Status of the Soviet Union's Unilateral Force Reductions and Restructuring of its Forces REPORT OF1HE Committee Delegation to West Berlin East Germany and the Soviet Union August 6-18 1989 COMMITIEEONARMEDSERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS FIRST SESSION OCTOBER 16 1989 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES DELEGATION TO THE SOVIET UNION ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS LES ASPIN Wisconsin Chairman WILLIAM L DICKINSON Alabama EARL HUTTO Florida II 1 Preface December 7 1988 in a speech to the United Nations Soviet President Milch Gorbachev announced a surprising program of unilateral military force withdrawals a reductions He also stated the Soviet Union would resoucture its remaining forces in Easte Europe to an unambiguously defensive posture The House Anned Services Commin has been closely monitoring the Soviet Union's implemenation of Mr Gorbache comminnents and assessing the implications the Soviet actions might have for the miliu requirements of both NATO and the United States On March 7 1989 the Defense Policy Panel of the House Armed Services Commiti began its examination of the Soviet Union's force reductions with a classified briefing Doug MacEachin Chief of Arms Control Staff and formerly Director of the Office of Sov Analysis Central Intelligence Agency On March 10 Andrey A Kokoshin Deputy Dire of the U S S R 's Institute of the U S A and Canada and a leading Soviet civilian analyst defense issues made an unprecedented appearance before the Policy Panel to give his vie on why the Soviet Union was talcing these unilateral steps and how it would implement th The Panel then recieved testimony on March 14 from the following panel of n governmental Soviet and military experts Barry Blechman Defense Forecasts Inc Phi Karber Senior Vice President and General Manager National Security Programs BI International and Edward L Warner Senior Defense Analyst The RAND Corporati Marshal Akhromeyev former Chief of the Soviet military' s General Staff and an advise President Gorbachev also spoke to this issue when he appeared before the committee on J 21 1989 The principal focus of the House Anned Services Committee's trip to the Soviet Un in August 1989 was the Soviet Union's implementation of its unilateral force withdrav see Appendex 1 for a detailed chronology Led by Chairman Les Aspin D-Wis Ranking Minority Member William L Dickinson R-Ala the delegation included Re1 sentatives Bob Stump R-Ariz Larry J Hopkins R-Ky Earl Hutto D-Fla Fr McCloskey D-Ind John Kasich R-Ohio Herbert H Bateman R-Va George Buddy Darden D-Ga Arthur Ravenel Jr R-S C Owen B Pickett D-Va Jame Bilbray D-Nev and Jim McCrery R-La Several experts on the Soviet mill including Phillip Karber Edward Warner Robert Blackwell the CTA's National Int gence Officer for the Soviet Union and Lt Colonel John F Shull U S Anny of the J Staff- accompanied the delegation which was hosted by the newly created Committe Defense and State Security of the reconstituted Supreme Soviet Together members o two committees comprised an unprecedented traveling party that visited military units facilities throughout the western Soviet Union Toe committee delegation began its firsthand examination of how the Soviet Union implementing its force cuts and proceeding with its plans for reoganizing its forces briefings in West Berlin from U S military and intelligence officials Toe comm delegation then visited a reorganized Soviet motorized rifle regiment in East Germany extensive discussions in Moscow with its counterpart committee and the General Staff c Soviet military and visited in Yavorov a town near the Polish border a motorized division that had not yet been reorganized On its return to Moscow members c delegation staff and the American experts held further discussions with the Soviet Ge 4 been contradictory and in some cases misleading see Appendix 2 for a compilation of key Soviet statements How well have the Soviet military's deeds matched up to Gorbachev's words Soviet Withdrawals from Eastern Europe The Soviet Union appears to be on track in carrying out its announced force withdrawals by the end of 1990 from Eastern Europe As Table 1 shows three of the six tank divisions have departed and about half of the promised 5 300 tanks In addition press reports suggest that about half of the air assault and assault crossing units have departed Oearly if the Soviets maintain the current pace of their withdrawals Mr Gorbachev's commitments on this score will have been borne out TABLE STATUS OF SOVIET UNILATERAL WITHDRAWALS FROM EASTERN EUR Total 1 Force Tanks 10 800 Artillery 7 420 3 Aircraft 1 278 4 Manpower 565 000 5 Divisions 30 Announced Withdrawal 5 300 260 to 300 50 000 6 Claimed 2 Withdrawal % of Annou Withdraw Complete 2 714 51 383 -- 121 40 to 4 - 24 509 49 36 50 1 Source Phillip A Karber et al NATO - Warsaw Pact F Levels in a Conventional Arms Control Context Volume II Atlantic-to-the-Urals Summary The BDM Corporation Augus t Totals exclude storage 2 Source Provided to HASC delegation on August 8 1989 b Rogov Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Public Inspection Gr c commissioned to monitor the unilateral withdrawals 3 Includes artillery and multiple rocket launchers of 122 r anti-tank guns of 100 mm or more and mortars of 107mm or 4 Air defense and ground attack aircraft only Excludes h 1 recce ew aircraft and trainers 5 Source The Military Balance for 1988-1989 IISS Groun personnel only 6 According to various Soviet s t atements the 25th Tank a Guard s Tank Divisions have been withdrawn from Eas t Germa 13th Guards Tank Division withdrawn from Hungary 5 But as the comminee delegation discovered on its trip the manner in which these withdrawals are taking place differs considerably from what had been expected First the Soviets are not withdrawing and then disbanding the six divisions as Mr Gorbachev and many subsequent spokesmen claimed Before the current reorganization a Soviet tank division had three tank regiments and one motorized rifle regiment while a motorized rifle di vision had three motorized rifle regiments and one tank regiment Rather than withdrawing a tank division in its entirety the motorized rifle regiment assigned to it is being transferred to a division that would remain in Eastern Europe and a tank regiment from that division withdrawn instead The overall reduction in Soviet armour from a Western perspective would seem positive-four tank regiments with a total ofabout 375 tanks would be withdrawn instead of three tank regiments and one motorized rifle regiment with a total of about 320 tanks Moreover as members of the Soviet General Staff pointed out to the committee delegation the Soviet Union was replacing tank regiments with motorized rifle regiments in all of the remaining divisions and it made little sense to transport a motorized rifle regiment back to the Soviet Union as part of the withdrawals and then return it to Eastern Europe as part of the restructuring General Lobov Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact said that the Soviets needed to start counting our money and that this was simply acting in a business-like manner But it turns out that this is not the only disbandment occuring in a tank division before itis withdrawn As Edward Warnertold the committee on September 13 1989 the Soviets are transferring considerable combat equipment - infantry fighting vehicles BMPs antitank means T-12 100mm guns and AT-5 pedestal-mounted anti tank guided missiles and possibly air defense systems and self-propelled artillery 122mm and 152mm selfpropelled guns - from these withdrawn divisions to the 24 ' restructured' Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions that are to remain behind in the Genm n Democratic Republic Poland Czechoslovakia and Hungary It now appears that withdrawing a tank division might come to mean in effect the departure of four tank regiments and some but certainly not all of the division's non-tank assets see Appendix 3 for the structure and equipment of Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions before the current reorganization Moreover as Phillip Karber pointed out to the committee on September 13 1989 the Soviet Union had six independent tank regiments in Eastern Europe in addition to 30 tank and motorized rifle regiments at the end of 1988 Soviet spokesmen also said that these would be withdrawn but failed to mention that they would be replaced by independent motorized rifle regiments In summary the Soviet Union appears to be implementing its withdrawals from Eastern Europe in a manner that meets Mr Gorbachev ' s commitments in his United Nations speech -with the exception of his statement that tank divisions would be v ithdrawn and disbanded Gorbachev's numerical goals for troop and equipment withdrawal from Eastern Europe will be met if current trends continue but not in a way consistent with many subsequent statements by Soviet military officials Moreover because the six tank divisions as well as the independent tank regiments are not being withdrawn in their full strength initial estimates about the impact of these withdrawals on the military capability of the remaining Soviet forces had to be revised Why were some Soviet discriptions of how they were withdrawing their forces misleading One explanation is that Soviet military officials were deliberately trying to 6 deceive the West in order to maximize the public relations effect of its withdrawals Several expens accompanying the delegation believed otherwise looking instead to the manner in which Moscow made the decision to withdraw Mr Gorbachev clearly imposed the program of force withdrawals and reductions on the Soviet military Then-Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshall Akhromeyev had repeatedly and adamantly stated his opposition to any unilateral force reductions throughout 1988 Subsequently when it came to implementing these reductions it had opposed the General Staff appeared to have proceeded in a way to minimize the impact of the new defensive strictures on the Soviet Union's military capability In addition some of the inconsistences seemed to reflect adjustments made as programs evolved For example the committee delegation was told by Soviet military officials from the 24th Motorized Rifle Division at Yavorovo that they had not yet been told what theirnew force structure would be These explanations notwithstanding the fact that the Soviets are implementing their withdrawals from Eastern Europe differently from what had been expected raised questions about the military impact of the withdrawals Soviet Reductions from the Atlantic-to-the Urals AITU Area The Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe must be evaluated within the context of the overall Soviet reductions in their forces opposing NATO Simply pulling back 5 300 tanks to the Western Military Districts of the U S S R would be less significant than withdrawing the tanks east of the Ural mountans Moreover destroying or converting to civilian use these 5 300 tanks - as Gorbachev himself and other Soviet spokesmen indicated they would - would be even more significant Pulling back forward deployed forces increases mobilization time and thus the warning time preceeding an attack it gives to an opponent but does not affect the military capability of fully generated forces Actually destroying weapons systems - as the committee delegation learned when it observed the destruction of a SS-20 transporter-erector-launcher at the INF elimination site at Samydiminshes military capability in manner difficult to reverse quickly As Table 2 shows the Soviet Union appears to have made much less progress in reducing its forces opposite NATO than it has in withdrawing forces from Eastern Europe Even though nine months of the two years Gorbahev said it would take to implement the force reductions have passed the Soviets have been virtually silent on the status of its force reductions in the ATTU area The Soviets clearly have a long way to go on this score 7 TABLE 2 STATUS OF SOVIET UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC-TO-THE-URALS REGION Total 1 Force Announced Reduction Tanks 37 000 10 000 Artill e ry 33 000 8 500 Aircraft 6 050 800 Manpower 2 200 000 Claimed 2 Reduction % of Announced unspecified Reduction Completed unknown 240 000 1 Source Conventional Forces in Europe The Facts Totals exclude equipment in storage 2 There have been no details announced of reductions having taken place in the Soviet Union west of the Urals There is great uncertainty about what the Soviets will do with the equipment being removed from their forces Despite some earlier statements that the tanks being removed from Eastern Europe would be destroyed or converted see Appendix 2 it now appears that the withdrawn tanks - mostly T-64s older than the T-80 tank but highly capable T-55s and T-54s- will replace older equipment in units in the Soviet Union perhaps on both sides of the Urals and may even go into storage in the interiorof the Soviet Union Soviet officials have said little recently about the disposition of the reduced tanks and there has is no indication that the large-scale destruction or conversion of tanks is underway This aspect of the Soviet Union's unilateral force reductions seems scarcely to have begun and will have to be monitored carefully The Restructuring of Soviet Forces Toe withdrawal of six tank divisions from Eastern Europe would account for the removal of approximately 2 250 assuming that four tank regiments are withdrawn for each departing division of the 5 300 tanks that Gorbahev indicated would be withdrawn The other 3 000 tanks that are to be withdrawn are to come from the restructuring or reorganization of the remaining 24 divisions and six independent tank regiments remaining in Eastern Europe This will be done the committee delegation was informed by withdrawing a tank regiment from each divisions and replacing it with a B MP-equipped motorized rifle regiment and replacing the six independent rank regiments with independent motorized rifle regiments As shown in Table 3 restructured tank divisions would have two tank regiments 8 and two motorized rifle regiments while restructured motorized rifle regiments would have four motorized rifle regiments and no tank regiments Replacing a tank regiment with a motorized rifle regiment particularly if the tank batallion in a BMP-equipped regiment is reduced from 40 to 31 tanks as the committee delegation was told by Soviet General Staff officers would make good on Soviet statements that they would reduce the number of tanks in tank divisions by 20 percent and the number of tanks in motorized rifle regiments by 40 percent But as Table 4 demonstrates replacing a tank regiment with a motorized rifle regiment involves adding considerable equipment and personnel especially B MP-2 infantry fighting vehicles While cenainly less fonnidable than modem main battle tanks particularly in certain offensive scenarios the BMP is a highly-capable armored personnel carrier equipped with a 73mm gun As the committee delegation discovered during its trip all of the BMPs from the six withdrawing tank divisions will stay in Eastern Europe and be distributed ro the remaining forces Edward Warner estimated that an additional 1800 or so BMPs would need to be brought forward from the Soviet Union in order to field the entire complement of 30 additional motorized rifle regiments being created by the Soviet restructuring Phillip Karl er's estimate was somewhat higher about 2500 additional B Ps These wimesses noted however that reconstituting the motorized rifle regiments in all of the remaining divisions would take several years Soviet spokesmen have stated repeatedly that in line with the defensive nature of their resoucturing that the antitank means of the forces remaining in Eastern Europe would be increased General Lobov for example told the committee delegation that there would be 20 percent more antitank guided missiles and antitank artillery in the restructured divisions Soviet Union also may be increasing the artillery holdings the 2S 1 self-propelled 122mmhowitzer and the 2S3 self-propelled 152mm-howitzer of its remaining forces in Eastern Europe Phillip Karber has noted that there was some evidence before December 1988 that the Soviets were increasing the number of guns in an artillery battery from 6 to 8 guns as they had already in the eastern U S S R As Karber told the comminee on Sept 13 1989 this would increase the number of guns in a division's artillery batallion from 18 to 24a 30 percent increase - and if not discontinued would add over 1 200 artillery systems to Soviet forces in Eastern Europe Although GeneralLobov told the committee delegation that the artillery strengh of a tank division would not be changed comments from other Soviet military officials suggested otherwise A 30-percent increase in the artillery strength of forward-deployed Soviet forces of course would partially offset the impact of tank withdrawals Tiris would hold even in offensive scenarios since many military experts using the Division Equivalent Force DEF methodology which assigns on a common scale combat utility scores to individual weapons which can then be aggregated to give a measure of total combat power rank modem self-propelled artillery almost as highly as rn ain battle tanks It would also call into question Mr Gorbachev's commitment to remove 8 500 artillery pieces from the A1TU area Phillip Karber told the committee on Sept 13 1989 that he could not account for the removal of more than 10 percent of this number nor account for any drawdown in divisional artillery which several Soviet spokesmen had said would accompany the tank drawdown In addition to the uncertainty about the exact fonn these reorganized divisions will take there is the question of whether as Mr Gorbachev said they have been souctured for ''unambiguously defensive purposes On this issue most American military experts are in 9 agreement A Soviet reduction in tanks particularly of the size promised by Mr Gorbachev would significantly reduce the ability of Soviet forces to mount large-scale offensive actions But this does not mean that the residual forces will not continue to possess significant offensive capability As Edward Warner told the committee on September 13 In my view and those of my RAND colleagues who specialize in the analysis of modem theater warfare these Soviet divisions after restructuring will represent a highly versatile combat force that is equally capable of conducting either modem maneuver-oriented offensive or defensive operations This more balanced combined-arms force will be well suited to employ dismounted infantry operating with tanks and concentrated artillery support Such a force could be employed to break through NATO's forward defenses that feature dense concentrations of antitank means It could also hold ground against possible NATO attacks during an initial defense or protect the flanks and most advanced elements in the course of an offensive penetration The restructured tanks divisions that remain could rapidly exploit successful breakthroughs or provide an effective mobile reserve during defensive operations Several Western specialists on the Soviet military such as the United Kingdom's Christopher Donnelly believe the Soviet military would have reorganized itself along these lines- namely fewer tanks but more artillery mechanized infantry and antitank capability - simply as response to perceived improvements in NATO's antitank capability The continued high rate of Soviet tank production until atleastearlierthis year suggests however that the Soviet military might have simply added more artillery infantry etc to its existing level of tanks rather than reducing sharply as Mr Gorbachev proposed the Soviet Union's tank deployments in Eastern Europe The committee delegation had an interesting opportunity to assess the Soviet claim that its forces would be defensively oriented during its visit to the Vorisholov Academy the training ground for its senior military officers The delegation observed a simulated student exercise - recreated by Phillip Karber and attached at Appendix 4-that was to display the Soviet Union's new defensive doctrine In describing the exercise the Soviet military briefer said that in the case of an enemy penetration the Soviet defender would launch a counterstrike to destroy the enemy and restore the border If this counterstrike failed the Soviet military would then marshall all of its units at the front and deliver a more powerful counterstrike which could be called a counteroffensive to defeat the aggressor While observing that some might consider a counteroffensive capability the same as an offensive one the Soviet officer argued that the aim of the Soviet counteroffensive would be to restore position and that there were no plans for ground forces to cross state borders Needless to say the committee delegation was unconvinced Impact of Soviet Modernization Programs Another factor that contributes to the uncertainty about the potential military impact of Gorbachev's force cuts is the rate at which the Soviet Union modernizes its remaining capability According to recently released data from the Defense Intelligence Agency the annual production rates of most Soviet weapons have increased in the three years after Gorbachev assumed power in 1985 For example in 1985 the Soviet Union produced 3 000 tanks 4 200 armored combat vehicles and 1 000 self-propelled field artillery and mortars as compared to 3 500 tanks 5 250 combat vehicles and 1 050 artillery pieces in 1988 Continued growth in the production rates for major weapons systems would offset to some extent any decline in force structure particularly given the Soviets' practice of kee Table 3 Provided to th e IIASC by Phi 1 Karber BDM International INEW WARSAW PACT DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE Soviet East German Model New Defensive Division New Combined Arms 160 Tanks Division· 260 Tanks BMP REGIMENT TR ArMEN 181 each New Mechanized Division 186 Tanks xx xx 31 -40 TANKS Polish Model Q 31 TANKS 42 BMP each xx TANK REGIMENT I 31 TANKS each 42 BMP MECHANIZED REGIMENT I I I each each 31 TANKS • Czechoslovakia force structure reorganization not announced • Hungarian and Bulgarian forces restructured earlier on basis of Corps Brigade structure 42 BMP Table 4 Pr ovid e d to th e IIJ S C by Phil Karber BDM International CONVERSION OF SOVIET TANK REGIMENTS TO MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENTS N EACH REMAINING DIVISION C Q NET EFFECT · loss gain Q 31 • T-64 T-72ff-80 -63 T-64 T-72ff -80 94 T-64 T -72 T-80 129 BMP-1 2 87 BMP-1 2 42 BMP-1 2 18 122mmSP HOW 6 120mm MORTAR 4 SA-9 SA-13 12 SA-7 SA-14 18 122mmSP HOW 18 120mm MORTAR 4 SA-9 SA-13 30 SA-7 SA-14 4 ZSU-23 4 or 2S6 1111 12 120mm MORTAR 1111 18 SA-7 SA-14 1111 4 ZSU-23 4 or 2S6 18 AGS-17 12 AGS-17 6 AGS -17 140 RPG -16 71 RPG -16 69 RPG -16 201 RPK-74 120 RPK-74 81 RPK -74 Troops Officers 650 Troops Officers 2 225 • 40 Tank battalion in the BMP regiment to be reduced to 31 per Soviet statements to GODEL Aspin 1 575 Troops Officers 10 weapons such as the T-10 tank in the inventory for a long time If the Soviets complete their tank withdrawals from Eastern Europe they would still have about 5 000 tanks deployed there virtually all modern T-80s Th is would be true whether the Soviet Union produced 3500 tanks in 1989 as it did last year or if they produced 1700 tanks as Marshal Akhromeyev claimed before the comminee in July However the higher production rate of tanks would cenainly improve the quality of the approximately 25 000-30 000 tanks assuming the AITU reductions are implemented deployed in the western areas of the U S S R Similarly the modernization programs for infantry fighting vehicles and artillery will be panicularl y im ponant in evaluating the impact of Gorbachev' s reductions As discussed earlier Soviet restructuring plans could require between 1800 and 2500 BMPs for Soviet forces deployed in Eastern Europe and perhaps 2 000 anillery pieces if its ongoing modernization program for anillery continues Soviet spokesmen including Marshal Akhromeyev have claimed that weapons production rates will decline because the Soviet Union desperately needs to shift resources from military to civilian use Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney publicly stated on September 14 1989 that the production rate of cenain conventional systems such as tanks is in fact declining How significant this decline is remains to be seen but it is clear that Soviet weapons production rates must be monitored closely To put it simply if Akhromeyev's claim that the Soviet Union will produce only 1700tanksin 1989-lessthanhalfofwhatitdidin 1988-istrue NATO will fa ce 1800 fewer tanks in January 1990 than would have otherwise been expected Impact of Reductions on Military Balance Evaluating the overall impact of Gorbachev's reductions on the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is clearly no easy maner The effects of the force reductions by the Soviet Union 's allies must also be factored in See Appendix 5 for a status repon on East European reductions Although the committee delegation did not receive any new infonnation on this question the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries appear to be reducing thier forces in accord with their announced schedule The interaction between the Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe the resoucturing of its forces in Eastern Europe and its announced reductions in the AITU area is complicated and still underway There is still great uncenainty about how the Soviets will implement the force reductions including the disposition of the 10 000 tanks In addition the ultimate impact of Soviet modernization programs can not be assessed until it is known how rapidly the Soviets produce weapons over the next several years Consequent y there is considerable uncertainty in estimating the military impact of Gorbachev' s cuts Nevertheless it now appears that two very imponant developments will occur in Eastern Europe by the end of 1990 - Soviet ground forces will be reduced from 30 to 24 divisions a 20-percent drop and 5 300 tanks a 50-percent drop will be withdrawn The effect of these changes on the capability of forward-deployed Soviet forces is significant and to a great extent overwhelms the potential impact of the remaining uncertainty about how the restructuring of Soviet Union's remaining divisions is proceeding As Edward Warner told the committee on September 13 1989 Preliminary calculations indicate that the aggregate combat potential of the Soviet ground forces that remain measured according to the Division Equivalent Force DEF methodology will be roughly 20 to 25 percent lower than that of the force that was in place when the 11 reductions were first announced in December 1988 This drop in capability would appear even more pronounced if one compares the restructured and modernized 24-division force with a modernized version of the full 30-division force that existed prior to the Gorbachev cuts Mr Warner's calculation assumed that the Soviets implemented their restructuring plans - 1800 or so BMPs more manpower additional air defense systems and engineering support including mine-laying equipment - but did not expand their divisional and nondivisional artillery holdings in East Europe Phillip Karber's estimate of how much Gorbachev 's withdrawals would reduce the capability of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe was between 10 and 20% somewhat lower than Mr Warner's They acknowledged that this difference between their estimates probably •reflected their use of different scoring systems i e for the combat potential of a particular weapon and the gap between their estimates of how many BMPs the Soviets would need to restructure 24 di visions As shown in Table 5 the range of uncertainty is considerable But as Mr Karber observed it is important to note that even his most pessimistic scenario in which the Soviets expand their artillery holdings and fully modernize all of their motorized rifle regiments by replacing the older BTRs with BMPs only brings the capability of forward-deployed Soviets forces back to its mid-1988 level If the Soviets had continued to modernize their 30-division force the Soviet threat could have been 30-percent higher in the absence of Gorbachev's cuts Table 5 also illustrates another important development the impact of Gorbachev's actions on the offensive capability of the Soviet Union's forward deployed forces In response to the committee delegation's questions on restructuring Soviet military officials frequently- sometimes with irritation- argued that the Americans were not sufficiently appreciative of the impact of the tank withdrawals For example Colonel General Chervov Chief of the General Staffs Treaty and Legal Directorate argued that after the withdrawals there would be no more tank fists General Forsin said flatly There is nothing that can replace tanks American military specialists generally agree that the modem main battle tank is critical for mounting and exploiting offensive breakthroughs and should be scored more heavily for offensive as opposed to defensive scenarios While the Soviet claim that their residual forces are now structured for defensive purposes only is unsupportable Gorbachev' s actions will reduce the offensive capability of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe by about 30 percent according to DEF methodology and the overall combat capability of these forces by anywhere from 10 to 30 percent depending on how the remaining forces are restructured In their initial examination of Gorbachev' s proposed reductions in March the military expens agreed if implemented these force reductions would sharply reduce -perhaps according to some eliminate-the Warsaw Pact's ability to mount a no-warning or shortmobilization attack that is one in which the Pact mobilizes for five to 10 days while NATO only mobilizes forone to five days before the war begins In their view Gorbachev's force cuts would cut significantly into the strength of the Pact's forward deployed forces and make any short-warning attacks prohibitively risky from the Soviet Union's perspective Secondly Gorbachev' s unilateral reductions would increase significantly the amount of warning - perhaps by five to ten days according to Mr Karber- NATO would have of a fullmobilization attack that is one that occurrd a several weeks of preparation by both sides In other words it would take the Soviets about five to ten days to compensate for the force Table 5 Provided to th e IIASC by Phil Karber 13DM International MILITARY IMPACT OF GORBACHEV REDUCTIONS UNILATERAL UNCERTAINTY - - FOR us I 1 5 1 25 ····· ········ ···· ·················· ···· ······· ······················ ···················· 1 • Quallty Quantlty Combat Coefflc nl of Sov 0 75 Force• In Eastern Europe · • WGF NGF CGF SGF 0 5 0 25 Infantry 1111 Antlarmor ■ Fire Support ■ Armor 0 _ lie l CDI l IIDOAtty --·- i 12 withdrawals from Eastern Europe Both Mr Karber and Mr Warner believed these conclusions were still valid even in the context of the new infonnation obtained about the manner in which the Soviet Union is implemeting its withdrawal from Eastern Europe Despite the uncertainties the depanure of 6 divisions- or to state it more accurately of 24 tank regiments minus their BMPs and assorted other equipment including artillery - and 5 300 tanks strongly affects the capability of its standing forces in Eastern Europe It is far more difficult however to evaluate the impact of Gorbachev 's cuts on long- or full-mobilization scenarios when both sides mobilize and redeploy over several weeks At this time not enough is known about how the Soviet Union is implementing its reductions in the ATIU area Edward Warner using modestly favorable assumptions about how Soviet and East European reductions would be carried out estimated that the Pact 's attack potential for war in Central Europe would be cut by 13 to 20 divisions 10 to 16 equivalent divisions thus reducing the margin of advantage enjoyed by the Pact under longmobilization conditions by 33 to 40 percent The significance for NATO of a reduced margin of superiority for the Warsaw Pact is questionable Moreover at this moment it is premature to address this issue because it remains to be seen whether and how the Soviet Union will reduce its forces in the Western Military Districts of the U S S R Implications Considerable uncenainty remains about how the Soviet Union will implement the unilateral force reductions announced on December 7 1988 by Mikhail Gorbachev In the view of the committee delegation's trip Soviet military developments that must be monitored carefully include the following • • How the Soviets complete the process of restructuring in Eastern Europe especially with respect to artillery and B MPs Whether and how the Soviets reduce their forces in the ATTU area Whether and how the Soviets restructure their forces in the western portions of the U S S R Whether reduced equipment in the ATIU area is destroyed convened to civilian use or moved east of the Urals Changes if any in the production rates for key weapons systems At this time the Soviet Union appears well on the way to meeting Gorbachev 's goals for withdrawing forces from Eastern Europe However there has been little evidence of progress on the restructuring or reduction of forces inside the Soviet Union itself Monitoring the Soviet Union's further implementation of Gorbachev's unilateral actions is not only critical to evaluating the impact of the force reductions on NATO's security but could be a strong indicator of how responsive the Soviet system is to the refonn leadership of Mr Gorbachev Another indication of course is whether the Soviet military accedes to a conventional arms control agreement that imposes huge about 80 000 pieces of ground equipment cuts in its forces deployed against NATO The most significant areas of uncenainty about how the Soviet Union is implementing Gortachev's cuts concern potential changes in the overall combat capability of fully mobilized Soviet forces Soviet forces are clearly being pulled back from Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union but little is known so far about what is happening to Soviet forces inside the Soviet Union Consequently in the view of the committee delegation NATO- and the United States -would be ill-advised to take any unilateral measures in reaction to the po- 13 tential but still uncenain impact that Gorbachev' s force reductions in the ATTU might have The committee delegation believes however that there is considerably less uncenainty about the military significance of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe Unless the Soviet Union reverses course- a possibility that NATO cannot ignore- the reduction in forward-deployed Soviet forces which appears to have been mirrored by the Soviet Union's allies has potentially signicant consequences for NA TO ' s military requirements In particular the committee delegation believes that the impact of a reduced threat of a shon-warning Warsaw Pact attack upon the following issues should be reexamined • • • NATO's mix of active and reserve forces NATO's requirement for forward deployed forces NATO's mobilization needs particularly the tradeoff between airlift and rapid sealift As a result of the Soviet Union's ongoing withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe the prospects for significant changes in the Pact's offensive capability- much less ability to mount short-warning attacks and a reduced capacity for preparing for full-mobilization attacks- are good While NATO must be careful to avoid takinr any actions that are more difficult to reverse than those happening on the other side it is not too soon to take advantage of the changes already taking place on the ground namely the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe #### 14 Appendix 1 Top Chronology August 5-18 1989 Aspin Delegation to the Soviet Union August 6-West Berlin 1 Received briefings from General Richards Deputy CINC EUCOM MG Haddock U S Commander Berlin Col Naab U S Military Liaison Mission Significance COD EL received an update on the status of unilateral Soviet force withdrawal from Eastern Europe and restructuring of its remaining military forces This assisted in later discussions with Soviet officials on their plans for reorganizing the military August 7-East Germany 1 Visited the Konrad Wolfe Radio Relay Regiment GDR at Ludwigsfelde Significance First American congressional delegation to visit an East Gennan military unit This regiment is one of several radio relay regiments providing communication links for East Gennan ground forces and the Ministry of Defense 2 Visited 69th Motorized Rifle Regiment USSR of the 35th Guards Motorized Rifle Division at Wuensdorf Significance First American congressional delegation to visit a Soviet military unit in Eastern Europe Soviet officials claim this unit has already been reorganized for defensive purposes The committee discovered however that this unit was part of the 32nd Tank Division which had already been withdrawn This raised questions about the nature of the Soviet withdrawals Were the six tank divisions withdrawn and disbanded as promised by the Soviets or did protions remain behind in East Gennany August 8-Moscow 1 Met with the Committee on Defense and State Security of the Supreme Soviet hosts for the CODEL Significance First foreign delegation to meet the Soviet committee established by the reconstituted Supreme Soviet to deal with military matters The COD EL and Soviet parliamentarians exchanged views on a wide range of topics including military policy anns control defense budgets unilateral force reductions and legislative executive relations The discussions were candid largely devoid of polemics and clearly useful to all participants Representative Hopkins requested a visit to the chemical weapons demilitarization plant at Chepayevsk The Soviet side eventually agreed 2 Met with delegation of USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs lead by Deputy Minister Viktor Karpov head of the Anns Control and Disannament Directorate 15 Significance Exchanged views about a wide range of arms control topics in particular the status of the START and CFE negotiations The Soviet side underlined its recent proposal for a limit of 800 mobile missiles with no more than 1600 warheads August 9-Moscow 1 Laid a wreath at Tomb of the Unknown Soldier 2 Discussions with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union lead by Colonel General Chervov Chief of the Treaty and Legal Directorate Significance Participants exchanged views on a wide variety of arms control topics and the Soviet Union's implementation of its plans for the reduction and restructuring of its military forces Participants also had a lively debate comparing the narure of military doctrines of the Soviet Union and the United States 3 Visited the Voroshilov General Staff Military Academy Significance Heard presentations on the history of the academy and its curriculum Observed first-hand the integrated combat simulation facilities that the Soviet military uses to train its senior officers Also observed a simulated exercise intended to demonstrate how the Soviets have changed to a more defensive military doctrine August 10-Sarny 1 Visited an INF elimination facility Significance First congressional delegation to wimess the elimination procedure for an SS-20 launcher and missile transporter The visit coincided with an American On-Site Inspection Agency OSIA inspection and CODEL wimessed the actual destruction of an SS-20 missile launcher August 11-Yavorov 1 Visited the 24th Iron Motorized Rifle Division Significance Committee had an extensive and unprecedented opportunity to examine closely key elements of modern Soviet ground force equipment including the T-72 tank with reactive armor boxes in place but apparently without the explosive charges inside the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle the 152-millimeter and 122-millimeter self-propelled artillery pieces the BlR-70 armored infantry vehicle and other divisional equipment Since the 24th MRD has not yet been reorganized the committee had the opportunity to compare its offensive organization with that of the 69th Motorized Rifle Regiment visited in East Germany The committee also examined Soviet training procedures for its enlisted and officer personnel all of whom were very forthcoming in response to detailed questions 16 August 11-Chepayevsk 1 Representatives Hopkins and Stump visited a chemical weapons demilitarization facility Significance First ever visit by a Western delegation to the newly constructed Soviet chemical demilitarization facility Delegation had full access to the demonstration plant and was fully briefed about Soviet plans for destroying the bulk of its chemical arsenal and the problems they are encountering from local environmental groups The Soviet Union later announced that the facility would not become operational but would be used as a training facility August 12-Sevastopol 1 Visited the SLAVA Guided Missile Cruiser Significance Although this class of ship has been visited by Americans in the past the committee had an opportunity to compare the annaments equipment and living quarters for Soviet naval personnel with their American counterparts The SLAVA impressed visitors both for its apparent warfighting capabilities and its amenities which included an on board sauna and small pool August 13-Alma Ata 1 Rest day Significance Chalk one up for 'home field advantage' An American vollyball team captained by a hero of the Soviet Union Col Ocheriov suffered defeat at the hands of a Soviet team captained by Rep Kasich The score two games to one The CODEL also took this opportunity to observe local Kazakhstan culture August 14-Baikonur 1 Visited Baikonur Cosmodrome Soviet space center Significance First Western delegation to tour vehicle assembly facilities for BURAN space shuttle and ENERGIA booster Soviet hosts were very forthcoming in providing launch schedule information for shuttle flights in the 1990s as well as for upcoming Soyuz and Progress launchers August 15--Teykovo 1 Visited an SS-11 ICB M site Significance Although previously visited by a Western delegation CODEL was given unprecedented access to the missile launch control facility Soviet officials were noticeably less forthcoming in responding to questions than had been the case earlier in the trip Nevertheless the CODEL learned that Soviet command and control procedures were similar to those used by the United States-dual key launch procedures permissive action links and allegedly a capability for 17 launch from other launch control centers and even from on board an aircraft August 16-Moscow 1 Visited laser facilities at Troitsk branch of Kurchatov Institute of atomic energy Significance CODEL toured three faci lities - the Tokamak magnetic confinement fusion experiment the Angara-5 fusion experiment which uses pulsed power pulses to investigate fusion and a megawatt Soviet laser While Western delegations had previously visited the first two facilities CODEL was the first Western delegation to observe the Soviet's high-enery laser The Soviet hosts demonstrated the laser's capability firing it for about five seconds and melting a metal target Soviet officials insisted that their laser technology - which impressed CODEI - had not proven to be cost effective from a military perspective The Troitsk laser whose power level was characterized by an American ex pen in the delegation as military-class did not have a beam director similar to the one seen previously at Sary Shagan This would be necessary for any laser weapon 2 Discussion with Soviet Refusniks Significance COD EL discussed the situation of Soviet Jews who have been denied permission to immigrate from the Soviet Union August 17-Moscow 1 Met with the Chairman of the Union of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Yevgniy Primakov Significance Mr Primakov accompanied by Mr Lapygin Mr Velekov and other members of the Defense and State Security Committee exchanged views with the CODEL on a wide range of subjects Of particular interest were the exchanges on how the Soviet Union makes arms control policy the possibility of forming joint committees to investigate issues such as proliferation terrorism and MIA POWs and the issue of refusniks 2 At the CODEL's request Represer atives Aspin and Kasich supported by several experts on the Soviet military met with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union Jed by Arm y General Lobov Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Significance CODEL was able to pose questions raised during their trip about the manner in which the Soviet Union was implementing its unilateral force reduction and restructuring The exchange was spirited and frank and resolved some but not all of the issues raised by the CODEI August 18-Moscow 1 Press conference on departure from the Soviet Union 18 Appendix 2 Key Statements on Soviet Unilateral Force Reductions and Withdrawals Provtaed to the HASC by Wayne G Armer BDM International Inc 7 December 1988 - General Secretary Gorbachev in an address to the United Nations Today I can report to you that the Soviet Union has taken a decision to reduce its anned forces Within the next 2 years their numerical strength will be reduced by 500 000 men The numbers of conventional annaments will also be substantially reduced This will be done unilaterally without relation to the talks on the mandate of the Vienna meeting By agreement with our Warsaw Pact Treaty Allies we have decided to withdraw by 1991 six tank divisions from East Gennany Czechoslovakia and Hungary and to disband them Soviet forces stationed in those countries will be reduced by 50 000 men and their armaments by 5 000 tanks At the same time we shall reduce the numerical strength of the armed forces and the numbers of armaments stationed in the European part of the Soviet Union In total Soviet armed forces in this part of our country and in the territories of our European allies will be reduced by 10 000 tanks 8 500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft 22 December 1989 - Major General Lebedev of the Soviet General Staff states that entire units with their materiel will be withdrawn from Eastern Europe The unites will be disbanded and much of their equipment including the latest model tanks will be scrapped Tank engines and auxilliary equipment will be turned over to the civilian economy Lebedev's statement was referring specifically to the tanks in the six divisions to be withdrawn however the context of his remarks indicate that he may have been referring to all tank units removed from Eastern Europe 30 December 1988 - TASS military analyst Vladimir Chemyshev The following measures will be carried out 6 tank divisions will be withdrawn from the Groups of Soviet Forces in theGDR Czechoslovakia and Hungary to be disbanded and not deployed anywhere else 18 January 1989 - General Secretary Gorbachev announces that half of the 10 000 tanks will be destroyed and half will be converted to civil use 18 February 1989-Article in Jane's Defense Weeldy quoting Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Army General Mikhail Sorokin Of the 10 000 tanks to be withdrawn from service 5 000 will be destroyed while the remaining 5 000 will be turned over to civilian use 23 February 1989 -Army General Moiseyev Chief of USSR Armed Forces General Staff in Krasnaya Zvezda Now we are talking about restructuring the very backbone of the armed forces Specifically there will be a reduction in the number of military districts armies and divisions Motorized rifle and tank divisions will be given a structure meeting the demands of fighting defensive battles They will experience a 30-35% reduction in the number of tanks artillery systems and assault crossing means But at the same time the quality of anti-tank means will increase by a factor of 1 5-2 28 February 1989 - Defense Minister Dimitry Yazov in Izvestiya The 6 tank divisions that are being removed from the GDR the USSR and Hungary are being disbanded I repeat disbanded not deployed elsewhere 13 March 1989 - Army General Moiseyev Soviet Military Doctrine Realization of its 19 defensive thrust in Pravda In the course of 1988-1989 the USSR armed forces will be cut by 500 000 men 12% of the total In terms of Europe Soviet troops are to be cut in the GDR the USSR Hungary Poland and in the European part of the country- a total of240 000 men 10 000 tanks 8 500artillery systems and 820combataircraft Of the 10 000 tanks 5 000 will be physically eliminated and the remainder will be converted into traction vehicles for civilian needs and training vehicles The military budget will decline byl4 2% and production of arms and military equipment will be cut by 19 5% The Soviet Union will withdraw from the GDR USSR and Hungary six tank divisions which will be disbanded In total 5 300 modern tanks are being withdrawn from the groups of Soviet troops 31 March 1989 - General Yuri Lebedev in an interview with the French magazine Le Figaro states We are not only scrapping old T-55 tanks but also T-72 tanks He later states We have made provisions for a reduction of 800 fighter planes including the very modern Sukhoy-24 planes 17 April 1989 - Army General Snetkov commander of Soviet forces in East Germany states that the tanks removed from the GDR will be sent beyond the Urals some will be mothballed and some modified for use in the national economy 18 April 1989 - TASS correspondents Komilov and Moskovskiy for Sovietskaya Rossiya Some of the most modern tanks being withdrawn from the G DR will remain in the Army's arsenal others will be mothballed and yet others will have their guns and machine guns removed and will perform peaceful service in the national economy - they will uproot timber or be used to extinguish forest fires 1 -· Fig 2 · GSFG tank division - structure and equipment · · · i s • · E ' -·' f 'S - · ----s ·· ·s 1''T ► • • ·' ' -5 • · S l 3 s v s - 1 - -• · 2 0 - -G i - - i-· O ' t -2 1 v es 8 'v a - o C i- s 6 M 2J H nc Es ie' 1 · s JC· · · · i§ J • • • • - - e 7 6C· Jr s - S 'D ' 2 ·Fvi · - F - C Jn s E ·· 1 TIO ' ' ' - •- 5 ' ' p Jf'l1C 4 ' • r'I • S · ' 1 J i '3 9 3 J ' 0 5 ' 3 6 'P ' s J ·- - · c- s _ r--------- --------- --------- --'------- -------- -------- s t - - - o 3 • · • Fig 3 GSFG motor rifle division - structure and equipment -• - 6 18 - J ' ' · · c- i · c - · t- · · 1 ·· • S r · - c - or · s 39 • - · 3 C ' • r ' · 5 ' ' c•- 1-- · ' ' s 22 s · e •' ' ····a - • __ ·· c ·- - t · - '- - · - · _ ·· •• • • · - 6 - J JllKS 51 T o S 7 B 9 ' I ' ' ' G ' C ·1e S 0 s · D 2 · c · c · s ac • _ · · _ g - - 3G Jnk s · E •r 5 BR 1 BA ' ' ' ' e 1 • v t 'l•C c S ' ' S - • - K ' n J Q T 6'18 'j aci - lk S J' f' · c ' C t S J ' 6- ' I Q 80 - l' •c · r - s · -- 3° -· _· ' ''S 3 s v - t-r s • J p l l fv 'S TG· v · s 1 •s T f 8 - SC· Jn1 s t•- c 21 ' EC - - - c ·-•t I c s s -C' 1 '- -- - _ Si C ' 1 L ri•-no 'E- C e ' c cs n·c es -1 25 'Tl SP ' JW Lers j is 2 · r s S_ l • 3 $ 1 s· s e'TlS ' lQ 11 ' ' ''S J ZS L - J J SP l A guns J SA i 3 5 l 1 s· s rns TGW S'1S' T'S -01e na scme O10r if 1e O1v 1s1ons nave rNO J zs _· 23 J ' ' 7 · _ --n-n · 1r 2 i 7 u· v · --s• - j ' i H t r _iJ 'C 'il' - - s J - C - n 7 •p EG l BP' I 1 • ·11n • r • ·1 5 l BR O c - - - c S t • 3 SJ s· s e·ns J ZS i_ 23- -l s 0 Jo hHlS I i 5 TG- v s - •- •s - 5- _ 5 1 BR or•na r c vt n u J BRD 1 J i c · c n c - s l 2s 12 2-nrr $ t _ •N tl rS 2 2S3 · 2---- 'i S r Qlh • ro J B 1 1 • J · •r h 1r· '1t-''1 SP l 9 1-s BMP 1Q1Or r1f 1e ·ey men s ana on • one BTR •eg men • - - o · s 1 9 - o ' 2J '-o •flC ·· - 1 · · Gs Appendix 4 Provided to the IIASC by Phil Karber ilDM lnternational VOROSHILOV ACADEMY - STUDENT EXERCISE -- SPRING 1989 IFRONT ON THE DEFENSIVE • START POSITIONS AT BORDER - DIVISION FRONTAGE± 30 KM • OPPONENTS EQUAL STRENGTH • OFFENSIVE CONCENTRATION ON THE PRIMARY SECTORS xx en a w fjj 0 J i 8 C ' 0 v N IZl - -xx IZl - -xx IZl xx - IZl -xx - IZl -xx IZl xx - IZl -xx - IZl -xx IZl xx lc JI xxxx xx lc JI xxxxlc JI xxxx xx xx lc JI X lc I VOROSHILOV ACADEMY - STUDENT EXERCISE - SPRING 1989 IFRONT ON THE DEFENSIVE • UNCONTAINED TACTICAL BREAKTHROUGH ON PRIMARY AXIS • COMMITTMENT OF ARMY RESOURCES U a xx Ic I lZ w E 0 xx J S2 I I I u N xx Ic I lZ IC I VOROSHILOV ACADEMY - STUDENT EXERCISE -- SPRING 1989 IFRONT ON THE DEFENSIVE • DEPTH OF OFFENSIVE PENETRATION 75 KILOMETERS • COMMITMENT OF 2nd ECHELON TANK ARMY • COUNTER OFFENSIVE- - USE OF INDIRECT FLANK ATTACK xx lc I Cl a 1111 LU tLU E 0 J S2 xx xx llll lc I I N llll llll xx lc I VOROSHILOV ACADEMY - STUDENT EXERCISE - SPRING 1989 IFRONT ON THE DEFENSIVE • ENCIRCLEMENT OF OFFENSIVE LEAD ELEMENTS • RESTORATION OF THE PRE-WAR BORDER en a w tij 2 0 _ J S2 xx Ic I ··········· Ic I JO 'I I' ' L2SJ ·- •· xx Ic I Appendix 5 P rovid ed to the HASC by Phil Karber BDM International NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT DEFENSE REDUCTIONS NATION DEFENSE SPENDING CUT MANPOWER UNITS EQUIPMENT 10% by 1990 10 000 Troops 6% reduction 130 troops from 8th Tank Regimen discharged on AprN 28 1989 Wilhdrawal of 6 tank regimenls 1 unspecified squadron of aircrah 8Ih ARTUR BECKER armored regimen disbanded prior lo 26 Aug 89 Jano's Dofonco Wookly 26 Aug 89 Equipment associated with units to be specified laler Iota ling 600 tanks 20% reduction 50 aircrah 14% reduction 31 T-55A tanks withdrawn on Aprll 28 1989 Withdrawn T-55s to be dismanrled at Charlollenhol dismantling field article accounts for 500 ol withdrawn tanks Berlin ADN International Service 21 Jun 89 CZ 15% by 1991 12 000 men active service 15 000 reserves Transfer of 20 000 aclive duly personnel 10 consIrucIion brigades divisional and regimental tactical training sessions are being reduced by 50 percent and combat fire by 25 -30 percent CZ Army construclion organization to be increased by 20 000 lroops Prague - Rude Pravo 13 Jul 89 850 tanks' 165 armored vehicles 51 fighler aircrafl Equipment for 3 other unspecified divisions pul in slorage personnel shihed 10 olher dulies 4% Assertion of previous cut of 15 000 lroops from 7 7% to Reducllon of 40 000 troops 5 5% of stale budget including 2 motorized rifle divisions in 1987 1988 March 3 4 of 1989 2 tank regiments 1 battlefield tactical missile brigade 1 training regiment and •several minor• units were disbanded Lalor 1989 2nd 15th Armored Divisions reduce manpower ol 10th 16th Tank Divisions 30 other units transformed Into civil defense formations• Jane's Dofonco Woekly 18 Mar 89 ·Poland plans to disband around 50 military units• Del Min Siovicki Krasnaya Zvezda 28 May 89 850' tanks 900 artillery guns and mortars 700 armored vehicles 80 combat aircrah Jane's Defence Weekly 18 Mar 89 Pomeranean MD lo be reOfganized having 3 Mech Divs rather than 3 MRDs and 2 TDs AR divs 10 have same structure -- 3 Mech Regiments 2 Tank and 2 lnfanlry battalions with supporting arms Jane's Defonce Woekly 17 Jun 89 1-lJ 17% 1989 9 300 mostly enlisIed servicemen defense budget 2 100 senior and junior ollicers CUI by 9% 8 8% According 10 Defense Minister F Karpatl an unspecified number of tank brigades and fighter aircrall squadrons will be dismantled 1 Tank Brigade stationed in area between lhe Danube and Tisza Rivers to be disbanded Moscow Domeslic Service 8 Jul 89 From unspecified units 251 tanks 30 APCs 430 artillery pieces including 180 anti -tank weapons 9 fighter-i nterceptor aircrall Creation of 60 mile 'zone ol security confidence building and cooperation along bOfders ol Austria and Yugoslavia alfecling approximately 200 tanks and 14 nuclear missile launching pads Washington Post 10 Sep 89 ElJ 12% 10 000 men 5 Naval units 200 tanks 200 artillery pieces 20 aircraft R 5% 1986 Unspecllied Unspecified Unspecified • Unknown as 10 whelher these tanks will be wilhdrawn from active or reserve units 9 - 18 - 89