Washington, D.C., May 22, 2020 – Seventy-five years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the start of the atomic era, questions about the value, danger, and morality of nuclear weapons continue to present a huge challenge for politicians, military strategists, and ordinary citizens.
As that freighted anniversary approaches, the National Security Archive’s Nuclear Vault has gathered a selection of primary sources that could be considered key to understanding the arc of U.S. nuclear policy during the crucial first four decades. The aim is to encourage broad discussion of the many facets of nuclear history grounded in direct evidence.
No doubt many readers will have their own ideas for what to include. We welcome nominations – feel free to submit to the address above. At a future date, we will publish an assortment of additional materials in an annex to this posting.
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A Short Documentary History of U.S. Nuclear Posture during the Cold War
By William Burr
The 75th anniversary of the dropping of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is approaching. The United States and the world had entered the atomic age at the moment of the secret test of an atomic device in New Mexico on 16 July 1945. No one could know how the new weapon would shape the political landscape at home and abroad although President Harry S Truman declared that “atomic power can become a powerful and forceful influence towards the maintenance of world peace.” Truman may have been right to hope that the bomb would help prevent world wars but any hope that the bomb would bring greater security to the world would prove mistaken. That the bomb has not been used in anger since August 1945 is a boon but the further development of nuclear weapons since then and their increase and dispersal created dangers far beyond what Truman could have conceived at the dawn of the atomic age.
Truman himself presided over the initial creation of an atomic weapons stockpile that reached 720 bombs in his last year in office. Besides authorizing the expansion of fissile materials production capabilities, Truman made the fundamental decision to develop thermonuclear weapons, with the first H-bomb test in 1952. He also approved the creation of the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command that would deliver atomic weapons to their targets. Recognizing, from the experience of Hiroshima-Nagasaki, the terrible effects of nuclear weapons, Truman established the system of presidential control over nuclear use decisions that continues to this day.
This posting of 27 declassified documents is intended to serve as a basic primary resource on nuclear history and as such is designed to provide an overview of major elements of the U.S. nuclear weapons posture from the Truman era into the 1980s. Minimally, the nuclear posture includes force levels, control of the weapons, technology for delivering them, and the plans for targeting them. Choosing just 25 or so documents on these issues is necessarily arbitrary because there are many high-quality declassified records to choose from. Moreover, some highly important materials remain classified. Nevertheless, it is possible to select a relatively small set that are particularly emblematic in conveying the development of the U.S. nuclear posture, which to a great extent, signified the array of forces that could be used for the devastation of targets – including civilian populations, as Truman pointedly noted – with as much precision as possible. For those who controlled that capability, the point was to deter attack on the United States and its allies, knowing that the use of nuclear forces could destroy all parties to a conflict.
A number of the documents in this collection are at the presidential level, which is appropriate in light of the central role of the chief executive in making nuclear use decisions. These include documents on presidential control and on the emergency or “pre-delegated” use of nuclear weapons. A document from the transition from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy administrations depicts the role of the “football” a briefcase that includes documents on war plans and special instructions geared for a nuclear crisis. Another document from the Kennedy administration describes which foreign governments needed to be consulted about nuclear use decisions and the practice of U.S. nuclear deployments in those countries whose governments Washington believed did not need to be consulted at all.
Other White House-level documents include Presidential Directive 59 and National Security Decision Directive 13, which attempted to give top-level direction to strategic targeting planning and policy. A few of the policy documents, the Reagan-era National Security Decision Directives 32 and 238, with important language on nuclear weapons policy, have been published before on-line but fully declassified versions have hitherto been buried more or less in obscurity.
Some of the documents are about nuclear weapons themselves and their delivery systems. A RAND Corporation report about the H-bomb conveyed the anticipated scope of its destructiveness. Documents from the 1950s illustrate the Navy’s plans for deterrence. A never-before published memorandum by CNO Arleigh Burke reviewed the role of nuclear-armed aircraft on carriers in war plans. A Navy report projected the prospective role of the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile in nuclear deterrence, even potentially assigning it a central role as a deterrent force. Another document, a memorandum to President John F. Kennedy from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara rejected the idea of “minimum deterrence” based on an SLBM force. McNamara’s role in the genesis of the “assured destruction” concept used to size strategic force levels is documented in a memorandum by JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor. Documents from the 1960s and 1970s speak to the role of MIRVs (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) in augmenting the lethality of ICBM payloads, as well as the failed proposals to ban them.
Other documents illuminate the development of war plans and planning. The 1949 Harmon Report, published here for the first time, presents a critique of the first war plan, TROJAN. A speech by General Curtis LeMay, commander-in-chief of the Strategic Air Command, reviewed SAC targeting strategy in a general war while a contemporaneous report by State Department official Gerard C. Smith gave insight into the destructiveness of SAC attack plans. Two documents from the 1961 Berlin crisis provide contrasting approaches to war planning: a Joint Chiefs of Staff report detailed Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) targeting and the huge levels of destruction that a nuclear war over Berlin would have caused, while a White House strategy memorandum outlined step-by-step political and military actions designed to avoid general war, if possible. A Nuclear Weapons Employment Planning (NUWEP) directive from 1974 shows how civilian defense officials used presidential guidance to direct military commanders to develop a range of attack options, from limited to major strikes.
One of the documents on this list was produced during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most protracted and dangerous Cold War nuclear crisis. A memorandum by then-Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay, it documents the decision to put the Strategic Air Command at Defcon 2, readiness for war, on 24 October 1962.
One of the noteworthy features of the 1960s,1970s, and 1980s was that presidents tried to guide nuclear target planning so they would have more choices about the level of destruction. However, the military officials at the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), who prepared the SIOP, did not receive scrutiny by civilians, who could ensure that there was an appropriate layer of outside follow-up, consistency with presidential objectives. The JSTPS’s relative isolation in Nebraska compounded the lack of dialogue between senior civilians and military commanders about the nature of the war plans. Thus, the plans developed without reference to the guidance – such as city withholds and limited nuclear options – that Presidents Carter and Reagan had issued. It was not until the mid-1980s that Pentagon civilian planners were able to gain some control of the process and it was not until the Cold War had ended that the SIOP became subject to thorough civilian review. The documentary record of this story remains classified, although key documents have been requested from the Defense Department.
The growing interest in flexibility and options for the president provided the context for a novel proposal that the Strategic Air Command put forward toward the close of Ronald Reagan’s first term. SAC’s commander-in-chief General Bennie L. Davis proposed the development of highly accurate non-nuclear weapons as a way to strengthen deterrence without further reliance on nuclear weapons. If the Davis proposal had any impact on discussions within the Pentagon it remains to be learned.