International Legal Perspectives on Cyber Operations A Common Baseline for NATO Allies Dr Agnes Kasper and Karine Veersalu NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre Of Excellence Forthcoming in NATO Legal Gazette Issue 44 ‘Legal Perspective on NATO and Fifth Generation Warfare’ About the authors Agnes Kasper PhD is the Head of Law Branch at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence CCDCOE She is also a Senior Lecturer of Law and Technology in the Department of Law of the Tallinn University of Technology TalTech She is a co-author of the ’Handbook on Developing a National Position on International Law and Cyber Activities A Practical Guide for States’ the collaborative project led by University of Exeter with NATO CCDCOE Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and may not necessarily represent the views of the CCDCOE Karine Veersalu is a former law researcher at the NATO CCDCOE where her work focused on the research and analysis of State positions and national cyber strategies and supporting the development of the ‘Handbook on Developing a National Position on International Law and Cyber Activities A Practical Guide for States ’ She holds a bachelor’s degree in law from Tallinn University of Technology and is completing her LLM at Lund University The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and may not necessarily represent the views of the affiliated institutions CCDCOE The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence CCDCOE is a NATO-accredited knowledge hub offering a unique interdisciplinary approach to the most relevant issues in cyber defence The heart of the CCDCOE is a diverse group of international experts from military government academia and industry currently representing 39 nations The CCDCOE maintains its position as an internationally recognised cyber defence hub a premier source of subject-matter expertise and a fundamental resource in the strategic legal operational and technical aspects of cyber defence The Centre offers thought leadership on the cutting edge of all aspects of cyber defence and provides a 360-degree view of the sector The Centre encourages and supports the process of mainstreaming cybersecurity into NATO and national governance and capability within its closely connected focus areas of technology strategy operations and law The Tallinn Manual prepared at the invitation of the CCDCOE is the most comprehensive guide for policy advisers and legal experts on how international law applies to cyber operations carried out between and against states and non-state actors Since 2010 the Centre has organised Locked Shields the biggest and most complex technical live-fire cyber defence challenge in the world Each year Locked Shields gives cybersecurity experts the opportunity to enhance their skills in defending national ITsystems and critical infrastructure under real-time attacks The focus is on realistic scenarios cuttingedge technologies and simulating the entire complexity of a massive cyber incident including strategic decision-making and legal and communication aspects The CCDCOE hosts the International Conference on Cyber Conflict CyCon a unique annual event in Tallinn bringing together key experts and decision makers from the global cyber defence community The conference which has taken place in Tallinn since 2009 attracts more than 600 participants each spring The CCDCOE is responsible for identifying and coordinating education and training solutions in the field of cyber defence operations for all NATO bodies across the Alliance NATO-accredited centres of excellence are not part of the NATO Command Structure www ccdcoe org publications@ccdcoe org Disclaimer This publication is a product of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence the Centre It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of the Centre or NATO The Centre may not be held responsible for any loss or harm arising from the use of information contained in this publication and is not responsible for the content of the external sources including external websites referenced in this publication Digital or hard copies of this publication may be produced for internal use within NATO and for personal or educational use when for non-profit and non-commercial purpose provided that copies bear a full citation 3 Table of Contents Abstract 5 1 Introduction 6 2 Overall trends in NATO 7 3 Key areas of convergence 9 3 1 Application of international law 9 3 2 Sovereignty 9 3 3 Non-intervention 11 3 4 Use of force 12 3 5 Due Diligence 13 3 6 International Human Rights Law 14 3 7 State responsibility 15 Attribution 15 Responses 16 3 8 International Humanitarian Law 19 Attack in armed conflict 20 Military objectives 20 4 Conclusions 22 4 Abstract The overall international legal framework has not changed in the last few decades What has changed is the maturity of the discussion and understanding on how the existing rules apply to the use of information and communication technologies The year 2024 marked a turning point and now the majority of NATO Member States either have an individual national position or joined a common understanding on the application of international law in ‘cyberspace’ Since cyber operations are often covert classified deniable or technically ambiguous and most applicable international rules are technology neutral verbal and written practice particularly these elaborate national and common positions carry exceptional importance This short article focuses primarily on areas where Allies agree areas of convergence among NATO Member States leaving the discussion of divergences for another occasion Analysing the published national positions of Member States and the EU’s common understanding this article maps out the convergence areas or a ‘common baseline’ within NATO which can be of immense value for furthering legal interoperability and doctrinal development in the field of cyber operations particularly in the light of the ongoing review of the Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyber Operations AJP 3 20 and can potentially serve as a foundation for a formally agreed NATO common position in the future It is timely for NATO to take onboard the collective understanding of Allies about how international law applies to cyber activities 5 1 Introduction Legal scholarly debate about the ’Law of the Horse’ emerged with the spread of information and communication technologies ICTs in the mid-1990s Judge Frank H Easterbrook argued that cyberspace does not call for an entirely new specialized body of law just as there would be no need for a distinct regime – the law of the horse – for the many cases involving sale injury care etc for horses In his words an attempt to do so would be ‘doomed to be shallow and to miss unifying principles’ 1 In his seminal article and book Lawrence Lessig famously countered that cyberspace does necessitate new legal considerations though existing legal doctrines should remain as a starting point that may need to be reinterpreted or tailored to accommodate regulation of technical design 2 Today Easterbrook’s and Lessig’s debate regarding domestic law has settled on the agreement that new technologies should be governed by general established rules which may need adaptations This suggestion is just as useful for international law and since its general rules are technology neutral 3 they remain valid for all technologies as also confirmed in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion 4 of the International Court of Justice ICJ The applicability of international law in cyberspace and cyber activities had been a matter of controversy until the mid-2010s Discussions on responsible State behaviour in cyberspace have progressed through various global and regional fora including initially at the United Nations UN Group of Governmental Experts GGE and later the UN Open-ended Working Groups OEWG In 2013 the GGE came to the landmark conclusion that ‘international law and in particular the UN Charter is applicable and is essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open secure peaceful and accessible ICT environment’ 5 which was also endorsed by the UN General Assembly later that year 6 While a marginal minority of States continue to put forward proposals for a new global cyberspace convention 7 by today more than one hundred States8 have expressed their positions in some form 9 on how existing international rules apply to cyber activities Easterbrook F H 1996 Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse 1996 University of Chicago Legal Forum 207 Available at https chicagounbound uchicago edu cgi viewcontent cgi article 2147 context journal_articles 2 ‘the Code’ - Lessig L 1999 The law of the horse What cyberlaw might teach Harvard Law Review 113 501 501-546 Available at https cyber harvard edu works lessig finalhls pdf 3 Dapo Akande Antonio Coco Talita de Souza Dias Drawing the Cyber Baseline The Applicability of Existing International Law to the Governance of Information and Communication Technologies 2022 International Law Studies 4 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion 1996 ICJ Rep 226 paras 39 85 86 5 UN General Assembly Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security A 68 98 24 June 2013 6 United Nations General Assembly Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security adopted 27 December 2013 UN Doc A RES 68 243 7 These include eg China Cuba Iran Pakistan and Russia 8 Key EU Messages UN Open-Ended Working Group on the use of ICTs in the context of international security ‘Norms and International Law’ Statement on behalf of the EU and its Member States 7 July 2025 https docslibrary unoda org Open-Ended_Working_Group_on_Information_and_Communication_Technologies__ 2021 2025-07-07_OEWG_Cyber_July_2025_EU_Statement_Norms_and_International_Law_FINAL pdf accessed 15 January 2026 9 Publishing a position may be done in a national context or collectively in a common position Also the format varies States may give preference to speeches UN Statements standalone written documents or academic articles See Chapter 5 on Format in Mačák K Dias T Kasper Á 2025 Handbook on Developing a National Position on International Law and Cyber Activities A Practical Guide for States pp 125-147 Available at Handbook-on-Developing-a-National-Position-on-International-Law-and-Cyber-Activities_A-Practical-Guide-forStates pdf 1 6 2 Overall trends in NATO Many NATO Member States have issued national positions since 2012 and the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration paragraph 72 10 established a landmark shift in NATO policy formally recognizing that international law applies in cyberspace 11 Some Member States – being also part of the European Union EU – expressed their positions via the 2024 Declaration on a Common Understanding of International Law in Cyberspace adopted by the Council of the European Union 12 The following table lists NATO Members that have issued an individual national position indicating the year s of the document s see Table 1 The table also notes NATO Member States that have not issued an individual national position to date but are part of the EU’s Common Understanding Table 1 Overview of national and common positions relevant for NATO Allies Source Cyber Law Toolkit https cyberlaw ccdcoe org A comprehensive list of publicly available national and common positions on the application of international law to cyber operations with additional analytical tools and links to the original texts is maintained in the CyberLaw Toolkit managed by the University of Exeter NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence CCDCOE and the National Cyber and Information Security Agency of the Czech Republic NUKIB 13 Since cyber operations are often covert classified deniable or technically ambiguous and most applicable international rules are technology neutral verbal and written practice particularly the elaborate national and common positions carry exceptional importance 14 Existing national and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Wales Summit Declaration NATO 5 September 2014 https www nato int cps en natohq official_texts_112964 htm accessed 15 January 2026 11 While the 2014 Declaration and many other documents use the wording ’international law applicable in cyberspace’ or similar logically this may not be entirely correct as activities are not taking place in cyberspace but States rather use cyberspace cyber measures or ICTs to create certain effects or to achieve various objectives While observing this the authors also acknowledge that national and common positions as well as many other documents may opt for the use of this term Terminology remains an unsettled issue to date 12 Council of the European Union Declaration on a Common Understanding of International Law in Cyberspace 15833 24 18 November 2024 Available at https data consilium europa eu doc document ST-15833-2024INIT en pdf 13 The CyberLaw Toolkit at https cyberlaw ccdcoe org hosts a collection of national and common positions 14 The precise legal significance of national and common positions is currently unsettled During the three roundtable discussions co-organized by the authors in 2024 most State officials from the 46 participating States have considered two aspects national positions can be seen as interpretation of treaty law eg Un Charter or 10 7 common positions on international law and cyber activities cover a very wide range of legal issues including views on the application of foundational rules and principles 15 specialized regimes 16 and the law of State responsibility 17 etc While these positions serve many functions 18 they are also useful in mapping out areas of convergence divergence and possible gaps in the existing legal framework Moreover particularly the common positions are a testament to the possibility of constructive dialogue and progress that States have already made on reaching common understandings despite legal differences This short article focuses primarily on areas where Allies agree areas of convergence among NATO Member States leaving the discussion of divergences for another occasion Analysing the published national positions of Member States and the EU’s common understanding this article maps out the convergence areas or a ‘common baseline’ within NATO which can be of immense value for furthering legal interoperability and doctrinal development in the field of cyber operations and can potentially serve as a foundation for a formally agreed NATO common position in the future The year 2024 marked a turning point and now the majority of NATO Member States either have a national position or joined a common understanding on the application of international law in ‘cyberspace’ However two notes of caution are merited First the degree of granularity in the different positions varies making it difficult to draw conclusions on issues where States have decided to remain silent Second this field is highly dynamic and some States are reportedly developing their national positions even if they have signed up for the EU common understanding 19 or reviewing their existing positions 20 Therefore the findings in this study should be treated as a snapshot of convergences at the beginning of 2026 21 Geneva Conventions and national positions can qualify as expressions of opinio juris or evidence of State practice as in customary international law Few participants suggested that national positions may ’double-count’ as opinio juris and State practice See more on this Chapter 1 on Motivations in Mačák K Dias T Kasper Á 2025 Handbook on Developing a National Position on International Law and Cyber Activities A Practical Guide for States pp 18-21 Available at Handbook-on-Developing-a-National-Position-on-International-Law-and-CyberActivities_A-Practical-Guide-for-States pdf 15 Such as sovereignty non-intervention use of force armed attack due diligence etc 16 Such as human rights law international humanitarian law international criminal law etc 17 Including attribution countermeasures plea of necessity etc 18 See Chapter 2 on Motivations in Mačák K Dias T Kasper Á 2025 Handbook on Developing a National Position on International Law and Cyber Activities A Practical Guide for States pp 22-43 Available at Handbookon-Developing-a-National-Position-on-International-Law-and-Cyber-Activities_A-Practical-Guide-for-States pdf 19 Eg during the writing of this article at the end of 2025 Belgium published its national views while it is also part of the EU’s common position 20 For example Estonia is planning to revise its national position as announced by Dr Rene Värk legal director at Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the CyCon 2025 conference in the plenary session ‘From Theory to Practice Developing a National Position on International Law in Cyberspace” on 29 th May 2025 Video available at https youtu be _o93N97jhG0 si TueLeQ5-2wyBStC1 21 Full references to national and common positions are omitted these can be found at the CyberLaw Toolkit available at https cyberlaw ccdcoe org wiki List_of_articles#Common_and_national_positions 8 3 Key areas of convergence 3 1 Application of international law All national positions of NATO Member States consistently affirm that international law applies to State uses of ICTs 22 This affirmation often found near the start of the position paper usually contains a general acknowledgement of the UN GGE and OEWG processes and the conclusions reached therein and a statement of the applicability of the UN Charter international humanitarian law and international human rights law which are then further expanded upon in detail NATO as an alliance has likewise affirmed as early as in 2014 the baseline that ‘international law including international humanitarian law and the UN Charter applies in cyberspace’ recognizing that cyber operations could threaten collective security 23 Moreover the Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations AJP-3 20 also recognizes that NATO cyber operations and cyber operations contributed by the Member States on behalf of the alliance are to be carried out in accordance with international law including the UN Charter international humanitarian law and international human rights law 24 Thus the general applicability of international law to cyber activities is not contested in and of itself but it is rather how the established rules operate in practice that calls for further clarification NATO Member States have maintained in their positions that existing international law is fit for governing the use of ICT’s with several States additionally implicitly or explicitly adding that they do not see a need for new rules for this purpose 25 3 2 Sovereignty All national and common positions on the application of international law to cyber activities including those of the NATO Allies address the principle of sovereignty in their statements There is a general consensus that sovereignty as a core principle of international law applies to State use of ICTs 26 However cyberspace in addition to a physical layer comprising hardware like computers cables and physical infrastructure rooted in a State’s territory consists also of data flows virtual networks and interconnected cyber-infrastructure that are not easily viewed through a strictly territorial lens 27 This can therefore pose novel challenges to the application of the ‘traditional’ concept of sovereignty in cyberspace Questions remain regarding this principle’s exact legal character – whether it is a standalone rule the violation of which may give rise to State responsibility – a view reflected in the See eg the national positions of Belgium Canada Czechia Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Poland Romania Sweden the UK the US as well as the common position of the EU 23 NATO Wales Summit Declaration Press Release 5 September 2014 available at https www nato int cps en natohq official_texts_112964 htm para 72 24 NATO 2020 January Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations AJP-3 20 Edition A Version 1 NATO Standardization Office Available at https assets publishing service gov uk media 5f086ec4d3bf7f2bef137675 doctrine_nato_cyberspace_operations _ajp_3_20_1_ pdf para 3 3 25 For States that have explicitly expressed this see eg the national positions of Belgium Czechia Estonia 2021 Norway Romania Sweden and the US 2012 26 UN General Assembly Draft Final Report of the Open-ended working group on security of and in the use of information and communication technologies 2021-2025 A AC 292 2025 CRP 1 11 July 2025 paras 41 a and e 27 Harriet Moynihan The Application of International Law to State Cyberattacks Sovereignty and Non-intervention Chatham House 2019 pp 13-15 22 9 majority of the examined State positions 28 or a principle which merely guides State interactions but does not constitute a rule in itself capable of being violated 29 While a further analysis of the divergence of these views is beyond the scope of this article it still leaves open the question of how States should treat cyber operations that fall below the threshold of non-intervention and use of force Aside from the debate on the legal nature of the principle a common denominator in the examined positions is that all Member States recognise that sovereignty should nevertheless be considered when conducting cyber operations 30 Thus this disagreement should not undermine the significant number of examples and practical criteria for violation of sovereignty to occur that States have expressed in their positions This has created more predictability and transparency around what criteria they use in their operational planning to evaluate cyber operations that could potentially be considered as encroaching on their own or another States’ sovereignty The accumulation of State and common positions now provides clearer guidance for identifying such thresholds of potentially wrongful conduct and violation of sovereignty While there is no agreement on the exact threshold for the necessary effects or harm and many States have argued for a lower one 31 there seems to be at least a broader understanding that at a minimum cyber operations causing substantial harmful effects on the territory of another State such as physical damage injury loss or death would highly likely be regarded by most States as a breach of sovereignty 32 At the same time not all non-consensual cyber operations are considered unlawful – several States seem to generally agree that cyber operations that have negligible or de minimis effects would not constitute a violation of international law 33 In any case States agree that all incidents should be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration their scope scale impact and severity 34 The majority of national positions issued to date converge in that a breach of a State’s sovereignty may constitute a violation giving rise to State responsibility From NATO Member States the positions that support this view include eg the national positions of Belgium Canada Czechia Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Poland Romania and Sweden as well as the common position of the EU 29 This view is mainly embraced by the UK see the UK’s positions from 2018 2021 and 2022 as well as supported by the US that has consistently held in its earlier positions that ‘there is not sufficiently widespread and consistent State practice to conclude that customary international law generally prohibits such non-consensual cyber operations falling below the threshold of prohibited intervention or use of force in another State’s territory ’ In its most recent 2021 position the US considers that ‘in certain circumstances one State’s non-consensual cyber operation in another State’s territory even if it falls below the threshold of a use of force or non-intervention could also violate international law ’ but that remote cyber operations would not constitute a violation per se and that ‘there is no absolute prohibition on such operations’ 30 Since all examined positions consider sovereignty it would be difficult to claim that in practice it should not be considered or it is somehow irrelevant even if it is ‘only’ a principle Also both Canada and the UK each a proponent of the two different approaches of treating sovereignty in cyberspace have stated that the differing viewpoints should not prevent States from assessing and achieving a consensus on when particular conduct can constitute an internationally wrongful act See the national positions of Canada para 21 and the UK 2021 para 10 31 Several States reject the notion that the effects or harm need to amount to physical damage in order to constitute a violation of sovereignty citing examples of ransomware that encrypts computers and disables the payment of pensions Czechia deletion or modification of data without resulting in physical damage or loss of functionality Denmark Finland Norway Sweden non-physical software-related impairments Germany exercising investigative powers in a cross-border context the Netherlands blocking digital communication between public bodies and citizens to interfere with the delivery of social services Norway and theft erasure or public disclosure of data Poland See also the national position of Belgium which does not cite specific examples but does affirm that ‘It is not excluded that a cyber operation that takes place on the territory of another State and does not cause loss of functionality or physical damage may nevertheless violate the sovereignty of a state ’ 32 See eg the national positions of Belgium Canada Czechia Denmark Finland France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Poland Romania and Sweden 33 See eg the national positions of Canada Czechia Denmark Germany and the US 2016 2021 34 See eg the national positions of Canada Czechia Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Norway and Sweden 28 10 3 3 Non-intervention Allies’ positions converge on the view that the principle of non-intervention is a foundational principle of international law and apart from the earliest statements most positions elaborate on its nature elements and examples in detail The precise terms used slightly vary preferences are given both to use ‘the principle of non-intervention’ or ‘non-intervention’ and also the synonymous ‘prohibition of intervention’ or ‘prohibition on unlawful intervention’ There is no difference in the content of the rule The prohibition of intervention stems from State sovereignty and the sovereign equality of States It applies only to State conduct but not to non-State actors unless their conduct is attributable to a State There is agreement that non-intervention is not only a principle but it is a primary rule that is capable of being violated Most States have unequivocally declared that it is part of customary international law 35 Several positions refer to or cite the Nicaragua judgement36 of the ICJ as legal authority supporting their reasoning 37 The prohibition of intervention is fully applicable to cyber activities A breach of this rule may occur if two cumulative conditions are met the conduct involves interference in the domaine réservé or the sovereign affairs of the target State and the conduct is coercive Several positions point out that the domaine réservé refers to matters within internal or external affairs of States and list examples such as the choice to decide freely on political economic social cultural systems or the formulation of foreign policy To further clarify the application of this rule in the cyber context the majority of Member States specify cases which may be qualified as falling within the States’ domain réservé in cyberspace e g tampering with electoral processes using ICTs 38 or interfering with cloud services or networks 39 or more generally via cyber vector within the target State’s territory or within its jurisdiction Interference must also be coercive to qualify as unlawful intervention under international law However coercion is not defined in international law Therefore the national positions are key to clarifying its actual meaning Use of force can be one of the most serious forms of coercion Several Allies point out that coercion is also distinguished from lower intensity influence operations propaganda public diplomacy and other ways of persuasion as these latter are insufficient to qualify as intervention 40 This is not to say that all influence and disinformation operations fall outside of this category 41 But what matters is certainly the consequences or for some Member States the intent and design of the measures to achieve coercive effect 43 Therefore as a common baseline for the Allies’ positions coercive interference needs to rise to the scale and effect that it deprives the target State the freedom of choice with regard to its sovereign affairs and a case-by-case assessment is needed Virtually all See eg the national positions of Belgium Norway the US and the UK as well as the common position of the EU 36 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Nicaragua v United States of America Merits Judgment I C J Reports 1986 37 See eg the national positions of Belgium Czechia Denmark Estonia Finland Germany Sweden the UK and the US as well as the common positions of the EU 38 See eg the national positions of Belgium Canada Norway UK US Czechia Denmark Finland Germany Italy and the EU’s common position 39 See the EU’s common position 40 See eg the national positions of Canada Czechia Denmark Finland Germany the Netherlands Norway Poland Sweden the UK and the US 41 See eg the national position of Germany ‘ but disinformation campaigns leading to scale and effect also may also amount to violation…’ Poland ‘ disinformation campaign with scale and effect also may…’ 43 See the terms ‘coercive effect’ used in the national positions of Canada and Estonia ‘methods of coercion’ in the national position of Czechia ‘potential of compelling’ and ‘designed to have decisive impact’ in the national position of Denmark ‘purpose to compel’ ‘but cyber measure must be of serious nature’ in the national position of Finland ‘State’s will manifestly bent’ and reference to intention in the national position of Germany ‘coercive impact’ in the national position of Italy ‘goal must be to effect’ in the national position of the Netherlands ‘narrow rule’ ‘designed to coerce’ includes attempts to interfere coercively in the national position of the US ‘directly or indirectly coercive interference’ in the common position of the EU 35 11 Allies agree that a cyber operation tampering with election systems of the target State can constitute prohibited intervention if it is attributable to a State 44 3 4 Use of force The prohibition of the threat or use of force enshrined in Article 2 4 of the UN Charter is a peremptory norm of general international law and it features in all of the examined national and common positions The prohibition undoubtedly applies to the conduct of State actors in the cyber context Allies’ positions uniformly confirm that in assessing when a cyber operation amounts to a use of force the emphasis is on the effects and not the means of the operation A cyber operation will fall within the scope of Article 2 4 if its consequences are comparable to those produced by a conventional use of force such as death injury destruction or significant physical damage Examples repeatedly cited include cyber operations causing the malfunction or damage of critical infrastructure or leading to accidents such as the crash of an aircraft 45 Many of the Allies are open to the interpretation that non-physical consequences46 of cyber operations may also be taken into account in determining whether a cyber operation potentially in combination with effects of other operations crossed the threshold of the use of force 47 All Member States agree that the assessment must be made on a case-by-case basis Some See eg the national positions of Belgium Canada Czechia Denmark Finland Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Poland Romania the UK the US and the reference to ‘ICT systems cloud-services and networks” in the common position of the EU 45 See eg the national position of Poland ‘An action in cyberspace that leads to a permanent and significant damage of a power plant a missile defence system deactivation or taking control over an aircraft or a passenger ship and causing an accident with significant effects may be considered the use of force” national position of UK 2018 ‘If it would be a breach of international law to bomb an air traffic control tower with the effect of downing civilian aircraft then it will be a breach of international law to use a hostile cyber operation to disable air traffic control systems which results in the same ultimately lethal effects” national position of US 2012 ‘Commonly cited examples of cyber activity that would constitute a use of force include for example 1 operations that trigger a nuclear plant meltdown 2 operations that open a dam above a populated area causing destruction or 3 operations that disable air traffic control resulting in airplane crashes” 46 For some States this may also include also severe economic loss see eg national positions of Denmark Netherlands Norway 47 See eg ‘With regard to the precise interpretation of the term force and the question as to whether economic or political coercion can qualify as use of force Denmark considers that it generally cannot be ruled out that acts of economic or political coercion can fall within the purview of Article 2 4 of the UN Charter if for example a cyber operation resulting in the malfunctioning of a State’s financial system leads to significant economic damage” national position of Denmark ‘A question has also been raised whether a cyberattack producing significant economic effects such as the collapse of a State’s financial system or parts of its economy should be equated to an armed attack This question merits further consideration” national position of Finland ‘France does not rule out the possibility that a cyberoperation without physical effects may also be characterised as a use of force” national positions of France ‘While it is generally accepted that cyber operations resulting in material damage can constitute a use of force we consider the qualification of cyber operations which merely cause loss of functionality a controversial one The inclusion of such operations in the scope of the prohibition of the use of force however could be justified if one considers that because of the reliance of modern societies on computers computer systems and networks cyber technologies have enabled States to cause the interruption of essential services without the need of physical damage” national position of Italy ‘Armed force that has a real or potential physical impact on the target state is prohibited ’ In the view of the government at this time it cannot be ruled out that a cyber operation with a very serious financial or economic impact may qualify as the use of force” national position of the Netherlands ‘ T he use of crypto viruses or other forms of digital sabotage against a State’s financial and banking system or other operations that cause widespread economic effects and destabilisation may amount to the use of force in violation of Article 2 4 ” national position of Norway ‘Modern societies have come to rely heavily on ICT which can be disrupted its usage prevented or denied or its workings altered by a cyber operation without resulting in any physical damage A cyber operation can have far-reaching adverse effects or cause severe interruption of daily life Depending on the circumstances the combined effects of several cyber operations could taken together be comparable to a kinetic use of force” common position of the EU 44 12 Member States refer to contextual48 and further factors in such assessments and frequently point to inter alia the criteria of severity and immediacy of the effects as offered in the Tallinn Manual 2 0 49 A recurring theme in the positions is the references to the ICJ’s jurisprudence concerning the use of force Czechia France Germany the Netherlands Norway Poland Romania and Sweden point to specific ICJ cases50 and or use citations regarding the thresholds of use of force and armed attack Most States unequivocally distinguish between the two and follow the view of the ICJ that ‘armed attack’ is considered as the gravest form of the use of force in other words a use of force does not always constitute an armed attack Only the US’ position indicates an alternative view using the formulation ‘use of force armed attack’ hence not distinguishing between the relevant thresholds but also expressly recognizing that other States may disagree 51 3 5 Due Diligence The issue of due diligence features in all examined positions and opinions converge that it refers to a standard of conduct that applies in the cyber context Generally this standard of conduct derives from two sources first the principle formulated by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case that it is ‘every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States’ 52 Second the ‘no-harm’ principle recognized in the Trail Smelter case53 also reflected by the International Law Commission Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities 54 All Member States examine whether due diligence is also a binding rule but they differ in their approaches and conclusions While the 2021 UK and US positions conclude that due diligence does not currently constitute a binding obligation of international law 55 Canada’s position which is rather ambiguous in this respect also uses the terms ‘should’ and ‘expectation’ but not ‘must’ and ‘obligation’ which may signal the voluntary and non-binding nature of the norm 56 Due diligence is currently recognized as a non-binding norm in the cyber context and the UN General Assembly has endorsed both the 2015 and 2021 GGA reports which elaborate on Norm 13 c that ‘States should not knowingly See eg the national positions of Czechia Denmark Finland France Germany the Netherlands Norway and the US 49 See Rule 69 of the Tallinn Manual 2 0 these factors are a severity b immediacy c directness d invasiveness e measurability of effects f military character g State involvement h presumptive legality Tallinn Manual 2 0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations prepared by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Cambridge University Press 2017 50 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Nicaragua v United States of America Merits Judgment I C J Reports 1986 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion I C J Reports 1996 51 This view is expressed in the 24 April 2024 speech of Richard C Visek Principal Deputy Legal Adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U S Department of State serving as the Acting Legal Adviser ‘Many States that have published views also agree that the inherent right of self-defense may be triggered by and exercised through cyber means In this regard it is important to recall that many States—although notably not the United States— distinguish between a use of force which in their view may not give rise to the right to use force in self-defense and an armed attack which would” See Richard C Visek The 2024 Arlin M and Neysa Adams Lecture International Law and Cyberspace Building Consensus Temple Law Review vol 97 no 1 Fall 2024 pdf at https www templelawreview org lawreview assets uploads 2025 01 Visek_International-Law-and-Cyberspace pdf accessed 17 January 2026 52 Corfu Channel United Kingdom v Albania Merits Judgment I C J Reports 1949 para 22 53 Trail Smelter United States v Canada Arbitral Tribunal 16 April 1938 11 March 1941 Reports of International Arbitral Awards RIAA vol III 54 International Law Commission Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities with commentaries 2001 U N Doc A 56 10 55 See eg the national positions of the UK and the US 56 See eg the national position of Canada 48 13 allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs’ 57 There remains however a lack of clarity regarding the legal character of due diligence also outside of the context of cyber activities 58 and what States appear to really agree on is the importance of the due diligence and that the topic requires further study 59 However the majority of Allies agree that due diligence is a binding obligation 60 hence all of their positions confirm the existence of at least an expectation to take reasonable steps if a State is notified about harmful activities emanating from its territory There is agreement on the key elements of due diligence These include the expectation of certain standard of conduct taking appropriate reasonably available and feasible steps to address the harmful activity but not necessarily a specific result by the State from whose territory the harmful activity emanates prerequisite knowledge to trigger the expectation no presumption of State responsibility for the harmful act itself no expectation to monitor all ICT activities within a territory 3 6 International Human Rights Law There is a clear and established consensus among States that international human rights law applies to State uses of ICTs 63 States therefore have both a negative duty to refrain from unlawful interference with human rights and a positive duty to protect individuals’ rights and these obligations apply online in the same way as offline 64 Member States acknowledge however that certain human rights are of particular relevance in the digital environment Key issues that the Allies have consistently raised in their positions include the freedoms of expression and opinion 65 the right to privacy 66 the freedoms of assembly and association 67 and the right to access information 68 While these themes remain central there also appear to be several emerging issues that States seem to be considering and increasingly incorporating into their national UN General Assembly Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security UN Doc A 70 174 22 July 2015 endorsed by UNGA Res 70 237 23 December 2015 UN General Assembly Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security UN Doc A 76 135 14 July 2021 endorsed by UNGA Res 76 19 6 December 2021 58 See International Law Commission Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its seventy-fifth session UN Doc A 79 10 2024 59 Mačák K Dias T Kasper Á 2025 Handbook on the Developing a National Position on International Law and Cyber Activities p 92 60 See eg the national positions of Belgium Czechia Denmark Estonia Finland France Italy the Netherlands Sweden and the EU’s common position 63 See eg UN Human Rights Council The promotion protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet Resolution A HRC RES 32 13 1 July 2016 UN General Assembly Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security A 70 174 22 July 2015 UN General Assembly Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security A 76 135 14 July 2021 See also NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué 9 July 2016 64 See the Human Rights Committee General Comment No 31 80 The nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant CCPR C 21 Rev 1 Add 13 26 May 2004 see also the national positions of Belgium Canada Czechia Estonia Finland Italy the Netherlands Norway Poland Romania Sweden the UK and the US as well as the common position of the EU 65 See eg the national positions of Belgium Canada Czechia Finland Italy the Netherlands Norway Poland Sweden the UK and the US as well as the common position of the EU 66 See eg the national positions of Belgium Canada Czechia Estonia Finland Italy the Netherlands Norway Poland Sweden and the UK as well as the common position of the EU 67 See eg the national positions of Canada Czechia the Netherlands Sweden and the US as well as the common position of the EU 68 See eg the national positions of Belgium Czechia Estonia Finland Italy and the US as well as the common position of the EU 57 14 positions such as the right of access to the internet 69 and the role of non-State actors in relation to human rights in cyberspace 70 States generally accept that qualified rights may be lawfully restricted for legitimate aims like national security public order or combatting crime At the same time certain measures including internet shutdowns and broad censorship may not satisfy these standards a point underscored by States including Romania and the United States 71 Finally while States affirm that international human rights apply online as they do offline they recognise that the nature of cyberspace and new technologies pose unique challenges and raise complex issues of territory and jurisdiction as digital conduct often transcends physical borders leaving open the questions of how far States must act to ensure human rights protection beyond their borders 72 3 7 State responsibility The national and common positions demonstrate a clear and unanimous agreement that the general rules of customary international law on State responsibility are fully applicable to State conduct in cyberspace This well-established body of law is reflected in the International Law Commission's Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts ARSIWA 73 An internationally wrongful act of a State in the cyber context requires two conditions - Conduct consisting of an action or omission that constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State - The conduct is attributable to the State under international law 74 Attribution All examined positions specifically address attribution and agree that the rules of attribution remain fully valid in cyberspace It is pointed out that attribution may be technically challenging However this is a question of evidence and not a lack of clarity of international law Based on well-established customary international rules a cyber operation is attributable to a State when carried out by its organs by persons or entities empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of governmental authority acting in that capacity or by non-State actors acting on the instructions of or under the direction or control of that State 76 It is central to the national and common positions that States cannot avoid legal responsibility for wrongful cyber acts by acting through proxies or non-State actors Several Member States emphasize that attribution in the legal sense—identifying a State as responsible for an internationally wrongful act—must be distinguished from technical identification of an actor and See eg the national positions of the Netherlands Poland Sweden and the US See eg the national positions of Czechia Poland Sweden and the US 71 On restrictions see eg the national positions of Czechia the Netherlands Poland Romania and the US 72 See eg the national positions of Canada Czechia Finland the Netherlands Norway Poland and the US 73 International Law Commission Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries U N Doc A 56 10 2001 74 ARSIWA Article 2 76 ARSIWA Chapter II - Attribution of Conduct to a State 69 70 15 from political attribution or public statements assigning responsibility 77 Legal attribution is a matter of international law technical and political attributions involve factual technical and policy considerations There is broad consensus that decisions on attribution are sovereign prerogatives of States A State may attribute cyber operations individually or collectively and it has discretion to make such attribution public Several States point out that international law imposes no obligation to disclose the evidence or basis upon which attribution is made although States may choose to do so for political or cooperative purposes 78 The absence of public attribution does not affect the application of international law or the existence of State responsibility Attribution determinations are based on the assessment of available information which may include technical data intelligence and contextual factors such as the nature effects and circumstances of the operation Absolute certainty is not required still some national positions point out the importance of a reasonable assessment – by the attributing State - of the facts under the circumstances 79 Responses According to the Lotus presumption in international law 80 sovereign States are free to act unless there is a specific prohibition While this principle has evolved and States are often expected to justify their actions especially where they act contrary to legal prohibitions it is a useful starting point regarding State uses of ICTs where the applicability or interpretation of certain rules is still unsettled National and common positions mainly focus on acts and responses thereto that may amount to breaches of international law specific thresholds of breaches or when they are unfriendly or concern expectations on how to settle their differences Rarely do they directly elaborate on the many possible actions that are not prohibited by international law but rather set the limits 3 7 2 1 Peaceful settlement The obligation of States to settle their disputes peacefully is a foundational principle enshrined in Articles 2 3 and 33 of the UN Charter It is a customary rule 81 which requires States to seek resolution to their disputes through peaceful means including by ‘negotiation enquiry mediation conciliation arbitration judicial settlement resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice’ in order to safeguard international peace and security 82 States have consistently affirmed in See eg the national positions of Canada ‘ a ttribution in its legal sense is of course distinct from the technical identification or technical attribution of the actor responsible for malicious cyber activity whether State or nonState as well as from the public denunciation of the responsible actor political attribution Further Canada believes that the public attribution of internationally wrongful acts engages various political considerations beyond technical and legal attribution” Denmark ‘ t he application of international law and State responsibility does not depend on public attribution” Finland ‘ i t is in this regard useful to distinguish identification as a technical operation from attribution as a legal operation Identification may be technically challenging given the often covert nature of hostile cyber activities but this is without consequence to the legal rules of attribution” US 2021 ‘ i t is crucial however to distinguish legal attribution from attribution in the technical and political senses States and commentators often express concerns about the challenge of attribution in a technical sense – that is the challenge in light of certain characteristics of cyberspace of obtaining facts whether through technical indicators or all-source intelligence that would inform a State’s policy and legal determinations about a particular cyber incident also national positions of Czechia Estonia France Germany Italy the Netherlands Sweden and the UK as well as the common position of the EU 78 See eg the national positions of Czechia the Netherlands Sweden the UK and the US 79 See eg the national position of Estonia 2019 ‘ a t the end of the day what is required from the attributing state is not absolute certainty but what is reasonable’ and Italy ‘ a lthough under international law there is no general obligation thereto Italy stresses the importance of transparency attribution of cyber wrongful activities should therefore be reasonable and credibly based on factual elements related to relevant circumstances of the case’ 80 The Case of the S S ‘Lotus” France v Turkey Judgment of 7 September 1927 P C I J ser A No 10 1927 81 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Nicaragua v United States of America Merits Judgment I C J Reports 1986 para 290 82 UN Charter Article 33 77 16 their national positions that this obligation applies equally to disputes arising in the context of State uses of ICTs – States must be committed to maintaining a peaceful ICT environment and when faced with harmful cyber operations seek a peaceful rather than a retaliatory response which could risk escalation 83 Nevertheless several States explicitly specify that the duty to settle disputes by peaceful means does not preclude recourse to other responses available under international law including selfdefence in the case of an armed attack or by taking countermeasures provided that the relevant requirements are met 84 3 7 2 2 Retorsion There is common understanding among Allies that States may respond to malicious cyber operations and it is generally implied that such responses of course include conduct that does not amount to violations of international law Some positions emphasize this by including a statement on retorsions 85 States agree that retorsions are lawful but unfriendly acts that a State may take in response to harmful or undesirable conduct by another State including malicious cyber operations 86 Because they are lawful by definition retorsions are always available as a response option regardless of whether the triggering cyber activity was unlawful They can be used both in reaction to unfriendly or harmful acts and in response to internationally wrongful acts Examples include the imposition of certain types of sanctions i e those that do not amount to a violation of international law the declaration that a diplomat is persona non grata 87 or even public attribution88 of hostile cyber operations 3 7 2 3 Circumstances precluding wrongfulness countermeasures necessity self-defence In some cases States may respond by taking measures that would otherwise violate international law These responses are exceptions and their wrongfulness is precluded but for the prior violation of international law entailing State responsibility or in case of invoking the plea of necessity for a grave and imminent peril National and common positions address countermeasures 89 and necessity90 in the meaning of ARSIWA as well as self-defence91 in the context of Article 51 of the UN Charter There are several converging points regarding the scope purpose and procedural elements of these responses Countermeasures All examined positions are in agreement that the purpose of countermeasures is strictly to induce compliance with international law including cessation of the wrongful act and reparation They may not be taken for retaliation punishment or retribution States consistently affirm that countermeasures must comply with customary international law as reflected in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility and applicable limitations Countermeasures must not involve the threat or use of force Countermeasures are temporary must end once the responsible State returns to compliance and must be directed only at the responsible State As a current common baseline for the Allies countermeasures are available to the injured State although there is an emerging view that collective countermeasures See eg the national positions of Canada Czechia Estonia France Norway and the UK as well as the common position of the EU 84 See eg the national positions of Canada Czechia and Estonia 85 See eg the national positions of Belgium Czechia Denmark Estonia Germany the Netherlands Norway Poland the UK and the US as well as the common position of the EU 86 Ibid 87 See eg the national position of the Netherlands Norway and US 2021 88 See eg the national position of Norway 89 All published positions address countermeasures 90 Addressed in the national positions of Czechia Finland France Germany the Netherlands Norway Sweden and the US as well as the common position of the EU 91 All published positions address self-defence 83 17 may be permissible 92 Countermeasures must be necessary and proportionate to the injury suffered and to the aim of inducing compliance 93 They must respect peremptory norms jus cogens and must not breach fundamental human rights obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals or the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises and personnel 94 They should be reversible to the extent possible 95 Member States agree that countermeasures may be taken by cyber or non-cyber means and do not need to be symmetrical Cyber countermeasures may respond to non-cyber wrongful acts and vice versa Before resorting to countermeasures the injured State must in principle call upon the responsible State to comply 96 which includes providing notification97 with some exceptions that apply in the cyber context 98 and offer to negotiate 99 giving an opportunity for the responsible State to cease its wrongful conduct Self-defence There is agreement among Allies that a cyber operation may amount to an armed attack when its scale and effects are comparable to those of a kinetic armed attack 100 Furthermore Allies recognise that the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might in certain circumstances be considered as amounting to an armed attack 101 All examined national and common positions further affirm that the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international law applies to State uses of ICTs 102 A State targeted by a cyber operation that constitutes an armed attack may exercise its right of individual or collective self-defence subject to the same conditions that apply to other forms of uses of force The responding State may use force in self-defence and is not limited to cyber means both cyber and conventional kinetic responses are available Conversely a cyber It is an unsettled area of the law whether international organisations or other States may conduct countermeasures on behalf of an injured State for unlawful acts that occur below the threshold of an armed attack see NATO Allied Joint Publication 3 20 Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations Edition A Version 1 2020 p 22 Also eg national position of Estonia ‘ i t is therefore important that states may respond collectively to unlawful cyber operations where diplomatic action is insufficient but no lawful recourse to use of force exists Allies matter also in cyberspace’ 93 See eg the national positions of Belgium Canada Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Poland Romania Sweden UK and US 94 See eg the national positions of Belgium Czechia Germany Italy the Netherlands Poland and the EU’s common position 95 See eg the national positions of Czechia Denmark and the EU’s common position 96 Art 52 1 a ARSIWA 97 Art 52 1 b ARSIW 98 Several national positions emphasize that certain procedural aspects such as notification requirement require further discussion in the cyber context See eg national position of Canada ‘ t he precise scope of certain procedural aspects of countermeasures such as notification needs to be further defined through State practice given the unique nature of cyberspace” Czechia ‘countermeasures may be undertaken without such prior notification” Netherlands ‘if immediate action is required in order to enforce the rights of the injured state and prevent further damage such notification may be dispensed with” Norway ‘ c ountermeasures may be taken without prior notification to the responsible State if providing such notification might reveal sensitive methods or capabilities or prevent the countermeasures from having the necessary effect” Sweden ‘it should be noted that this rule also allows for countermeasures without prior notification when urgent measures are needed to preserve the rights of the injured State” UK 2018 ‘we would not agree that we are always legally obliged to give prior notification to the hostile state before taking countermeasures against it” 99 Art 52 1 b ARSIWA 100 It has been stated in the 2014 NATO Wales Summit Declaration para 72 that a cyber attacks in some cases may lead to the invocation of Article 5 The 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué reaffirmed that a significant cyber attack could trigger Article 5 The examined national positions further clarify this point specifically confirming that the right of self-defence is both individual and collective and that the assessment whether a cyberoperation or a campaign reaches the threshold of armed conflict depends it’s the scale and effect 101 2021 NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué para 32 102 See eg the national positions of Belgium Czechia Denmark Estonia 2021 France Germany Italy the Netherlands Norway Poland Sweden UK US and EU’s common position expressly referring to Article 51 of the UN Charter 92 18 response may be used in self-defence against a kinetic armed attack There is no requirement to respond in kind 103 The exercise of self-defence—whether cyber or kinetic—must comply with the customary international law requirements of necessity and proportionality 104 Force may be used only when necessary to repel or end the armed attack and response measures must not exceed that objective The right of selfdefence remains subject to relevant reporting obligations including notification to the UN Security Council 105 Necessity Most but not all Allies106 address when the plea of necessity can be invoked in the cyber context 107 They emphasize that it is a narrow and exceptional justification available only under strict conditions and to be assessed on a case-by-case basis The plea of necessity may be invoked under Article 25 ARSIWA only when the act is the only way for a State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril The peril must be serious imminent and clearly established on the basis of the information reasonably available at the time and the threatened harm need not already have materialized nor must it necessarily be physical 108 A key point is that the peril does not need to be attributable to a State The invocation of necessity remains strictly limited in scope and duration and available only when no other real alternative exists for addressing the grave and imminent peril 109 3 8 International Humanitarian Law All examined positions of Allies are in clear alignment that International Humanitarian Law IHL fully applies to cyber operations during armed conflict 110 Moreover they agree that application of IHL neither legitimizes conflict nor militarizes cyberspace On the contrary IHL exists to limit the effects of armed conflict which includes limits on conduct and use of capabilities including cyber by the parties IHL also seeks to protect civilians civilian objects and other protected persons and objects as well as to regulate the conduct of hostilities Core principles and protections of IHL e g humanity distinction proportionality military necessity precautions and protection of civilians apply equally in the cyber context Some national positions further acknowledge that IHL limits cyber capabilities and require legal review of cyber or cyber-enabled weapons means and methods of warfare 111 See eg the national positions of Canada Czechia Estonia Finland France Germany Poland and US 2021 See eg the national positions of Belgium Czechia Estonia France the Netherlands Norway Poland Sweden UK and EU’s common positions 105 See eg the national positions of Belgium France Germany and Sweden 106 See the collection of national positions regarding the plea of necessity in the CyberLaw Toolkit available at https cyberlaw ccdcoe org wiki Plea_of_necessity 107 See eg the national positions of Czechia Finland France Germany the Netherlands Norway Sweden and the US as well as the common position of the EU 108 Ibid 109 Ibid 110 See a collection of relevant sections of national and common positions in the CyberLaw Toolkit available at https cyberlaw ccdcoe org wiki International_humanitarian_law_ jus_in_bello This has also been agreed in the landmark resolution ‘Protecting civilians and other protected persons and objects against the potential human cost of ICT activities during armed conflict’ at the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in 2024 which was adopted by consensus Further see eg Kubo Mačák The First Humanitarian ICT Resolution Ambitions and Limitations 25 November 2024 available at https www ejiltalk org the-firsthumanitarian-ict-resolution-ambitions-and-limitations 111 See eg the national positions of Belgium Canada Czechia France Germany and the US 103 104 19 Attack in armed conflict Allies’ positions112 affirm that cyber operations can constitute an ‘attack’ under IHL when conducted in the context of an armed conflict A cyber operation is considered an attack in armed conflict when it amounts to an act of violence against an adversary whether offensive or defensive 113 meaning that it is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects including harmful effects on cyber infrastructure or the systems that rely on it 114 This determination is based primarily on the effects of the operation not the means used While definitions of harm may vary there is growing agreement that physical harm significant functional disruption or destruction are central indicators 115 Furthermore while some Allies included language on ‘reasonably foreseeable’ 116 effects as a minimum in the definition of an attack it remains unclear what precise types or what order effects beyond the direct first order effects 117 are relevant in determining whether a cyber operation amounts to attack in the meaning of IHL 118 Where a cyber operation qualifies as an attack the same IHL rules and principles that govern attacks by kinetic means apply This framework applies regardless of whether the cyber operation is offensive or defensive and even where the relevant infrastructure is dual-use i e shared between civilian and military sectors Cyber operations that do not rise to the level of an attack are still subject to relevant IHL rules and general principles of the law of armed conflict such as the general protection of civilians and the obligation to take constant care if conducted in the course of an armed conflict 119 Military objectives Examined positions of the Allies unanimously emphasize that the rules pertaining to the principle of distinction apply in the cyber context Accordingly attacks including those by cyber operations shall be limited strictly to military objectives Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited regardless of whether conventional or digital means are used 120 Member States recognize that objects indispensable to the survival of the population which are protected by Article 54 Additional Protocol I may include ICT infrastructure hence these are also protected 121 It is not controversial that civilian ICT infrastructures and objects e g computers networked devices etc with no military significance enjoy protected status However the infrastructure in cyberspace can often be dual-use thus the context may require specific considerations It is conceivable that acts of civilians carrying out cyber operations may be Many but not all national positions address the threshold of ‘attack’ in the meaning of Article 49 of Additional Protocol I or corresponding customary international law However even those States that remained silent about attack in their national positions see eg the national positions of Estonia Finland Poland and Romania eventually addressed the issue via the EU common position 113 This corresponds to the definition of attack under Article 49 1 of Additional Protocol I 114 See eg the national positions of Belgium Canada Denmark France Germany and the EU’s common position 115 Some Allies eg Denmark seem to take the view that a cyber operation amounts to an attack only if it is expected to lead to physical harm 116 See eg the national position of Canada Czechia Denmark Sweden and UK 117 Effects can also be indirect reverberating intended unintended cumulative cascading sequential parallel collateral immediate short-term long-term etc 118 It needs a note that the ICRC expressly includes both foreseeable direct and indirect reverberating effects in determining whether a cyber operation constitutes an attack under IHL Example a cyber operation that disrupts a power grid could cut electricity to a hospital if patients die as a result those indirect deaths are part of what must be considered in deciding whether the operation amounts to an attack See International Committee of the Red Cross International Humanitarian Law and Cyber Operations during Armed Conflicts ICRC Position Paper November 2019 7–8 119 Mačák K Dias T Kasper Á 2025 Handbook on Developing a National Position on International Law and Cyber Activities A Practical Guide for States pp 103-104 Available at Handbook-on-Developing-a-NationalPosition-on-International-Law-and-Cyber-Activities_A-Practical-Guide-for-States pdf 120 See the collection of national positions on this matter in the relevant pages of the CyberLaw Toolkit including https cyberlaw ccdcoe org wiki Military_objectives 121 See eg the national positions of Belgium Czechia France and Romania 112 20 characterized as direct participation in hostilities in this case the respective civilians would become legitimate military targets 122 It remains controversial how IHL applies to data as such whether data can constitute an ‘object’ and on this basis enjoy protections as civilian objects A few States consider that cyber operations targeting data may fall within the scope of IHL when the operation qualifies as an attack in armed conflict and in such case relevant limitations of the law of targeting e g rules of distinction proportionality precautions apply However several States note that the issue needs further considerations 123 See eg the national positions of France Germany and UK 2021 Further see Kubo Mačák ‘Will the centre hold Countering the erosion of the principle of distinction on the digital battlefield’ 2023 105 923 International Review of the Red Cross 965 970–977 123 See eg the national positions of Denmark Finland France Germany the Netherlands Poland and the US 122 21 4 Conclusions Allies conducting cyber operations whether or not contributing cyber effects separately or on behalf of the Alliance 124 must conduct them consistently with international law as well as adhere to their own national laws and where applicable other legal frameworks The overall international legal framework has not changed in the last few decades What has changed recently in the last few years is that most Allies now have clear and public positions on how to interpret and apply the rules of this framework in using ICTs By issuing national and common positions NATO Member States now actively exercise their role in developing and clarifying international law insofar as these documents have legal value 125 Two implications of this are highlighted here First now that many States have expressed their positions Allies need to take these into account when designing planning and conducting cyber operations It is natural that NATO’s cyber operations doctrinal and policy development should build on or even derive from the convergences in these positions 126 Second however it is also necessary to account for the differences and where States have chosen to remain silent on specific issues and it falls to States to identify how legal frameworks apply to State uses of ICTs and publicly articulate and confirm these standards Many questions remain in the national and common positions and there is ample room for both deepening and widening the discussion on both the convergences and divergences Further State practice and opinio juris are needed to clarify for example the thresholds for violations of sovereignty non-intervention prohibition of use of force etc Articulations of specific examples of incidents that States would likely consider a wrongful act under international law can reduce the margin of error for misinterpretation by others This in turn creates more transparency clarity and predictability Case-by-case analysis of cyber incidents that States can consider in their operational planning would also further mutual respect and solidify the expectations rules of the international community Therefore it is worthwhile to facilitate and support the processes that address the application of existing international law to cyber activities be it development or revision of a national position capacity-building on these topics or scenario-based discussions and exercises for bridging interpretation gaps By now most Allies have considered the issue of how international law applies to the State uses of ICTs They have addressed this question individually and some also collectively via the lenses of the EU It is timely for NATO to take onboard the collective understanding of Allies about how international law applies to cyber activities Eg in accordance with SCEPVA Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily by Allies mechanism which refers to a framework within NATO for voluntary provision of cyber capabilities and effects by individual NATO member States in support of Alliance operations and missions 125 Mačák K Dias T Kasper Á 2025 Handbook on Developing a National Position on International Law and Cyber Activities A Practical Guide for States pp 18-21 126 The NATO AJP 3 20 published in 2020 could not possibly have benefited from the now available national and common positions as they mostly came around in later years 124 22