CyCon 2024 Over the Horizon 16th International Conference on Cyber Conflict C Kwan L Lindström D Giovannelli K Podiņš D Štrucl Eds 2024 © NATO CCDCOE Publications Tallinn Permission to make digital or hard copies of this publication for internal use within NATO and for personal or educational use when for non-profit or non-commercial purposes is granted provided that copies bear this notice and a full citation on the first page Any other reproduction or transmission requires prior written permission by NATO CCDCOE The International Legal Framework for Hunt Forward and the Case for Collective Countermeasures Jeff Kosseff Associate Professor Cyber Science Department United States Naval Academy Annapolis MD United States kosseff@usna edu Abstract United States Cyber Command’s “persistent engagement” strategy and “defend forward” operational concept have produced the “Hunt Forward” operation As Cyber Command describes them Hunt Forward operations are “strictly defensive operations” that Cyber Command conducts “at the request of partner nations ” Hunt Forward protects both US allies and the United States by blunting the harm of malicious attacks on shared networks and it provides the United States with valuable intelligence about adversaries’ methods Cyber Command has publicly reported successful Hunt Forward operations in Ukraine Latvia Albania Estonia and other nations This paper draws on publicly available sources including Cyber Command reports and media commentary to give a comprehensive picture of Hunt Forward’s capabilities operations and limitations The paper argues that Hunt Forward has already resulted in numerous successful operations around the world and benefited both the United States and its allies The paper then analyzes the basis for Hunt Forward under international law and concludes that current operations as publicly described are permissible The paper goes on to argue that although Hunt Forward is purely defensive future collaborative operations should include assistance in degrading adversaries’ ability to conduct malicious cyber campaigns against the United States and its allies To provide further breathing space for collaborative operations the global community should affirm the use of collective countermeasures a concept that some countries such as The views expressed in this paper are only the author’s and do not represent the United States Naval Academy Department of Navy or Department of Defense 221 Estonia and Costa Rica have embraced and that others such as Canada and France have questioned Keywords countermeasures sovereignty Hunt Forward retorsion espionage 1 INTRODUCTION Over the past decade US cyber strategy has evolved to address new threats gradually moving from an active-defense strategy of combating adversaries once they reach US networks to a “defend forward” model that operates outside of the United States to deter threats before they reach the United States 1 Most recently in a 2023 summary of its cyber strategy the Defense Department stated that it “will continue to defend forward by disrupting the activities of malicious cyber actors and degrading their supporting ecosystems ”2 “Defend forward” was not new to the 2023 cyber strategy For more than five years the Department has articulated such an operational concept as a key component of its strategy to persistently engage with cyber adversaries 3 Perhaps most noteworthy about the 2023 strategy summary was the Department’s focus on defending forward “in close coordination” with “our global Allies and partners ”4 As the Department observed in its strategy since 2018 it had “regularly worked with our Allies and partners to help identify vulnerabilities on their government-operated networks ” and those activities “have aided U S cybersecurity preparedness contributed to the warfighting capability of the Joint Force and established or enhanced strong information-sharing relationships with a number of nations including Ukraine ”5 The Department’s term for these operations is “Hunt Forward ”6 As of September 2023 Cyber Command deployed Hunt Forward teams to operations on seventy-seven 1 2 3 4 5 6 222 See Dave Weinstein The Pentagon’s New Cyber Strategy Defend Forward Lawfare Sept 21 2018 “Whereas active cyber defense according to the Defense Department’s 2011 Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace consisted of intrusion prevention at the perimeter and ‘defeat ing adversary activities on DoD networks and systems ’ defend forward implies the conduct of operations on non-U S networks to ‘stop threats before they reach their targets ’” Jeff Kosseff The Contours of “Defend Forward” Under International Law Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict 13 2019 “To be sure Defend Forward is subject to several legal limits particularly when it comes to positioning and degradation but even within these limits the United States can conduct cyber operations that are far more active than the U S active defense concept of years past ” U S Defense Department Summary 2023 Cyber Strategy of the Department of Defense 6 See U S Cyber Command Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority Command Vision for U S Cyber Command 6 2018 “Defending forward as close as possible to the origin of adversary activity extends our reach to expose adversaries’ weaknesses learn their intentions and capabilities and counter attacks close to their origins ” U S Defense Department supra note 2 at 6 Id at 12 Id networks in twenty-four countries and Gen Paul Nakasone then-commander of Cyber Command in 2023 called Hunt Forward a “resounding success ”7 For instance Ukraine credits a Hunt Forward operation conducted before the Russian invasion with helping it maintain train service during the early days of the invasion 8 And in 2023 alone Hunt Forward resulted in the release of 90 samples of malware to the public 9 But what precisely is “Hunt Forward” Cyber Command defines Hunt Forward operations as “strictly defensive cyber operations conducted by US Cyber Command USCYBERCOM at the request of partner nations ”10 If Cyber Command teams are invited by a partner nation they deploy “to observe and detect malicious cyber activity on host nation networks ”11 Cyber Command reports that Hunt Forward operations “generate insights that bolster homeland defense and increase the resiliency of shared networks from cyber threats ”12 The United States makes Hunt Forward findings public allowing companies to patch software and “eliminate adversary network accesses and capabilities ”13 While Cyber Command’s general description provides some clues as to the international law issues that might surround Hunt Forward the inherently sensitive nature of collaborative military cyber operations means that many details cannot be made public Still Cyber Command has publicly described many Hunt Forward operations to news outlets and in written statements Section 2 of this paper reviews those public statements in an attempt to paint a clearer picture of the scope of Hunt Forward Section 3 applies international law principles to those facts and argues that broader acceptance of collective countermeasures could build on the success of Hunt Forward and similar collaborative cyber operations allowing more effective responses to internationally wrongful acts of adversaries 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Patty Nieberg “Hunt Forward” Cyber Teams Have Deployed to 24 Countries Including Ukraine Task and Purpose Sept 28 2023 Remarks by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John Plumb at Center for a New American Security 2023 DOD Cyber Strategy Event U S Department of Defense Sept 12 2023 https www defense gov News Speeches Speech Article 3525636 remarks-by-assistant-secretary-of-defense-for-spacepolicy-john-plumb-at-center Posture Statement of General Timothy D Haugh Commander United States Cyber Command Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services April 10 2024 at 7 Cyber 101 Hunt Forward Operations U S Cyber Command https www cybercom mil Media News Article 3218642 cyber-101-hunt-forward-operations Id Id Cyber 101—Defend Forward and Persistent Engagement U S Cyber Command Oct 25 2022 https www cybercom mil Media News Article 3198878 cyber-101-defend-forward-and-persistent-engagement 223 2 THE ELEMENTS OF HUNT FORWARD Cyber Command’s public descriptions of Hunt Forward operations help to fill in some of the ambiguities in the general definition of the operations A Searching for Threats and Malware One of the most common elements in descriptions of Hunt Forward operations is the monitoring of allies’ systems and networks for malicious activities For instance in its description of a 2020 Hunt Forward operation on the Estonian Defence Force’s networks Cyber Command stated that US and Estonian cyber specialists “hunted for malicious cyber actors on critical networks and platforms ”14 The partner nation can determine the direction of this assessment In a 2023 Hunt Forward operation in Lithuania US personnel “analyzed key networks identified and prioritized by the partner for evidence of malicious cyber activity while identifying vulnerabilities ”15 Likewise after a series of Iranian cyber attacks on the Albanian government in 2022 Cyber Command deployed a Hunt Forward team to Albania for three months “hunting for malicious cyber activity and identifying vulnerabilities on networks of Albania’s choice ”16 In a 2023 interview Army Maj Gen William Hartman leader of the Cyber National Mission Force emphasized that this assessment takes place at the invitation of partner nations And the first step is to detect “anomalous activity ” Hartman said “The team goes through the investigation and at the end of the day they’re going to decide whether there’s a potentially malicious IP or whether the malware that they found they want to know if it’s good or bad ”17 Cyber Command is uniquely positioned to provide informed assistance he said as it is housed in the same headquarters as the National Security Agency and its Cybersecurity Directorate “We get access to to information that the cybersecurity director has about adversaries that target the United States or allies and partners ” Hartman said “And so ultimately we want to execute an intelligence-driven mission Because we have intel that tells us that an adversary that threatens us is also threatening one of these partners ”18 This expertise 14 15 16 17 18 224 Hunt Forward Estonia Estonia U S Strengthen Partnership in Cyber Domain with Joint Operation U S Cyber Command Dec 3 2020 https www cybercom mil Media News Article 2433245 hunt-forward-estonia-estonia-us-strengthen-partnership-in-cyber-domain-with-joi # text 3%2C%20 2020- Hunt%20Forward%20Estonia%3A%20Estonia%2C%20US%20strengthen%20partnership%20 in cyber%20domain%20with%20joint%20operation text Estonian%20and%20U S %20cyber%20 commands September%2023%20to%20November%206 “Building Resilience” U S Returns from Second Defensive Hunt Operation in Lithuania U S Cyber Command Sept 12 2023 https www cybercom mil Media News Article 3522801 building-resilienceus-returns-from-second-defensive-hunt-operation-in-lithuania “Committed Partners in Cyberspace” Following Cyberattack US Conducts First Defensive Hunt Operation in Albania U S Cyber Command Mar 23 2023 https www cybercom mil Media News Article 3337717 committed-partners-in-cyberspace-following-cyberattack-us-conducts-first-defens Dina Temple-Raston Q A with Gen Hartman “There Are Always Hunt Forward Teams Deployed ” The Record June 20 2023 Id uniquely positions Hunt Forward operations to help partners detect threats on their systems and networks B Gathering Intelligence A primary benefit of Hunt Forward for the United States is to gather intelligence about the cyber tactics of common adversaries and to use that intelligence to improve US cybersecurity “We do these defend-forward missions and the whole point of the defend-forward mission is to learn something on someone else’s network a partner network another nation’s network so we can bring back that information and make sure our networks are more secure ” Brig Gen Reid Novotny special assistant to the director of Air National Guard for Cybercom J5 said at a June 2023 conference 19 For instance a Hunt Forward Operation that was conducted after the attack on SolarWinds “yielded eight files attributed to the Russian Intelligence Service SVR APT 29” and “yielded information about adversary tactics techniques procedures and intentions ” Cyber Command stated 20 And in its discussion of a joint Hunt Forward operation conducted with the Canadian Armed Forces in Latvia Cyber Command noted that the operations “provide us advanced notice of adversary tools and techniques ”21 The intelligence-gathering benefits not only allies but also the United States itself For instance in a 2020 Foreign Affairs article co-authored with his senior advisor Michael Sulmeyer Nakasone wrote that Hunt Forward operations were partly responsible for the United States disrupting “a concerted effort to undermine the midterm elections” in 2018 22 Likewise in an April 2022 Senate hearing Nakasone touted the intelligence value of Hunt Forward as “understanding what our adversaries are doing and … sharing that broadly not only with our partners and NATO but also with the private sector ”23 By operating on the systems and networks of partner nations the United States obtains valuable insights into the methods and techniques of adversaries and the strategies that the United States develops with partner nations to combat these threats can be useful if the United States later faces similar threats from adversaries 19 20 21 22 23 Mark Pomerleau US Cyber Command Conducts “Hunt Forward” Mission in Latin America for First Time Official Says DefenseScoop June 8 2023 U S Cyber Command Public Affairs Cyber 101 Hunt Forward Operations 960th Cyberspace Wing Nov 15 2022 https www 960cyber afrc af mil News Article-Display Article 3219164 cyber-101-huntforward-operations Cyber National Mission Force Public Affairs “Shared Threats Shared Understanding” U S Canada and Latvia Conclude Defensive Hunt Operations Sixteenth Air Force Air Forces Cyber May 10 2023 https www 16af af mil Newsroom Article 3392740 shared-threats-shared-understanding-us-canada-andlatvia-conclude-defensive-hun Paul M Nakasone Michael Sulmeyer How to Compete in Cyberspace Cyber Command’s New Approach Foreign Affairs Aug 25 2020 Transcript of U S Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States Special Operations Command and United States Cyber Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2023 and the Future Years Defense Program Apr 5 2022 52 225 C Assisting Allies in Remediation A key benefit of Hunt Forward for US allies is assistance in remediating harm caused by adversaries In his 2023 interview Gen Hartman of Cyber Command said that Hunt Forward operations involve the use of unclassified equipment on allies’ networks “And when we identify either malware or some type of misconfiguration on a network we instruct the partner and the partner will take the remediation actions on their own network ” he said 24 He characterized some US remediation support as recommendations made to allies based on best practices 25 But what assistance if any does the United States provide beyond recommendations for remediation The public descriptions of Hunt Forward do not provide much more detail Although Cyber Command describes the operations as “strictly defensive ” it is unclear exactly where the line is drawn between defensive and other operations 26 For instance in its description of Hunt Forward operations with Ukraine from December 2021 to March 2022 Cyber Command wrote that the United States “conducted network defense activities aligned to critical networks ”27 A 2021 article on Hunt Forward captured the ambiguities in the “strictly defensive” terminology “The fact is it can be difficult to draw a hard line between offense and defense in cyberspace ” Brad D Williams wrote on the news website Breaking Defense “For instance if CYBERCOM disrupts an adversary’s infrastructure ahead of a suspected attack against the US is that an offensive or a defensive operation ”28 Williams reported that Air Force Lt Gen Charles Moore the Cyber Command deputy commander “likened CYBERCOM’s evolution from that of a football team where only the offense or defense is on the field at one time to more like a hockey team where any given line change plays both an offensive and defensive role ”29 In short there is no evidence in the public record that US remediation assistance goes beyond providing technical recommendations and assistance for partner nations to harden their defenses against adversaries But any legal analysis of the potential of Hunt Forward and future collaborative efforts should consider possible impacts of the operations on adversaries’ systems One component of Defend Forward is “positioning ” which Cyber Command describes as “a forward cyber posture that can 24 Temple-Raston supra note 17 25 Id 26 Hunt Forward Operations are generally characterized as fitting within the Defensive Cyberspace 27 28 29 226 Operations-Internal Defensive Measures mission See Paul Schuh Expeditionary Cyberspace Operations The Cyber Defense Review at 37 Spring 2023 If an operation is not on “friendly cyber-space terrain ” but instead “is conducted external to the defended network in foreign cyberspace and without the permission of the affected system’s owner ” it falls within the Defensive Cyberspace Operations-Response Action mission Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-12 Cyberspace Operations at 8 2023 External effects operations also can fall within the Offensive Cyberspace Operations mission Cyber National Mission Force Public Affairs Before the Invasion Hunt Forward Operations in Ukraine U S Cyber Command Nov 28 2022 https nsarchive gwu edu sites default files documents rmsj3h751x3 2022-11-28-CNMF-Before-the-Invasion-Hunt-Forward-Operations-in-Ukraine pdf Brad D Williams CYBERCOM Has Conducted “Hunt-Forward” Ops in 14 Countries Deputy Says Breaking Defense Nov 10 2021 Id be leveraged to persistently degrade the effectiveness of adversary capabilities and blunt their actions and operations before they reach U S networks ”30 Such activities should be part of future collaboration allowing the United States and its allies to blunt the impact of persistent attacks by common adversaries 3 HUNT FORWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COLLECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES This section analyzes the permissibility of Hunt Forward operations under international law and explores the potential for more robust collaboration between the United States and its allies in a fight against common adversaries As seen above nothing in the public record clearly defines the boundaries of Hunt Forward operations Nor does anything suggest that Hunt Forward operations have a direct impact outside of the partner countries Part A of this section examines the international legal issues surrounding of the conduct of Hunt Forward operations on partner nations’ physical territory systems and networks and the importance of proper authorization Part B examines the trickier international legal issues surrounding any impacts of collaborative operations on adversaries and argues that greater acceptance of collective countermeasures would give the United States and its allies more flexibility to take full operational advantage of Hunt Forward in the event of an internationally wrongful act by an adversary A International Legal Issues Surrounding Partner Nations Under Hunt Forward US forces conduct cyber operations within the physical territory of allies and might monitor their systems or networks to identify and remediate adversarial threats These actions are permissible under international law because the United States operates within the parameters of the consent that the partner nation provides Assessing Hunt Forward requires an examination of whether the operations breach any international legal obligations that the United States owes to the partner nations 31 Merely analyzing allies’ systems and networks with their consent does not raise concerns under international law But issues might arise if US Hunt Forward operations inadvertently cause damage within the systems or networks of the partner nation 32 Here it is vital that the United States receive express authorization from the 30 31 32 See Kosseff supra note 1 at 4 Id Government Offices of Sweden Position Paper on the Application of International Law in Cyberspace 2 July 2022 “In general Sweden is of the view that violations of sovereignty may arise from cyber operations that result in damage or loss of functionality Altering and interfering with data without causing physical harm may also violate sovereignty ” 227 partner to conduct cyber operations within its territory 33 To be sure at least some states hold that some minor cyber harms even without consent do not automatically lead to sovereignty violations 34 Even with the potential allowance of cyber operations that cause insignificant harm Hunt Forward operations must always be based on clearly defined consent and not exceed the authorized scope of that consent 35 The United States should take great care to ensure that authorization is clearly defined and describes each specific part of the systems networks and information that US personnel may access The authorization should also specify the types of activities that are permissible under Hunt Forward and the aims and duration of the operation B International Legal Issues Surrounding Adversaries and the Case for Collective Countermeasures Although Hunt Forward operations are conducted from the physical territory of partner nations and are characterized as strictly defensive any legal analysis of the potential of future collaborations should account for possible impacts on the adversaries’ network Merely remediating and preventing further harm to the systems of partner nations might frustrate the objectives of adversaries but it is difficult to see how that assistance would violate international legal obligations owed to adversaries Although Hunt Forward might disturb adversaries’ objectives in cyberspace helping their targets harden their defenses does not raise any reasonable concerns under international law Any legal analysis from the perspective of adversaries should focus on impacts on the adversaries’ systems networks and information 33 34 35 228 See Italian Position Paper on “International Law and Cyberspace” 4 “Italy finds that according to the same principle a State may not conduct cyber operations from the territory of another State without its express authorization ” See Government of Canada International Law Applicable in Cyberspace 17 “The rule of territorial sovereignty does not require consent for every cyber activity that has effects including some loss of functionality in another State Activities causing negligible or de minimis effects would not constitute a violation of territorial sovereignty regardless of whether they are conducted in the cyber or noncyber context ” Finnish Government Finland Published Its Positions on Public International Law in Cyberspace Oct 15 2020 “The assessment of whether an unauthorized cyber intrusion violates the target State’s sovereignty depends on the nature and consequences of the intrusion The matter is subject to a case-by-case assessment ” To be sure “there is no clear consensus as to whether an act of cyber aggression could constitute a standalone violation of sovereignty or if it must implicate another rule such as non-intervention ” Jeff Kosseff Retorsion as a Response to Ongoing Malign Cyber Operation Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict 2020 at 12 See Tallinn Manual 2 0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 27 2017 hereinafter Tallinn Manual “Consider a case in which non-State actors are engaged in harmful cyber activities on a State’s territory against that State The State in question does not have the technical ability to put an end to those activities and therefore requests the assistance of another State The assisting State’s ensuing cyber operations on the other State’s territory would not violate the latter’s sovereignty as long as the operations remain within the scope of its consent ” Harriet Moynihan The Application of International Law to State Cyberattacks Sovereignty and Non-intervention 48 Chatham House Dec 2019 “A violation of sovereignty occurs when one state exercises authority in another state’s territory without consent in relation to an area over which the territorial state has the exclusive right to exercise its state powers independently ” The public descriptions of Hunt Forward operations suggest that one of the key benefits of Hunt Forward to the United States is learning about adversaries’ cyber tactics Such information-gathering—occurring on the physical territory of partner nations—does not violate adversaries’ sovereignty Under the majority view of international law the United States would not violate sovereignty even if the Hunt Forward operations resulted in the United States observing the adversary’s systems 36 Although cyber espionage is not per se a violation of international law the operations could cross the line to a sovereignty violation if they cause sufficient damage 37 To be clear the descriptions of Hunt Forward operations do not suggest espionage activities within the systems of adversaries much less operations that cause damage to those systems But such considerations are important when examining the permissible legal scope of future mutual cyber operations Likewise the descriptions of Hunt Forward do not suggest that US Hunt Forward operations include helping partner nations to penetrate adversaries’ systems and disable the capabilities that are at the source of the malign cyber acts But such actions would be a logical extension of Hunt Forward in future collaborative operations and allow both the United States and its allies to work together to cause adversaries to cease persistent cyber aggression that results in internationally wrongful acts Such operations might raise concerns about infringements of the adversaries’ sovereignty 38 Accordingly collaboration between the United States and its allies must either continue to avoid such operations on adversaries’ networks or be grounded in a legal justification that permits activities that would otherwise violate an international legal obligation owed to the adversary A plausible legal justification for such activities would be countermeasures which according to Michael Schmitt and Sean Watts are “non-forcible but otherwise 36 37 38 See Tallinn Manual supra note 35 at 168 “Although peacetime cyber espionage by States does not per se violate international law the method by which it is carried out might do so ” New Zealand The Application of International Law to State Activity in Cyberspace ¶ 14 2020 “There is a range of circumstances—in addition to pure espionage activity—in which an unauthorized cyber intrusion including one causing effects on the territory of another state would not be internationally wrongful ” Government of Canada supra note 34 at ¶ 19 “Importantly some cyber activities such as cyber espionage do not amount to a breach of territorial sovereignty and hence to a violation of international law They may however be prohibited under the national laws of a State ” but see Costa Rica’s Position on the Application of International Law in Cyberspace ¶ 22 “Furthermore surveillance operations may be carried out in ways that lead to breaches of State sovereignty or other rules of international law As such Costa Rica believes that in some circumstances cyber espionage may amount to a breach of State sovereignty ” See Tallinn Manual supra note 35 at 170 “For instance if organs of one State in order to extract data hack into the cyber infrastructure located in another State in a manner that results in a loss of functionality the cyber espionage operation violates in the view of the Experts the sovereignty of the latter ” See id at 21 “The Experts agreed that in addition to physical damage the remote causation of loss of functionality of cyber infrastructure located in another State sometimes constitutes a violation of sovereignty although no consensus could be achieved as to the precise threshold at which this is due to the lack of expressions of opinio juris in this regard ” Germany On the Application of International Law in Cyberspace Position Paper 4 2021 “If functional impairments result in substantive secondary or indirect physical effects in the territory of the target State and a sufficient causal link to the cyber operation can be established a violation of territorial sovereignty will appear highly probable ” 229 unlawful acts undertaken in response to another state’s breach of an international law obligation ”39 The commentary to the 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts states that “the commission by one State of an internationally wrongful act may justify another State injured by that act in taking non-forcible countermeasures in order to procure its cessation and to achieve reparation for the injury ”40 When states exercise countermeasures they face important limitations A state that is exercising countermeasures “may only take countermeasures against a State which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with its obligations” under international law 41 Among the many requirements of countermeasures is that they “are limited to the non-performance for the time being of international obligations of the State taking the measures towards the responsible State” and that they must “be taken in such a way as to permit the resumption of performance of the obligations in question ”42 Countermeasures are also subject to the rule of proportionality meaning that they “must be commensurate with the injury suffered taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question ”43 Accordingly for the purposes of the discussion of countermeasures in this paper let us assume that the adversary has committed an internationally wrongful act against the US ally For instance imagine that State A maintains an ongoing denial-of-service attack against government servers in State B a US ally Assuming that the denial-ofservice attack constitutes a breach of international legal obligations State B would be entitled to engage in proportional countermeasures against State A with the goal of terminating the internationally wrongful acts Indeed states widely recognize the availability of countermeasures to respond to internationally wrongful acts in cyberspace 44 and the Tallinn Manual takes a similar stance 45 While the ability of an injured state to exercise cyber countermeasures is generally accepted a more disputed issue is whether another state can lawfully exercise cyber countermeasures on behalf of the injured state In other words could the United 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 230 Michael N Schmitt Sean Watts Collective Cyber Countermeasures 12 Harvard Nat Sec J 373 377 2021 To the extent that the activities were unfriendly but did not violate an international legal obligation they could be justified as retorsion see Tallinn Manual supra note 35 at 112 but the sovereignty issues surrounding damage to an adversary’s computer make countermeasures a more likely justification Int’l Law Comm’n Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts Rep of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session U N Doc A 56 10 at 75 2001 hereinafter Draft Articles Draft Articles note 40 at 129 Id Id at 134 See e g New Zealand The Application of International Law to State Activity in Cyberspace ¶ 21 2020 Countermeasures “may include but are not limited to cyber activities that would otherwise be prohibited by international law ” Tallinn Manual supra note 35 at 111 “A State may be entitled to take countermeasures whether cyber in nature or not in response to a breach of an international legal obligation that is owed by another State ” States engage in countermeasures against State A on behalf of its injured ally State B The Draft Articles touch on issues related to such “collective countermeasures” but do not take an explicit position on their permissibility 46 Article 48 allows a non-injured state “to invoke the responsibility of another State” if “the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole ” but that does not explicitly address collective countermeasures 47 In the Draft Articles commentary the International Law Commission asserted that “there appears to be no clearly recognized entitlement of States referred to in article 48 to take countermeasures in the collective interest” and that therefore “it is not appropriate to include in the present articles a provision concerning the question whether other States identified in article 48 are permitted to take countermeasures in order to induce a responsible State to comply with its obligation ”48 James Crawford the International Law Commission’s special rapporteur at the time the articles were drafted later wrote that a proposal for collective countermeasures was too divisive for inclusion 49 Most national position statements about international law in cyberspace say nothing about collective countermeasures The experts who drafted the Tallinn Manual were divided as to their permissibility Most of the experts concluded that “purported countermeasures taken on behalf of another State are unlawful ” but a minority concluded that “a non-injured State may conduct countermeasures as a response to an internationally wrongful act committed against an injured State so long as the latter request that it do so ”50 The experts were more closely divided as to whether “a State may assist another State in conducting the latter’s countermeasures ”51 The question of the permissibility of collective countermeasures reemerged nearly twenty years after the publication of the Draft Articles and two years after the publication of the second edition of the Tallinn Manual At the 2019 International Conference on Cyber Conflict CyCon Estonian president Kersti Kaljulaid announced Estonia’s stance that “states which are not directly injured may apply countermeasures to support the state directly affected by the malicious cyber operation ”52 Since then some other countries have embraced that position In its December 2020 statement on international law in cyberspace New Zealand said that it was “open to the 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 See Jeff Kosseff Collective Countermeasures in Cyberspace 10 Notre Dame J Int’l Comp Law 18 24 2020 “The lengthy and spirited debate is evident in the text of the Draft Articles which do not directly address the legality of collective countermeasures but dance around the issue quite a bit ” Draft Articles supra note 40 at 126 Id at 139 James Crawford The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts A Retrospect 96 Am J Int’l L 874 884 2002 “Although the proposal received a degree of support both within and outside the ILC some governments strongly opposed it In the end discretion seemed the better part of valor particularly having regard to the interaction of these issues with the general mandate of the Security Council ” Tallinn Manual supra note 35 at 132 Id President Kaljulaid at CyCon 2019 Cyber Attacks Should Not Be an Easy Weapon ERR News May 29 2019 https news err ee 946827 president-kaljulaid-at-cycon-2019-cyber-attacks-should-not-be-easyweapon 231 proposition that victim states in limited circumstances may request assistance from other states in applying proportionate countermeasures to induce compliance by the state acting in breach of international law ”53 In a stronger endorsement of collective countermeasures Costa Rica maintained in its cyber law position statement that “States may respond collectively to cyber or non-cyber operations that amount to internationally wrongful acts by resorting to cyber or non-cyber countermeasures ”54 And Ireland stated in 2023 that collective countermeasures “are permissible in limited circumstances ”55 Some countries have questioned or rejected Estonia’s position on collective countermeasures Canada while open to the general concept of assisting an injured state noted that it considered collective countermeasures but “does not to date see sufficient State practice or opinio juris to conclude that these are permitted under international law ”56 And France went further in its refusal to recognize the concept stating that “collective counter-measures are not authorised which rules out the possibility of France taking such measures in response to an infringement of another State’s rights ”57 The success of Hunt Forward weighs in favor of broader global acceptance of collective cyber countermeasures To be sure the United States has consistently characterized Hunt Forward as purely defensive and has not described any operations that would need to be justified as countermeasures But acceptance of collective countermeasures in cyberspace would provide such operations with breathing space to collaborate more effectively 58 Collective countermeasures would allow collaborative operations to expand from merely helping partners identify and analyze threats on their systems such as Hunt Forward to also helping the partners stop malicious activities at their source For instance consider a small state whose local-government computer systems are routinely targeted by malicious code transmitted by a larger adversarial nation The malware often prevents the local governments from conducting their daily business and serving constituents Such malign actions likely violate international legal obligations and would entitle the target state to engage in limited and proportionate 53 54 55 56 57 58 232 New Zealand The Application of International Law to State Activity in Cyberspace ¶ 22 2020 Costa Rica’s Position supra note 36 at ¶ 15 Ireland Position Paper on the Application of International Law in Cyberspace ¶ 26 “The possibility of imposing third party or collective countermeasures in the cyber context is particularly relevant for states that may consider it necessary to respond to a malicious cyber-operation with a counter-operation but lack the technological capacity to do so on their own ” Government of Canada supra note 34 at ¶ 37 Canada took a middle ground reasoning that “assistance can be provided on request of an injured State for example where the injured State does not possess all the technical or legal expertise to respond to internationally wrongful cyber acts However decisions as to possible responses remain solely with the injured State ” Id France International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace Paper shared by France with the OpenEnded Working Group Established by Resolution 75 240 at 4 See Schmitt Watts supra note 39 at 410 “The unique nature of cyberspace suggests a need for greater tolerance of countermeasures ” countermeasures intended to terminate the malign actions For example the small state might remotely disable the adversary’s computer systems that are the source of the malware But imagine that the small state lacks the skills knowledge and staffing to implement such an operation 59 Under the doctrine of collective countermeasures US Hunt Forward teams could either directly conduct the operation against the adversary or assist the small state in doing so Such an operation not only would benefit the small state by stopping the malign operations on its systems but also would benefit the United States by weakening the source of a potential future operation against US systems A legitimate criticism of collective cyber countermeasures is that they are susceptible to abuse and could escalate tensions While such concerns are understandable they could be mitigated by the fact that the same limits that are imposed on countermeasures in the offline world would apply in cyberspace For instance countermeasures must be “proportional ” meaning “commensurate with the injury suffered taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question ”60 In the example above a permissible countermeasure might include knocking an adversary’s computer offline if that computer had been the source of the malware but it would not be proportional to mount a broader attack on a larger telecommunications system The collective countermeasures can only have the purpose of causing the adversary to “comply with its obligations” under international law 61 and the states must terminate their countermeasures “as soon as the responsible State has complied with its obligations” under international law 62 In other words collective cyber countermeasures would not be a blank check for non-injured states to attack adversaries and escalate tensions 63 To be sure my proposal would require a significant expansion of collaboration beyond the current purely defensive Hunt Forward construct It would require different personnel moving beyond only the Cyberspace Protection Teams that focus on defending cyberspace and toward teams that work on Defensive Cyberspace Operations-Response Actions or Offensive Cyberspace Operations While the legal issues surrounding my proposal are more complex and the risk of escalation increases the success of the current Hunt Forward model suggests that the United States and its allies have good reason to embrace the model of collective countermeasures and collaborate with allies not only in gathering information and fixing harm but by preventing further aggression by adversaries 59 60 61 62 63 Id at 377–78 “The lack of collective responses to international law breaches would render self-help through countermeasures impossible for many weak states If forced to respond alone they would not be able to induce more powerful responsible states to cease unlawful activity ” Draft Articles supra note 40 at 134 Id at 129 Id at 137 See Kosseff supra note 46 at 32 “That is why collective countermeasures would be subject to all of the limitations that apply to countermeasures taken by the target state It also would be reasonable to impose additional responsible limits on third parties seeking to engage in collective countermeasures ” 233 4 CONCLUSION The first five years of Hunt Forward operations have demonstrated substantial benefits not only for partner nations but also for the United States By helping allies identify the source of malicious cyber operations on their networks the United States gains valuable intelligence that it can use on domestic security Provided that the United States has clear and specific authorization from the partner nation Hunt Forward operations as publicly described do not raise concerns under international law Broader acceptance of collective countermeasures would enable the United States and its partners to further leverage collaboration to degrade the capability of adversaries While concerns about the misuse of collective countermeasures are legitimate the international community could address many of those concerns by applying the same limits that nations face under the general law of countermeasures including proportionality and limits on purpose and duration Expanding collaboration beyond Hunt Forward through the embrace of collective countermeasures would more fully realize the benefits of Defend Forward and persistent engagement 234