Date

Jun 10, 1982

Description

A CIA memorandum provided some of the backstory to interagency debates over NSDD 39, especially the recognition of domestic political constraints and limitations on U.S. diplomatic and intelligence capabilities. One problem pointed out by the State Department was “the [limited] capability of the U.S. to prevent theft and diversion of plutonium through technical manipulation of the fuel cycle.” That meant that it was necessary to “focus on the political and military aspects of the problem,” possibly a reference to action, whether unilateral or multilateral, to nip a weapons program in the bud.

A domestic constraint was that “Congressional critics” would object to advance consent to plutonium use as “a bad precedent and serious weakening of US nonproliferation efforts.” Another problem was the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s concern about the need for greater attention to the "safeguardability" of plutonium and the problem of "`timely warning’ of any diversion from non-military to military uses.” One implication was that IAEA safeguards needed to be strengthened, but as the Acting Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence observed, “timely and reliable detection” of any diversion was “extraordinarily difficult.”

Source

CIA FOIA Web site

Document published in following posting(s):

U.S.-Japan Negotiations over Reprocessing and Plutonium Use: Opening Moves, 1981-1982

Feb 12, 2019

Acting Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, “Comments on NSDD-39, US Policy on Foreign Reprocessing and Use of Plutonium,” 10 June 1982, attached to routing slip and White House memoranda, Secret, excised copy.