATO Allies France will be the most resistant to potential Soviet gambits with the United Kingdom a strong second Of the major partners the Federal Republic of Germany will be the most responsive to such ploys because of its strong desire to reduce defense spending and to reduce the chance of the country becoming Europe's nuclear battleground The challenge for the United States and the rest of NATO will be to continue the ongoing NATO modernization while at the same time negotiating on a possible agreement with a more sophisticated adversary in an environment where the public perception of the Warsaw Pact threat has been softened significantly 1these t ey Jua' g111ent a e Seu et lV ufo1 n '' Beeret • iv SC 03771 88 225