Obama Brings 'Declassified Diplomacy' To Argentina

The Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget James Lynn write a memorandum to President Ford appealing his decisions on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits for Latin America.

Secretary Kissinger asks for an increase of FMS credits for Argentina "up from $34 million in 1976 to $50 million" for Fiscal Year 1977. Kissinger argues:

"The Argentine program must be increased to accommodate Argentina's force modernization plans and maintain our overall relations with a country where the military is taking increasing responsibility for government."

Two days after the military coup in Argentina, Secretary of State Kissinger convenes his weekly staff meeting. In this declassified, formerly secret transcript of the first conversation on Argentina, Assistant Secretary for Latin America William Rogers informs Kissinger that for the military government to succeed the generals will make "a considerable effort to involve the United States -- particularly in the financial field." Kissinger responds "Yes, but that is in our interest."

Rogers advises that "we ought not at this moment rush out and embrace this new regime" because he expects significant repression to follow the coup. "I think also we've got to expect a fair amount of repression, probably a good deal of blood, in Argentina before too long. I think they're going to have to come down very hard not only on the terrorists but on the dissidents of trade unions and their parties." But Kissinger makes his preferences clear: "Whatever chance they have, they will need a little encouragement ... because I do want to encourage them. I don't want to give the sense that they're harassed by the United States."

On March 27, 1976, the IMF released $127 million in credit for the military junta, and soon after the Videla government came to power the Ford administration quietly approved $49 million in security assistance. This marked the beginning of a series of policy decisions that extended essentially unrestricted support to the Argentine generals. This document was not part of the Department of State 2002 declassification on Argentina. It was obtained by Archive Senior Analyst Peter Kornbluh at the U.S. National Archives.

In May 1976, several Argentines working with U.S. universities and as Ford Foundation grantees, and at least two American citizens, the then head of the Fulbright Commission and the wife of a former Embassy official, are kidnapped and abused by Argentine security forces. The Embassy suspects that Argentine security forces are involved in the killing of two Uruguayan former Senators living in Buenos Aires - Michellini and Gutierrez Ruiz.

After raising his concerns about escalating human rights violations, Ambassador Robert Hill notes that Argentine Secretary for the Presidency Ricardo Yofre warns of more atrocities to come:

"Dr. Yofre noted that there are two distinct complications in checking the hardliners and in bringing the human rights problem under control: a) the first is that the country is in an all-out war against subversion. In the heat of the battle there will inevitably be some violations of human rights. And Yofre warned that the government plans to drastically step up its campaign against the terrorists very shortly. b) Secondly, he said, there are a number of groups who are operating on their own..."

U.S. Ambassador Robert Hill concludes that "in view of the general worsening human rights situation here, I believe the time has come for a demarche at the highest level." Hill requests permission to present the demarche to Foreign Minister Cesar Guzzetti, stating that "We fully understand that Argentina is involved in an all-out struggle against subversion. There are, however, some norms which can never be put aside by governments dedicated to a rule of law. Respect for human right is one of them..." The demarche is approved by Under Secretary Joseph Sisco, while Secretary Henry Kissinger is away on official trip. Hill presents it to the Foreign Ministry on May 27, 1976.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger meets Argentine Foreign Minister Cesar Guzzetti in Santiago, Chile, on June 10, 1976. According to U.S. Ambassador Robert Hill, Guzzetti expected to be admonished on human rights. Instead, at various moments while Guzzetti explained how the military are engaged in a counterinsurgency offensive, Kissinger expresses support:

"We are aware you are in a difficult period. It is a curious time, when political, criminal, and terrorist activities tend to merge without any clear separation. We understand you must establish authority."

"I realize you have no choice but to restore governmental authority. But it is also clear that the absence of normal procedures will be used against you."

"If there are things that have to be done, you should do them quickly. But you should get back quickly to normal procedures."

[The date in the memorandum is incorrect. As the "Secretary's Calendar of Events" attests, they met on June 10, 1976 from 8:00 to 9:10 am]

The official "Secretary's Calendar of Events" for Thursday, June 10, 1976, indicates the correct date of the Kissinger meeting at "8:00 Working breakfast with Argentine Foreign Minister Guzzetti (9:10)."

Deputy Chief of mission Maxwell Chaplin reports on his meeting with Director General of International Policy Pereyra, at the Argentine Foreign Ministry.
"Charge expressed USG concern over refugee abduction, and raised broader issue of human rights. Pereyra's response was an impassioned, almost fanatic defense of GOA. With regard to substance of the issue, Pereyra contended that GOA was doing best it could in an all-out war with extremists; that it was not possible to prevent occasional excesses by embattled security forces who shed their blood daily..."
"... Pereyra expressed satisfaction over his conclusion that Secretary Kissinger was realistic and understood the GOA problems on human rights."

In this brief conversation, Henry Kissinger berates his aide after learning that the State Department's Latin America bureau has issued a demarche to the Argentine military junta for escalating death squad operations, disappearances and reports of torture following the coup in March 1976. The demarche was recommended by Ambassador Robert Hill and conveyed by him to Foreign Minister Guzzetti on May 27. A similar message was given to the Argentine ambassador in Washington D.C. by one of Shlaudeman's deputies, Hewson Ryan. But the demarche appears to contradict a message that Kissinger has personally given to Guzzetti during a private meeting in Santiago on June 10; to act "as quickly as possible" to repress leftist forces in Argentina. Now Kissinger demands to know "in what way is it [the demarche] compatible with my policy." He tells Shlaudeman: "I want to know who did this and consider having him transferred."

Secretary Kissinger is explicitly briefed on the rampant repression taking place in Argentina: "Their theory is that they can use the Chilean method," Kissinger's top aide on Latin America Harry Shlaudeman informs him, "that is, to terrorize the opposition - even killing priests and nuns and others."

Ambassador Robert Hill has just returned to Argentina amid reports of massacres of prisoners and widespread human rights violations by Argentine security forces, as well as mounting evidence of assassinations of foreigners under Operation Condor. On instructions from Washington, Hill is tasked with raising the human rights issue at the highest level of the Argentine government. But, as Hill reports to Washington, "the Foreign Minister said that GOA had been somewhat surprised by indications of such strong concern on the part of the USG in human rights situation in Argentina. When he had seen SECY of State Kissinger in Santiago, the latter had said he 'hoped the Argentine Govt could get the terrorist problem under control as quickly as possible.' Guzzetti said that he had reported this to President Videla and to the cabinet, and that their impression had been that the USG's overriding concern was not human rights but rather that GOA 'get it over quickly.'"

In this cable, Ambassador Hill reports how his human rights concerns are also dismissed by the Argentine president.

"[The] President said he had been gratified when FONMIN Guzzetti reported to him that Secretary of State Kissinger understood their problem and had said he hoped they could get terrorism under control as quickly as possible. Videla said he had the impression senior officers of the USG understood situation his govt faces but junior bureaucrats do not. I assured him this was not the case. We all hope Argentina can get terrorism under control quickly - but to do so in such a way as to do minimum damage to its image and to its relations with other governments. If Security Forces continue to kill people to [the] tune of [a] brass band, I concluded, this will not be possible. I told him Secretary of State had told me when I was in US that he wanted to avoid human rights problem in Argentina."

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Argentine Foreign Minister Cesar Guzzetti meet at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York City during the UN General Assembly gathering. The following are excerpts of the memorandum of the conversation, previously classified SECRET NODIS:

"Foreign Minister Guzzetti: The terrorist organizations have been dismantled. If this direction continues, by the end of the year the danger will have been set aside. There will always be isolated attempts, of course."

"The Secretary: When will they be overcome? Next Spring?"

"Foreign Minister Guzzetti: No, by the end of this year."...

"The Secretary: Look, our basic attitude is that we would like you to succeed. I have an old-fashioned view that friends ought to be supported. What is not understood in the United States is that you have a civil war. We read about human rights problems but not the context. The quicker you succeed the better."

"The human rights problem is a growing one. Your Ambassador can apprise you. We want a stable situation. We won't cause you unnecessary difficulties. If you can finish before Congress gets back, the better. Whatever freedoms you could restore would help."

After Admiral Guzzetti returns from the UN meetings, Ambassador Robert Hill files what Assistant Secretary of State Shlaudeman terms "a bitter complaint" to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Hill protests that the Argentine military are not receiving a strong disapproving signal from Washington for their human rights violations. Given what Kissinger has said to Guzzetti, Hill reports, the Embassy is now in an awkward position to present demarches on human rights and protest the treatment received by American citizens.

In this memo Hill writes that "[Guzzetti] spoke first of his lunch in Washington with Deputy Secretary Robinson, Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman and Ambassador Martin. He emphasized how well they understood the Argentine problem and said that 'the consensus of the meeting was to [unintelligible] the terrorist problem as soon as possible.'"

"He considered his talk with Secretary of State Kissinger a success. The Secretary... had urged Argentina 'to be careful' and had said that if the terrorist problem was over by December or January, he (the Secretary) believed serious problems could be avoided in the U.S...."

"Guzzetti's remarks both to me and to the Argentine press since his return are not those of a man who has been impressed with the gravity of the human rights problem as seen from the U.S. Both personally and in press accounts of his trip Guzzetti's reaction indicates little reason for concern over the human rights issue. Guzzetti went to US fully expecting to hear some strong, firm, direct warning of his govt's human rights practices. Rather than that, he has returned in a state of jubilation. [He is] convinced that there is no real problem with the USG over this issue. Based on what Guzzetti is doubtless reporting to the GOA, it must now believe that if it has any problems with the U.S. over human rights, they are confined to certain elements of Congress and what it regards as biased and/or uninformed minor segments of public opinion. While that conviction lasts it will be unrealistic and unbelievable for this embassy to press representations to the GOA over human rights violations."

Assistant Secretary Harry Shlaudeman responds to Ambassador Hill on behalf of Secretary Kissinger: "As in other circumstances you have undoubtedly encountered in your diplomatic career, Guzzetti heard only what he wanted to hear. He was told in detail how strongly opinion in this country has reacted against reports of abuses by the security forces in Argentina and the nature of the threat this poses to Argentine interests."

"Finally, with respect to Guzzetti's "jubilation" and its effect, we doubt that the GOA has such illusions. It was obvious in our contacts that Guzzetti knew his country has a problem--one that requires a speedy solution. And we will continue to impress on Argentine representatives here, as we expect you to do there, that the USG regards most seriously Argentina's international commitments to protect and promote fundamental human rights. There should be no mistake on that score... Kissinger"

This is a memorandum of the conversations held by Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, Patricia Derian, between March 28 and April 1, 1977, in Buenos Aires with U.S. Ambassadors to Argentina, Robert Hill, and to Uruguay, Ernest Siracusa. Ambassador Hill reports to Derian about the meeting of Foreign Minister Guzzetti and Secretary Kissinger in June 1976. "The Argentines were very worried that Kissinger would lecture to them on human rights... but the Secretary did not raise the subject. Finally, Guzzetti did. Kissinger asked how long will it take you (the Argentines) to clean up the problem. Guzzetti replied that it would be done by the end of the year. Kissinger approved. In other words, Ambassador Hill explained, Kissinger gave the Argentines the green light."

Returning from a four-day visit to Argentina where she had to impress on Argentine officials the seriousness of the Carter Administration's human rights policy, recently appointed Coordinator for Human Rights Patricia Derian realizes there is work to be done at home too:

"The [Argentine] government method is to pick people up and take them to military installations. There the detainees are tortured with water, electricity and psychological disintegration methods. Those thought to be salvageable are sent to regular jails and prisons where the psychological process is continued on a more subtle level. Those found to be incorrigible are murdered and dumped on garbage heaps or street corners, but more often are given arms with live ammunition, grenades, bombs and put into automobiles and sent out of the compound to be killed on the road in what is then reported publicly to be a shootout or response to an attack on some military installation...

THE U.S MILITARY & OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

Through these agencies the United States government is sending a dangerous and double message. If this continues, it will subvert our entire human rights policy.

It is widely believed by our military and intelligence services that the human rights policy emanates only from the Department of State, is a political device and one with a short life due to its wide impracticality, the naiveté and ignorance of individuals in the Administration and to the irresponsible headline grabbing of members of Congress."