UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY The IT Combat Supl Ort Agency Country Characterizations Dependencies ofCdtical lnfonnation lnfrastmcture Mission Assurance Plans and Analysis June 2019 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Disclosure Statement The information provided in this briefing is for general information purposes only It does not constitute a commitment on behalf of the United States Government USG to provide any of the capabilities systems or equipment presented and in no way obligates the USG to enter into any future agreements with regard to the same The information presented may not be disseminated without the express consent of the USG These briefings may also contain references to USG future plans and projected system capabilities Mention of these plans or capabilities in no way guarantees that the USG will follow these plans or that any of the associated system capabilities will be available or releasable to foreign governments UNCLASSIFIED UNITED IN SERVICETO OUR NATION 2 UNCLASSIFIED Critical Infrastructure Defined · · ' · P rts ' ' · f ll ill b UNCLASSIFIED - - •tr· '• s •- - _- -- 1 - __ _ · i · _ Critical infrastructure are the assets systems and networks whether physical or virtual so vital that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security national economic security national public health or safety or any combination thereof UNITED IN SERVICETO OUR NATION 3 UNCLASSIFIED Mission Assurance If you try to hold everything you hold nothing - Frederick the Great What is Critical Mission Analysis - What is Mission Essential What must we be able to do - What assets are required Water Electricity Telecommunications - Interdependencies What do those assets rely on Answering these questions is fundamental to defining your critical infrastructure UNCLASSIFIED UNITED IN SERVICETO OUR NATION 4 UNCLASSIFIED What's really important UNCLASSIFIED UNITED IN SERVICETO OUR NATION 5 UNCLASSIFIED Whole of Government Responsibility Environ mental Protection Transport at ion Aeency • How does the power grid with a nation state rely upon its neighbors • What routes do telecommunications and electrical lines share in the right of way • What te l ecommunications outages in one state region impact other states or regions Finilncial Services Water Wastewater Defense Indus try Healthcare Public Health Aerlculture Transportation Chemical Nucleillr I UNCLASSIFIED UNITED IN SERVICETO OUR NATION Communications Dams 7 6 UNCLASSIFIED Telecommunications Interdependencies What systems capabilities do telecom service providers rely upon • Terrestrial and Undersea Fiber Optic Cable • • Repeater Stati ons • Switches Routers Servers • Cable Landing Stations Multiplexers r- -- UNCLASSIFIED - · -_ -- UNITED IN SERVICETO OUR NATION 7 UNCLASSIFIED Telecommunications Interdependencies Telecom Interdependencies • Right of ways and ducting requiring power and access • Overhead telephone poles providing aerial transport • Fiber Optic repeaters requiring electrical power to operate • Termination switches requiring power and manning • Other sectors such as power water and transportation I Sectors employ Industrial Control Systems ICS to operate I UNCLASSIFIED UNITED IN SERVICETO OUR NATION 8 UNCLASSIFIED Mission Assurance Operational Environment Country Characterization DoD relies on commercially leased infrastructure to support its operations in the Continental United States CON US and abroad Infrastructure overseas is often owned and operated by international partner governments ministries of defense MoDs or commercial companies Threat Actors Cyber criminals hacktivists nation-states and terrorist organ izations All have demonstrated bath ability and intent ta carry aut attacks an C P • Vulnerabilities Physical access inadequate stand-off aging technology not designed to protect against modern threats as well as complex technology introduced with unknown vulnerabilities Risk to Military Operations Persistent adversaries are determined to stea l intellectual capital coerce victims for monetary gain or political purposes and in severe instances deny access to services or destroy assets with the potential to cause casualties Adversaries presently possess the ability and intent ta disrupt and ar destroy infrastructure the DoD relies on to conduct operations • Mission Assurance Responsibilities Assigned in Department of Defense Directive DoDD 3020 40 Mission Assurance includes military systems and associated sector interdependency risk mitigation Mission Assurance requires identification of mission essential tasks METs and task critical assets TCAs as well as threat vulnerability and risk assessments Supply Chain Risk Management SCRM Identify vulnerabilities presented through the supply chain SCRM Approved Products List Assessments Criticality Analysis Support to Program Management Office Mission Partners Industrial Control Systems Identify vulnerabilities in ICS SCADA systems to the Mission Provide network and Cyber SME to Facility Engineers assessing Control Systems UNCLASSIFIED UNITED IN SERVICETO OUR NATION 9 UNCLASSIFIED DISJ ° • The Importance of Country Characterizations Understand critical components and systems for both the Ministry of Defense and the Nation State stabilization • Electric Power • Telecommunication • Transportation Roads Rails Ports Airports • Fuel • Water • Chemicals • Analyze the requirements of our neighbors • How can one issue impact the whole region UNCLASSIFIED UNITED IN SERVICETO OUR NATION 10 UNCLASSIFIED DISJ ° How the Internet has changed Industrial Control Today 30 Years Ago I tam I ··· I Ai1 • • •• • • - llllilill UNCLASSIFIED UNITED IN SERVICETO OUR NATION UNCLASSIFIED What is ICS Industrial Control System or ICS is a general term that encompasses several types of control systems • • • • • • Human - Machine Interface HMI Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition SCADA Distributed Control Systems DCS Set points Co ntro I alga rithms Para meter constraints Process Data ---- -'-- - - -Manipula ted UNCLASSIFIED I I I Control er ------- I Con trolled Variables Variable 1 I I Process Control System PCS Programmable Logic Controllers PLC Platform IT PIT Any other automated control system Remote Diagnostics and Ma intenance r------- ------ Actuators - - - - - - - - - - - - _ Senso rs - '· ·- Process input s - - - --w Co ntro lied Process i __ _ _ L _ __ _ _ _- - - - ' Process outputs Disturbances UNITED IN SERVICETO OUR NATION 12 UNCLASSIFIED DISJ DHS Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team ICS-CERT ° ' 2016 Annual Report FY 2016 Incidents by Sector 290 total Def ense Industrial Base 1 - - - - - - - ICS- C ERT M ON T R Rnancial Services 2 - - - - - - - - Emergency Services 2 - - - - - Food and Agriculture 3 Chemical 4 commercial Facilities 5 N uclear Reactors Materials and Waste 7 I FY 2016 Incidents by Tlueat Vector 290 total Removable Media 1 Rogue Device 1 Brute Force 3 Abuse of Authorized Access 5 Information - - - - - Technology 7 Healt hcare and Publ ic Health 11 Transport ation _ Systems 14 ------ ----- ----- ------- SLQ 7 - - - Network Scanning Probing 35 - - Oams O Incidents by Sector 290 UNCLASSIFIED Incidents by Infection Vector 290 UNITED IN SERVICETO OUR NATION 13 UNCLASSIFIED DISJ DHS Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team ICS-CERT ° ' 2016 Annual Report FY 2016 Incidents by Functional Impact 290 total ICS-CERT MONJT Significant Impact to - - - - - - Business Services 1 s1gn111cant impact to 1cs 2 s1gnmcant Impact to cr1uca1SefVices 3 - - - - - R - - --------- Level 6- Crit ica l Systems 20 - - - - - Leve I 5 - Critica I Syst ems M anagement 7 - - - Unknown 119 M1nima11mpact to Non-Critical Services 15 Scans Probes 40 No Impact Level · Business DMZ 23 to Services 184 Level 7 - Safety Systems O Corporate Intrusion O Miscellaneous old methodology 69 Control Network Impact O No Network Imp act o Incidents by Functional Impact 290 UNCLASSIFIED Incidents by Level of Intrusion 290 UNITED IN SERVICETO OUR NATION 14 UNCLASSIFIED Most Prevalent Weaknesses in ICS Systems • • • UNCLASSIFIED Boundary Protection was the most identified weakness Weakness related to boundary protection accounted for 13 4% of all discovered weaknesses Energy Government Facilities Transportation Systems and Water and Wastewater were the most frequently assessed representing 75% of all assessments FY 2016 MOST PREVALENT WEAKNESSES Boundary Protection 1 • Undetected unauthorized activity in critical systems Least Functionality 2 • Weaker boundaries between ICS and ente rise networks • Increased vectors for malicious party access to critical systems Identification and Authentication 3 Physical Access Control 4 • Rogue internal access established • Lack of accountability and traceability for user actions if an account is compromised • Increased difficulty in securing accounts as personnel leave the organization especially sensitive for users with administrator access • Unauthorized physical access to field equipment and locations provides increased opportunity to o Maliciously modify delete or copy device programs and firmware o Access the ICS network o Steal or vandalize cyber assets Audit Review Analysis and Reporting 5 Authenticator Management 6 o Add rogue devices to capture and retransmit network traffic • Without formalized review and validation of logs unauthorized users applications or other unauthorized events may operate in the ICS network undetected detection • Compromised unsecured password communications • Password compromise could allow trusted unauthorized access to systems UNITED IN SERVICETO OUR NATION 15 UNCLASSIFIED Top Discoveries • Inadequate access security controls for virtual machines VMs allows adversaries to gain access to every guest VM on the host computer allowing potential unauthorized access to any part of the ICS • Insecure implementation of remote access from the corporate network to the ICS or from the Internet to the ICS • Improper use of Virtual Local Area Network VLAN While VLANs can logically segment networks if users do not fol low best practices of the hardware vendors unauthorized users can traverse to other VLAN segments • Weak Bring-Your-Own-Device BYOD security policies for ICS Mobile and other devices are not typically managed by the organization and security policies implemented by the organization are often not implemented on the portable devices Use of BYOD devices to access personal email web pages and social media applications are inherently high risk to ICS • Insufficient hardening of cloud services security and Service Level Agreements SLAs for critical ICS functions Organizations must ensure that the parts of any ICS architecture hosted externally maintain security levels consistent with the criticality of the ICS functions • Inadequate adoption of ICS Network Monitoring as a core Defense-in-Depth DiD strategy An attacker will leverage this to receive system discovery information and determine how to best implement a customized UNCLASSIFIED Training Available through ICS-CERT Web - Based Training available on the https ics-cert-training inl gov learn Operational Security OPSEC for Control Systems 100W - 1 hour Differences in Deployments of ICS 21 0W-1 - 1 5 hours Influence of Common IT Components on ICS 210W-2 - 1 5 hours Common ICS Components 210W-3 - 1 5 hours Cybersecu rity with in IT ICS Domains 210W-4 -1 5 hours Cybersecu rity Risk 21 0W-5 - 1 5 hours Current Trends Th reat 21 0W-6 - 1 5 hours Current Trends Vulnerabilities 210W-7 - 1 5 hours Determining the Impacts of a Cybersecurity Incident 21 0W-8 - 1 5 hours Attack Methodologies in IT ICS 210W-9 - 1 5 hours Mapping IT Defense-in-Depth Security Solutions to ICS 210W-10 - 1 5 hours 5-Day Instructor Led Training in Idaho Falls Idaho course description on https ics-cert us-cert gov TrainingAvailable-Through-lCS-CERT#workshop UNCLASSIFIED UNITED IN SERVICETO OUR NATION 17 UNCLASSIFIED Questions UNCLASSIFIED UNITED IN SERVICETO OUR NATION 18 DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY The IT Combat Support Agency UNITED IN SERVICE TO OUR NATION UNCLASSIFIED 19