Date

Nov 1, 1957

Description

While U.S. defense officials originally linked cuts in South Korean conventional forces (and saving in military aid) to U.S. nuclear deployments in the South, Rhee and his generals resisted cuts in their armed forces. Thus, the specific savings in military assistance sought by the Defense Department failed to materialize, but the plans for nuclear deployments moved forward State Department misgivings notwithstanding. [7]

The State Department expected to be consulted on any specific decisions to store nuclear weapons in South Korea, but senior Defense Department officials were assuming otherwise. To reaffirm the State Department's role, Farley recommended to Murphy that he sign off on the attached letter to Mansfield Sprague. In that letter, Murphy reminded Sprague that for "specific implementation" of Eisenhower's instructions, "we understand that further Presidential authorization is required ... and that the Secretaries of State and Defense should support their appropriate recommendations to the President for that purpose."

Source

RG 59, Policy Planning Staff Country Files, 1947-1952, box 30, Korea TS

Document published in following posting(s):

The First Nukes on the Korean Peninsula

Nov 20, 2019