Virtual Reading Room

Page 474 of 68813743 document(s) found

Dec 31, 1969

CIA, Attachment to Third World-158611, “Relative Capabilities – U-2 and B-57D,” Classification Unknown

Source

CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room

Dec 31, 1969

CIA, “Progress Report on Data Processing and ELINT Analysis of System IV Tapes Accruing from Missions 2037, 4065, 4066, and 4069,” Classification Unknown, Early 1958

Source

CIA FOIA Electronic Reding Room

10-Charles-Bartlett-Oral-History-Interview-JFK-2

Dec 31, 1969

Oral History, “Charles Bartlett Oral History Interview—JFK #2, 2/20/1965,” February 20, 1965

Source

John F. Kennedy Presidential Library Oral History Collection

Dec 31, 1969

Excerpts from daily diaries of Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, 21-25 October 1962

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U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 2021), document 353

Dec 31, 1969

El Ejercito Reconoce el Arresto de Timerman

Source

Department of State Argentina Project

1944-1945

Decrypted VENONA files (1944-1945).

Dec 31, 1969

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Zbigniew Brezinski, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 18 October 1977, Top Secret

Source

President Carter’s dissatisfaction with the number of people on the line during the Ivory Item exercise is reflected in this directive from Brzezinski ordering that “unnecessary people” be excluded from the next simulation. He also asked that “standby communication” lines be made available with one being secure and the other open. Brzezinski also wanted to review with Brown the “new SIOP instructions format” before it went to the President.

Dec 31, 1969

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, “South Korean Capabilities for

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Jan 4, 1975

Dec 31, 1969

U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency telegram 4406

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Jun 23, 1972

Dec 31, 1969

“Magic” – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1228 – August 5, 1945, Top Secret Ultra

Source

This summary included several intercepted messages from Sato, who conveyed his despair and exasperation over what he saw as Tokyo’s inability to develop terms for ending the war: “[I]f the Government and the Military dilly-dally in bringing this resolution to fruition, then all Japan will be reduced to ashes.” Sato remained skeptical that the Soviets would have any interest in discussions with Tokyo: “it is absolutely unthinkable that Russia would ignore the Three Power Proclamation and then engage in conversations with our special envoy.”