Cuba and Caribbean

Washington, D.C., May 15 – The National Security Archive at George Washington University today posted on the Web a declassified Presidential Directive, signed by Jimmy Carter, which stated: “I have concluded that we should attempt to achieve normalization of our relations with Cuba.” The directive, dated March 15, 1977, shortly after Carter took office, is believed to represent the only time a President has ordered normalization of U.S. relations with Castro’s Cuba to be an explicit foreign policy goal of the United States. On May 12, 2002, Carter became the first U.S.

NEW BOOK based on Unprecedented Access to Cuban Records; True Story of U.S.-Cuba Cold fear Clash in Angola presented in Conflicting Missions Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive today posted a selection of secret Cuban government documents detailing Cuba's policy and involvement in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s.

In his new exposй of the National Security Agency entitled Body of Secrets, author James Bamford highlights a set of proposals on Cuba by the Joint Chiefs of Staff codenamed OPERATION NORTHWOODS. This document, titled “Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba” was provided by the JCS to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on March 13, 1962, as the key component of Northwoods. Written in response to a request from the Chief of the Cuba Project, Col. Edward Lansdale, the Top Secret memorandum describes U.S. plans to covertly engineer various pretexts that would justify a U.S.

Havana, Cuba: Documents discussed on the second day of an historic meeting of former adversaries in Havana show that CIA officials believed that the Cuban people would welcome a U.S.-sponsored invasion and spontaneously rise up against the Castro regime.  CIA officials also expected that Cuban military and police forces would refuse to fight against Brigade 2506, the CIA's 1400-man mercenary invasion force.

Havana, Cuba: Documents released this afternoon on the second day of an historic meeting of former adversaries in Havana highlight missed opportunities for U.S.-Cuban rapproachment following the failure of the U.S.-sponsored invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.

Havana, Cuba: British documents released on the first day of an historic conference on the Bay of Pigs show that CIA Director Allen Dulles hoped that British refusal to sell military items to Cuba would force the Cuban government to request arms from the Soviet bloc, providing a pretext for U.S. intervention.

Havana, Cuba: On the eve of an historic meeting in Havana, former combatants, covert operatives, policy makers and Cuban government officials gathered to discuss one of the most infamous episodes in the Cold War—the April 1961 invasion at the Bay of Pigs.  The three-day international conference, “Bay of Pigs: 40 Years After,” which includes former officials from the Kennedy Administration, the CIA, and Brigade 2506 members, and their counterparts in the Cuban military and government of Fidel Castro, opens tomorrow, March 22.

Washington, D.C., May 3, 2000 – Shortly after the CIA's botched paramilitary invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, President John F. Kennedy established a commission to investigate the failure and to consider whether the United States should conduct similar covert operations in the future.

Washington, D.C. – To commemorate the historic competition of a U.S. and Cuban baseball team on a diamond in Havana this Sunday, the National Security Archive today posted a collection of documents which chronicles the origins of "baseball diplomacy"--an effort initiated 25 years ago. The documents, ranging from unclassified letters to declassified secret cables and high-level State Department memoranda, reveal the efforts of then-commissioner of baseball, Bowie Kuhn, and his counterparts in Cuba, along with aides to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, to arrange a game between U.S.

Washington, D.C.: Thirty-seven years after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA today released a secret after-action report entitled "Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba." The May 5, 1961 report was written by Colonel Jack Hawkins, the operation's paramilitary chief. His 48-page report cites poor CIA organization, and "political considerations" imposed by the Kennedy administration, such as the decision to cancel D-day airstrikes which "doomed the operation," as key elements of its failure.