i I PRESERVATION CO Y I Q LASSlFIED NLR b1t'f r1w f SEGRE I Non-log NAAADATE-- L t ATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL y WASHINGTON D C 20506 _§ ECRE' I December 2 1986 MEMORANDUM FOR JACK FROM BOB LINHARD'y SUBJECT Your Paper dated 25 November First of all let rre apologise for taking so long to respond to this All I can say is that it is a serious subject your Ireirorandum troubled rre a bit and it has taken rre a bit of tine to resolve _in If Y CMn mind how best to help in the process through If Y response to you I have returned your package next under annotated to indicate the changes that I would recomrend that you make I think that the letter to Gorbachev is about right but that we may wish to wait until next week to allow the currently ongoing discussions in Geneva to be carpleted it We could then fold into the letter any developnents and send I also agree that it is premature to look at fundarrental changes in our position right now Now we need to quietly consolidate what we have and look to refinarents over the next nonth which we can surface during the next negotiating round In the process of doing this we could have the ACSG quietly vet the four alternatives included in the Shultz letter in an appropriately carpart rnanted channel In addition we can use this sane drill to get back to basics on where we are where are priorities are and where our priorities should be over the next 3-6 nonths in the negotiations I have sare additional thoughts on this which I will outline shortly My main problem is with the idea of a dramatic new proposal which focuses us on a plan for the total elimination of nuclear weapons I think that this would be ver y damaging at this tine especially since we have just put the flap over zero nuclear weapons in the context of Reykjavik behind us This certainly would make news -- but it is clearly not the basis of any anns control agreement and therefore would be inmediately recognized as either propaganda or posturing by the US It is not on the main line of the recent evolution of our policy and not in synch with the Reagan-Thatcher priorities I believe it would further exacerbate our allies especially That cher be difficult to get the US anns control ccmnunity to work seriously especially the Joint Chiefs and divert us fran needed evolution on the main line of our policy I really think that this is not the thing to do right now It is for that reason that I would delete it fran the package As to the issue of what we defense of the President's the price that we put on a camri trrent not to withdraw should do I think that we need to be finn in our proposal of 0 ballistic missiles but cast it as US acceptance of the Soviet danand for a 10-year fran the ABM Treaty We still need to consolidate Declassify on OADR SE6REf SENSITIVE 2 support for the validity of the President's making this proposal at Reykjavik both with certain quarters in the Adminstration and with Allies The idea will give us a lot of needed leverage later when we face the problem of dealing with the huge Soviet advantage in SRINF SNF ballistic missiles -- but to do so we need to make it real now At the sane tine we need to make it clear that our preferred priorities involve significant reductions in STARI' and INF without any unnecessary linkage to the Defense and Space area I et the Soviets care to us as demandeurs in the D S area They will -- since the SDI program is continuing each day and ti Ire is working for us on this score In short we need to reinforce that the US position which does not walk away fran the US Defense and Space counter-proposal made at Reykjavik is consistent with long-standing US and NATO anns control strategy and the recent Reagan-Thatcher priorities With respect to refinarents I strongly believe that we should not look at any further steps with respect to one exception that carry us below the Reykjavik position in tellllS of force levels A 50% reduction in strategic forces 1600 6000 with the right to adjust forces fran ballistics to slow-flyers as needed and an appropriate LRINF agrearent are realistic and achievable goals which can be supported by our military and allies The one exception that needs roore work is the issue of SRINF SNF missiles We will work on that one in the next few weeks Jack I wanted to get this to you soonest today I can understand if you can't agree with the fixes that I have suggested Against that contingency I will provide by about Jpn today two paragraphs for your use one that expresses my non-concurrence with the Tab III material and one that makes the points in the paragraph just above about further refinerents I had hoped to have these with this nero but I got diverted once again Give a call once you have digested this and let's see how I can help you ire SEC ' SENSITIVE