The Short-lived NATO-Russia Honeymoon

President of the Russian Federation Brussels, Belgium 9 December 1993 Meeting between NATO Secretary General M. Wörner and Russian President B. Yeltsin at the Chateau du Stuyvenbergh

Meeting between NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner and Russian President Boris Yeltsin at the Chateau du Stuyvenbergh, December 9, 1993. From left, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, Yeltsin, and Woerner.

New evidence on the high hopes of 1992-1995

Documents include transcripts of NATO secretary general with Russian parliament leaders,
U.S. defense secretary with high-level Duma delegation, and
reports on Russian defense minister at joint U.S.-Russian exercises

Washington, D.C., April 4, 2024 - Top NATO and U.S. officials worked out cooperative agreements with senior Russian leaders including the defense minister of the newly independent Russian Federation during three years of high-level dialogue and hands-on engagement from 1992 to 1995, according to previously secret Russian and American documents published today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

Marking the 75th anniversary of the signing of the NATO Treaty in April 1949, the new publication illuminates the all-too-brief period of close U.S., NATO, and Russian security cooperation in the 1990s, which dramatically reduced nuclear arms and risks, addressed peacekeeping challenges in the Balkans, and held out hope of Russia’s eventual integration into Europe and partnership with NATO.

The documents describe joint U.S.-Russian peacekeeping exercises at Fort Riley, Kansas, breakthrough understandings on treaty negotiations, and meetings of the minds on the future security of Europe with leaders of the Russian Supreme Soviet and its successor, the Duma. In the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the new evidence highlights the tragedy of roads not taken and hopes unfulfilled.

The documents include the Russian transcript, published for the first time, of NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner’s lengthy conversation in Moscow with Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov in February 1992, where Woerner outlines the NATO vision of Europe as “a new security environment from [the Urals] to the Atlantic … built on three pillars”: the Helsinki process, the European economic community, and NATO – a view very close to Russia’s own.

Khasbulatov had stood on the tank with Boris Yeltsin in defiance of the August 1991 hardliners coup against democratic reforms in the Soviet Union and worked with Yeltsin to dissolve the USSR in December 1991. The Supreme Soviet leader was still a year or more away from his own political confrontation with Yeltsin, a power struggle that would end terribly with Yeltsin shelling his parliament. But these Russians did not believe they had lost the Cold War; rather, they saw themselves as victorious over the Communist system and as the leaders of a superpower deserving of mutual respect from the West and on its way toward European integration.

The documents also include U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry's dramatic SECRET/EYES ONLY memo to President Clinton recounting his three days with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev in October 1995. Perry said the first seven hours at the Pentagon were “quite tense” but that the visit to Fort Riley to observe joint U.S.-Russian peacekeeping exercises was a “smashing success,” leading to agreement on a joint force for Bosnia reconstruction, followed by Grachev and Perry together pressing the “dual key!” that blew up a U.S. Minuteman silo at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri.

There would be other short-lived periods of NATO-Russian cooperation, most notably after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., when the Russian Federation facilitated the transit and supply of U.S. and NATO troops across Russia and Central Asia into Afghanistan in pursuit of al Qaeda. A highlight came in May 2002 with the convening of the NATO-Russian Council in Brussels. This period of cooperation and the reasons it ended remain to be documented. Watch for future postings on the subject from the National Security Archive.

 

The Documents

Doc 1 1992-02-25 NATO Memcon Khasbulatov-Woerner translation

Document 1

Memorandum of Conversation between NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner and Speaker of the Russian Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov
Source

State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fond 10026, Opis 5, delo 453

In his first visit to newly independent Russia, Secretary General of NATO Manfred Woerner meets with the Speaker of the Russian parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, to talk about the future of European security and about NATO-Russia cooperation. Present at the conversation is Gen. Konstantin Kobets, who supported Yeltsin during the August coup of 1991 and was briefly named Russian Defense Minister in September 1991.

Woerner talks about the common interests Russia and NATO have, notes NATO’s deep interest in helping Russia “flourish,” and expresses NATO’s willingness to help with the challenge of defense industry conversion. He presents his vision of future European security in terms that surely respond to his Russian interlocutors’ vision: “We want to build a Europe that will inhabit a new security environment from [the Urals] to the Atlantic. It will be a unified Euro-Atlantic community built on three pillars. The first pillar is the Helsinki process, the second -- the European Community, which will create the basis for a solid political future for our community, and the third pillar is NATO.”

In response, Khasbulatov and Kobets talk about the challenges and the hardships of the Russian transformation, and the lack of housing for the troops, especially the officers returning from Eastern Europe. Khasbulatov tells Woerner how the reduction in defense spending helped Russian economic reforms and said he “believe[s] that the North Atlantic Alliance’s contribution is very significant, and we also hope that we will continue to pursue the path of reducing nuclear weapons.”

Doc 2 1994-03- Perry-Rybkin memcon translation

Document 2

Memorandum of Conversation between U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry and Speaker of the Russian Duma Ivan Rybkin
Source

State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fond 10100, Opis 3, delo 5

The new Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin (from the Agrarian Party) leads a high-level Russian parliamentary delegation visiting Washington in March 1994. This is the Duma that was elected with a nationalist plurality in December 1993, rejecting the radical economic reforms. The Duma delegation meets with several Clinton administration officials and members of the U.S. Congress, including Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, who had already authored the key legislation on cooperative threat reduction that funded the denuclearization of former Soviet republics and Russia’s own arms reductions.

This memorandum of conversation with Defense Secretary William Perry shows both sides’ willingness to cooperate on many important military and security issues, such as the nuclear arms reductions in the START treaty, continuing efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, the ongoing Partnership for Peace network for military cooperation, and peacekeeping cooperation in Bosnia.

Sergey Yushenkov, Chairman of the Russian Duma Committee on Defense, and Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the Duma Foreign Affairs Committee (the former ambassador to Washington), are present on the Russian side. Perry talks about the benefits of the Partnership for Peace program for Russia. Rybkin speaks in support of PfP, saying he “shares the goals and objectives” of the program. Lukin agrees but says that the optics of “selling it in Russia” are not perfect. He suggests that “we should announce this program together and invite everyone who wants to participate in it.” Lukin also stresses the need for more consultation and coordination in the former Yugoslavia, with which Perry fully agrees.

Doc 3 1995.10.27 Perry Grachev Memo for President, Special Defense Report

Document 3

Memorandum from Secretary of Defense William Perry to President Clinton, Subject: Special Defense Report
Source

Office of the Secretary of Defense, National Security Archive FOIA

Secretary Perry informs President Clinton about a “breakthrough experience” with Russian Defense Secretary Pavel Grachev, who came from Russia to observe joint U.S.-Russian military maneuvers. These exercises, named “Peacekeeper” and held at Fort Riley in Kansas, were intended to prepare the Russian troops to participate in NATO peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. Perry talks about the change in Grachev’s behavior and position over three days as he moved away from a “quite tense” seven hours of meetings in Washington, had a long one-on-one conversation with Perry on the flight, observed the joint maneuvers in Kansas, met with the troops, and then traveled with Perry to Missouri to blow up a Minuteman silo.

Perry tells the president that the “visit to Fort Riley was a smashing success.” They achieved a breakthrough on Russia’s participation in NATO peacekeeping in Bosnia and in the complicated issue of “flanks” troop levels in the conventional forces in Europe negotiations. In addition, when Grachev got to Whiteman Air Force Base, according to Perry, “Grachev and I jointly pressed the trigger (dual key!) that blew up an American Minuteman silo […] he fully caught the historic symbolism of this act by a Russian Defense Minister on U.S. soil. He spoke emotionally about making sure his children and grandchildren understood and remembered the significance of this day.”

Doc 4 1995.10.27 Handwritten Note from Talbott to Bill Perry re breakthrough with Grachev, NATO, US Russia relations

Document 4

Handwritten Note from Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to Defense Secretary William Perry
Source

State Department, National Security Archive FOIA

Talbott sends this handwritten note to Perry an hour after the U.S. Secretary of Defense called him from Fort Riley with the report on joint U.S.-Russian peacekeeping maneuvers and on his “smashing” breakthroughs with Russian Defense Minister Grachev on Bosnia and CFE flank negotiations. Like Perry, Talbott sees the significance of the moment: “I suspect that a decade from now I will feel the same way about it: this is an immensely significant and positive development with implications far beyond Bosnia. Altogether, your handshake with Grachev could be one of these critical pivot points in history.” (Talbott’s underlining)