Date

Sep 21, 1973

Description

Strategic instability intensified in the years following the SALT I agreement, although mutual deterrence remained solid enough. By mid-1973, if not earlier, U.S. intelligence was collecting evidence that the Soviets were testing MIRVs on several new ICBMs, whose development Moscow had set in motion with decisions made during 1969. Several of the ICBMs had MIRV capabilities, with one, the heavy SS-18 (R-20), providing a hard-target kill capacity (although it was not deployed until 1988). With these developments, the Soviets could erode the U.S. advantage in numbers of nuclear warheads.[42] At this meeting of the NSC Verification Panel, Henry Kissinger (on his first day on the job as Secretary of State-designate) and advisers discussed the new reality and its implications for the U.S. strategic position and SALT negotiations. Kissinger had already discussed Soviet MIRVs with Dobrynin, who said that U.S. strategic programs had been “driving” their program, while Kissinger claimed it was the “opposite.”

Because the Soviets were seeking to MIRV their SALT-imposed numbers of ballistic missiles, just like the U.S. had, the meeting participants wanted to “put pressure on the Soviets to slow down” and “dissuade them from seeking an advantage.” All agreed with SALT negotiator Alexis Johnson that the Soviets should realize that the U.S. “would not accept inferiority.”

To get the Soviets to accept what Washington saw as an “equitable” SALT agreement, DCI William Colby believed that the U.S. would have to apply “pressure.” One form of “leverage” suggested—and which was certainly the view of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger—was the U.S.’s “superior technology” and “especially our ability to develop a hard target capability.”

Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements suggested that the U.S. could “exert pressure” through “larger warheads, greater accuracy, and cruise missiles,” all of which were in the works. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush added that it would be difficult to get the Soviets “to give up anything” unless the U.S. “confronted them with programs which they will find uncomfortable and will wish to stop.” While U.S. officials were worrying about what came to be known as a “window of vulnerability” for the U.S. ICBM force, the Soviets were not seeking a first-strike capability, but a more secure and comprehensive second-strike, retaliatory force, a goal that was consistent with strategic stability.[43]

Source

DNSA

Document published in following posting(s):

Strategic Stability and Instability during the Middle Years of the Cold War

Dec 10, 2021

Seymour Weiss [Office of Politico-Military Affairs for S/S [Executive Secretariat] – Mr. Pickering, 21 September 1973, enclosing Weiss memorandum to Acting Secretary, “SALT Verification Panel Meeting September 19, 1973,” 21 September 1973, Top Secret