Date

Dec 5, 1965

Description

Before the B-52 accident at Palomares, Spain, in January 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara wanted to discontinue the airborne alert program for budgetary and strategic reasons (for example, bombers were a shrinking element of U.S. strategic forces). JCS Chair Wheeler opposed discontinuing the program but accepted cutting back on the flights to six sorties a day. Part of his defense included the role of SAC airborne alert bombers in monitoring BMEWS at Thule, which he saw as an “important benefit.” According to Wheeler, “Visual/electronic surveillance of those facilities is maintained on a continual basis at all times; thus, the airborne alert indoctrination itself becomes a positive link in our improved warning capability.” During 1966, after the Palomares crash, the debate continued. McNamara wanted to end airborne alert but he accepted Wheeler’s compromise proposal for four daily sorties. Airborne alert continued, including the Thule Monitor.[23]

Source

Digital National Security Archive (DNSA)

Document published in following posting(s):

The United States and Greenland, Part I: Episodes in Nuclear History 1947-1968

Jun 3, 2025