The Kissinger Telcons: The Story Behind the Story

This early look at the legal problems associated with producing and keeping records of telephone conversations never mentioned Henry Kissinger by name (it is presented as a “hypothetical case”), but whoever wrote the memorandum may have had some inside knowledge of the Secretary’s record keeping practices. The author found that transcripts of conversations produced using government resources and prepared in order to keep track of government business could not be claimed as personal property or be destroyed by the official who created them. According to the author, “Only if the transcripts were made and used exclusively by the government official himself would there be any chance of claiming they are personal property and even then success is uncertain.” If the documents were the subject of a FOIA request, the government could deny them under various exemptions, including (b)(1), relating to national security matters, and (b)(5), which shields records that are part of deliberative processes.

A “memorandum of law” prepared a few months later looked more closely at the problem of protecting sensitive diplomatic information in the telephone conversation transcripts and the Nixon tapes. While Michael Sandler’s memorandum did not state as fact that Kissinger had a collection of telcons, it was the assumption. Considering that at least one senator, Lowell Weicker (R-CT), had asked about the telcons, one of the issues considered was, in a case where Congress sought access to the telcons, whether the State Department could invoke executive privilege to protect sensitive diplomatic information. Such a claim could be justified legally, although Sandler suggested there might be “practical reasons” for not doing so.

As for the vulnerability of the telcons to FOIA requests, there were “ticklish problems.” The telcons could be deemed agency records if they were generated and kept on the Department’s premises, but there also was the argument that they were “personal” papers. If the telcons included foreign policy information, if “persons other than the Secretary were permitted to read the records, or if the records helped the Secretary or others to make departmental policies or decisions, the records could well be viewed as those of an ‘agency.’” If, however, the Secretary “intended to keep the records for his personal use, if he limited access to himself, and if he segregated them into files marked ‘personal,’ than the materials should perhaps be viewed as ‘personal’ rather than ‘agency’ records,” according to Sandler.

If FOIA requests were ever made for the records, exemptions could be invoked to prevent disclosure, but that assumed that the telcons had “been properly classified.” Sandler suggested the possibility of a review and the imposition of classification categories when appropriate.

Before William Safire’s FOIA request arrived, a reporter, possibly Safire, had raised questions about the telcons. Carlyle Maw, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, told Leigh that the reporter had asked by what authority Kissinger’s telcon records for the Nixon period could be removed from the White House. During the discussion between Leigh and Maw, the possibility was raised that they were the Secretary’s personal papers. But even if they were government records, Kissinger had legitimate interests in keeping them at the State Department to consult them for current work and for their future “literary interest.” In Leigh’s view, the telcons probably did not fall under the scope of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, but he acknowledged that the General Services Administration/National Archives could disagree and create complications. Concerning Kissinger’s refusal, in his deposition for the Morton Halperin lawsuit, to disclose information on conversations with third parties, Leigh saw the government’s support for Kissinger’s rejection as legitimate but also saw another reason: the “governmental interest in assuring the confidentiality of advice proffered to senior officials and others.”

According to this memorandum, common law and constitutional law required confidential status for Kissinger’s telcons. The documents were not subject to the Presidential Records and Materials Preservation Act because they were not controlled by White House record keeping procedures. Thus, they could be withheld under FOIA exemptions. Moreover, “confidentiality may be legally justified in the absence of a statute” because it is “implied by common law courts where the need for confidentiality overcomes the asserted interest in disclosure.”

William Safire’s FOIA request for Kissinger telcons created a flurry of internal deliberations and memorandum writing, beginning with a meeting of White House and State Department officials. The discussion touched on several issues, such as whether the telcons were under the scope of the Nixon Materials Act, whether they were Kissinger’s personal papers, which FOIA exemptions could preclude release of the telcons, and whether they could be considered “drafts.” All of those issues required further consideration. White House Counsel Philip Buchen requested that Lawrence Eagleburger prepare a memorandum describing the volume and the scope of the telcons.

As far as can be told, Safire did not publicize his FOIA request or its eventual denial, but on 15 January 1976, he published a New York Times column, “The Dead-Key Scrolls,” where he raised questions about the removal of the telcons from the National Security Council (NSC), the “authority” for that action, and the ownership of the telcons. Safire concluded his column by writing that Kissinger’s transfer of the telcons to the State Department exposed them to FOIA requests. “Citizens rush in where solons fear to tread.”[7]

Sandler provided a recap of the telcon references in the Kissinger interrogatories. He noted that, contrary to Safire’s column, there were no characterizations that any of the telcons were “verbatim” records.

This preliminary report on the issues raised by Safire’s request covered a range of issues, including the legality of taping telephone calls, possible legal restrictions on Kissinger’s transfer of the telcons to the State Department, and alternative responses to the FOIA request. Among the possibilities, all of which were discussed in some detail, were to claim that the telcons were Kissinger’s personal records, that they were non-agency records (and thus not subject to the FOIA), that FOIA exemptions could be used to deny access, and that telecons produced prior to 8 August 1974 could be treated as Nixon records. The problems raised by each alternative needed to be explored further. To do so, Maw and Leigh requested Kissinger to approve a ten-day extension for the reply to Safire.

Leigh relayed Eagleburger’s request that copies of all White House and State Department papers that Kissinger had either signed, approved, or issued be placed in a “secure and convenient” government repository. Leigh observed that the new emphasis on copies suggested that this was a “fallback from the assertion that the papers are personal papers.”

Responding to Philip Buchen’s request for details on the telcons, Eagleburger reported that there were about 20 file drawers of the material covering a variety of topics, including social engagements along with discussions with foreign diplomats, U.S. government officials, Presidents Nixon and Ford, journalists and editors, and academic associates. According to Eagleburger, a thorough assessment of the telcons “would require enormous labor on my part … more the job of a librarian.

This long legal memorandum covered the issues raised by FOIA requests for Kissinger’s telcons, including ownership of the transcripts, their status as “agency records,” possible exemptions to their release under presidential papers laws, statutory exemptions, national security exemptions, exemptions for “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums,” and privacy issues. On the agency records issues, as far as the White House telcons were concerned, “there is a strong basis for maintaining that these transcripts are not ‘agency records’” because Kissinger was then a member of the President’s immediate staff, and his records would not have agency status.

Here Leigh reviewed recent developments surrounding the State Department’s denial of Safire’s FOIA request on the grounds that the telcons requested were not agency records because they were from the period when Kissinger was on Nixon’s staff. Another FOIA request had come in from a Washington Star reporter that was likely to be denied on the same grounds. For Leigh, the problem raised by the FOIAs were not legal, but “political,” because of the certainty that Safire and others will “sensationalize” the telcons and initiate legal proceedings challenging the denials, “which will further mobilize public attention.”

To “defuse unfounded suspicion” but also to protect “sensitive” foreign policy information and to safeguard Kissinger’s “right to access” and “privacy rights,” Leigh proposed steps to donate the telcons and possibly other records. If Kissinger kept the records as personal property, the public reaction could be “explosive” and action in court at “personal expense” might be necessary to protect such a claim.

Leigh suggested several possibilities, including the immediate donation of records to the National Archives (except for the most recent material) and donation of Kissinger’s records to the National Archives (or to “some repository under government control”) upon his retirement. Leigh reviewed the various complications and requirements involved in donating records to the Archives. While the Archives have a “first rate” reputation for maintaining the security of records, Leigh saw an “outside possibility” that a staffer “may not adhere to customary standards of confidentiality.”

Once Kissinger returned from his South America trip, Leigh proposed a meeting with Eagleburger to discuss the possibilities.

The State Department’s Council on Declassification Policy informed William Safire that the Department had upheld the denial of his FOIA appeal. Maintaining that the telcons were not agency records in the first place, which precluded an appeal, the Department informed Safire that “we have employed the same procedures to your request as would be applicable to an appeal.” Even if the telcons were agency records, they would be denied under exemption (b)(5) because the “documents reveal the detailed mental processes of government officials, as well as portray some discussions of policy and decision alternatives.” The attached memorandum by Leigh detailed the legal grounds for denying Safire’s appeal.

With the publication of Robert Woodward and Carl Bernstein’s The Final Days in March 1976, more important facts about the telcons reached the public: for example, that at various points Kissinger had them removed from the White House and shipped to the Nelson Rockefeller estate at Pocantico Hills, New York. In a column on 12 April 1976, Safire raised that issue but added new morsels, such as the fact that Kissinger’s White House office had an “inner file” of sensitive records including not only the telcons but also memoranda of conversations with the President and diplomats such as Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, for which were no other copies existed.

The matter came up in the State Department’s briefing on 13 April and Michael Sandler brought two “striking” matters to Leigh’s attention: 1) that the Department acknowledged that transcripts had been produced from tape recordings, and 2) the lack of precision as to which of Kissinger’s “private papers” went to the Rockefeller estate (for example, whether they included the telcons). Sandler predicted that this matter could come up again.

This is an expanded version of the memorandum that Leigh sent to Kissinger on 16 February that includes copious supporting material. Perhaps Leigh prepared it because Kissinger wanted a more exhaustive and comprehensive review of the alternatives concerning the telcons and his other government papers. Kissinger may have also wanted to know more about what predecessors, like Dean Rusk, had done with their telcon records. Leigh believed that it was legally arguable that the telcons were personal papers and “not subject to disclosure under the FOIA,” but that if Kissinger made such a claim he would face the risk of litigation at his own expense. Otherwise, the telcons could be treated as partly personal and partly official, which would raise administrative complications (e.g., in preparing summaries of the official material for inclusion in Kissinger’s State Department files).

Leigh reviewed the possibility of including the telcons in Kissinger’s records at State, as Dean Rusk had done, or donating the telcons to the National Archives and pointed out the pros and cons of each option. For example, with a donation to the Archives there was the possibility that some of them would be determined to be subject to the Presidential Materials Act or the risk of a future decision that the telcons were government records. For Kissinger’s files held by the Executive Secretariat, Leigh reviewed two basic options: 1) transfer of the files to an approved storage facility, but of copies only, not originals, or 2) leaving the files at the Department, while making arrangements for copies to be made for transfer to an approved facility upon the time of Kissinger’s retirement.

How Kissinger reacted to Leigh’s recommendations is unclear, but State Department officials continued to look into procedures for inventorying and storing records and for granting access to former officials. This paper provided considerable detail on those matters.

Following up on his memorandum from 11 May, Monroe Leigh drafted a paper for Kissinger on “Disposition of Your Papers and Records.” The draft discussed the various records involved, including official State Department “working files” and the telcon records, with proposals for screening out the “working files” to remove any personal materials and arrangements for preserving them, not only to ensure Kissinger’s future access but also for their eventual transfer to the National Archives.

The chief Records Manager, John S. Pruden, commented on the draft, noting ambiguities on the record status of the telcons and the problems involved in describing Kissinger’s records as “working files,” with the implication that the files would have non-records status and would not be subject to the FOIA. Not entirely comfortable with that implication, Pruden suggested that any such arrangements for such a “controversial collection” could be “tested in court with the possible result of some form of access.” Whether Leigh worked up this memorandum further is unclear, but soon Kissinger had in mind the possibility of an arrangement with the Library of Congress, which Librarian Daniel J. Boorstin proposed in August 1976 [See Document 14].

Before Gerald Ford’s electoral defeat on 4 November 1976, Kissinger spirited away the telcons from the State Department. Believing that they were his personal property, regardless of the litigation risk that Leigh had mentioned, on 29 October he sent them back again secretly to Nelson Rockefeller’s estate, possibly without consulting State Department records managers, much less the National Archives.[8]

Ford’s defeat subsequently prompted Kissinger to make final decisions on arrangements for his papers. The uncertainties that Leigh had mentioned may have excluded from serious consideration storing records or copies at the National Archives or the State Department. A donation of personal and official papers to the Library of Congress, where Kissinger could have easy access, quickly became the focus of attention. There were uncertainties, however, and this report by one of Leigh’s aides looked closely at the legal and other questions involved in a donation, such as gift authority, possible claims of access by Congress or the Justice Department, the need for State and NSC approval, conditions of access, amenities for Kissinger (workspace, research assistance), the need for private counsel, because this was a private transaction between Kissinger and the Library, and the tenure of the Librarian of Congress.

Each of those topics raised questions that needed answers. For example, a key issue was access. Sandler asked whether it was reasonable to require that outside access be barred for 25 years or until Kissinger died (whichever was later), whether the Library’s employees would have access to the papers, and how the Library handle FOIA requests. Before he raised the latter question, Sandler had written that, “There should not be any basis for access under the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts.” That was so, he opined, because the proposed donation did not consist of “agency records,” either because they were personal papers or copies of government records. Apparently, Sandler had not yet realized that Congress and its institutions were immune from FOIA requests.

Some of Sandler’s questions about the Library of Congress may have been answered during a telephone conversation with John Broderick, the Manuscript Division’s chief. Broderick could not give Kissinger’s papers ironclad protection from Congressional requests, but, as he suggested, it had been decades since a subpoena had been served (for Robert Lansing’s papers from World War I). Whatever else Broderick and others with the Library had said, the answers must have been good enough, because the next day, on 12 November, Kissinger signed a donation agreement with the Library of Congress.

Apparently not knowing of Kissinger’s preemptive action on the telcons, Monroe Leigh provided him with a recap of the view that he had taken since the Department responded to Safire’s FOIA: that the telcon transcripts were not agency records but were personal papers. Leigh argued that they were personal because they were “retained solely at your discretion as work aids to help you recall prior conversations and events.” Leigh noted that he had reviewed some of the telcons and did not believe that their contents included “any government decisions or policy actions.” But if other telcons did include such information, he cautioned, Kissinger should review them and arrange to have an extract or summary prepared for preservation by records officials.

According to Leigh, “The fact that the papers were retained for personal use, that they were not required to be prepared, that they have been consistently treated as personal, and that they contained personal and private matter, support the view that they are personal in nature.” Leigh further observed that the fact that the telcon transcripts were prepared by government secretaries using government resources was not “controlling” because it was “accepted practice that officials who must devote extraordinary amounts of time to government duties may make use of government resources to prepare private correspondence and other personal materials.” He did not consider the possibility that the GSA/National Archives might not agree.

The State Department shared this memorandum with the media on 22 December 1976 when journalists learned that the telcons were not covered in Kissinger’s donation to the Library of Congress [see Document 25].

With Gerald Ford losing the election to Jimmy Carter, the press had questions for briefer Robert Funseth about the status of pending negotiations, including the SALT talks, but also about transition arrangements at the Department of State. One journalist asked about arrangements for Kissinger’s records, “whether the monitored telephone conversations, for instance, belong to him or belong to the people.” He further stated that “we’re entitled to be told what papers will remain Government property and which will be sold or used in his personal pursuits.” When one of the journalists observed that keeping records of the telephone conversations was a “rather new procedure,” Funseth observed that keeping such records was a “rather customary practice, both in Government and in private life.” He informed the press, not quite correctly, that in January 1976, the Legal Adviser “ruled ... that secretarial notes of the Secretary’s telephone conversation are personal papers.” On this point, there were no follow-up questions except about the name of the Legal Adviser.

Other questions followed about the records of Kissinger’s meeting with Chinese and other foreign officials, with Funseth noting that even if there was not a U.S. interpreter present, there was a U.S. notetaker and records of the meeting had been preserved. In accordance with 1967 State Department regulations, Funseth explained, Kissinger would have copies of his official records, but they “will be kept in a Government facility so that the classified documents are properly secured.” He may not have known about the Library of Congress arrangement that had just been negotiated.

Leigh prepared talking points for Kissinger to use when meeting with President Ford to discuss his plans for donating copies of NSC and State Department documents to the Library of Congress. Leigh included a copy of a recent Philip Buchen memorandum on “Presidential Papers” that stipulated that “personal files do not include any copies, drafts, or working papers that relate to official business.” Leigh observed that a “question may arise as to whether this statement may be extended to some of your telephone memoranda.” He also saw a “problem” with a paragraph prohibiting the retention of copies of documents that include advice to the President, a requirement that “might cast a cloud” on the copies of White House papers that Kissinger was sending to the Library of Congress.

On 15 November 1976, U.S. Archivist James B. Rhoads issued a bulletin through the General Services Administration to heads of federal agencies concerning the “disposition of personal papers and official records.” A noteworthy point with direct relevance to the Kissinger telcons was the discussion of personal papers, which were defined as “papers of a private or nonofficial character which pertain only to an individual’s personal affairs that are kept in the office of a Federal official.” Such records, he said, should “be clearly designated by him as nonofficial and will at all times be filed separately from the official records of his office.”

In his cover memorandum, Leigh disagreed with the Archivist’s definition of personal records, seeing it as too restrictive. Existing law and federal regulations, he argued, “recognize that personal papers can include discussion of government activities.” He also saw a contradiction between the Archivist’s definition of personal papers and a requirement that “extracts be made of certain matters pertaining to official business that appear in ‘private-personal correspondence.’” Leigh did not mention the Kissinger telcons but he probably had them in mind.

Kissinger met with President Ford and discussed with him his wish to donate his “public papers” to the Library of Congress. The donation would include copies of his NSC and State Department records. “The President agreed with this procedure,” according to this record of their meeting.

Writing to Boorstin, Scowcroft sent him a transfer agreement for copies of papers from Kissinger’s NSC files. He enclosed a copy of the agreement with the Library for copies of Kissinger’s State Department files.

If Kissinger thought that sequestering the telcons at Rockefeller’s estate would end the matter, he found out otherwise. His Library of Congress donation became a news story on 21 December 1976 with the Washington Post’s Don Oberdorfer reporting that the donation would not include the telcon transcripts because they were “personal” records. According to the Post, when asked about the whereabouts of the telcons, Lawrence Eagleburger declared that “we haven’t faced the question of where” they would be kept, keeping secret Kissinger’s earlier action.

The telcons were also the subject of awkward questions at the Department’s press briefing on 22 December, with reporters asking about the telcons, how they were prepared and used, and why Kissinger considered transcripts of his conversations with journalists or the Soviet ambassador to be his personal records.[9] When asked whether the telcons would go to an archive or remain at the State Department, the answer was no, that “they belong to the Secretary.” When asked whether Secretaries Rusk or Rogers had such transcripts prepared and what had happened with them, the briefer said that “you will have to ask” the former secretaries. The briefer agreed to provide copies of Leigh’s 11 November legal opinion.

Leigh brought the press coverage to Kissinger’s attention the next day, further noting that the American Historical Association, represented by an Arnold & Porter attorney, would make Kissinger’ personal control of the telcons the subject of a lawsuit. Leigh noted that a lawsuit and ensuing court orders could have “very immediate consequences for your use of the telcons” and that a lawsuit would create more press attention. By contrast, depositing the telcons at the Library of Congress could help end press speculation and stop any AHA litigation.

Leigh proposed alternatives, with pros and cons, that he and Eagleburger could discuss with Kissinger: 1) a separate donation to the Library of Congress with the 25 year/Kissinger’s death restriction with privacy conditions for future disclosure of telcons, 2) a separate donation with a 35-year restriction, 3) include the telcons in the original deed of gift to the Library, 4) maintain the “current position” (personal records).

Apparently accepting Leigh’s advice and not wanting to leave the State Department under a cloud, Kissinger quickly arranged for a second deed of gift to donate the telcons to the Library of Congress.

At this State Department press briefing reporters continued to ask about the telcons, for example, about the GSA/National Archives Bulletin defining personal papers. A reporter asked how the State Department squared the Archive’s definition with “with the idea that Secretary Kissinger can treat as his personal property” transcripts that cover official matters. The spokesperson John H. Trattner had no answer and, when pressed, said he would look into it. The reporter persisted by asking about a departmental regulation that required the preparation of extracts or summaries from private papers that discuss official business, asking whether that was being done with the telephone call transcripts. The spokesperson said that would also be looked into.

At the beginning of the State Department’s news briefing on 28 December, spokesperson John H. Trattner announced that Kissinger had donated the telcon records to the Library of Congress. According to the Department’s statement, the telcons were prepared as “memory aids,” were not “action documents,” and were never circulated. Kissinger was adding them to the donation of his papers because he wanted to “avoid any misinterpretation.”

The reporters raised more questions, asking whether the recent memorandum from the Archivist influenced the decision, how many telcons there were, and why Kissinger had change his mind in view of the legal opinion that the telcons were “private papers,” and what, exactly, was the “misinterpretation” that the former secretary wanted to avoid. There were other “unanswered questions.” Trattner claimed that Kissinger had time to consider the privacy issue and that it had influenced his donation, including the stipulation about the consent of the “first party” in the telcon records.

This is the official statement on Kissinger’s second deed of gift, along with a copy of the deed, which was distributed at the December 28 press briefing. On the preparation of telcon extracts, they would be created only for matters that were not documented “in existing government records.” The State Department disagreed with the GSA/Bulletin on the grounds that it was “inconsistent with Department regulations that have been in effect since 1967.”

The Department sent Kissinger guidance on the various issues that had come up, such as the Archivist’s bulletin and the matter of preparing extracts, among other issues. The answers would be provided only if asked.

Einhorn confirmed the receipt of Kissinger’s papers, including the telcons, on 14, 28, and 29 December 1976.

With the telcons and related matters in the news, the Archivist intervened. He informed Kissinger that, as Archivist of the U.S., he had responsibility for “ascertaining that Federal agencies create, maintain, and dispose of their records in an efficient and lawful manner, and that they preserve records of permanent historical value for eventual deposit in the national archival system.” Rhoads also stated that the Nixon materials preservation act made him “responsible for assuming custody and control of the Presidential historical records of the Nixon administration.” Consistent with that, he asked that professional archivists be allowed to inspect the telcons and related materials at the Library of Congress and determine whether “such material [is] indeed, personal property or whether some portions of them maybe Federal records or Nixon historical materials.”

For all intents and purposes, Kissinger denied Rhoads’ request by sending him a copy of a new Leigh memorandum that insisted that archivists had no useful role to play when the Department had decided that the telcons were personal papers. Leigh argued that the GSA was a “proponent for a definition of official records that is inconsistent with Department of State regulations.” Treating the Archives as an “advocate,” Leigh observed that “it would not seem appropriate for GSA archivists to preempt the Department of State by reviewing the notes in question.” Leigh also saw the Archivists’ request as prejudicial to the Department’s interests: the “respect for privacy expectations implicit in the Department’s regulations has enabled numerous Department officials to originate candid diaries and notes which have proved to be invaluable historical resources.”

When Rhoads replied to Kissinger he put new Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in the loop by forwarding the letter along with the GSA’s legal opinion. Restating his request for professional archivists to determine the status of the telcons, Rhoads advised Kissinger that he had made the request because he had “authority and responsibility to make an independent determination of the character … of the telephone transcripts and related documents.” Reviewing the issues in detail, including statutory authorities and the protection of personal and private information, Donald Young’s legal opinion found a “glaring oversight” in Leigh’s memorandum: it “totally ignores any examination of the statutory and regulatory authorities and responsibilities” of the GSA as “delegated to the Archivist of the United States, which flow from the FRA and Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act.”

Contrary to Leigh’s view about agency freedom of action in determining the definition and preservation of federal records, Young maintained that the U.S. Code made “it quite clear that every agency head shall operate the agency’s records management program in full cooperation with and under regulations prescribed by the GSA.” He found Leigh’s rejection of a GSA role in the matter, because of a supposedly “disqualifying advocate’s interest in the ultimate resolution of the controversy,” as “patently absurd” because the Archivist based his request on “statutory authorities and responsibilities.” As for the status of Kissinger’s telcons, Young observed that the existence of “gray areas” between federal records and personal papers presented a strong argument “for the input of professional archivists in the decision-making process” concerning the status of the telcon transcripts.

Perhaps the force of NARA’s legal arguments persuaded private citizen Kissinger to backtrack a bit, at least to the extent of agreeing to a NARA role, but it did not convince him to agree to the independent inspection that Rhoads sought. Instead, Kissinger accepted a plan for a joint inspection of selected telcons by NARA and the State Department officials.

NARA archivist Richard Jacobs, and State Department records manager John Pruden inspected over 500 telcons but were far from a meeting of minds on which were government records and which were not. As this tally summary indicates, Jacobs found that 88 percent of them were records, while Pruden believed that 51 percent were records. The joint review ground to a halt, and within months the State Department and the Justice Department developed a plan to exclude the Archives from a further role. As Milton Gustafson explained in his review of the story (see Appendix), the government would take no action to recover the Kissinger telcons to either the State Department or the National Archives.

When the National Archives had a Diplomatic Branch with a large staff, the late Milton O. Gustafson was one of its chiefs, and he was a font of knowledge. With this paper from 1981, Gustafson provided a detailed review of the role of the Library of Congress in housing the papers of Secretaries of State and of the early controversies surrounding the Kissinger telcons, including Kissinger’s donation to the Library in 1976, the National Archives’ early attempt to get access to the telcon collection, and the lawsuit by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. As he noted, the Supreme Court ruling in the Reporters Committee lawsuit “implicitly invited agency action to recover the documents,” but it would take two more decades before that became possible.