United States General Accounting Office GAO Report to Congressional Requesters November 1998 COMBATING TERRORISM Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency GAO NSIAD-99-3 GAO United States General Accounting Office Washington D C 20548 National Security and International Affairs Division B-278556 November 12 1998 The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority Member Committee on National Security House of Representatives The Honorable J Dennis Hastert Chairman Subcommittee on National Security International Affairs and Criminal Justice Committee on Government Reform and Oversight House of Representatives Concerned that terrorists might move beyond using conventional weapons to weapons of mass destruction WMD —chemical biological radiological or nuclear devices—Congress authorized the federal government to improve capabilities to respond to such incidents particularly at the local level As requested we reviewed the status and other aspects of the Domestic Preparedness Program a training assistance and equipment loan program led by the Department of Defense DOD Specifically we evaluated 1 the training and other benefits offered to cities under the Domestic Preparedness Program and 2 the methodology for designing and implementing the program including the way in which cities were selected to participate how cities’ capabilities and needs were assessed and the effectiveness of interagency coordination on this and other similar consequence management training and equipment programs You also asked us to determine the potential cost of equipping and maintaining the capability of a city to respond to a terrorist incident involving WMD This matter will be the subject of a report to be issued later Results in Brief The training and equipment that DOD is providing to cities through the Domestic Preparedness Program have clearly increased cities’ awareness of and should better prepare them to deal with a potential chemical or biological terrorist incident Local officials in the seven cities we visited praised the training program’s content instructors and materials as well as DOD’s willingness to modify the program based on suggestions from local officials They also credited the program with bringing local state and federal regional emergency response agencies together into a closer working relationship Page 1 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 In designing the training and equipment program DOD selected 120 cities based solely on city population This decision resulted in 14 clusters of 44 cities within 30 miles of at least 1 other city selected By dealing directly with cities DOD did not build upon the states’ existing emergency management and training structures Had it used existing structures such as counties response regions mutual aid agreements or other similar arrangements that reflect how emergency response is actually organized DOD could have consolidated training and equipment purchases to cover more jurisdictions in fewer locations than presently planned at less cost Because less than one-third of the cities had received training at the time of our review DOD or any subsequent lead agency could still refocus its approach for greater efficiency economy and effectiveness DOD’s loan of equipment in support of the training program has caused frustration and confusion among local officials The legislation authorized DOD to lend rather than give or grant equipment to local jurisdictions and DOD established a 5-year renewable loan agreement to govern the provision of about $300 000 worth of equipment to each city This agreement restricts the use of the equipment to training and requires the cities to repair maintain and replace the equipment even though DOD program officials intend for the loans to be permanent and will allow the use of equipment for operational purposes Cities were concerned about the lack of federal sustainment money to maintain repair and replace the equipment Also the program has raised expectations among some local officials that the federal government may provide additional funding for operational equipment The interagency coordination process provided a valuable information-sharing forum but was of limited success in helping steer the design and development of the program According to some Senior Interagency Coordination Group members DOD did not heed their advice on designing the program For example DOD did not adequately leverage existing training programs However the Group did influence the timing of the first cities to be trained The Group also disapproved of DOD’s method of assessing the 120 cities’ needs or requirements but did not develop an acceptable alternative assessment approach No threat and risk assessment1 was applied to help determine cities’ requirements or needs or to establish a roadmap or defined end state of preparedness While it is not possible to eliminate or reduce the risk to all potential targets against WMD terrorism threat and risk assessments can help ensure that localities 1 Combating Terrorism Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments GAO NSIAD-98-74 Apr 9 1998 Page 2 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 receive the most appropriate training and equipment based on the level of protection desired Federal agencies’ individual efforts to enhance consequence management of possible incidents involving WMD terrorism are not guided by an overarching strategy for achieving a defined end state Local officials in most of the cities we visited raised the issue that the many WMD training equipment and consequence management programs are evidence of a fragmented and possibly wasteful federal approach toward combating terrorism Cities pointed to similar federal agency training and equipment programs such as those offered by the Department of Justice and FEMA and the new initiative to give the National Guard a WMD response role as examples of the unfocused federal approach to combating terrorism Background Concerned that WMD are increasingly available to terrorists Congress passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act P L 104-201 Sept 23 1996 The act designates DOD as the lead agency to enhance domestic preparedness for responding to and managing the consequences of terrorists’ use of WMD 2 Under the act DOD can provide training exercises and expert advice to emergency response personnel and lend equipment to local jurisdictions The Secretary of Defense designated the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict as the policy office and the Secretary of the Army to carry out the Domestic Preparedness Program Because of its subject matter expertise the Army’s Chemical and Biological Defense Command CBDCOM was tasked to implement the program through the Army Director of Military Support The Director of Military Support and CBDCOM designed a training program to build on the existing knowledge and capabilities of those who would first deal with a WMD incident locally—fire law enforcement and medical personnel and hazardous materials technicians This generally week-long program takes a train-the-trainer approach On the last day of the week-long program local officials role-play their responses to a specific terrorism scenario through a tabletop exercise The act also authorizes 1 funds for DOD to assist the Secretary of Health and Human Services in establishing Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams MMST to help improve local jurisdictions’ medical response capabilities for a WMD incident 2 a 2 Training for consequence management would include measures to alleviate damage loss of life or suffering protect public health and safety restore essential government services and provide emergency assistance Page 3 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 telephonic link to provide data and expert advice for the use of state and local officials responding to emergencies involving WMD 3 a rapid response information system including an inventory of rapid response assets and a database on chemical and biological materials and 4 a chemical biological rapid response team Agencies that participate in the program include the Federal Emergency Management Agency FEMA the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI the Department of Energy the Department of Health and Human Services’ Public Health Service PHS and the Environmental Protection Agency The act also requires that DOD coordinate with state and local emergency preparedness agencies Until June 1998 the coordinating body for the Domestic Preparedness Program was the Senior Interagency Coordination Group on Terrorism 3 received $36 million in fiscal year 1997 to implement the program An additional $6 6 million was provided for PHS to establish medical strike teams DOD’s fiscal year 1998 and 1999 budget estimates are $43 million and $50 million respectively to continue the program DOD estimates that the last 2 years of the 5-year program will cost about $14 million to $15 million each year DOD expects its portion of the 5-year program to cost at least $157 million but it expects to incur costs of about $5 million per year in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to conduct program-related exercises Appendixes I through III show more detailed actual and projected DOD Domestic Preparedness Program costs for fiscal years 1997-99 DOD Cities Benefit From Domestic Preparedness Program Cities that have received training under the Domestic Preparedness Program have a greater awareness of how to respond to a potential chemical or biological terrorist incident Local officials praised the training program content instructors and materials as well as DOD’s willingness to act on constructive criticism and adjust the courses They also credited the program with bringing local state and federal regional emergency response agencies together into a closer working relationship By December 31 1998 DOD expected to have trained about one-third of the 120 cities it selected for the program and planned to complete the entire training program by fiscal year 2001 Those trained—fire fighters hazardous materials technicians emergency medical services personnel 3 In March 1998 FEMA which established and chaired the Senior Interagency Coordination Group withdrew from the Group Currently a National Security Council working group under the new National Coordinator for Security Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism—a position established in May 1998 by Presidential Decision Directive 62—is responsible for interagency coordination Page 4 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 law enforcement personnel hospital personnel and dispatchers—are expected to train other emergency responders through follow-on courses The seven cities we visited were planning to institutionalize various adaptations of the WMD training primarily in their fire and law enforcement academies A related exercise program to allow cities to test their response capabilities also has begun As authorized under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation DOD is in the process of providing $300 000 in training and operational equipment—personal protection detection decontamination and training aids4—selected by each city after it is trained As of June 1998 nine cities had received equipment and other cities were developing their lists See appendix IV for DOD’s suggested equipment list Other Program Aspects Are Being Implemented The other aspects of the Domestic Preparedness Program either have been implemented or are in process DOD established a hot line for reporting incidents and requesting technical assistance through the existing National Response Center for hazardous materials spills and a help line was established through which CBDCOM experts can provide information and advice The Command also has an internet web site to provide information on the Domestic Preparedness Program FEMA established the Rapid Response Information System to allow federal and state agencies controlled computer access to a database on federal response capabilities WMD substances equipment and other information An internet web site allows general access to an abbreviated version of the system A number of city and state officials we interviewed had limited knowledge about these communications systems and some were skeptical of their value during a crisis These officials indicated that the systems seemed redundant to existing emergency response reporting channels and information sources and they did not expect to take the time to use any of these systems in the event of an incident In association with the cities of Baltimore and New York CBDCOM is identifying ways to improve the response to chemical and biological WMD incidents respectively The Command is also testing first responder equipment such as protective clothing and chemical detectors to enable cities to make more informed decisions about equipment purchases or requests through the DOD equipment program At the time of our review DOD had not finalized a joint command structure for a Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team which is intended to support federal state and 4 Training aids are a standard package provided by DOD Cities have flexibility in selecting items from the other three equipment categories as long as the items relate to WMD response Vehicles are not among the authorized equipment items Page 5 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 local agencies in dealing with a WMD incident The team will comprise existing military units from more than one military service and possibly from National Guard and Reserve units PHS continues to establish and equip MMSTs for which the initial 27 program cities are developing concept of operations plans for medical systems PHS has contracts with the 27 cities and expects them to complete their plans including how MMSTs are being incorporated into the local emergency response and medical systems by December 31 1998 At the time of our review PHS further planned to establish MMSTs in all 120 program cities These teams are eligible for unmatched federal funding to acquire an average of $350 000 worth of equipment supplies and pharmaceuticals based on the requirements related to their concept of operations plans 5 Cities Selected Based Upon Population decided to implement its Domestic Preparedness Program in the 120 largest U S cities based on city population 1990 census revised Apr 1995 6 This equated to all U S cities with more than 144 000 people at the time Figure 1 lists the cities DOD selected The 120 cities represent about 22 percent of the U S population and cover at least 1 city in 38 states and the District of Columbia Twelve states7 and the U S territories have no cities in the program and 25 percent of the cities are in California and Texas DOD 5 Unmatched federal funding for equipment supplies and pharmaceuticals ranges from $300 000 for smaller cities to $800 000 for New York City All MMST cities are required to have sufficient pharmaceutical stocks to initially treat at least 1 000 casualties See appendix V for an example of the types of equipment being acquired for MMSTs 6 The decision to select the most populated 120 cities was discussed within the Senior Interagency Coordination Group 7 Connecticut Delaware Idaho Maine Montana New Hampshire North Dakota South Carolina South Dakota Vermont West Virginia and Wyoming Page 6 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 Figure 1 Cities Selected for Domestic Preparedness Program in order of population 1 New York N Y 2 Los Angeles Calif 3 Chicago Ill 4 Houston Tex 5 Philadelphia Pa 6 San Diego Calif 7 Detroit Mich 8 Dallas Tex 9 Phoenix Ariz 10 San Antonio Tex 11 San Jose Calif 12 Baltimore Md 13 Indianapolis Ind 14 San Francisco Calif 15 Jacksonville Fla 16 Columbus Ohio 17 Milwaukee Wis 18 Memphis Tenn 19 Washington D C 20 Boston Mass 21 Seattle Wash 22 El Paso Tex 23 Cleveland Ohio 24 New Orleans La 25 Nashville Tenn 26 Denver Colo 27 Austin Tex 28 Fort Worth Tex 29 Oklahoma City Okla 30 Portland Oreg 31 Kansas City Mo 32 Long Beach Calif 33 Tucson Ariz 34 St Louis Mo 35 Charlotte N C 36 Atlanta Ga 37 Virginia Beach Va 38 Albuquerque N Mex 39 Oakland Calif 40 Pittsburgh Pa 41 Sacramento Calif 42 Minneapolis Minn 43 Tulsa Okla 44 Honolulu Hawaii 45 Cincinnati Ohio 46 Miami Fla 47 Fresno Calif 48 Omaha Nebr 49 Toledo Ohio 50 Buffalo N Y 51 Wichita Kans 52 Santa Ana Calif 53 Mesa Ariz 54 Colorado Springs Co 55 Tampa Fla 56 Newark N J 57 St Paul Minn 58 Louisville Ky 59 Anaheim Calif 60 Birmingham Ala 61 Arlington Tex 62 Norfolk Va 63 Las Vegas Nev 64 Corpus Christi Tex 65 St Petersburg Fla 66 Rochester N Y 67 Jersey City N J 68 Riverside Calif 69 Anchorage Alaska 70 Lexington Ky a 71 Akron Ohio 72 Aurora Col 73 Baton Rouge La 74 Raleigh N C 75 Stockton Calif 76 Richmond Va 77 Shreveport La 78 Jackson Miss 79 Mobile Ala 80 Des Moines Iowa 81 Lincoln Nebr 82 Madison Wis 83 Grand Rapids Mich 84 Yonkers N Y 85 Hialeah Fla 86 Montgomery Ala 87 Lubbock Tex 88 Greensboro N C 89 Dayton Ohio 90 Huntington Beach Calif 91 Garland Tex 92 Glendale Calif 93 Columbus Ga 94 Spokane Wash 95 Tacoma Wash 96 Little Rock Ark 97 Bakersfield Calif 98 Fremont Calif 99 Fort Wayne Ind 100 Newport News Va 101 Arlington Va a 102 Worcester Mass 103 Knoxville Tenn 104 Modesto Calif 105 Orlando Fla 106 San Bernardino Calif 107 Syracuse N Y 108 Providence R I 109 Salt Lake City Utah 110 Huntsville Ala 111 Amarillo Tex 112 Springfield Mass 113 Cleveland Ohio 114 Irving Tex 115 Chesapeake Va 116 Kansas City Kans 117 Metairie La a 118 Ft Lauderdale Fla 119 Glendale Ariz 120 Warren Mich a Not a city government Source U S Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command took a city approach because it wanted to deal with a single governmental entity that could select the most appropriate personnel for training and to receive equipment But in selecting cities DOD did not take into account a city’s existing level of preparedness or financial need Also DOD did no analysis to determine whether all cities on the list actually had a perceptible level of threat and risk of terrorism or whether a smaller city with high risk factors might have been excluded from the program due to its lower population No federal agency determined and assessed cities’ DOD Page 7 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 risk factors based on intelligence assessments critical infrastructure points national symbols future special events drawing large crowds sensitive government or corporate activities or similar analyses and data to help evaluate cities’ key assets and vulnerabilities to WMD In fact in no city we visited did the FBI determine there was a credible threat of a WMD attack which would be one factor considered in a threat and risk assessment 8 Linking Future Training to Existing Structures Would Be More Efficient and Economical has set out to deliver training without taking advantage of existing state emergency management structures mutual aid agreements among local jurisdictions or other collaborative arrangements for emergency response By delivering the program to cities based on population size DOD replicates training sessions in nearby cities that also qualified for the program and might even be part of the same response system or mutual aid jurisdiction Mutual aid agreements unified emergency service districts councils of government hazardous materials response regions and traditional state roles in fire and emergency management training as well as links to the federal response system 9 would allow DOD to consolidate training and could result in far fewer training iterations Training in fewer locations and taking advantage of existing emergency response structures could hasten the accomplishment of program goals and have the added benefit of reinforcing local response integration Such an approach could also cover a greater percentage of the population and make effective use of existing emergency management training venues Under this approach WMD training could be delivered over the long term through existing state training systems Table 1 compares the difference in coverage that results from selecting 120 cities counties or standard primary metropolitan statistical areas DOD 8 Although the FBI and the intelligence community see growing interest in WMD by groups and individuals of concern the intelligence community concluded that explosives or other conventional weapons will continue to be the most likely form of terrorist attack over the next decade 9 Federal state and local responders have a well-established command structure that can expand and contract as needed FEMA uses this incident command structure in disaster response to coordinate activities with state and local authorities Page 8 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 Table 1 U S Population Covered Based on Size of Area Selected Size of area selected City population Total population of area millions Percentage of U S population covered 54 9 22 0 County population 108 9 43 6 Standard primary metropolitan statistical area 160 2 64 1 Note Largest 120 areas based on 1990 census updated 1994-95 Table 2 shows that DOD could have selected fewer areas to cover 22 percent of the population Table 2 Areas Needed to Cover 22 Percent of the U S Population by Type of Area Type of area selected Total area City 120 cities County 24 counties Standard primary metropolitan statistical area 12 statistical areas DOD’s approach resulted in clusters of program cities each of which is to receive training and equipment Figure 2 shows the location of the cities nationwide and the clustering effect resulting from DOD’s decision to base training delivery on city population Page 9 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 Figure 2 Clustering of Cities Selected for Domestic Preparedness Program Seattle WA Spokane WA Tacoma WA Portland OR San Francisco CA San Jose CA Fremont CA 1 Sacramento CA Oakland CA Denver CO Stockton CA Modesto CA Fresno CA Bakersfield CA Glendale CA Los Angeles CA Long Beach CA Huntington Beach CA San Diego CA Omaha NE Lincoln NE Salt Lake City UT Aurora CO Las Vegas NV Wichita KS San Bernardino CA Riverside CA Anaheim CA Santa Ana CA Phoenix AZ Glendale AZ Tulsa OK Albuquerque NM Amarillo TX Oklahoma City OK Mesa AZ Lubbock TX Irving TX Fort Worth TX Tucson AZ El Paso TX Garland TX Dallas TX Arlington TX Austin TX Houston TX San Antonio TX Anchorage AK Honolulu HI Page 10 Kansas City KS Colorado Springs CO Corpus Christi TX GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 Minneapolis MN St Paul MN Worcester MA Syracuse NY Grand Rapids MI Milwaukee WI Madison WI Des Moines IA Warren MI Detroit MI Rochester NY Springfield MA Buffalo NY Newark NJ Cleveland OH Akron OH Pittsburgh PA Toledo OH Fort Wayne IN Columbus OH Knoxville TN Nashville TN Charlotte NC Chattanooga TN Memphis TN Huntsville AL Atlanta GA Little Rock AR Birmingham AL Columbus GA Jackson MS Montgomery AL Shreveport LA Baton Rouge LA Providence RI Yonkers NY New York NY Jersey City NJ Philadelphia PA Chicago IL Dayton OH Arlington VA Indianapolis IN Cincinnati OH Richmond VA Kansas City MO Louisville KY Lexington-Fayette KY St Louis MO Norfolk VA Boston MA Baltimore MD Washington DC Newport News VA Virginia Beach VA Chesapeake VA Greensboro NC Raleigh NC Jacksonville FL Mobile AL New Orleans LA Metairie LA Tampa FL Orlando FL St Petersburg FL Ft Lauderdale FL Hialeah FL Miami FL Note City locations are approximate Source U S Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command Page 11 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 Figure 3 shows 14 clusters of 44 different cities within 30 miles of at least 1 other program city or 37 percent of the total number of cities that DOD selected for the program Increasing the distance to 60 miles between cities produces 18 clusters involving 58 cities or nearly half of the total number of cities in the program Page 12 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 Figure 3 Program Cities Within 30 Miles of Another Program City Program city Program city Distance in miles a Southern California Los Angeles Santa Ana Long Beach Riverside Santa Ana Anaheim Long Beach Long Beach Los Angeles Los Angeles Long Beach Anaheim Glendale Anaheim Huntingon Beach San Bernardino Huntington Beach Huntington Beach Anaheim Santa Ana Long Beach Anaheim Glendale Glendale 5 6 10 9 13 4 17 0 17 4 18 1 19 9 20 2 25 3 26 0 29 6 30 3 Northern California San Francisco San Jose Oakland Oakland Fremont Fremont 8 8 12 9 30 1 New York Metro Newark New York New York New York Jersey City Newark Jersey City Yonkers Jersey City Newark Yonkers Yonkers 5 4 13 4 13 6 19 0 19 1 23 7 Dallas Metro Fort Worth Dallas Arlington Dallas Fort Worth Arlington Irving Irving Arlington Irving 12 3 15 6 20 8 25 2 26 0 Tidewater Norfolk Virginia Beach Norfolk Virginia Beach Newport News Chesapeake Norfolk Newport News Chesapeake Chesapeake 5 4 18 1 21 4 22 5 27 1 Arizona Phoenix Phoenix Mesa Glendale Mesa Glendale 7 3 20 7 28 0 Central Florida Tampa St Petersburg 24 6 Cluster Page 13 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 Cluster Distance in miles a Program city Program city Southern Florida Miami Miami Hialeah Hialeah Ft Lauderdale Ft Lauderdale 5 4 23 4 25 6 Kansas City Kansas City Mo Kansas City Kans 1 7 Capitol Washington D C Arlington Va 3 3 Louisiana New Orleans Metairie 5 0 Minnesota Minneapolis St Paul 9 6 Colorado Denver Aurora 10 0 Michigan Detroit Warren 12 1 a Driving distance city center to city center Source GAO analysis based on mileage from GeoSystems Global Corporation Inc The Southern California area shows the greatest effect of clustering Under the California Standardized Emergency Management System there are countywide operational areas within six mutual aid regions see fig 4 Page 14 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 Figure 4 California’s Mutual Aid Regions Del Norte Siskiyou Humboldt Trinity Modoc Shasta III Lassen Tehama Mendocino Glenn II Lake Sonoma Butte Colusa Napa Sierra Yuba Nevada Solano Sutter Placer Marin San Francisco Plumas Contra Costa Yolo Alameda El Dorado Amador Alpine IV San Mateo Calaveras Santa Clara Sacramento Santa Cruz Tuolumne San Benito Mariposa Madera San Joaquin Monterey Mono Stanislaus Merced Fresno V Inyo Tulare Kings VI Kern San Luis Obispo Santa Barbara Ventura San Bernardino I Angeles Los Riverside San Diego Imperial Orange Source California State Emergency Management System Guidelines In Los Angeles County the sheriff is in charge of the consolidated interagency response to an incident occurring in any of the 88 cities and 136 unincorporated areas within the county The Los Angeles county operational area includes the cities of Los Angeles Long Beach and Glendale all of which are treated as separate entities in the Domestic Page 15 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 Preparedness Program Further the nearby cities of Anaheim Huntington Beach Santa Ana San Bernardino and Riverside are within 30 miles of at least one other program city and are also treated as separate entities Through mutual aid and under California’s statewide system Los Angeles county could conceivably assist or be assisted by these other neighboring cities or any other jurisdictions in the state in the event of a major incident Similarly as shown in figure 5 Virginia has 13 regionalized hazardous materials teams to respond to a WMD incident Through these regional teams that operate under state control four adjacent program cities—Norfolk Virginia Beach Newport News and Chesapeake—could assist one another in the event of a WMD incident Figure 5 Virginia’s Regional Hazardous Materials Response Teams Frederick Clarke Shenandoah Warren Rappahannock Page Highland Madison Rockbridge Bath Fairfax Arlington Prince William I H Rockingham Alleghany Loudoun Augusta F Greene Albemarle Fauquier Stafford King George Culpeper J Orange Spotsylvania Caroline Louisa Westmoreland Accomack King and Queen Fluvanna Hanover King Lancaster Goochland William Middlesex Buckingham Montgomery Amherst Henrico Botetourt Powhatan New Kent Mathews Craig Cumberland ChesterfieldCharles Tazewell James City Gloucester Appomattox Amelia Bedford City Giles Prince Prince Roanoke York Edward George Campbell Newport Bland Nottoway Surry News Pulaski Northampton Dinwiddie Franklin Hampton Sussex Isle Charlotte Lunenburg Russell Floyd Wythe of Smyth Brunswick Wight Carroll Halifax Mecklenburg Southampton Chesapeake Henry Grayson Washington Suffolk Virginia Beach Patrick Pittsylvania Greensville Nelson Buchanan K D Dickenson Richmond Northumberland Essex M G Wise Lee Scott A E C L B Legend A - Wise County Team E - Danville Team I B - Bristol Team F - Central Shenandoah Valley Team J - Fredericksburg Team - Northern Virginia Team C - Giles County Team G - Henrico County Team K - Newport News City Team D - Roanoke Valley Team H - Winchester Team L - Southside Tidewater Team M - Eastern Shore Team Page 16 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 Texas has four program cities less than 30 miles from each other Dallas Fort Worth Irving and Arlington And the Washington D C MMST is based on a metropolitan area council of governments agreement involving six jurisdictions and two program cities in Virginia Maryland and the District of Columbia that would support Washington D C or other metropolitan area first responders in the event of a WMD incident MMSTs in other cities are also designed to be integrated into the local emergency response and medical systems for that particular area In response to comments by state and local officials DOD began holding regional meetings to introduce the program Nevertheless each program city still receives its own training program and training equipment package Cities may invite representatives from neighboring jurisdictions and state agencies but classroom space tends to be limited and if the neighboring city is a program city it will eventually receive its own on-site training States have existing training structures that DOD could have used to deliver its training courses California’s Specialized Training Institute for example provides emergency management training to first responders statewide In Texas the state’s Division of Emergency Management conducts training for local first responders and fire protection training is provided through the Texas Engineering Extension Service FEMA said that it delivers numerous courses through and in cooperation with state and local fire training academies and emergency managers Under current circumstances it is up to the individual cities whose personnel were trained as trainers to ensure the appropriate courses are delivered to the rank-and-file emergency response personnel Cities we visited were adapting the DOD courses differently and used different venues to deliver the training Cities plan to deliver the courses through their local academies and in most cases will also deliver the courses directly One delivery method that DOD could consider to reach large numbers of first responders while minimizing travel costs is distance learning For example the U S Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases has successfully used distance learning techniques through satellite-to-television links and FEMA provides training to emergency responders nationwide through its Emergency Education Network CBDCOM has been considering distance learning technology to provide training to cities other than the 120 selected for the Domestic Preparedness Program but is not using it to train first responders in multiple cities in the existing program Page 17 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 Terms of DOD Equipment Agreement Concern Cities Because of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislative language authorizing DOD to lend equipment 50 U S C 2312 e DOD provided equipment as a 5-year renewable loan for training purposes rather than giving or granting equipment to the cities DOD’s loan agreement terms have caused frustration and confusion among local officials Under the terms of the loan agreement cities are to repair maintain and replace the equipment and are to use it only for training purposes Officials from some cities we visited viewed the acceptance of the equipment as tantamount to an unfunded federal mandate because DOD is providing no funds to sustain the equipment At least two cities were reluctant to accept the equipment unless DOD would assure them that the equipment could be used operationally and that DOD did not intend for the equipment to be returned Although such assurances contradict the loan agreement DOD program officials acknowledged that DOD will not require cities to repair maintain replace or return the equipment and that cities can use it for operational purposes as well as for training DOD officials also pointed out that much of the equipment has no more than a 5-year useful life and is largely incompatible with standard military-specification equipment Further expectations have been raised among some local officials that the federal government may eventually provide funds to sustain the program if not to provide even more equipment toward meeting cities’ perceived operational requirements DOD officials said that the $300 000 equipment package was intended only for cities’ training needs Also DOD wanted to encourage cities to share in the burden of preparing for WMD terrorism by funding additional equipment themselves DOD’s basis for determining the $300 000 value of the equipment program and allowing all cities the same amount regardless of their existing capabilities or financial need is unclear and undocumented Moreover no federal agency has made assessments as a part of the program to help determine requirements needed for WMD over and above what is needed for a response to an industrial hazardous materials incident Interagency Coordination Has Been Limited Congress intended the Domestic Preparedness Program to be an interagency effort with DOD as lead agency Under FEMA leadership the Senior Interagency Coordination Group provided a forum for DOD and the other involved agencies to share information However in developing the program some member agency officials stated that DOD did not always take advantage of the experience of agencies that were more accustomed to dealing with state and local officials and were more knowledgeable of domestic emergency response structures For example some agency Page 18 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 representatives said that they offered suggestions such as taking a metropolitan area approach and coordinating with state emergency management agencies instead of dealing directly and only with cities 10 DOD made most program decisions and presented them to the Group for discussion According to DOD the Group was often unable to form consensus or reach a decision DOD was obligated to move forward with the program without interagency agreement According to participants the Group did influence two decisions DOD initially planned to cover 20 cities in the first phase of the program but the Group raised the number to 27 and gave 7 cities higher priority in terms of timing for the training than their population would otherwise warrant The Group made this decision to account for special events geographical balance and the remoteness of Honolulu Hawaii and Anchorage Alaska from the continental United States Also concerned about an assessment guide that DOD developed for the cities and cities’ presumed negative perceptions the Group recommended that DOD abandon its plan to have cities conduct formal self-assessments of their capabilities and needs The Group did not press for a more acceptable assessment methodology which resulted in the lack of any analytical basis for cities to determine their requirements for a prudent and affordable level of preparedness for WMD or to guide DOD in defining individual cities’ requirements In addition the Senior Interagency Coordination Group did not resolve the issue of similar or potentially overlapping terrorism-related courses Some agency officials told us that in developing its training program DOD did not take advantage of existing terrorism-related courses or curriculums For example a joint Department of Justice and FEMA 2-day basic concepts course on emergency response to terrorism was being developed at about the same time as the Domestic Preparedness Program Department of Justice officials described the course as being more detailed and technical than the WMD awareness portion of the 5-day DOD program They said that the training materials were available if DOD had wanted to use them for the awareness and operations modules of its training program but a DOD program official said that the materials were draft at the time and could not be used and Department of Justice officials said they made available to DOD materials from existing Emergency Management Institute and National Fire Academy courses or workshops on terrorism-related subjects Other FEMA 10 The International Association of Fire Chiefs said that it also recommended a metropolitan area approach given that many fire departments are countywide Another firefighter organization criticized DOD’s city approach because it excludes large numbers of first responders in smaller jurisdictions Page 19 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 federal agencies also have training that includes WMD or other terrorism-related topics DOD did not adopt these materials and the Department of Justice and FEMA continued developing additional terrorism-related courses as well Some city and state officials and national first responder organizations faulted DOD for not seeking their input or heeding their advice in the early stages of program development so that DOD could have a better appreciation of state and local emergency management and training structures and incident command systems 11 Strategy Needed to Coordinate and Focus Multiple Training Equipment and Response Elements Some local officials viewed the growing number of WMD consequence management training programs including the Domestic Preparedness Program the Department of Justice and FEMA courses FEMA Emergency Management Institute courses National Fire Academy courses and a National Guard Bureau’s National Interagency Counterdrug Institute course as evidence of a fragmented and possibly wasteful federal approach toward combating terrorism Similarly multiple programs with equipment segments—such as the separate DOD and PHS initiatives and the new Department of Justice equipment grant program—are causing frustration and confusion at the local level and are resulting in further complaints that the federal government is unfocused and has no coordinated plan or defined end state for domestic preparedness 12 The DOD and PHS equipment segments of the Domestic Preparedness Program which were designed and implemented separately overlap as both include personal protection decontamination and detection equipment The separation of the DOD equipment and where applicable the PHS equipment supplies and pharmaceuticals required local officials to develop separate equipment lists and to ensure compatibility and interoperability of the equipment optimize the available federal funding and avoid unnecessary duplication This was particularly important because the two equipment initiatives overlap According to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict DOD intentionally separated the two equipment 11 DOD did include local representatives in discussion groups used to help establish training objectives 12 In Combating Terrorism Observations on Crosscutting Issues GAO T-NSIAD-98-164 Apr 23 1998 and Combating Terrorism Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program GAO T-NSIAD-99-16 Oct 2 1998 we testified before the Subcommittee on National Security International Affairs and Criminal Justice House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight on the growing number of players in the counterterrorism arena and the need for improved interagency coordination Also in Combating Terrorism Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination GAO NSIAD-98-39 Dec 1 1997 we recommended that governmentwide priorities for terrorism-related spending be established and that resources be allocated based on the established priorities and assessments of the threat and risk of terrorist attack Page 20 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 segments of the program A joint coordinated equipment program could have alleviated the administrative burden on city officials and lowered the level of confusion and frustration Although PHS circulated cities’ proposed equipment lists among the Domestic Preparedness Program’s interagency partners for comments this coordination at the federal level did little to simplify the process for the cities The separation of the two equipment packages also required local officials to deal with two federal agencies’ differing requirements and procedures Since the PHS equipment program is offered through a contract with unmatched federal funds the cities had to meet certain requirements including the development of a concept of operations plan for MMSTs to fit into the local area’s overall medical response system The DOD equipment loan program required a different process Other equipment initiatives such as a new Department of Justice equipment grant program may add to the local governments’ perception of an unfocused federal strategy State and local officials and some national firefighter organizations also raised concerns about the growing number of federal response elements being formed including the new initiative to train and equip National Guard units for a WMD response role These officials did not believe specialized National Guard units would be of use because they could not be on site in the initial hours of an incident and numerous other military and federal agency support units can already provide assistance to local authorities as requested These units include the Army’s Technical Escort Unit the Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological Incident Response Force and the PHS’ National Medical Response Teams 13 State and local officials were more supportive of the traditional National Guard role in providing requested disaster support through the state governor We are currently reviewing the proposed role of the National Guard and reserves in WMD consequence management As noted in our December 1997 report and in our April 1998 and October 1998 testimonies the many and increasing number of participants programs and activities in the counterterrorism area across the federal departments agencies and offices pose a difficult management and coordination challenge to avoid duplication fragmentation and gaps Recent interagency coordination initiatives to deal with the increasing number of consequence management training and equipment programs are underway both within and outside the National Security Council A key 13 For a more comprehensive overview of federal support capabilities see Combating Terrorism Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy GAO NSIAD-97-254 Sept 26 1997 Page 21 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 proposal involves the transfer of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program to the Department of Justice We did not examine the effectiveness of these coordination efforts or the details of the proposed transfer of the program to the Department of Justice Conclusions Because DOD has trained only about one-third of the program cities and the FBI and the intelligence community conclude that conventional weapons will be terrorists’ weapons of choice for the next decade there is adequate time to refocus the Domestic Preparedness Program and to conduct the threat and risk assessments recommended in our April 1998 report DOD or any subsequent lead agency could improve the efficiency economy and effectiveness of the Domestic Preparedness Program if it consolidated training on a more regional basis particularly where it will reinforce existing state mutual aid and other similar multijurisdictional emergency response structures The program could also benefit from involvement of the states particularly where state or regional training structures are in place and could be leveraged to provide first responder training Additionally the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislative language providing for the loan of equipment could allow for greater flexibility given the issues arising from the equipment segment of DOD’s Domestic Preparedness Program and the practical difficulty of implementing DOD’s loan agreements Moreover the many federal WMD consequence management training equipment and response initiatives could benefit from a coordinated integrated approach with a defined end state Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense—or the head of any subsequent lead agency—in consultation with the other five cooperating agencies in the Domestic Preparedness Program refocus the program to more efficiently and economically deliver training to local communities We also recommend that the Secretary or the head of any subsequent lead agency use existing state and local emergency management response systems or arrangements to select locations and training structures to deliver courses and consider the geographical proximity of program cities We recommend that the National Coordinator for Security Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism actively review and guide the growing number of WMD consequence management training and equipment programs and response elements to ensure that agencies’ separate efforts leverage existing state and local emergency management systems and are Page 22 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 coordinated unduplicated and focused toward achieving a clearly defined end state Matter for Congressional Consideration Congress may wish to amend the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation to provide DOD or any subsequent lead agency greater flexibility in the conditions under which it provides the $300 000 worth of equipment to local jurisdictions That is the legislation could be amended to allow DOD or any subsequent lead agency to provide equipment to local jurisdictions on such terms and under conditions that it deems appropriate Agency Comments and Our Evaluation DOD the Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services and FEMA provided written comments on a draft of this report DOD did not agree with our recommendation to refocus the Domestic Preparedness Program or that Congress should consider amending the program’s legislation to allow greater flexibility on the provision of equipment to local jurisdictions It also provided specific comments on our findings related to threat and risk assessments Justice generally agreed with the substance of our report but did not comment specifically on our recommendation to refocus the program FEMA noted that our report provided an in-depth examination of the program Health and Human Services and FEMA provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate The comments of these four agencies and our evaluation of them appear in appendixes VI to IX We also provided a draft of this report to the Department of Energy the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Security Council and they did not provide comments stated that we suggest a regional approach to domestic preparedness but that such an approach is not efficient because the command and control structure is more difficult to define and is less able to control first responder training resources within multi-entity jurisdictions DOD also stated that it is better to have redundant coverage than to wait until regional first responders can reach the scene of the incident—the bureaucratic process at the city level is such that each city would likely exhaust its integral resources before calling on regional actors for support DOD Our report discusses gains in efficiency and effectiveness in delivering training that could occur if DOD or a succeeding lead agency were to take advantage of and reinforce the existing emergency response and training structures at the local and state levels Our evaluation showed that local jurisdictions states and federal agencies are already linked through Page 23 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 long-standing emergency response plans and structures with defined command and control systems A number of localities respond to or receive back-up support for emergencies through well-established county or regional response structures and through mutual aid arrangements Under a more consolidated approach to the training emergency response personnel from nearby cities who might be called upon to assist one another could receive program training together in one location rather than in separate training sessions Further DOD stated that critical to the goal of helping municipalities establish their own emergency response programs is the ability to interface with a single entity authorized to direct appropriate and competent first responder trainers to attend the instruction Regarding DOD’s goal of helping municipalities establish their own emergency response programs we note that the legislation authorized support to improve state and local emergency response agencies’ capabilities and did not mandate that municipalities receive assistance to establish their own emergency response programs Regarding the selection of training participants a consolidated approach to delivering training would not prevent participating jurisdictions from selecting appropriate and competent personnel to attend the training sessions Conversely DOD’s city-by-city approach does not guarantee that the most appropriate personnel receive the DOD training Some program cities we visited filled their training slots on the basis of who was available rather than the training qualifications of participants also commented that redesigning the program would negatively impact cities’ readiness because cities scheduled to receive training in fiscal year 1999 have already begun to prepare We do not believe that refocusing the program to use existing emergency response and training structures or to train nearby cities together would materially delay program completion or harm cities’ readiness First the cities we visited did not spend lengthy periods in advance of the training to identify training venues or participants Second under the approach we recommend nearby program cities currently in clusters could receive training earlier if appropriate The efficiencies gained should compensate for any time spent to reconfigure the program This approach should enhance readiness Also if existing state emergency management training structures were used the training could be institutionalized statewide and ensure the training is sustained over the longer term DOD Page 24 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 noted that conducting threat and risk assessments would negatively affect cities’ readiness However as discussed in our April 1998 report it would take only about 2 weeks per city to conduct a threat and risk assessment and determine a prudent and affordable level of response capability DOD further said that sufficient data is not available to conduct threat and risk assessments there is no credible pre-attack predictor and the FBI has not identified a specific WMD threat As discussed in our April 1998 report perfect intelligence data or pre-attack predictors are not needed to perform a sound qualitative threat and risk assessment although threat information would be one factor to consider Our prior report showed that a multidisciplinary risk assessment team would use the best available intelligence information to generate valid scenarios to perform the risk assessment process DOD also stated that the threat and risk methodology described in the report is intended for point targets with controlled perimeters and internal traffic not for area targets such as cities with virtually no control over entry exit or internal traffic The model highlighted in our April 1998 report has diverse applications and is not limited to point defense applications Additionally the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection recommended that threat and risk assessments be performed on such nonpoint targets as the telecommunications and banking and finance infrastructures A rational businesslike collaborative assessment by city state and federal representatives can help determine the appropriate minimum requirements for preparedness given the threats risks and vulnerabilities for that city In our view such assessments are conducive to preparedness and awareness Assessments can enhance preparedness by helping decisionmakers prioritize and target investments of federal and local resources Moreover in nearly every city we visited local officials told us they would welcome such an assessment because they currently have no sound basis for determining their requirements DOD stated that it does not recommend that Congress amend the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation to provide greater flexibility for providing equipment to local jurisdictions as it intends to transfer the program lead to another agency—the Department of Justice—as soon as possible As stated in our report DOD’s equipment loan agreement terms have caused frustration and confusion among local officials As a practical matter because the loan agreement terms are not likely to be fully implemented we question the benefits of using this type of instrument for providing equipment Regardless of which agency leads the program to DOD Page 25 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 completion the program would benefit from a more practical less confusing arrangement for providing equipment to local jurisdictions Scope and Methodology We reviewed the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation to determine the Domestic Preparedness Program’s objectives and we discussed program design coordination and implementation with—and obtained documents from—several Department of Defense organizations including the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict the U S Army Director of Military Support and the U S Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command We discussed the same topics with headquarters and many regional officials of the Federal Emergency Management Agency the Federal Bureau of Investigation the Public Health Service the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Energy and also with the International Association of Fire Chiefs the International Association of Fire Fighters the National Volunteer Fire Council and the International Association of Chiefs of Police We interviewed and obtained documents regarding the Domestic Preparedness Program including MMSTs from local officials of emergency management agencies fire departments law enforcement agencies and health departments in New York New York Los Angeles California Denver Colorado Seattle Washington Honolulu Hawaii Columbus Ohio and Washington D C We also interviewed state emergency management officials for most of these locations and obtained information on their organizations for emergency planning and response We observed domestic preparedness training and examined equipment in Philadelphia Pennsylvania and discussed MMSTs with the Arlington County Virginia fire department We discussed related initiatives with the Department of Justice We analyzed Domestic Preparedness Program city clusters based on city center to city center mileage calculations and we based our analysis of population coverage on 1990 census data revised in 1994-95 We also obtained information on and examined and analyzed in the context of program city clusters state and local emergency response and training systems and structures in California Colorado the District of Columbia Hawaii Ohio Texas Virginia and Washington We did not analyze and compare the content of program training courses with other agencies’ terrorism-related courses to evaluate the extent of commonality nor did we fully evaluate other program initiatives to assist cities by providing Page 26 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism B-278556 equipment or training While we obtained information about PHS’ MMST program we did not evaluate its implementation We conducted our work from October 1997 to August 1998 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards As agreed with your offices unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier we plan no further distribution of this report until 5 days after its issue date At that time we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees the Secretaries of Defense Energy Health and Human Services and Justice the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Directors of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Office of Management and Budget We will make copies available to other interested parties upon request If you have any questions about this report please contact me at 202 512-3504 Major contributors to this report were Davi M D’Agostino Richard A McGeary Marc J Schwartz and Madelon B Savaides Richard Davis Director National Security Analysis Page 27 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Contents Letter 1 Appendix I DOD Domestic Preparedness Program Costs by Fiscal Year 32 Appendix II DOD Contractor Costs Fiscal Year 1997 33 Appendix III DOD Contractor Costs Fiscal Year 1998 34 Appedix IV DOD Equipment Categories and Suggested Items 35 Appendix V Metropolitan Medical Strike Team Equipment Categories 36 Page 28 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Contents Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Defense 37 Appendix VII Comments From the Department of Justice 41 Appendix VIII Comments From the Department of Health and Human Services 42 Appendix IX Comments From the Federal Emergency Management Agency 47 Related GAO Products 51 Tables Table 1 U S Population Covered Based on Size of Area Selected Table 2 Areas Needed to Cover 22 Percent of the U S Population by Type of Area 9 9 Figures Figure 1 Cities Selected for Domestic Preparedness Program Figure 2 Clustering of Cities Selected for Domestic Preparedness Program Figure 3 Program Cities Within 30 Miles of Another Program City Figure 4 California’s Mutual Aid Regions Figure 5 Virginia’s Regional Hazardous Materials Response Teams 7 10 Page 29 13 15 16 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Contents Abbreviations DOD CBDCOM FBI FEMA MMST PHS WMD Page 30 Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Command Federal Bureau of Investigation Federal Emergency Management Agency Metropolitan Medical Strike Team Public Health Service weapons of mass destruction GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Page 31 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix I DOD Domestic Preparedness Program Costs by Fiscal Year Dollars in millions Program category 1997 actual 1998 projected 1999 estimated Emergency response preparedness Assessment training development training $9 5 $7 9 $8 6 Hot line help line database 2 8 3 8 3 2 Technical support 0 2 0 4 0 5 Equipment testing 0 9 1 9 1 2 Equipment 5 1 12 1 11 0 Training exercises 1 4 4 4 4 4 Response improvement testing and exercise 4 0 3 7 9 2 Major exercise 2 4 1 5 1 5 C B-RRTa support 1 0 0 8 0 8 C B-RRTa equipment 5 5 2 0 5 1 Training 0 0 0 2 0 2 Program management 3 2 4 5 4 1 $36 0 $43 1 $49 8 Exercises and preparedness testing Chemical biological response Total a Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team Source Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Page 32 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix II DOD Contractor Costs Fiscal Year 1997 Contractor Fiscal year 1997 awarda Percentage of fiscal year 1997 total Booz-Allen Hamilton $12 554 500 59 7 Equipment packages training support and preparation program management integration and support hot line concept help line web page database Response Planning Inc 2 769 300 13 2 Exercise support Science Applications International Corporation 1 495 300 7 1 Medical training support Battelle Main purposes 1 404 700 6 7 Technical and program support training assessment Sonalyst 833 100 4 0 Training videos Innovative Emergency Management 799 000 3 8 Hot line setup operations and equipment database EA Procurement 485 200 2 3 Personal protection equipment for testing GEO Centers 298 100 1 4 Response communications study 374 500 1 8 Hardware storage containers $21 013 700 100 0 Others 4 Total Program management expert assistance training exercises chemical biological response a Includes subcontractor costs For example EAI Corporation is a subcontractor of Booz-Allen Hamilton for equipment packages Source U S Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command Page 33 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix III DOD Contractor Costs Fiscal Year 1998 Fiscal year 1998 awarda Percentage of fiscal year 1998 total $16 811 850 58 0 Equipment packages training support program management help line database workshops Response Planning Inc 5 817 683 20 1 Exercise support response improvement support Science Applications International Corporation 2 992 148 10 3 Medical training support Battelle Contractor Booz-Allen Hamilton Examples of purposes 1 069 708 3 7 Response improvement support training assessment Innovative Emergency Management 999 948 3 4 Hot line operation GEO Centers 521 757 1 8 Equipment testing response improvement support rapid response team support SoBran 335 000 1 2 Multimedia development 442 849 1 5 Information technology cell phones assessment support $28 990 943 100 0 b Others 4 Total Program management expert assistance training exercises chemical biological response Note Projected contractor costs for fiscal year 1999 total $29 796 551 but contractors have not yet been selected Costs are expected to include equipment packages for cities training support hot line operation exercises multimedia development and program management a Includes subcontractor costs For example EAI Corporation is a subcontractor of Booz-Allen Hamilton for equipment packages b Also includes contractors who provided materials for equipment testing Source U S Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command Page 34 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appedix IV DOD Equipment Categories and Suggested Items Personal Protection Fully encapsulated chemical suits with boots and gloves level A maximum protection Chemical suits with boots and gloves level B medium protection Self-contained breathing apparatus Disposable decontamination suits Detection M256A1 chemical agent detector kit Chemical warfare agent detector kit and tubes Improved chemical agent detector Decontamination Portable shower kits Emergency shelter Sample collection equipment kits Training Aids M256A1 training detector kit M28 simulator detector tickets M29 simulator detector tickets Biological detection tickets M18A2 chemical detector kit M8 chemical agent detector paper M9 chemical agent detector paper Chemical warfare agent detector kit and tubes Mark I auto injector trainers Chemical agent monitor simulator Reference materials Course materials Page 35 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix V Metropolitan Medical Strike Team Equipment Categories Personal protection level A maximum protection for entry into contaminated zone and level C protection for decontamination operations Detection Decontamination Communications Ancillary equipment Antidotes and pharmaceuticals for 1 000 casualties Page 36 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Defense Note GAO’s comment supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix Page 37 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Defense See comment 1 Page 38 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Defense Page 39 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Defense The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Defense’s DOD letter dated October 2 1998 GAO Comment 1 We modified the text to reflect DOD’s comments as appropriate Page 40 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix VII Comments From the Department of Justice Page 41 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix VIII Comments From the Department of Health and Human Services Note GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix Page 42 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix VIII Comments From the Department of Health and Human Services See comment 1 See comment 2 See comment 3 See comment 2 See comment 4 See comment 5 See comment 6 Page 43 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix VIII Comments From the Department of Health and Human Services See comment 7 See comment 8 See comment 8 See comment 8 Page 44 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix VIII Comments From the Department of Health and Human Services The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Health and Human Services’ letter dated September 22 1998 GAO Comments 1 We disagree that the lack of valid intelligence depicting an actual threat prevents a threat and risk assessment The threat and risk process requires assumptions regarding a number of inputs and is not dependent on definitive intelligence on terrorists 2 This comment pertains to a matter discussed in the draft report that is not included in the final report 3 We acknowledge in the report that the Department seeks to develop health systems through the Metropolitan Medical Strike Team MMST program but there is also an equipment segment of the program that overlaps with the equipment segment of the DOD Domestic Preparedness Program The fact that the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici initiative contains two separate unintegrated federally funded equipment components has caused confusion and placed the full burden of coordination on local agencies 4 We agree that federal agencies should work with locally developed response structures and believe the report is consistent with this comment 5 Our report suggests that efficiencies can be gained by using and reinforcing existing response structures for domestic preparedness training or by otherwise consolidating training for nearby cities We believe that federally funded equipment should be allocated as best fits the state and local response structure The report does not suggest creating new regionalized response systems for a weapons of mass destruction WMD incident 6 Both the DOD and the Health and Human Services portions of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici initiative have equipment components Reference to National Medical Response Team equipment in the draft report was deleted in the final report 7 The report discusses the design and implementation of DOD’s training program We did not evaluate the integration of MMSTs into state and local response structures We do note however that the Public Health Service PHS plans to replicate MMSTs in all 120 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program Page 45 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix VIII Comments From the Department of Health and Human Services cities which is not clearly leveraging state and local emergency response structures 8 We modified the text to reflect the Health and Human Services’ comments as appropriate Page 46 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix IX Comments From the Federal Emergency Management Agency Note GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix Page 47 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix IX Comments From the Federal Emergency Management Agency Now on p 4 See comment 1 Now on pp 2 and 19 See comment 2 Now on p 3 See comment 3 Now on p 5 See comment 4 Now on p 8 See comment 5 Now on p 8 See comment 5 Now on pp 17 and 19 See comment 5 Now on p 17 See comment 5 Page 48 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix IX Comments From the Federal Emergency Management Agency Now on pp 8 and 22 See comment 6 Page 49 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Appendix IX Comments From the Federal Emergency Management Agency The following are GAO’s comments on the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s FEMA letter dated September 25 1998 GAO Comments 1 The legislation did not direct FEMA to establish a telephonic link The Chemical and Biological Defense Command CBDCOM established the hot line FEMA established the Rapid Response Information System 2 Reference to FEMA’s National Fire Academy and Emergency Management Institute is made on page 19 We did not review in detail federal training programs other than the Domestic Preparedness Program 3 We agree that an overarching strategy for consequence management training equipment and response initiatives should be developed with full consideration of legislative and statutory requirements 4 City and state officials commented on the newly established communications systems in general At the time of our review they had a limited understanding of the Rapid Response Information System and its intended use 5 We modified the text to reflect FEMA’s comment as appropriate 6 We accurately portrayed the intelligence community’s assessment of the WMD threat We did not suggest that the domestic preparedness effort be canceled or substantially delayed Page 50 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Related GAO Products Combating Terrorism Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program GAO T-NSIAD-99-16 Oct 2 1998 Combating Terrorism Observations on Crosscutting Issues GAO T-NSIAD-98-164 Apr 23 1998 Combating Terrorism Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments GAO NSIAD-98-74 Apr 9 1998 Combating Terrorism Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination GAO NSIAD-98-39 Dec 1 1997 Combating Terrorism Efforts to Protect U S Forces in Turkey and the Middle East GAO T-NSIAD-98-44 Oct 28 1997 Combating Terrorism Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy GAO NSIAD-97-254 Sept 26 1997 Combating Terrorism Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas GAO NSIAD-97-207 July 21 1997 Chemical Weapons Stockpile Changes Needed in the Management Structure of Emergency Preparedness Program GAO NSIAD-97-91 June 11 1997 State Department Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud GAO T-NSIAD-97-167 May 20 1997 Aviation Security FAA’s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices GAO RCED-97-111R May 1 1997 Aviation Security Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection Devices GAO RCED-97-119R Apr 24 1997 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking Responsibilities for Developing Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies GAO NSIAD-97-95 Apr 15 1997 Federal Law Enforcement Investigative Authority and Personnel at 13 Agencies GAO GGD-96-154 Sept 30 1996 Page 51 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Related GAO Products Aviation Security Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed GAO T-RCED NSIAD-96-151 Sept 11 1996 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics GAO NSIAD RCED-96-252 Sept 4 1996 Aviation Security Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security GAO T-RCED NSIAD-96-237 Aug 1 1996 Passports and Visas Status of Efforts to Reduce Fraud GAO NSIAD-96-99 May 9 1996 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking Threats and Roles of Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technology GAO NSIAD RCED-96-76BR Mar 27 1996 Nuclear Nonproliferation Status of U S Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States GAO NSIAD RCED-96-89 Mar 8 1996 Aviation Security Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International Challenges GAO RCED-94-38 Jan 27 1994 701125 Page 52 GAO NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism Ordering Information The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free Additional copies are $2 each Orders should be sent to the following address accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents when necessary VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted also Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent Orders by mail U S General Accounting Office P O Box 37050 Washington DC 20013 or visit Room 1100 700 4th St NW corner of 4th and G Sts NW U S General Accounting Office Washington DC Orders may also be placed by calling 202 512-6000 or by using fax number 202 512-6061 or TDD 202 512-2537 Each day GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30 days please call 202 512-6000 using a touchtone phone A recorded menu will provide 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