Date

Aug 18, 1976

Description

With the explosion of oil prices and increased accumulation of revenues, the Shah of Iran sought to develop a nuclear energy sector as a domestic power alternative to oil and gas. The Shah’s objective raised proliferation concerns in part because he proposed developing a domestic capacity to reprocess spent fuel that could be used as reactor fuel. That raised the risk of plutonium production that could be used for bombs.

The U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations coincided with ongoing discussions in the Ford White House on the need to develop credible international alternatives to domestic reprocessing to manage proliferation risk. During talks with the Shah, the U.S. proposed buying back the spent fuel rods and reprocessing them in the United States as a less expensive alternative to reprocessing in Iran. At that point, uranium enrichment options and technology were not part of the talks with Iran.

When Kissinger met with the Shah in early August 1976, he spelled out the options, including the buy-back option. Kissinger made it clear that “reprocessing in Iran on a purely national basis would not be an acceptable solution.” That seemed acceptable to the Shah and his advisers, but they worried about the reliability of the United States as a supplier of reactor fuel, among other concerns. The talks were friendly, but the Iran nuclear deal would remain unsettled until 1978, not long before the fall of the Shah.

Source

RG 59, Records of Policy Planning Staff Director Winston Lord

Document published in following posting(s):

History of U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, 1969-1977, Detailed in
New Declassified Documents Collection

Jun 25, 2025

Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, through Deputy Secretary Charles Robinson, to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, “White House Task Force and Iran Nuclear Negotiations,” 18 August 1976, with memorandum and telegram on Kissinger-Shah discussions attached, Secret