DEAR MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH I am sending you a record of excerpts from the conversation between Academician A D Sakharov and the American scientists Jeremy Stone and Frank von Hippel obtained by operational means With deep respect V Chebrikov 19 02 1987 11 February 1987 Record of excerpts from the conversation between Academician A D Sakharov and the American scientists Jeremy Stone and Frank von Hippel Sakharov I know there was a discussion whether Reagan’s Strategic Initiative violates the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty or not If it does then at what stage I think the American side has always recognized that deployment—the placing of a combat system in space—constitutes a violation of the ABM Treaty Stone The Federation of American Scientists proposed to the Soviet side to begin disarmament without thinking about “Star Wars ” The sides should begin disarmament even if they cannot resolve the question of SDI right now Sakharov I agree with that The speech that I was going to make is directed against the “package” principle Stone I am sure that our positions are very similar and coincide in many respects On the first and third questions Sakharov Is this what the American scientists are bringing to the forum Stone This is my own point of view and my own idea Sakharov The first point The “package” principle Stone The first idea has been under discussion since 1984 and the discussions continue I am not sure this is the position of the American government or whether the authorities will agree to it I am sure that they are generally against disarmament That is P Nitze’s position not that of the U S government This idea was first put forward by you in 1975 It is our joint idea We have been working on it for fifteen years Sakharov It seems to me that this is very reasonable but how can all of this be turned into actual policy by the USSR and the U S I will speak about the USSR The fact of the matter is that linking all questions of strategic-arms reductions to the question of SDI is a central point of the Soviet position in Reykjavik and even before Reykjavik Very strong arguments and very strong pressure are needed in order for the Soviet side to abandon this principle It seems to me that it would be very important to focus on this problem The Soviet side’s argumentation takes various forms but one of the forms is as follows Suppose strategic weapons were reduced tenfold while the United States deployed an SDI system in space An SDI system would be ineffective against 100 percent of Soviet ballistic missiles but against 10 percent it would already be effective And the Soviet Union would simply find itself disarmed This gives rise to the idea that there must be guarantees that after disarmament of ballistic missiles an SDI system will not be created Where are those guarantees We need to find strong arguments I am trying to find such arguments but it is very important to me that support from American scientists and the American public be such that we could achieve the Soviet side's renunciation of the package principle Stone Building missiles is cheaper than building a missile-defense system Sakharov And cheaper Stone When one side begins building a missile-defense system the other side builds missiles faster Therefore the ratio remains the same Sakharov Let us suppose the Soviet side understands that Does the American administration understand it Stone When Reagan leaves office in two years American interest in SDI will decline If there is an agreement on disarmament there will not be such expenditures Sakharov That is also my argument directed not at the American side but at the Soviet side I also believe that we have to get out of the impasse created in Reykjavik The only real way out is for the Soviet side to abandon the “package” principle I only wanted to warn you that this will provoke a very serious discussion I am on your side here But the Soviet representatives will defend the “package” position We must be prepared to gather all the arguments that are possible here Von Hippel Indeed if the deployment of these defensive initiatives goes too far reductions will become difficult and even impossible Sakharov But there is also the reverse relationship If there are no reductions that in fact will contribute to the unfolding of negotiations on strategic weapons Stone The idea is not to carry these reductions out in such a way that they go too far before the development of these defensive initiatives begins In a conversation with Velikhov he said two things First of all he said that this should be called asymptotic reduction since everything does not immediately go to zero but asymptotically He says that you are for a sharp decrease and reduction Sakharov Those are Velikhov’s words Stone Yes Velikhov knows about my proposal as well Sakharov Does Velikhov assess Stone's proposal as too sharp a reduction Stone The Soviet side is gradually moving toward our common point of view Sakharov There is also a big difference between what is said in discussions and the real weapons policy that follows after that All of this is very complicated Stone The Soviet position can be criticized from many sides Sakharov Which position Let us assume that the Soviet position was put forward in its most advanced form in Reykjavik I am far from certain that Gorbachev has a full mandate to implement the proposals he made at Reykjavik Perhaps this goes further than what he can realistically obtain from the General Staff This too must be taken into account Stone I am sure that Gorbachev was to a large extent able to control all these proposals Soviet experts were making very many concessions Sakharov In Reykjavik Stone Yes Sakharov But behind all of this stood the specter of SDI The Soviet Union actually conducted this discussion in such a way that it kept the “package” principle as a reserve option to stop all movement preemptively—that is to nullify everything afterwards Stone The Soviet side says “We want to link the offensive and defensive line ” The American side asks “What specifically do you want ” The Soviet side could not say anything concrete The American side says “Embody your principles in specific useful ideas ” For example the Soviet side says that the American side should observe the ABM Treaty for ten years The American side is already participating in this treaty without a time limit The Soviet side says that you must remain in the treaty for ten years and the American side says that we are already in it indefinitely Sakharov But at the same time it gives it another interpretation Stone From the American side’s point of view these ten years do not change anything and do not provide anything The Soviet side wants restrictions on certain experimental work but this does not affect the fact that by and large the American side is developing SDI Sakharov Do you mean to say that Soviet proposals for a compromise agreement on SDI would in fact be acceptable to the Americans—or the opposite I did not understand Stone Even if the American side accepts all the Soviet proposals under the “package” principle the “Star Wars” program will still continue Sakharov In the final analysis what are you trying to achieve—that the Soviet side abandon the “package” principle Or do I get the impression that you are explaining to the American side that the package principle does not restrict work on SDI These are completely different formulations of the question In the first case it is directed toward the USSR and in the second toward the United States Who do you think should change their position Stone I am against SDI Sakharov So am I But the question is what are you proposing Who at this stage should try to change their position Stone The Soviet side should take into account that SDI is more of a political question than a technical one There is a political solution to this question but not a technical one The political solution is disarmament Sakharov If the Soviet Union carries out disarmament abandoning the “package” principle then you believe SDI will not be developed In other words your thesis is in fact really addressed to the Soviet government Action is required from the Soviet government if we accept this Stone Yes Sakharov That is what I wanted to establish I think I have now received the answer to my question I simply wanted to repeat when you make demands of the Soviet side everything must be argued very seriously and your assertions must be made very clearly Otherwise it will get bogged down in some sort of semi-technical semi-political discussion Von Hippel We discussed proposals for reducing the nuclear potential of the USSR and U S to 10 percent Here is an article containing the same proposals Sakharov But I have this question What principles do you use in determining precisely the 10 percent limit Von Hippel The first principle is that even after the reductions the Soviet Union and the U S remain hostages to one another Sakharov Why precisely 10 percent What is the criterion There exist criteria of maximum acceptable damage criteria of assured mutual destruction What is meant here Von Hippel One of the basic criteria of such a confrontation between the USSR and the U S is the number of people who can be destroyed by a certain number of nuclear weapons This is the traditional model used by our government in which it is assumed that the number of casualties and destruction is the same as it was in Hiroshima with one exception the radius of effect increases by the cube root of the increase in explosive yield Sakharov Hiroshima was very atypical There were fires there was the element of complete unpreparedness for the attack So it is impossible to use Hiroshima estimates Why are losses in the USSR greater here than in the United States with the same number of strikes Von Hippel Because of greater population density In your urban areas population density is greater The second model assumes that with nuclear strikes of modern yield fires will be more destructive than they were in Hiroshima This model assumes ignition Here the role of the fires is taken into account They are so large that people will not be able to escape them And the destructive power of either the USSR or the U S at present amounts to approximately 4 000 one-megaton bombs Sakharov We are talking about bombs that have reached their targets First I want to clarify the technical side of the matter and then the underlying principles We are talking about bombs that have reached their targets You evidently introduce some coefficients for the effectiveness of anti-missile defenses The equivalent megatonnage in the USSR is greater because of the greater yield of an individual warhead Where do the yields of Soviet charges come from From Soviet statements during negotiations Von Hippel No These are data we obtain ourselves There are two sources for obtaining such information The first is seismic measurements of underground explosions Sakharov But in seismic tests it is entirely possible that the Soviet side tested thermonuclear charges with incomplete loads After all that is very easily recalculated Simply for reasons of convenience in testing in order to do less drilling It is standard practice to conduct tests with some reduction of the load of active materials—not active ones but the light thermonuclear fuel A reduction in the quantity of thermonuclear fuel Von Hippel We also check and compare this information when we measure the flight of Soviet missiles with our own missiles Let us say we compare Soviet missiles with our “MX” missiles We draw conclusions from the totality of data including seismic data We judge explosive yield per kilogram of ballistic warhead Sakharov I have this question When the technical negotiations were held in Reykjavik the Soviet representatives made public a great deal of specific data That was very bold Von Hippel We came to the conclusion that the effectiveness of Soviet and American warheads is in a ratio of 1 to 2 Sakharov In other words our ratio between weight and yield is worse You believe it is worse I understand Von Hippel In this respect you lag behind us by five years Sakharov How is the assessment made of the destruction at a given tenfold-reduced arsenal of what will happen in the USSR and in the U S And what do you do with that afterward What is considered acceptable That is a question for the political leadership What can it consider acceptable And this depends on what type of destruction can constitute effective deterrence Von Hippel The question first of all is why we need so many weapons if we can destroy one another many times over Sakharov The main question is what is acceptable what is considered a deterrent At what level do you believe neither of the states would risk the outbreak of a major thermonuclear war of this scale By what principles can this level be established Von Hippel I want to answer these questions in another way It is known that you made some proposals in Hiroshima in 1975 This is similar to the proposals I have been making in the U S since 1979—that both sides simultaneously undertake identical reductions and begin the gradual destruction of weapons to asymptotically bring them to zero Sakharov I did not write it in such a literal form Von Hippel After all these proposed reductions we will still be able to destroy one another Sakharov What does “destroy one another” mean That is my question Von Hippel It means destroying cities Sakharov We are talking about some real scenario of war at this level That is a question at the level of the General Staff It is very difficult to determine without a colossal amount of information In order to visualize war at a certain level one must proceed from a very specific scenario of what is happening There is enormous variety among these scenarios If we want to assess something with accuracy to within a factor of two we must work through several scenarios taking into account the real anti-missile defenses the level of protection of the civilian population in each country and in general a very large number of factors which in my opinion are not available to private individuals I have the impression that assessing losses for some specific scenario or for the totality of possible scenarios is extraordinarily difficult I would like to know what data did you use to perform this analysis Who did this In my understanding to obtain this data it would take a large organization with thousands of employees computers and so on It is simply impossible to do it on paper Von Hippel With further reductions we would need to conduct a comprehensive analysis but down to the 10 percent level the accuracy is sufficient Sakharov You believe the accuracy is sufficient with reduction to the 10 percent level Von Hippel With further reductions a complex analysis has to be done but here I believe this is sufficient There are no significant defensive systems If the economy and the social structure are destroyed civil defense will not help Sakharov Some of our warheads are used against the launch positions of the U S and some remain in reserve But no country carrying out a first strike would ever decide not to retain a substantial part It could very well be two thirds Some will be aimed incorrectly because of technical malfunctions communications-line defects because of diversion and sabotage in that situation this is inevitable Moreover arranging deterrent forces which are effective only in the event of a first strike is terribly dangerous It means provoking the adversary into making the first strike Therefore in your calculations when you speak about the force of deterrence it is a mistake to base the calculation on the first strike Methodologically incorrect The assessment of deterrence must be made for a retaliatory strike for each side That immediately gives a factor of well at least three That is the first part of my concerns about the methodology used to obtain this assessment The second part is that when we are talking about the only thermonuclear war in history the notion of maximum acceptable damage becomes vague Take for example the siege of Leningrad Leningrad was not surrendered despite the loss of a very substantial part of the population And this despite the fact that the loss of Leningrad did not mean the loss of the war Of course it would have had grave consequences for us but it would not have been decisive Now imagine a clash between the great powers on a much larger scale In that case the leaders will face far more serious losses than before I mean relative losses compared with those suffered in Leningrad during the siege That is why the very principle of maximum possible losses when establishing the level to which armaments can be reduced seems dangerous to me You have to consider the irrationality that occurs during wartime when logic itself becomes or shall we say takes on a distorted nature I think the principle of maximum possible damage cannot be formulated on the basis of peacetime psychology There is the principle of assured mutual destruction Von Hippel The fact is that many people speak of the advantage of a first strike Sakharov I believe that you and I should strive to ensure that there is no first-strike advantage This is very important But this is precisely an argument for higher levels since a first strike can be effective even at a relatively low level If the level is high guaranteed mutual destruction exists even for a retaliatory strike We will notionally distinguish—first strike and retaliatory strike The retaliatory strike is notionally three times weaker Do you agree with this estimate Stone I agree Von Hippel Possibly Sakharov Then the level must be set with allowance for this factor of 1 3 so that our data relate to the retaliatory strike Von Hippel The purpose of the reduction is that even where there is the danger of a first strike and the presence of a second retaliatory strike the ratio changes Two thousand warheads Now we have 10 000 strategic and 10 000 tactical You see the second principle is to achieve stabilization Let’s take this example this is the number of missiles in the USSR and this is the number of warheads It would be good if the number of missiles corresponded to the number of warheads Sakharov I agree with you that the idea of multiple independently targetable warheads led to a loss of strategic stability This happened in the 1960s when the modern weapons system was taking shape and multiple independently targetable warheads were not part of it As the result the structure of armaments turned out imperfect What do you propose Von Hippel To return to the original arrangement—to single warheads Sakharov Prioritizing the reduction of warheads—that is replacement of multiple warheads by single ones Von Hippel Yes So our proposal is this let us say the reduction of tactical weapons short-range missiles from 10 000 to 0 on each side and the replacement of warheads On the American side strategic missiles with MIRVs must be reduced by such-and-such an amount and on the Soviet side—by such-and-such an amount Sakharov That will require colossal rearmament This is not merely a reduction it is a rearmament of the existing strategic forces And rearmament will mean colossal expenditures for both the USSR and the U S Is it realistic I understand that as a result of two factors—the emergence of multiple warheads and the increase in accuracy—a certain strategic instability has arisen Von Hippel Soviet missiles are for the most part deployed in silo launchers Sakharov Yes The fact that in the USSR the overwhelming part of our arsenal consists of silo-based missiles plays an enormous role I think the most realistic path for overcoming strategic instability is to prioritize the reduction of silo-based missiles—perhaps even replacing them with mobile launchers In that case they can be mobile Concurrently it would be possible to implement the suggestions you are making These would be missiles with one warhead In this form the proposal is directed mainly at the USSR The fact is that in the United States a significant part of strategic weapons is not in silos very few are in silos Von Hippel Yes American missiles are mainly deployed on submarines and bombers Sakharov Yes on bombers and submarines The fact that the Americans began building the “MX ” I hope will make the Soviet Union more amenable to prioritizing the reduction of its silo-based missiles Soviet silo-based missiles conflict with both of your principles The “MX” does as well but the “MX” still constitutes a very small portion of the American potential For us that is almost everything so it will be a very acute issue for the Soviet approach to disarmament In Reykjavik Gorbachev agreed to proportional reductions at least that was what was reported in the press It is possible that there were some details in the confidential negotiations that are unknown to me Perhaps you know what Gorbachev proposed confidentially Proportional reductions What was announced was proportional reductions Stone Basically they agreed to 50 percent reductions in each category Sakharov That is what was reported in the press The reason I asked this question is because there are some hints that in the confidential negotiations between the military groups there was some other arrangement Stone There were negotiations at different levels Sakharov There were negotiations at the highest level and there were negotiations between military groups Stone At the first level they spoke about 50 percent At the second level there was discussion about how many bombs should be on bombers The Soviet side agreed to the option most favorable to the American side each bomber would have one bomb Sakharov A very powerful one Stone But that bomber can carry as many as twenty bombs Sakharov What type of bomber are we talking about A B-52 Stone Yes The opposing side cannot verify how many bombs are on each bomber so they decided to agree that ostensibly there will be one bomb whereas in fact there may be more That is this is a notional agreement Sakharov What does “notional” mean Is one bomb used in the count or is that a requirement I did not understand Stone In the count Sakharov That is a different question Stone I want to give you a letter from Senator Edward Kennedy Sakharov Edward Kennedy courteously invites me to come to the United States This is always a difficult question for me I have a standing position with regard to all the invitations that I have been receiving lately Representatives of the Soviet government have repeatedly stated officially that I cannot leave the USSR on any trips I worked with secret materials Therefore I myself do not undertake any steps regarding my travel abroad I believe that for this to make sense the Soviet authorities must change their position on this question This can happen in two cases if the authorities need it for their own political reasons or if there is very strong action on the part of foreign political figures and organizations that contributes to a change in policy As regards the latter I believe that it would take such powerful concentrated efforts that are already not commensurate with the goal There are many other important tasks involving pressure on Soviet authorities I think that for my part I cannot be the initiator of such campaigns and seek changes regarding my secrecy status Translated by Anna Melyakova for the National Security Archive