U.S. Ambassador Carlos Pascual presents an award to a member of Mexico’s Secretariat for Public Security (SSP) while SSP chief Genaro Garcia Luna (left) looks on. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Embassy Mexico City, November 24, 2010)
Documents Detail U.S. Failure to Build “Trustworthy Institutions” in Mexico
U.S. Sent Paper Shredders to Police Intel Group Same Month Chief Came Under Suspicion for Aiding Cartels
Washington, D.C., December 9, 2020 – Since 2007, the U.S. government has relied on a small coterie of Mexican officials to implement the Mérida Initiative, a wide-ranging U.S. aid program to fight organized crime and narcotrafficking. Now, some of those same individuals are facing trial in the United States on charges of rampant corruption linking them to drug cartels.
Documents published today by the National Security Archive describe growing internal U.S. warnings about the vital need to properly vet officials involved with the multi-billion-dollar initiative. Instead, some of the most senior and trusted counter-narcotics officers in Mexico appear to have not only raked in millions of dollars in bribes but leaked highly sensitive intelligence to the very drug cartels they were supposed to combat.
The documents, obtained largely through the Freedom of Information Act, are a revealing window into the complexities of managing a major, sensitive U.S. aid program. They also have direct salience for Mexico today as the legal and diplomatic issues surrounding the prosecutions of key former Mexican officials not only threaten to undermine Mérida’s legacy but have serious implications for efforts to investigate and defend against human rights abuses by elements within the Mexican government.
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Ten years ago, a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Mexico laid bare a profound truth about the Mérida Initiative, a multi-billion-dollar U.S. security assistance package focused on combating organized crime and promoting the rule of law in a country ravaged by narcotics-related violence and corruption.
The success of the program, the Embassy said, hinged in large part on the ability to build “trustworthy institutions” in Mexico, screen out corrupt actors, and ensure that the sensitive information and powerful law enforcement tools being provided by the U.S. did not fall into the wrong hands.
The May 2010 Embassy missive, signed by U.S. Ambassador Carlos Pascual, emphasized that vetting programs initiated under this framework—known as “Control de Confianza” (“Confidence Control”)—were “critical to the success of the entire Merida Initiative”:
If equipment and training are provided to corrupt individuals, the [U.S. government] will have accomplished nothing more than provide expertise and technology to individuals who may use it to undermine all [U.S. government] efforts in Mexico. The bottom line is that if Control de Confianza fails, Merida fails.
A decade later, those fears have apparently been borne out. Two Mexican officials considered central to Mérida’s success, former Public Security Secretary Genaro García Luna and Iván Reyes Arzate, the longtime head of the U.S.-backed Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), are currently awaiting trial in the U.S. on charges that they took millions of dollars in bribes to protect drug cartels. A third official, Gen. Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda, the former defense secretary, was recently released from U.S. custody despite what is reportedly overwhelming evidence of his ties to narcotraffickers.[1] Mexico has since signaled its intention to request that the U.S. also return García Luna to Mexico.
The release of Cienfuegos has set off alarms among groups seeking justice in high-profile human rights abuse cases they say have languished for years in toothless Mexican courts. The families of 43 student teachers forcibly disappeared in 2014 worry that the liberation of Cienfuegos will generate additional resistance among the military to ongoing investigations. As Secretary of Defense, Cienfuegos himself denied investigators the possibility of interviewing military members about the case, maintaining such investigations would be a violation of soldiers’ rights. “Impunity remains the norm,” according to the most recent report for Mexico from Human Rights Watch.
The May 2010 cable is part of a new collection of declassified documents describing the extent to which the U.S. relied on these individuals to allocate billions of dollars in security assistance, manage a steady flow of sensitive U.S. intelligence and law enforcement information, and implement programs meant to root out corrupt officials, all while these same individuals are said to have secretly profited from the very narcotrafficking groups that were fueling violence and murder in Mexico. Their arrests represent a serious blow to the legacy of a program that has been the cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Mexico since 2007 and raised serious doubts about Mexico’s commitment to confronting narcotics-related corruption and impunity—a key component of U.S. policy toward Mexico for more than two decades.
Thirteen years since the Mérida Initiative was launched, ushering in an era of “shared responsibility” for these security challenges, Mexico continues to see record violence. Homicide rates have risen steadily, with organized criminal groups responsible for as many as half of the murders in the country during that time. Reporting by the country’s National Search Commission found that of the 61,637 disappearances reported since 1964, 97% occurred between 2006 and 2019. Yet accountability remains limited due to high levels of corruption and impunity and despite $2.3 billion in funding appropriated by U.S. Congress for equipment delivery, training, and capacity building for Mérida Initiative projects focused on “Disrupting the Operational Capacity of Organized Crime” and “Institutionalizing Reforms to Sustain the Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights in Mexico.”
García Luna, who was arrested one year ago on December 9, 2019, pleaded “not guilty” in an October 2020 hearing and remains in U.S. custody. Among other evidence, U.S. prosecutors cite the statements of former top members of the Sinaloa Cartel, one of whom testified to personally delivering “briefcases containing between three and five million dollars” to García Luna, “in exchange for the defendant’s assurance that we would assist the Sinaloa Cartel.”
U.S. prosecutors have formally linked the case against García Luna to that of Iván Reyes Arzate, who for years was the head of a special police task force created and vetted in coordination with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as a central point of contact for the sharing of sensitive U.S. intelligence and law enforcement information. Among other accusations, Reyes Arzate and his co-conspirators are said to have “tipped off cartel members when the DEA had obtained judicial authorization to intercept their phones, and leaked the identity of a cooperating source who was covertly working with the DEA to gather evidence against the cartel.”
Reyes Arzate led the SIU when members of the unit passed sensitive U.S. law enforcement information to the Zetas criminal group, sparking, among other things, the March 2011 massacre in Allende, Coahuila, according to reporting from ProPublica. A subsequent report from the investigative group found that, since 2007, “most of the unit’s Mexican supervisors have either been compromised by payoffs and bribes from various drug traffickers, or killed in ways that strongly suggest they were inside hits.” The U.S. suspended assistance soon after Reyes Arzate became the target of DEA suspicions. Ironically—perhaps only coincidentally—the final U.S. delivery under the SIU assistance package was a shipment of paper shredders in September 2016.
The exposure of alleged corruption at the highest levels of Mexico’s security establishment has done little to stem the flow of U.S. security assistance. Congress most recently allocated $150 million for accounts that fund Mérida Initiative activities, exceeding the requested amount for 2020 by $73 million. The House Appropriations Committee is currently weighing an additional $140 million for the 2021 fiscal year.
Meanwhile, Mexico’s current president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who took office in December 2018, has used the corruption allegations to point a finger at his predecessors and to question whether the U.S. should also share the blame. A new proposal submitted last week by his government would strip U.S. agents in Mexico of diplomatic immunity and require them to share any intelligence collected with the Mexican government. The DEA, he said, has acted with “complete freedom” in Mexico, according to comments made in October and reported by Reuters. “Why is it,” he asked, “that it’s just the people in Mexico who took part in these acts being accused or implicated, and (the DEA) aren’t criticizing themselves, reflecting on the meddling by all these agencies in Mexico?”
From the beginning of the Mérida Initiative in 2007, Genaro García Luna was seen as one of the most important figures in the reform of Mexico’s internal security system, which had become increasingly reliant on the military to fight organized crime. As the newly-named head of the Secretariat for Public Security (SSP)—a rough equivalent of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—he would be instrumental in the reassertion of civilian control over Mexican security institutions. This reform would entail a restructuring of Mexico’s police, merging the SSP Federal Preventive Police (PFP) and the Federal Investigations Agency (AFI) Federal Police into one unit under SSP control.
A U.S. Embassy cable written shortly after his appointment in December 2006 described García Luna as “a trusted liaison, partner and friend of the FBI.” García Luna had previously held a variety of key positions in the Mexican security establishment, including top posts at CISEN, Mexico’s CIA equivalent, and later as head of the AFI, similar to the U.S. FBI. Yet it was during his four-year stint as AFI chief (2001-2005) that he allegedly began to take money from the Sinaloa Cartel. The Embassy cable said that having García Luna positioned “at the top of the civilian security structure should help maintain the excellent cooperation that the [U.S. government] law enforcement agencies enjoyed” under the administration of Mexican President Vicente Fox (2000-2006).
As head of the SSP, García Luna assumed control of the agency that was to be the vanguard of President Felipe Calderón’s (2006-2012) strategy to control organized crime. The SSP chief steered the development of a massive new communications network, giving him an unprecedented level of access to sensitive information on counter-narcotics operations, and exercised considerable control over augmented vetting procedures meant to screen out corrupt officers. By October 2009, a cable from the U.S. Embassy Mexico viewed García Luna as a “key player” in Mexico’s security apparatus whose cooperation was necessary to move the “law enforcement agenda to new levels of practical cooperation.” More than anything, the U.S. was focused on encouraging him to “operationalize, in real time, critical intelligence that we can provide.” Another cable found that the SSP, under García Luna, was “increasingly becoming a major player on the intel block.”
A U.S. State Department briefing paper prepared for a December 2007 meeting between García Luna and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, shortly after the Mérida Initiative was announced, said that the SSP director’s “role in the national security context is the most complex, given the extensive corruption that permeated the previous Federal Preventive Police force and the extraordinary technological projects he has initiated.” One of García Luna’s key projects, Plataforma México, is described as “a communications system that will provide inter-connectivity throughout the country, potentially linking police and prosecutors at all levels of government across Mexico,” putting García Luna at the nerve center of narcotics related intelligence in the country.
Negroponte encouraged García Luna’s efforts to centralize control of Mexico’s internal security forces and noted “the importance of harmonizing policing across Mexico,” according to a readout from the December meeting. García Luna replied that the reforms planned by President Calderón “would force police to work nationally in a coordinated manner.” Plataforma México, described as “the billion-dollar scheme for establishing interconnections between all police and prosecutors,” would “allow SSP to analyze criminal trends in real time,” according to García Luna, giving the agency effective control over sensitive intelligence and law enforcement information on the cartels. Support provided through the Mérida Initiative, he told Negroponte, “would help provide the police the technological advantage now enjoyed by the well-funded criminal organizations they face.”
A U.S. Embassy “Spot Report” from 2009 described the near completion of the “National Command and Control Center” (known informally as “The Bunker”) located immediately adjacent to SSP headquarters in Mexico City and that would house Plataforma México. The Embassy report said the new facility would “allow all federal and local entities to work together in protected space with a full flow of information.” The Bunker looked “like a NASA command center with multiple screens and three rows of trained computer operators monitoring data and events across the country.”
As the physical principal site of Plataforma Mexico the command center will have the information needed to empower the SSP operations officers to collate intelligence regarding major incidents from many of its departments and manage them from initial prevention, response, and resumption of normal conditions after the incident.
The SSP also went through a massive personnel expansion under García Luna, largely thanks to funding provided from the U.S. through the Mérida Initiative, putting the SSP chief in a position to verify the trustworthiness of thousands of new police recruits. A U.S. Embassy cable summarizing a February 2007 meeting with DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff said the massive recruitment effort “would require a new approach to vetting officers.” García Luna hoped “that DHS could help him establish programs for assuring the integrity of his force,” according to the cable. These comments came amid a discussion about intelligence and information exchanges between the DHS and SSP, including possible “protocols to allow for more sharing of ‘high-quality’ law enforcement intelligence.” The briefing paper prepared for the December 2007 Negroponte meeting recommended that he ask Mexico’s attorney general “for his assessment of the [Mexican government’s] plans to create a national police force under Public Security Secretary Garcia Luna, including how the [Mexican government] intends to avoid the problems of corruption and alleged human rights violations that have derailed previous reform efforts.”
The U.S. Embassy also endorsed García Luna’s handling of personnel vetting in its International Narcotics Control Strategy Report from November 2007. Under the heading “Professionalization of the Federal Police,” the report praised the SSP chief, who it said had begun “to morph the federal police structure into an entity that is more effective and trustworthy.” García Luna had replaced hundreds of officials, it said, and the SSP would “soon have the means to vet its entire force … stemming the rampant corruption that has existed.” In April 2008, García Luna told a group of visiting U.S. congressional staffers that the centralization of state and municipal police forces under SSP control “would enforce professionalization and break the back of the pervasive corruption.”
At the same time, there was growing concern that the ability to screen out untrustworthy officials was not keeping pace with the flow of U.S. security assistance reaching Mexican security forces. In one instance, Mexican security expert Ernesto López Portillo told the Embassy he thought García Luna was “overly reliant on vetting police officers … instead of changing the institutions themselves.” The SSP was “taking on too many projects in too short a period of time,” he said, adding that he “fears that the [Government of Mexico] will build up a very powerful justice system supported by lots of technology and equipment but too little accountability.”
A cable from the following month noted the alarming rise in violence directed at high-level police officials, including “close DEA contacts” and “a leader in the DEA’s Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU).” The Embassy chose to link the uptick in violence to the government’s “success in disrupting the cartels—in the form of pressure applied through massive military/police surges along with more targeted arrests based on improved intelligence.”
More concrete problems with the vetting programs were evident in cables from the following year. One found that “A number of senior level PGR and SSP officials have not passed vetting or polygraph tests, and over a quarter of the 60 individuals selected for the senior-level SSP training course did not pass their exams.” A subsequent cable stressed that Mexico’s security strategy was “often fractured, ad hoc, and heavily reliant on the United States for leads and operations.”
While García Luna oversaw all police operations as head of the SSP, Reyes Arzate’s position as SIU chief made him “the principal point of contact for information sharing between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement personnel assigned to the SIU.” For eight years, Reyes Arzate “routinely had contact with and worked collaboratively with DEA agents in Mexico City,” according to U.S. federal prosecutors, while at the same time collaborating with some of Mexico’s most dangerous criminal groups.
A set of declassified letters from the State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) describes a range of sensitive equipment provided to the SIU under the Mérida Initiative from 2011, the year the unit leaked information that sparked the Allende massacre, through 2016, the year when U.S. prosecutors say that Reyes Arzate first drew the attention of U.S. law enforcement. Equipment provided under the program included armored vehicles, motorcycles, computers, and data extraction tools. Interestingly, the final memo in the set, dated September 26, 2016—the same month that U.S. law enforcement began to suspect Reyes Arzate—described a shipment of paper shredders.
U.S. support for the Mexico SIU long predated the Mérida Initiative and went well beyond the equipment described in the INL memos. Mexico (along with Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia) was one of the first countries where the U.S. set up an SIU to coordinate counter-narcotics investigations and operations, including the sharing of sensitive intelligence information. The specialized units, first housed in the office of Mexico’s Attorney General (PGR), were seen as a means of dealing with the problem of corruption within Mexican security forces, especially when it came to counter-narcotics operations. As early as 1995, the U.S. and Mexico were discussing “the possibility of creating a special joint unit consisting of elements of U.S. intelligence and law enforcement and the attorney general’s office” to assist Mexico’s “efforts to fight narco-trafficking and the attendant corruption that flows from it.” The SIU was to be the exemplar for the modeling of “clean” units in Mexico.
The importance that the U.S. placed on the vetted unit concept was evident as early as 1996, after Mexico’s Attorney General, Jorge Madrazo, released from detention an alleged second suspect in the 1994 assassination of presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio. “The key [U.S. government] interest in the affair remains that of continuity within the PGR,” according to a U.S. Embassy cable from August 8, 1996.
The only hope for long term reform of corruption, unprofessionalism, and disorganization in the PGR lies in continuity of trusted personnel. Any change in PGR leadership at this time would not only stop any chance of such reform for the moment (such as the upcoming shakeup of the Federal Judicial Police), but threaten important bilateral cooperation programs such as the border task forces and vetted investigative units.
The need to get vetted investigative units up and running became even more urgent, in the view of the U.S. government, after the February 1997 arrest of Gen. Jesús Héctor Gutiérrez Rebollo, an Army general who had more recently been director of Mexico’s National Institute for Combating Drugs (Instituto Nacional para el Combate a las Drogas – INCD). Gutiérrez was to be the first person prosecuted under Mexico’s new Organized Crime Law, accused of accepting hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes from Juárez Cartel boss Amado Carrillo Fuentes.
In the days following the Gutiérrez arrest, U.S. Ambassador James Jones called on Attorney General Madrazo to discuss the newly-formed SIU. Madrazo said he feared that Gutiérrez had “compromised” some of his agency’s most important narcotics investigations, as he had “deceived a lot of people in the Army and the Secretariat of Defense,” adding that their “first impressions of him were all very positive.” Gutérrez’s firing, Madrazo said, was intended to send the “very strong” message “that even at the highest levels, Mexican officials cannot carry out crimes with impunity.” Madrazo continued that the next INCD director would “be subjected to the most demanding tests” and an “extensive vetting process.” The Gutiérrez arrest was “a golden opportunity for sweeping structural reforms, a clean break with the past,” according to the ambassador. “Madrazo could take a negative-seeming event and turn it into a positive,” according to the Embassy’s read-out of the meeting.
A year later, a U.S. State Department démarche on counter-narcotics cooperation with Mexico said that “the creation of vetted and technically-proficient teams to combat organized crime” showed “great potential for impact against the cartels and for improving bilateral cooperation.” The U.S. was pleased with “efforts to identify and remove corrupt individuals,” according to the document, but said that “institutional changes are needed to prevent it from recurring.” Vetted units were “a solid first step in addressing the problem of corruption.” However, the State Department said that “Mexico should expand the vetting process to include a wider range of officials in sensitive positions in key institutions as well as examine ways to further strengthen its security practices.”
The SIU was transferred to the cognizance of the AFI in 2002, just one year after García Luna took charge of the organization and around the time, prosecutors say, he allegedly began to receive bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel.
Reyes Arzate joined the SIU the next year as a member of the Federal Police, rising to the position of SIU commander in 2008, just as the Mérida Initiative was getting underway and not long after a 2007 report from the Justice Department’s Inspector General (OIG) found serious deficiencies in the SIU. Despite hosting one of the largest such organizations in the world, with 184 agents (second only to Colombia), the OIG found that the unit suffered from “inadequate equipment management” and that DEA advisors “did not maintain an inventory of equipment provided to its SIU teams.” Oversight of the Mexico SIU was also substandard, according to the report, which estimated the ratio of DEA Special Agents to SIU members at 1:23, far below the required minimum of 1:15.
Under Mérida, the U.S. poured more money into the troubled unit and maintained confidence that the vetted SIU, under the command of Reyes Arzate, was a secure liaison point for bilateral cooperation on the most sensitive counter-drug investigations. “Activity Descriptions” in the State Department’s “Mexican Security Cooperation Plan” for fiscal year 2008 included $2 million for upgrading the vetted units associated with the PGR and SSP, noting that “expanded information sharing” was “a key component” of the program. Another $5 million was set aside to “stand up” a “robust polygraph program” at several Mexican federal agencies, including the SSP. An inventory of equipment and training to be delivered to Mexico for 2009 and 2010 included “clandestine laboratory equipment and “special investigative courses” for SIU agents at the DEA Training Academy in Quantico, Virginia. An August 2009 cable published by Wikileaks indicates that Reyes Arzate was among five SIU officers cleared of involvement in “gross human rights violations” so that they could attend the DEA’s “Advanced SIU Course” in Aruba.
Less than two years later, the SIU sparked one of Mexico’s bloodiest cartel killing sprees. A groundbreaking 2017 investigation from ProPublica found evidence that the SIU had passed key information about sensitive DEA cell-phone-tracking efforts to the leaders of the Zetas criminal group, triggering a three-day cartel sweep through Allende, Coahuila—a wave of retribution that reportedly left hundreds dead in March 2011. A separate report from ProPublica found a similar pattern in a case from April 2010, where an SIU leak is said to have prompted the disappearances (and presumed deaths) of four innocent civilians staying at a hotel being used by SIU members to surveil a top Zetas leader.
Another four years would pass before U.S. law enforcement realized that its most trusted intelligence liaison was part of an alleged “conspiracy to corruptly impede a U.S.-based narcotics investigation.” Meanwhile, the State Department continued to tout the Mérida Initiative’s accomplishments. A 2013 review of the Initiative’s Pillar II programs, dedicated to the “Development of an Institutionalized Capacity to Sustain the Rule of Law,” highlighted “important advances” that included “developing trustworthy institutions, advancing judicial reforms and crime laboratory development, and training all levels of justice sector personnel.” The report pointed to “measurable results” in the ability of internal control units to “detect and deter corruption” and to “contribute to building a culture of lawfulness in Mexico.”
The fact that García Luna and Reyes Arzate are now in custody may represent a victory for the U.S. Justice Department, but it also exposes the failure of one of Mérida’s key pillars: “The Development of Trustworthy Institutions.” At the highest and most important levels, Control de Confianza, the linchpin of the Mérida Initiative, was an utter failure. The false confidence that the beefed-up vetting program instilled in U.S. officials cleared the way for the funneling of hundreds of millions of dollars into the hands of officials who now stand accused of lining their pockets with the ill-gotten profits of the very groups they were supposed to combat.
Now, one year since García Luna’s arrest, Mexico has signaled that it would like the U.S. to return him for prosecution in Mexico. To do so following the release of Gen. Cienfuegos, and after the DEA spent years building ironclad cases against them, would seem to be another embarrassing setback for the architects of Mérida.
Document 01
Freedom of Information Act request
Collection: Mexico-United States Counternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013
Accession Number: MD01349
During a conversation between Ambassador Jones and Attorney General Antonio Lozano, Jones describes a previous discussion with Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo regarding the creation of a “special joint unit” to assist with rooting out narcotics trafficking-related corruption in the Mexican police, judiciary, and political circles. This unit would be composed of U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials and members of the Attorney General’s office (PGR) but would have to be designed and approved through the inter-agency process in Washington. Lozano affirms the idea, observing that members of the joint unit would have to be subject to rigorous vetting and testing to ensure that they could be trusted. Lozano says he would prefer that a joint operation be formed as an “elite unit” as provided for in pending legislation, rather than with the current INCD, Mexico’s counter-narcotics unit.
Document 02
Freedom of Information Act request
This cable describes the U.S. support for Mexico’s Attorney General Antonio Lozano, despite public criticism following the release of Othon Cortes, the alleged “second gunman” in the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio. The cable references a conversation between Lozano and Ambassador Jones, when the Attorney General indicated he would appeal the release. Ambassador Jones comments on how Lozano “continues to appear uncorrupt, serious, and dedicated to expanding cooperation with the USG in law enforcement matters.” He also highlights the key USG interest in the affair. This includes the importance of continuity within the PGR, given that “any change in PGR leadership at this time would not only stop any chance of such reform for the moment ... but threaten important bilateral cooperation such as the border task forces and vetted investigative units.”
Document 03
Freedom of Information Act request
This cable describes the implications of the recent dismissal and arrest of Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, the Commissioner General of Mexico’s National Institute to Combat Drugs (INCD), for receiving payments from drug lord Amado Carrillo Fuentes. During a conversation between Ambassador Jones and Attorney General Jorge Madrazo, the Attorney General stated that Gutiérrez had “deceived a lot of people in the army and the secretary of defense” and that “the public message sent by his firing was meant to be very strong – that even at the highest levels, Mexican officials cannot carry out crimes with impunity.” When discussing Gutierrez’s successor, the Attorney General indicated that a decision had not yet been reached but that the next INCD director “will be subjected to the most demanding tests,” including polygraph testing, urine testing for drug use, and background investigations, among others. The Ambassador and Attorney General also discussed the status of the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), as Madrazo indicated forthcoming collaboration between the Mexican military and the unit as well. Vetting and investigation of the 36 unit members was expected to be completed soon.
Document 04
Freedom of Information Act request
In a démarche, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright describes the importance of the narcotics certification process, despite international criticism. Highlighting certification objectives (or “benchmarks”), Albright lays out necessary progress if the Mexican Government is to obtain certification for 1998. In a section on current and future efforts to combat organized crime, the Secretary notes how “the creation of vetted and technically-proficient teams to combat organized crime shows great potential for impact against the cartels and for improving bilateral cooperation.” The next steps for these units will entail a shift from recruiting, vetting, and training to developing cases against criminal organizations. In describing criminal justice reform within Mexico, Secretary Albright highlights the importance of institutional changes and states that to prevent the recurrence of corruption, “the creation of vetted units is a solid first step.” The démarche also advises that “Mexico should expand the vetting process to include a wider range of officials in sensitive positions in key institutions as well as examine ways to further strengthen its security practices.”
Document 05
Freedom of Information Act request
This U.S. Embassy cable describes the shake-up at Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office (PGR) following the decision to drop investigations into then-mayor of Mexico City Andres Manuel López Obrador. Former Attorney General Rafael Macedo de la Concha resigned on April 25th, prompting the departures of more than a dozen senior officials and paralysis among lower-level officials. And while the reorganization extended to the military, with several officers recalled from their duties with the PGR, the Federal Investigations Agency (AFI) and the organized crime division (SEIDO) of the PGR remain largely unaffected. As the cable notes, “AFI head Genaro García Luna has been asked to stay on. While such action is a reflection of what is widely considered to be the solid anti-crime, anti-trafficking work that he has accomplished at the helm of AFI, it did not hurt that García Luna also enjoys a positive relationship with Los Pinos and Cabinet Secretaries independent of his strong ties to former Attorney General Macedo.”
Document 06
Wikileaks
This U.S. Embassy cable provides biographies for President Calderón’s new security cabinet appointed the day before the December 1, 2006, inauguration. In addition to describing García Luna’s previous positions dating back to 1989, Ambassador Bassett notes his “friendly” attitude towards the United States and describes how “García Luna has been a trusted liaison, partner and friend of the FBI since his days at the PFP. He is a ‘big picture guy’ and strategist, approaching issues and problems like the engineer that he is.” The Ambassador also notes how García Luna’s “personal reputation is very good,” distinguishing the newly appointed Secretary of Public Security from some of his subordinates. Additionally, Ambassador Basset describes the benefit of García Luna and Attorney General Medina Mora’s appointments, as “having both of them at the top of the civilian security structure should help maintain the excellent cooperation that the USG law enforcement agencies enjoyed with the Fox administration. Both men have been strong advocates of the need for significant restructuring of the federal police structure; García Luna even wrote a book about it.”
Document 07
Freedom of Information Act request
In a 65-page program description, the Department of State provides a breakdown of various Mérida Initiative activities and associated U.S. funding amounts for the 2008-2009 fiscal year. Each activity is tied to a specific Mérida Initiative objective and includes a description of the program, maintenance and training required, contribution to be made by the Mexican Government, and intended impact. Funding recipients include Mexico’s Secretary of Defense (SEDENA), Secretary of the Navy (SEMAR), Attorney General’s Office (PGR), Center for Research and National Security (CISEN), and Secretary of Public Security (SSP). The “Strengthening Units on Anti-Gang, Anti-Organized Crime, & Anti-Money Laundering” program notes the creation of special vetted units to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement, whose stated impact is to “provide GOM law enforcement entities with the proper tools to investigate and prosecute gang leaders, drug lords and cartel leaders.”
Document 08
Wikileaks
Collection: Mexico-United States Counternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013
Accession Number: MD01561
In a write-up following Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff’s two-day trip to Mexico City in February 2007, this cable recounts separate meetings with Attorney General Medina Mora and Secretary of Public Security García Luna. During the Secretary’s meeting with Medina Mora, the General notes potential legal changes anticipated under the Calderón administration and lays out the “three most critical law enforcement challenges Mexico faces: improving institutional strength of local, state, and federal police forces; dismantling the sophisticated business operations run by the drug cartels; and crafting a regional strategy encompassing the U.S., Mexico and Central America.” In Chertoff’s meeting with García Luna the following day, García Luna reiterates the legal reforms described by Medina Mora, including the plans to merge Mexican Law Enforcement agencies under his authority at the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP) and to recruit over 8,000 new officers. This large recruitment “would require a new approach to vetting officers,” leading to García Luna’s “hope that DHS could help him establish programs for assuring the integrity of his force.” Chertoff and García Luna proceed to discuss intelligence and information exchanges between the DHS and SSP, including possible “protocols to allow for more sharing of ‘high-quality’ law enforcement intelligence.”
Document 09
Freedom of Information Act request
In anticipation of a meeting between Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and Mexico’s Attorney General Medina Mora, the State Department’s bureau for the Western Hemisphere prepared a series of talking points. The meeting is set to occur just after the October 22 announcement of the Mérida Initiative, and will therefore emphasize new efforts to transform and modernize the bilateral relationship between the United States and Mexico. The three objectives for discussion include transforming the security relationship, judicial reform, and working toward prosecutions in high profile human rights cases. Specific to judicial reform, the document notes, “You might also ask Medina Mora for his assessment of the GOM's plans to create a national police force under Public Security Secretary García Luna, including how the GOM intends to avoid the problems of corruption and alleged human rights violations that have derailed previous reform efforts.”
Document 10
Freedom of Information Act request
Collection: Mexico-United States Counternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013
Accession Number: MD01590
As part of a list of talking points prepared ahead of Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte’s meeting with Secretary of Public Security García Luna, the State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs highlights García Luna’s accomplishments to date. “García Luna's role in the national security context is perhaps the most complex, given the extensive corruption that permeated the previous Federal Preventive Police force and the extraordinary technological projects he has initiated, including the Plataforma Mexico, a communications system that will provide inter-connectivity throughout the country, potentially linking police and prosecutors at all levels of government across Mexico. The tasks he has assumed are Herculean.”
Document 11
Freedom of Information Act request
Collection: Mexico-United States Counternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013
Accession Number: MD01598
This U.S. Embassy cable summarizes the achievement of the Calderón administration in combating organized crime and drug trafficking between 2007–2008. To curb drug trafficking in a country which produces 90 percent of all cocaine consumed in the U.S., the document says, the GOM has taken numerous actions, including the professionalization of the Federal Police, the creation of Plataforma México, legal reforms, and a regional security plan. The cable notes how Genaro García Luna has led efforts to morph the federal police structure into an entity that is “more effective and trustworthy.” To this end, the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP) will soon have the means to vet its entire force, as well as police on the state and municipal level, with the goal of stemming rampant corruption. Moreover, in 2007, the Calderón administration targeted corruption within the federal government, which led to the dismissal or suspension of nearly 3,000 federal employees. The cable concludes by noting President Calderón’s courage and dedication to curbing the influence of drug trafficking, establishing integrity within the ranks of the police, and reestablishing sovereign authority through military force.
Document 12
Freedom of Information Act request
Collection: Mexico-United States Counternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013
Accession Number: MD01612
This Embassy cable describes meetings between Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, Assistant Secretary of State Tom Shannon, and officials from Mexico’s Secretariat of the Interior (SEGOB), Secretariat of Public Security (SSP), and Attorney General’s Office (PGR). During the meeting with Genaro García Luna, García Luna summarizes steps undertaken to improve law enforcement, including the expansion of the federal police, upgrades of federal prisons, and efforts to engage with civil society. Additionally, García Luna notes the SSP’s instituting of polygraph tests of federal forces under its control, with the ultimate goal of police restructuring to “broaden the authority of federal police to investigate aggressively, to proactively prevent crime, harmonize police procedures and standards and, impose binding ethical standards on police officers.” He describes the need to “re-populate the entire police force across the country (breaking the grip cartels hold on local police in particular), restore public respect for law enforcement in Mexico, and train and equip police forces to challenge the technological edge cartels have long maintained here.” Luna also notes that “the support provided through the Mérida Initiative would help provide the police the technological advantage now enjoyed by the well-funded criminal organizations they face.”
Document 13
Wikileaks
Collection: Mexico-United States Counternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013
Accession Number: MD01634
This Embassy cable describes the March 2008 visit to Mexico by staffers from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the House Appropriations Committee. In a trip focused on the application of Mérida Initiative funds, staffers share concerns regarding human rights abuses, corruption, and the need for further police reform, and suggest the possibility of funding cuts. During a meeting between García Luna and staffers, García Luna provides an outline for Mexican police over the next 5 years, whose role would increase to match the diminished role of the military. In particular, he indicates, “Central control over the state and municipal police would enforce professionalization and break the back of the pervasive corruption.” In a separate meeting, Attorney General Medina Moura notes how Mérida Initiative (MI) funds are “a catalyst and as such would allow the GOM to tackle more rapidly its counter drug priorities. MI was important on a political level because it demonstrated U.S. readiness to assume shared responsibility.”
Document 14
Wikileaks
Collection: Mexico-United States Counternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013
Accession Number: MD01635
After a meeting with Hector Sanchez from the Secretariat of Public Security’s (SSP) Office of International Relations, U.S. Ambassador Antonio Garza provides a summary of seven goals constituting the SSP’s “bible” for a planned restructuring. The proposed reform includes merging police units from the Federal Preventive Force (PFP) and Federal Investigations Agency (AFI) into a single, unified “Federal Police.” The reform transfers budget control for AFI from the Attorney General’s Office (PGR) to the SSP and includes specific provisions for “professionalizing and institutionalizing the Federal Police.” As part of the “Combating Corruption” goal, the SSP is strengthening vetting of SSP officials, federal police officers, and new recruits.
In a separate section titled “Short on Accountability,” the cable highlights the concerns of Mexican security expert Ernesto Lopez Portillo about police accountability for abuses and corruption given the limited infrastructure to match the expanded authority of Mexico’s federal police. In particular, Lopez Portillo “fears that the GOM will build up a very powerful justice system supported by lots of technology and equipment but too little accountability.” Ambassador Garza’s concluding comment notes, “an additional step that the reforms still need to address is doing more to strengthen procedures to prosecute abusive and corrupt officials … To be successful, the reforms will need to allow for greater civilian involvement in public security policy development and in oversight of police activities. García Luna has signaled openness to both. Whether he can achieve the many ambitious goals he has set remains an open question.”
Document 15
Wikileaks
Collection: Mexico-United States Counternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013
Accession Number: MD01642
In a cable describing the wave of attacks by cartels on both law enforcement and military officials, Ambassador Garza recounts some of the more high-profile killings from the first two weeks of May 2008. These attacks include the May 1 assassination of Robert Velasco Bravo, head of the Secretariat of Public Security’s (SSP) Organized Crime Department and leader of the DEA’s Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) Program as well as Aristeo Gomez, a senior administrative officer of the SSP just two days later. The violence is attributed to the Mexican Government’s success in disrupting the cartels. Despite this success, the increased attacks have affected officials, as “top police officials within DEA's Special Intelligence Unit (SIU) repeatedly have asked to be reassigned out from the SSP's elite anti-drug unit to ‘safer’ areas of police work.” Additionally, SSP recruitment remains low, the supposition being that “well-educated grads are unwilling to join, for one reason (the endemic violence) or another (e.g., the continuing low stature of police in Mexican society).” With President Calderón and the Mexican government committed to the war against organized crime, outbreaks of violence among cartels and against authorities are expected to continue.
Document 16
Freedom of Information Act request
As part of a forecast plan for Mérida Initiative programs, this U.S. Embassy cable provides a list of commodities and services costing more than $25,000, which the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) plans to acquire during fiscal years 2009 and 2010. The cable details the description, estimated cost, and possible source for purchasing the requested materials. Among the 53 projects to be funded is the Secretariat of Public Security’s (SSP) Command and Control Operations Center, which has included the provision of computer and communications equipment. Future support will entail “engineering services, project management, civil engineering site preparations, and provisions of office equipment,” which are considered mandatory priority. Additionally, the cable describes a proposal for Special Investigative Unit (SIU) Specialized Training. The training will entail three annual special investigative courses for 20 SIU agents per course at the DEA Training Academy in Quantico, VA, which “will emphasize professional police work, especially evidence exploitation, and assist the SSP SIU agents to successfully bring a greater number of criminal cases to closure.”
Document 17
Freedom of Information Act request
This Embassy cable describes the Calderón administration’s Operation Cleanup (Limpieza) – an anti-corruption initiative into information leaks by law enforcement officials to drug traffickers – that resulted in the arrest or dismissal of more than 30 Mexican government officials. Several of the implicated officials are contacts close to Genaro García Luna and may therefore undermine García Luna’s authority. These colleagues and subordinates include the Director for International Police Affairs at the Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) and head of Interpol in Mexico, Ricardo Gutierrez Vargas; the Chief of Special Operations for the Secretary of Public Security (SSP), Francisco Navarro; the head of the Federal Preventive Police, Gerardo Garay Cadena; and García Luna's private secretary, Mario Velarde Martinez. While the arrests are considered a sign of the administration’s commitment to rooting out corruption, Ambassador Garza suggests, “the real loser in all this may be García Luna, who while to date not implicated personally in the corrupt activities of his subordinates, will have to work hard to overcome the perception that he is either oblivious to what goes on around him or tolerates his underlings.”
Document 18
Freedom of Information Act request
This update on Mérida Initiative activities details Public Secretary García Luna’s overview of a new training and development program for Mexico’s Federal Police. With U.S. government assistance, the program strives to conduct a large-scale training of senior leaders, investigators, instructors, and special units. Central to García Luna’s plan to revitalize federal police forces is a “new model of policing,” which emphasizes the integration of Mexico’s security forces within a single system of information, common training standards, and an integrated system of accountability. According to the cable, García Luna asked for U.S. assistance in four specific areas: the training of investigators, the training of new instructors and curriculum, new leadership, and specialty courses. García Luna was also particularly interested in developing societal factors that bolster public security, expressing “a good deal of interest” in historical cases where authorities used ex-guerrillas and reformed narcotics bosses as public security officials to build a social base to counter insurgents.
Document 19
Freedom of Information Act
Collection: Mexico-United States Counternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013
Accession Number: MD01725
This U.S. Embassy cable provides an assessment of the Mérida Initiative projects in the eight months since the signing of the Letter of Agreement (LOA), highlighting the equipment and training provided thus far, anticipated deliveries moving forward, and challenges faced during this initial period. While senior Mexican government officials have expressed a concern over slow implementation, the cable describes a “false expectation in terms of Mérida delivery” that has been exacerbated by factors on both the U.S. and Mexican sides. This eight-month assessment is intended to consider these factors while also taking stock of program activities to date. Among the “noteworthy deliveries,” the cable describes federal police investigator training as part of an effort to restructure the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP). In addition, the cable notes the recent U.S. Department of Justice assessment of the Office of the Attorney General (PGR) and SSP as well as efforts to assist Mexican agencies in establishing standards, policies, and procedures for polygraph programs for internal controls. Future activities for the next four months will include the provision of approximately $3.9 million in server equipment for the National Command Center (the Bunker), which will allow for integration with Plataforma Mexico.
Document 20
Freedom of Information Act request
This U.S. Embassy Cable describes the Secretariat of Public Security’s (SSP) initiative to build a national command and control center known as “The Bunker.” The new facility is being built with funding and support from the NAS and will serve as a multi-agency coordination center across all levels of government for “planning, coordination and assisting law enforcement in the fight against crime.” Additionally, it will serve as the operations center for responding to and recovering from large-scale catastrophic disasters across Mexico. The cable states that the U.S. Embassy’s Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) has provided expertise, technical support and computer equipment, installing 60 servers for the project at a cost of approximately $3.5 million. The project is part of a growing web of new technologies in Mexico to support the fight against organized crime. Additional equipment includes two aircraft hangers, two major operational centers, a forensics lab, an intelligence facility, a state-of-the-art firing range, and a special operations training facility. The cable concludes by noting that the SSP’s budget has increased by 300 percent over the past three years.
Document 21
Wikileaks
In an action request sent to the Department of State, Deputy Chief of Mission John Feeley provides a list of five individuals for vetting under the Leahy laws. The request is sent from the Embassy on behalf of the DEA ahead of an Advanced SIU Course to be held in Aruba on September 14, 2009. As part of the Leahy laws, the U.S. government is prohibited from providing training or assistance to individuals who have perpetrated a gross violation of human rights with impunity. Ivan Reyes Arzate is included in this list for approval, given his role as Subinspector for the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP).
Document 22
Wikileaks
In a preparatory cable ahead of García Luna and Chavez’s visits to Washington, D.C., Deputy Chief of Mission John Feeley describes next steps for the Mérida Initiative, including building infrastructure for Mexico to operationalize U.S. intelligence, implementing constitutional legal reforms, and addressing human rights concerns. The scenesetter highlights ongoing challenges including consistently high levels of violence; mistrust between government institutions and between security services at the federal, state, and municipal levels; as well as slow implementation due to delays in transferring funds between U.S. government agencies. Despite the expansion of the Secretariat of Public Security’s (SSP) capacity – growth attributed significant budget allocations, new powers following the federal police reform, participation in wire-tapping activities, and the development of the Plataforma Mexico criminal database – Feeley also notes potentially limited accountability. As President Calderón and the Ministry of Defense (SEDENA) consider human rights violations a "price to pay” in confronting criminal groups, Feeley urges U.S. officials to press for “concrete steps on the human rights front.”
Document 23
Wikileaks
Collection: Mexico-United States Counternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013
Accession Number: MD01738
This U.S. Embassy cable details the inefficacy of President Calderón’s intelligence apparatus to produce high quality information and targeted operations, particularly in relation to counter-narcotics efforts. The cable states that Mexico’s use of strategic and tactical intelligence is often “fractured, ad hoc, and heavily reliant on the United States for leads and operations.” A critical reason for the fractured nature of Mexican intelligence is a lack of trust between and within GOM institutions, which often suffer from internal suspicions, as local military commands are often penetrated by organized crime. Inter-agency rivalries further impede effective intelligence sharing. The cable explains that the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP), which received the bulk of the Mexican Government’s security budget, is unlikely to cooperate with the Attorney General’s Office after recently receiving legal backing to allow García Luna to build a new intelligence and investigative program. Thus, sustained U.S. assistance is needed to help shape and fortify the technical capacity of institutions and create a more reliable inter-agency environment.
Document 24
Freedom of Information Act request
Collection: Mexico-United States Counternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013
Accession Number: MD01780
In a background paper, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) describes a proposal to share information about repatriation of convicted felons from the U.S. to Mexico. The Memorandum of Cooperation for information sharing stems from a request by the Mexican Government made in 2009 and is expected to be signed during the March 23, 2010, meeting of the Mérida Initiative High-Level Consultative Group on Bilateral Cooperation Against Transnational Organized Crime. Attendees of this meeting include Secretary of Public Security (SSP) Genaro García Luna and DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, among others.
Document 25
Freedom of Information Act request
In a status update about the Mérida Initiative, Ambassador Carlos Pascual describes U.S. Assistance for “Control de Confianza,” a program intended to “design and develop sound practices to reduce corruption” in Mexico’s judicial, intelligence, and security ministries through vetting and internal controls. The program will center on two principles: Gatekeeper, which seeks to prevent corrupt officials from entering government law enforcement organizations, and Internal Culture of Lawfulness, whose focus is on deterring corruption among already employed officials. Ambassador Pascual emphasizes the significance of the program, stating “Control de Confianza is critical to the success of the entire Mérida Initiative. If equipment and training are provided to corrupt individuals, the USG will have accomplished nothing more than provide expertise and technology to individuals who may use it to undermine all USG efforts in Mexico. The bottom line is that if Control de Confianza fails, Mérida fails.”
Document 26
Freedom of Information Act request
In a monthly summary of U.S. counter-narcotics and law enforcement program activities in Mexico for June 2010, U.S. Embassy staff note record-high levels of deaths related to the drug war. The cable highlights U.S.-sponsored training activities, ranging from police professionalism, corrections system reform, and legal reform, to IT system upgrades and police canine certification. As part of bilateral efforts, the Mexican Secretariat of Public Security (SSP) hosted 60 U.S. and Mexican officials in Ciudad Juárez from June 21-25, 2010, to review progress and develop specific programs to advance joint work in “intelligence, public security, IT and judicial operations.” U.S. Ambassador Pascual and SSP Secretary Genaro García Luna took part in an executive-level meeting at the end of the week, at which were agreed to “a number of concrete implementable proposals for capacity building, equipment and mentoring that we will start on soon.”
Document 27
Freedom of Information Act request
This U.S. Embassy cable provides a list of commodities and services costing more than $25,000 which The Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) plans to acquire for the Mérida Initiative. The planned acquisitions support various Mérida Initiative projects, and the cable provides the description, estimated cost, and possible source for purchasing the requested materials. Specific to Plataforma Mexico, the plan notes a “100 per cent likely-hood of funding” for additional special investigative equipment, computer equipment and appropriate training.” Additional proposed purchases include polygraph machines to help root out corruption in GOM law enforcement; training and technical assistance in ethics, anti-corruption, and internal affairs to support the Culture of Lawfulness project; and training for Sensitive Investigative Units that will “emphasize professional police work, especially evidence exploitation, and assist the SSP SIU agents to successfully bring a greater number of criminal cases to closure.”
Document 28
Freedom of Information Act request
A series of letters ranging in date from May 2011 through September 2016 indicate equipment provided by the U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to Sensitive Investigative Units (SIUs) in Mexico as part of the Mérida Initiative. Included are registries of equipment provided, which range from radiocommunications, data extractors, GPS, and computer equipment to antidoping kits and clandestine lab detection equipment, among others. Of note are the May 20, 2011, donation of CellDek equipment, a forensically sound mobile phone and personal digital assistant (PDA) data extraction tool able to obtain real time intelligence from a mobile handset at a scene, and the September 26, 2016, donation of ten paper shredders.
Document 29
Freedom of Information Act request
During an introductory meeting between Secretary of Public Security Genaro García Luna and U.S. Ambassador Wayne, García Luna describes the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP) as a force that can “fill one security gap” between municipal police and military that was previously completely disconnected. The SSP’s development has entailed improved capabilities in information management, expanded recruitment, and improved training. García Luna notes the current wave of violence, which he attributes to several factors: a successful campaign against Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) leadership; less adept criminal foot soldiers who have taken the place of captured leaders and have in turn resorted to extortion and kidnapping; changes in the drug market itself; and domestic gang competition. In response, García Luna suggests that “what Mexico needs ... is a whole new model for policing,” with reforms of both the security forces and prison system.
Document 30
Freedom of Information Act request
This U.S. Embassy cable outlines the Mérida Initiative’s Developing Trustworthy Institutions (DTI) Program, with the stated goal of “Strengthen[ing] the Government of Mexico’s (GOM) Judicial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement entities by limiting the ability of corrupt individuals to enter or remain in these institutions.” At 36 months, the DTI Program has begun to expand from the federal to the state level, with efforts that include modernizing Mexico’s Control de Confianza Program. Control de Confianza was established under Mexico’s 2009 General Act of the National Public Security System (Ley General del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública) and requires the administration of a five-part evaluation to vet all potential and current employees in public security institutions. According to the cable, to date, “$20 million of Mérida funds have been committed for the vetting and trust controls program.” It is also explicitly stated that the DTI Program’s goal includes “contribut[ing] to build a Culture of Lawfulness and helping ensure that other Mérida programs are not assisting bad actors.”
Document 31
Freedom of Information Act request
This U.S. Embassy cable reports the arrest of four high-ranking Mexican Army Officers with suspected ties to organized crime, specifically the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO). The four men – Ricardo Escorcia Vargas, Roberto Dawe Gonzalez, Silvio Isidro de Jesus Hernandez Soto, and Tomas Angeles Dauahare – are suspected of collaborating and selling arms to the BLO. The cable states that the men have yet to be formally charged and details about what charges may be forthcoming are “sketchy.” Although three of the four men were retired at the time of their detention, they have all occupied high posts in the Mexican Army, with Escorcia having commanded a force in Beltran Leyva territory and Hernandez Soto having served on the security team of then-Presidential Candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO). The cable states that the press is suspicious of the timing of these arrests, fearing that they are politically motivated in light of the upcoming July 1 election. The arrest of Angeles, for instance, supposedly “stems from a long-time power struggle between Angeles on one side, and SEDENA General Galvan and Public Security Secretariat (SSP) Head Genaro García Luna on the other.”
Document 32
Freedom of Information Act request
This U.S. Embassy cable summarizes the achievements of the Mérida Initiative after four years and more than $1 billion in allocated funds. The cable focuses on Pillar II, “the Development of An Institutionalized Capacity to Sustain the Rule of Law,” shortly before Mexico’s first change of administration since the program’s inception in 2008 and predicts potential policy changes in the incoming Enrique Peña Nieto administration. In summarizing achievements of the Control de Confianza program, the cable notes that, while well-intentioned, the GOM’s polygraph tests have proven unreliable, as uniform standards for their administration have not been adhered to across GOM agencies. Moreover, the cable details the success of the Office of the Attorney General’s (PGR) internal control unit (the Visitaduría) in conducting investigations of high-level officials within the PGR who were suspected of corrupt activities. However, the future of agencies’ internal control units is considered uncertain due to reorganizations under the new Peña Nieto administration. The cable concludes by emphasizing the importance of a smooth transition that maintains the strong, bilateral collaborative efforts between the Mexican and U.S. governments.
Document 33
CourtListener
This Grand Jury indictment charges Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda, also known as “El Padrino” and “Zepeda,” with four counts based on alleged illicit activities between December 2015 and February 2017. During this period, Cienfuegos Zepeda engaged in the manufacturing, distribution and importation of controlled substances including heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine and marijuana into the United States and elsewhere. The fourth count alleges that Cienfuegos conspired to launder narcotics proceeds, transferring funds from within the United States to and through other locations, including Mexico. The indictment concludes with forfeiture allegations, indicating that upon conviction, Cienfuegos Zepeda will be required to forfeit property associated with the charged offenses.
[1] In doing so, the U.S. Justice Department said the decision to release Cienfuegos, purportedly so that he can be prosecuted in Mexico, was “in the interests of demonstrating our united front against all forms of criminality.” In a November 17, 2020, filing with U.S. District Court, U.S. Attorney Seth D. DuCharme explained that “sensitive and important foreign policy considerations outweigh the government’s interest in pursuing the prosecution” of Cienfuegos, who allegedly took bribes to protect drug traffickers from government persecution, directed military operations against rival cartels, and helped orchestrate drug shipments, among other charges.