SECRE ---- DRAFT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV Dear Mr General Secret ary Since our meetings in Reykjavik I have given considerable thought to the issues we discussed and to the future of the U S -Soviet relationship I think it is clear that we made substantial progress in bridging our positions on a number of important issues I hope that you will agree with me that our task now is to proceed from the basis we reached in Reykjavik and press on to find solutions acceptable to both of us £or the problems which remain What strikes me most as I review our discussions in Iceland is the way we succeeded in focusing on practical steps to reduce nuclear weapons radically and to move toward a world totally free of them We of course had agreed previously on these objectives in general But I have the feeling that our meetings in Hofdi House were qualitatively different from earlier discussions in that for the first time we began to agree on concrete and practical steps to move us toward these goals ' Though details remain for our negotiators to work out it seems to me that we now are essentially in agreement on the basic elements of a treaty to reduce longer-range intermediate-range nuclear missiles to an interim global ceiling of 100 warheads on each side to be located outside of Europe We also seem very close to agreeing on the basic elements of a treaty to reduce strategic weapons by fifty percent in five years In this instance the question of sublimits remains an unresolved issue However since you have proposed deep cuts in your heavy missiles and a 50% cut in each leg of the triad of nuclear forces -- both of which proposals imply the existence of sublimits -- our negotiators should be able to work out precise figures which are mutually cceptable if we authorize them to ·d ea1 with the question in a constructive way We also have _ agreed on the approach to negotiations on nuclear testing In sum so far as three 0£ the four key nuclear-related areas are concerned w e should be able to bridge the r emaining -differences rapidly if we approach the questions with the proper political will l In the fourth area that of defensive and space weapons we also made substantial progress in particular by agreeing that there could be under appropriate circumstances a mutual commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years Still some major points remain at issue and we should lose no time in seeking to resolve them In this connection I hope you recognize that my proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles by 1996 was made among other reasons to accommodate the concerns you expressed to me in DECLASSIFIED -SECRE'J ' SENS I Tl vE 7 fde- q £ Y Jh r t_ C NARADAiE 11 71 tlf NLRR SECRE'I' - S IT IVE - 2- Geneva about the danger that strategic defenses could be used a s part of an offensive first-strike strategy Obviously if we eliminate our ballistic missiles before deploying advanced strategic defenses such a strategy would he impossible You are of course aware that my proposal has been questioned by some American Allies and even by some of my own specialists as too forthcoming In fact it would require the elimination of some of the most advanced weapon systems in the American arsenal However this is a step which I am prepared to take in the interest of genuine and radical arms reduction Therefore my proposal remains on the table and I believe that you will see after analysis and reflection that acceptance of it would contribute to the security of both our countries As I told you at Reykjavik and earlier I endorse the goal of ultimately eliminating all nuclear weapons It is important for us not only to keep this goal in the public eye but to develop a practical strategy for moving toward it This is why I welcomed your comprehensive proposal in January However I believe we must recognize that our ability to eliminate nuclear weapons will depend not only on steps to reduce nuclear weapons as such but also on creation of an overall international security environment which makes nuclear weapons unnecessary A reasonable conventional arms balance the absence of threatening international behavior including of course the aggressive use of conventional arms the existence of trust based on openness and demonstrated willingness to settle disputes peacefully and the development of ¤ffective non-nuclear defenses will all be essential elements of a world in which nuclear weapons can be eliminated This is why I have made so many proposals to deal with these matters -- and it is why I will continue to do so _ Neverthele ss 1 we both must recogni·z e thaf progres s has be e n ver y slow and in some important areas there has been no ne at all For examp1 e I see no sign that the Soviet Union is making any genuip e _practic al moves to end its olonial war i--n Af hanist·an ' In mentioning this my purpose is not to revive at our debate on Afghanistan and other regionai conflicts Rather it is to explain why I believe we must find ways_ to take the first steps toward nuclear arms reduction without attempting to settle all the key issues between our countries at once If we try to do everything at once we will probably find that we are able to do nothing As we both have noted history expects and deserves better of us Of course either of us can condition our proposals any way we wish From the American point of view it greatly complicates the conclusion of major arms reduction agreements while Soviet forces are still fighting in Afghanistan while families remain divided despite commitments made in Helsinki as far back as 1975 SEC - 3- and while the Soviet Union is constructing a large phased-array radar forbidden by the 1972 ABM Treaty Nevertheless important as it is to resolve all these and many other issues eventually the United States has tried to minimize rigid linkages in the arms reduction area because of its commitment to rapid progress in reducing the levels of nuclear arms I£ the Soviet leadership approached these questions with the same constructive attitude then I believe that we would have grounds for substantial optimism since we seem so close to agreement on some of the most important nuclear weapons issues Concluding agreements in these areas would unquestionably provide momentum for settling other issues I assumed that this was · precisely what you meant to do when you suggested in your letter dated September 15 that we meet to work out instructions for negotiation of two or three draft agreements Well as I have mentioned we did reach substantial agreement on three of the four topics we discussed most intensively But what are we hearing now from the Soviet side That everything discussed in Iceland has suddenly become an indivisible package Mr General Secretary I do not dispute your right to change your position anytime you wish Nor do I dispute that it is highly desirable to resolve as many contentious issues in U S -Soviet relations as we can However I must be frank to say that your apparent reversal of one of the achievements in our negotiations at Geneva -- when we agreed that some arms reduction steps would be possible on an interim basis before we had settled all the nuclear issues -- is not designed to hasten the day when we can begin the substantial reduction of nuclear weapons whi h we have promised our peoples _ In additfon to this apparent change n your approacn also noted a disturbing tendency in recent weeks for some- Soviet spokesmen to - genigrate the importance of what we achieved in Iceland nd to present aspects of our meeting in terms which a n objecti e observer can only regard as bizarre For example have · been accused -Of coming with empty pockets to the meeting you proposed -- when the record shows that I made very substantial concessions in each of the negotiating areas Frankly this comment reminds me of someone who invites a friend to dinner and then complains that the friend brought no more than half the dinner with him The shifting approaches and distorted comments that we have been hearing from some Soviet officials are not encouraging since they place in question the seriousness of the Soviet leadership's commitment to lowering the levels of arms and - 4improving relations with the United States on the basis of parity and reciprocity I hope that these discouraging signs are the result of transitory factors in the Soviet Union and that you will soon be in a position to join me in efforts to bridge the remaining gaps in our respective positions For nothing that has _happened since our meetings in Reykjavik has shaken my judgment that we both can be proud of what we achieved and that we should continue the process precisely from the point we reached in Iceland Whenever you are willing to join me in this effort you will find me ready to press ahead I look forward to any comment or further suggestions you may have on these matters With personal regards Sincerely S SENSITIVE t · l • • -r J _ _ _ _ - ' SECR ITlVE EYES ONLY NOTIONAL PLAN FOR ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS Three phases lasting minimum of 5 years each but o f a sufficient duration to achieve the objectives of each Second and third phases are likely 'to take longer than five years since they will require basic changes in Soviet habits and practices Nevertheless if plan is issued public position is that i t could be done by the Year 2000 if we start now and keep up momentum Phase One 50% reduction of strategic nuclear weapons INF reduced to 100 warheads world-wide Reykjavik formula Agreement to reduce SRINF following conclusion of INF agreement Verifiable CW ban BW verification regime Expanded CBM's Compliance with all agreements to satisfaction of both parties Reduction of superpower military involvement in regional conflicts including withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan Eff_J ctive international actions against terr orism i ncluding quarantine of states sponsoring_ terrorism an d of groups committed to it and ban on military supplies or military training to such countries and grou_p s Agreement on verification measures to limited nuclear testing further limitations on testing as nuclear weapons a re reduced Tightened non-proliferation regime Substantial improvements in citizen-to-citizen contacts and the flow of information across national boundaries end to all radio jamming and increased facilities for sale of foreign publications MBFR ·agreement to establish verification measures during time-limited freeze or other significant agreements to reduce conventional forces in Europe DECLASSIFIED NLRR BY A Fote 11 ti fs rl- fl 4 1 NARADATE 11 lll 'J- §ECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY - 2 - Phase Two Further reductions on conventional weapons world wide Agreed veri£iable limits on use of military force outside national boundaries Termination of direct or indirect superpower military involvement in regional conflicts peaceful settlement of major regional conflicts Establishment of -free contacts and information flow across national borders including a No restrictions on travel of one's own citizens to foreign countries b No restrictions on travel of foreigners in one's own country c No restrictions legal or administrative on contact of one's citizens with foreigners d Reserved access in the mass media for foreign opinion e Right to establish cultural and ·information centers and outlets for periodical book and VCR sales in the other country at the sole discretion of the sending country f Elimination of national legislation which makes the expression of divergent opinion a criminal act effective guarantees of the freedom of speech Substantial additionai reduction ·o f offensive particularly ballistic missiles Negotiations on conditions for a CTB to take effect third stage Reduction of strategic controls on trade when arms r -e duction agreemf nt-s are consummated _ Agreements on role to be played by defensive weaponry SECRE' ' SENSlj'IV iU ¥BS ONLx SE ET 1 SENS ITPJE EYES ONLY- 3 J J Phase Three Fine-tune and extend various verification measures developed in previous stages Establish in practice the habits 0£ openness and restraint from use o f military force negotiated earli·e r Eliminate all strategic and political controls on trade Negotiate a legal enforcement r egime for a world free of nuclear and other mass de s truction weapons and for the control of the level and use of conventional weapons Deploy agreed systems of strategic defense As these measures go into place and are proven in practice proceed to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons i n final stages S CRE IEYES ONLY ' --