I • • i t · · y i · •J · · · ·· I • t 1 '' ' •·•t r· · 1 · · •• • SECRET SflllSftlVE · · 1 Nofom•N_p t i'ntract -orc on 1 1 j I · ·· 51 i · · l i '1 · • · • - ii '• · · • -•- ' r '- • · ' ' • ·· I · · ' · ··CBILB ·r IM 'LICATIONS OF 7EE LETELil R CAS l · ' ' _ _ _ '· · · i · · ·' Cent rd lP te l Ugeocc Agency National torcl gti Alf HRllt ' • t c · -- - ·- - - -- - _ _ _ 4 Nay 1978 l ey Judgncnt8 • Recent • di•closures in the inves tigo tic-n of the 11urder i of Orlando Lete lier Omer minister ·in the Allende 9ovem- ment and one-tir2c Ambassador to the US have raised the I posail ility that the critne lll be linked to the highest levels or the Chilean Covenuneont The acnaational 4evel opi ments bave evoked a eculation Uout President Pinochet's political survival · We b ll lcve that Pinochet· h•• a reason• ' able chance 0£ riding out the stor o ut if enough in· criminati ng evidence cotDCa to light hiS cuppo t fro the - military couldl Jegin to slip rapidly • I ' · · oov rnmcnt reaction to proof of J inochet •o or iplicity i - in -the t etolier slaying aight t ake one 0£ aeveral courses ' I -- An attempt to insti tute ll eove i ip4' with ehar es that the lJS la trying to destabili c t 'tc reg me ii ' I I• • Ii • ' i ' e££ort to eatablish a ocapegoat who wvuld draw £ire away fro the l'reaident -· l n l i ' 111urclcr but with the explanation that the action w• G juatified because I etelier was plotting against Pinochet •· A reco'1 '4tion that Pinochet in guilt f ollo·1ed · by a mliu cy decision to orce hi•• re oval An acknovledgaient of a coMeCtion vith the 1· ' I I · Pinochet would r ot be depoaed Wiles• di• ntent l Jeca lle widespread in tlle army and even theo only aCter uch souluearc 'li q by ita eadero There is no _ •a i lY identi£iable U ' ELLI HCE m OP l 'l U I • •• • i • • •' • • •' • •• • • · p AOVED FOR REL EASE ' ' · • ' i i · · AT E SEP 199 ii lii I J• ·•·' •' 1 • • ••• j •• •· 1 ·i ' EN lTIIIE ' '· l2__ J St i Sl'J IV l -✓ ' ' i · · ' · ' ' • ' j • I•' •• ' · · ·1' '' l ' ''' ·' ' SE lVE ' ' • 'I I · n ' ' I i Pre•ident Auguoto Pinochet o ce• • otentielly crit- · j' I ical challenge to his cor tinUed leadershJ p e the complex Letelier u1sas 1Jination probe continue• to evolve Letelier• e ' ·1 l · ' '· · nureer in Washington rai6ed im u diate eharqea that Chilean intelligence agent vere b•hind the ineide11t Recent developments i ugge•ting that the death night be traced 1 1- - - - 1t o--hi 31rllh -l eon-cU-icialc-have caua d eho cl JtaY e '- · __- --- · j · 1 'santiago Oe•cribed by a junta member a•• Chilean 'W•tcr ate • the controver y threatens to engulf the Presi · · i I • 'dent along with intelligence 1111d 11ecurity o££iccra If ' 1· 1 -I · 'the president•• co1111 licity i• proved it would have 9rave I ' 'political implications ch ae triggering •ilitary de·I i • •11ands for inochet•s s cignation 1111d co pelling Chil •c f I j generals to find a succeccor · 1· · · ' j · l' · 1 I ' _ At present Pinochet etanda a reaaont' ble chance of 'holding his ground Although there ia gr unl ling a nong ai -level officers the amy doea not appear to be seri•oysly di sati££ied with the President fUld most military men ap r willing to accept bis claim that his •hands are elem Onl if 'the scandal eachcs considerable agnitude with 1ndi•putable evidence·o high-level con pira ey would there b A aW stantial Ghift o sentin- ent aaainst Pinochet As long a• the anii remain• behind him there is little chance of his being unseated over t i e past £our yeara th Chilean am ed force a have strived to preserve internal cohesion in the· face o dif£icult soci l and economic problem s ·and worldwide hostility So far dissent ha• b en limited to low-keyed critieis ·of recerit policy decisions -Military reluctance to move · againut 'Pinochet would be strengthened by f'earc of fac• tionalism end unsettling political and ccono ic repercu• aions · '' · '' ·'•' • - 1 · • · ' Clouding the outlook for Pinochet is the posalbility that - orioer intelligence chief c oneral mnuel Contreras will bo ' linked directly to the cri e Public diacloaurc of Contreras' quilt••either thr Ugh bis o m admittion·or· J in co 1%t •testimony -vould · almost certain to imJ licate Pinochet'and irreparably d age hi• credibility w thin _the ' Nilitary None of the government•• cr'itiea and £ev o its supporter• would be willing to ewallo cloia s that ' Contreraa ec ted without -preci Jential concurrence ·The • ' 'former secret police chief ia knovn to have repe rted di' • rectly to· - the President who· had exclusive responsibility for ·the o t'ga niza tion 1 £ ectivities some generals may al' ' %cady ·h u bor cuopiciona about Contreras• involv ent in · illegal operationa and probably gue tion Pinochet'• re··•ponsibilit y 'in the 111att er • ·· · ' · •• 3 I' SEC RF MENSITIVE •· • SECR T lVE · l ii I • I • • 1 l •· · ' • ·t Contrera a will be the key to how' the t etelier ·ca e - • ' I punrolde •lt- io problematical whether he will be prepared 1' ·• i • to toll ·aout the darl eide of the regi11e•a activity i£ · · · the ·investi9ation surfaces 'i 1£ornatio11 authenticating· · · · • 1 PINA collusion in plotting Letelier• s murder Put · · • • ·· f loyalty to rinoche1' i • · no g aranue that Contreras woul d • · ' ·• witbhold censitive detoila on operation• authori cd by · ' · '-· 1 ee treiide11t u 1Jllly if he thoyg_ e i lere bein tagged ae a ocape9oat 1£ Pi noche1' declared pul c y · - 1 that Contreres hod lied t o him the general--who ba11 noY · 11 · · ··reeigned ror the army--might believe that -h e bas l i tUe 1 •- ••to loee t y divulging clocely held o tate eecreta Sensa• - • 1 tional disclosure• ellltarrascing to l'inochet could rapidly ·· i · ••ke Ilia poaition ununBl le l'inochet might trY to buy 1 • Cont re a •' silence by _promi ing eo1' e sort 0£ irmnunity o r · arranging hi• departure £ron the country Contrera• i• · not likely to atte q t to sbi£t tho blall e tci lower echelon ·- '- l DI NA minions Another aspect of the c se that could e detrimental to l'inochet is the tie that 1- as been made t l blicly betveen •' lI the Letelier assassination and the o linilar death o General Carlo• Prata- Allende'• ar ny commander--in an un•olved cor bombing in Buenos irea in September 1974 ' ' hie and the attempted ahooting of exiled Chriat ian OCJD· Toeratic Party leader Bernardo Leighton in RoDle in 1975 I have provoked speculation about possible p attc%n of ' I e ssase i D tiona Opposition elements have accused DINA ·· o masu mlnding all threo operat iona Prat• allegedly ·· was about to publiab • book vilifying the role of Pinochet 'i n overturning a conotitutional govemrncnt some · 'have charged that Pre ts w s also actively i n v o 1 v e • 1 ·Chilean exile a c onspiring against Pinochet ta any case • · any di sclosure tha1' l'inochet authorized the death of e -1 former amy COfll Dander v ould create serious doubts within · ·t1te o ilit 4ry about the President'• co petellC4' and judgl 1 1 ·ment Irrespective 0£ conflicting attitudes within Ule 1 • • amed force• about Prat•' role in ct llbl ornLy oppocing •• 1 1 I intervention in 197S maey 111ilitacy vffice • ' IOUld suspect •· · • I ·· _C ontreras of orderintt the killin · and rould nave diffi I i I · wlty co mtenaneing the idea of DINA conniving to bring I about the death 0£ a fellov officer i I l I' i • ' I I ' '' Details oC th Letelier slaying and other alle1ations 0£ DlWI misdeed• may un old elwl y 1 but the C1 1mulat1ve effect could be to place l'inochet 111 an extremely vulnerable position In the event of a full-blown ocandol the r aceion could take one of several Corms ' r I '' ' ' ' I l The yovern ent could re1ist pressure to fe ret out new leads and attempt to cover up pocui• · ble involvement It i9ht al10 counter by oeeuoing the us covenwent e£ inot l gat1n9 en anti-Chilean campaign to deatobilize tl e re9111e soir e hardline I general• already harbor qualm• al out finochet' co• ' l - - - - op e r ation in illegally handing over Michael TOWlll y · u th -preo 1llabll'-v U-oe opposed ti furthel' 'i conceasiona that 11i9ht C0111pro ui10 the goveni nent • rua course would ri•k additional damage t o relations • with tho us but it might Cind aubsuntiC'll backing I ' j in Yiew 0£ the poor prcBJ ectc for an· early ir prove• · SDCnt in any c • ae · · I • •• • • 2 Pinochet llight decide to shift the blame • some DINA o££ieiala arguing that tl e e ceasee rred vitbaut hi• ·kllowledge P e could buttre•• · this line by• 11oting that DINA VAS abol 1•hed laot year and that a ceriec ·or reform• had been inotitut d to qullrd ll9ainst further illeg4l1t1eo l r 'one ac _cused ·of criminal actions vould prea1111a1 l-y be tried •under Chilean legal procedures rather than extradited but ev n tbis IOi gbt expc ae the •9overnment to dal11a9 • ·· illg revelations EVen 1if the public ere to accept ' · l Pinochet I s profes£iona · 0£ hie ovn innocence there i i• the ·chance that a· scapegoat would not cooperate ' and 1tould clivulge ·in oniation harmrul to the Preci dent and some of his-cloce adrlsera Thie couroe ' would -also ·hei•g hten the chance• or 11111t ary di•• ' unity some elements lll gt t wo ey about their ovn I ' • ' ' i i necuf'othera would find it rej i et en•ible for their • · '· - su eriora to try to · eacape reapon ibilit for seri• i 1 · oua offen• ea · · j · • ' I 71 I I to r ' i · j ·· · • 'I · ' I ' • I ' I I I I I I 'I 'I '' I · J - · · · 1 3 IC confronted 1tith · ·i ·denee the·-11oven1111e111 19ht incontrovertible evi• face the isau directly b acknovledgiJ g a c nnection with the ••••••ina• ' t1on but y to vindicate i to elf by contendin 1 that i etelier va• ·conspiring- agninat Pinoch•t 'flus woulC be a desperate pitch to tally domestic oupport against · • an l JUoat certain outburst of indignati on in tbe us and othor countries More i IJ ortant lt ie doubtCul Wbether the Chilean Anlly or public vould accept the 1 tory leavillg Pinochet o ut on a lilnb and sub• ject to groving do eiltic censure · ' In the nost d1££ieu1t· circuir tal co• the am d forces might recognize ¢e culpability o the preoent leadership and attempt_ to force Pinochat•• 4 0 SEC IYE --- ' • · l- r · j f ' ' t ·t ' i · • ' ·_ ·· h · i i• •l · I 1 l ' ' ' '' -- I • J ' J I j ' oueter Pinochet is a etubboria conny individual however vith a sluu p instinct tor survival lie can _be oxpeetcd to play oft one group againat another jCO pr tect hi11• elf and to e ploy deftly the asset• ·o hi• authoritarian regi11e security o ficiale 'Chary of opening tho door to a ide-ranging invest • gation of alleged regime 11ladee4 4'14 illegal abuoea ·aince the 1973 COl PJ_ i11ld be CAlUllJ 4 llP OJ J CUlUl ·- -- - -- i -tl lnochet but again the potential or an in ternal milita y eehi•• would be high Pinoc het•s roaoval in icgrace ould unde%cut the o al author• ity of the anned £ore••· Jt wolll d most likely co • 1 1 moti e them ttt t ony ne W ta leader would be c ompelled to ac-celerate plans for a return to civil• ian over ent The ilitary•s efforta would be turned to salvaging what dignity it could £rom a h 'iliating plight and exonera t ing the honor of the inctitution 1£ possil le • ___ _ i I • • Pi• ochet'• l U ter vo lld requir e Ch ile•s au te re ·9enerala to svallow a large easu re of pride it would not be an eaey task f'or the a and would require 1u1 11uch Goul•aea rching aa tJ e deeiaion to intervene against Allende Moreover ahould tbe ARIY ove to replae the President there i no obvious auecesGor in he winga %he chaiec would be c temined in large part by how badly the mili• ta ry was tainted by the scandol Jf Fi ochet 4nd other senior of£ic 1ale were judged lllilty preaaures would grow to inatall a •re mOderatc off icer Public opposition to Pinochet haa not been formidable and indeed heap• pears to enjoy aul atantial BUPP Ort a uong the populace but criti iaa o hie palicie• could pro opt sentiment for a change · · ' Navy junta 'ember Ad liral t1erino la nominally next in line Cor the presidency -but he is not likely to uc ceed becauae 0£ tbe pre-eminence 0£ the amy • Air- force chief and junta me Ober General Leigh l• Ulbltiou• but his chance are -likeui•e not rated hi e ia a aaverick ho hae openly aired hi• disa9reements with Pinochet but apparent ly ' h•• no clear politieel pr09raio and little real following While the n c oy 11ight feel the brunt 0£ criticicftl in the -event of •l'inochet•s do m£all we bel1eve·that it would •till be able to retain the presidency The othor aezvicea are likely to come under ao c Cira for their own ol • in abuaea that occurred after the coup The p lblic uproar liltely to occur if Finochet•s ·complicity becu e expli it wo ld be likely ' to reinforce 1 illta y attClllpU to 11aintain collegial unity and to ork out an acceptable auceeccion omula ' - - ·sE7 •lTll E · ' • ' ' f • · ·Pinochet hao edged aside - oot o the potential contenders for hi• job within the an y The high co1M1ond · would probably tum to a moderatAt active dcty general not too clo1ely linked to P1nocJ et Corps COll Olonder · Ceneral Nilo Pl oody and the 11iUt cy rector o the Ur i• • veroity of Chile General Agustin Toro Davila have been i · a ent iontd among the potential front runnero altho gh - - -j--- -- ' · e d42a ear• open to other• •• well ' t tll o the e llen re eet · con atl i -nta-c• the en • forces they are vell di1po1ed tovard the us and Ceneral J ' j ' '• · d 1 r erved • • n c r o11 ton rubiaa chief o e clential suf£ u hio hoir ap parent · · eavarrubiae as little aeniority however and hic no i in•tion vo ld-by custoest-• force the retire ent af a nwnber 0£ senior 9ener ls Moreover 'While Covarrubia• ie respected in some circles for hi• abilities ' · he · ia ·alao looked upon with ouop icio by s enior o ficers · because oI his close tiea to aim Guzman en influential ycung civili an adviser to the Precident and tlle ideologic l spokesman £or the corporatist guild •ovemcnt that has st unchly backed the r ulitacy regi-e They diGtruat Guzaan because 0£ his role in persuading Pinochet to adopt recent liborali ing neasureG In Santi•90 1 · e Pres dent WAI cons favor of covar rubia• e n9 re aqu 11 o We beliave Pinochet l a float- ing thio idea in order to -int imidate ailita ry leaders •I I crit ical of bio handl ing of the Letelicr c ase The Chilean leader 'l Y also be trying to uoe the threat of a Covan ubiao presidency to penu•d• Contrcrae - not to reveal nything incriminating •incc Contreras strongly resents COv rnbias whcft he blaaes for forcin9 hie re•ignation froz the aJ IIY after widely pw lici •d charges that Contretaa had a hand in t he -Le elier AUrder If Pinochet f llo the present junta vould probah ly Military l derc might be forced to atep aside alao hope that a complete cha nqe o f c ea would 91ve the gov- erruaerit • fresh at«rt in iaproving i ts in age A new president would pi obably emphasize the int•ri• ru ture of iulitary rule and prondse t o advance the proce•• of reconstituting democratic inatitutions Thie is by no mean a certain hov-eve r becaui e of the authoritarian leanings many offi cers Military foctions vith strong of na tionalist inclination• might chafe at appearin to crumble W'Lder outside pressuce for a rapid transition to civilian governmen · SEC IVB ' • • SE EKSITlVE ' 1• • Residual oppoaition vithin the military to advanc• ing the timetabl e woul d prubal lY be offaet bY the wide• oprcad popular demand• likely w emerge once the floodgates were opened by Pinochet'a dcpartu r These pres• sure• would be hard for a t ew junta to i9 ore especially if iU president were a moderate Critics of the military gove ent such aa t he Chri•tian Deftoeratic Party••tb• I ' f · - 'i- --i-- oJ mtry' s la r geat••would aeek • political opening per · j hapo offerln17· to cooperate in ret R f J -t • -• o n - - - - tinued aovement toward a •horter period of nllitary tute• la9e Other 9roupe•••uch aa democratic lal or organi a• tions•••ight al so find a post-Pinochet atn osphere 111ore conducive to inereaaiif9 their prescure for broader lib- • I •' I ' eralization Greater civilian participation in govern• 1 1ent ol9ht be one im111ediate apino££ of a c latt9eover as the armed £orcea oved to placat a puhlic anxiouo for their retum to the barracks and impat1en or full re• instatement a the political liberties traditionally enjoyed in Chile I ' - ' • ' '' ' • •• I ' ' ' 8 SECRE'I $1TlVE