·· c -'u 'ft ·-· DEPARTMENT OF STATE BRIEFING MEMORANDUM S 5 J c_ ir1 · SECRET NODIS To ' The Secretary Through The Deputy _Secretary From S P - Winston Lord White House Task Force and Iran Nuclear Negotiations I understand you indicated to Chuck Robinson when he saw you yesterday that you wanted to ensure that the product of the White House nuclear policy review would 'be consistent with our ongoing nuclear-negotiations with Iran On the basis of our work with the White House Task Force to date it is clear that it is considering on a more general level fuel assurance and exchange possibilities all of which would not interfere with successful implementation of your important W1derstandings with Etemad and the Shah In general the Task Force has been developing papers and alternative options on nuclear waste management plutonium use · domestic and international implications of us reprocessing decisions and international · non-proliferation policies -- · centered on the international implications of a ·Presidential decision on US domestic· reprocessing · --··which it intends to revise for final review to ·the agencies by this weekend if possible The Department has been commenting informally on each Task Force draft with the understanding that --final comments and approval would be deferred until the full revised report becomes available next week This will give you the opportunity to approve formal Department comments and to send a separate memorandum to the President on the report's international implJcations and policy· recom-·mendations · and the content- of his mid- -Sep_tember public message • SECRET L · I DECLASSIFIED Authority N A fflS2 0 ByAL NA Date ' 2f D SECRET - 2 - Upon your return from Kansas City I believe it would be useful to review with you the status of the White House efforts in preparation for your own recommendations to the President on the Task Force's study and what he might say about non-proliferation in September ·The Task Force Director Bob Fri has met several times with Chuck and others of - us 'here It is now our impression that in his cover memoranduM to the rep Ort he will be recommending use of the Barnwell reprocessing plant as· a demonstration of uranium plutonium separation and eventual recycle with the possibility of foreign services and participation This outc9me -rep esents a compromise between advocatesr of ful1-·scale· cornmercialization· of r processing· in the US - - which _ w ould send negative interna ional signals · about US p'ercept ons of reprocessing and plutoniuM - • and proponents of indefinite postponement- of any us• domes_t c reproce_ss ing - If ·adopted the dernonstration · approach could well lend credibility to our international arguments ·ror supply of reprocessing services as an alternative to techno logy while demonstrating the problems that lessadvanced nations would encounter in pursuing national facilities On the other hand· we might prove just as· credible internationally if we were to defer a reprocessing decision in the US white · pursuing effective international alternatives to national plutoniwn plants and perhaps plutonium recycle In view of these and related foreign and non-proliferation policy considerations we have clearly conveyed t·o Fri that the internatiqnal implications must be carefully addressad in the Presidential'message and that State·must continue to play a key role in this process This said Chuck and · r would appreciate ·your confirmation guidan e if possible before you leave for Kansas City on next steps in the Iran negotiations and _ in our non-proliferation work both in this Department and the White House These · subjects are addressed in two action memos which you received in the past weeks proposing a line of action and procedural choices on Iran Tab 1 and non-proliferation initiatives relating to your diplomatic strategy and timetable and to preparations for the Presidential· rnessage beginning this • month Tab 2 • · SECRET ' Authority t t Jf - ffl 52 D AL NARA Date f'JO ---· By SECRET - I 3 - At a minimum we would like to have your authorization to begin proceeding along _the lines of Option 3 of the Iran' memo State ERDA preparation of an action plan for you to recommend to the President while keeping the White House Task Force advised of the substance of a general approach and to prepare a contingenct package of diplomatic approaches along the lines o _the August action proposals Steps 1 to 3 in the nonproliferation memo In this latter connection we would of course want to adjust any approaches to the outcome of your recent nuclear discussions in Iran Pakistan and Europe In order to arrive at the necessary guidance on both of these· fronts· you may wish to meet with'• Chuck1 and me briefly before your departure Attachments Tab 1 - Memo on Nuclear Negotiations with Iran Tab 2 - Memo on Non-Proliferation Initiatives - l t Drafter 5 P JKalicki mn x28986 8 1°8 76 • • • • •• SECRET - - THE DEPUTY S1 CRETARY OF S'•ATE WASHINGTON --- August 13 1976 SECRET r· NODIS MEMORANDUM FOR THE SE ARY w -l 'J Robinson h _ FROM Charles SUBJECT Nuclear Negotiations for Iran Attached is a memorandum of August 12 1976 from Irving Vest and Lord on the subject of nuclear negotiations with Iran I am in general agreement with this memorandum and concur in its recommendations although I believe the treatment of commercial risk 11 is unduly complicated I be lieve that the U S can underwrite any excess costs to Iran resulting from our buy back arrangement without incurring undue financial burden Until such time as the value of the products from reprocessing enriched uranium and plutonium exceeds the costs of reprocessing the spent rods have no value and therefore Iran has not incurred any economic loss This condition prevails today and will probably contir ue for 5-10 years in the future When the commercial value of enriched uraniwn and plutonium increase sufficiently to give the spent rods economic value we would have to compensate Iran for any loss it has suffered as a result of our reprocessing of the spent rods The cost to transport spent rods from Iran to the U S plus the cost of reprocessing in a larger more efficient U S plant would then have to be compared with reprocessing costs which Iran might otherwise have faced in a domestic reprocessing facility The principle is relatively simple and I would not anticipate any insurmountable problems in arranging an acceptable formula with Iran Furthermore I don't SECRET NODIS r I DECLASSIFIED Authority_ 1 b91 '5 1Q • I S1 CRE'l' NODI S - 2 - I J believe that there would be any great inancial burden to the U S in assuming the commercial risks in such a buy back arrangement Attachment August 12 Memo on Nuclear Negotiations for Iran SECRET NOD IS I COPY Dep_a rtment- of Sta-te SECRET N00391 SECT0·200B9 0822142 • PAGE Z1 62 ACTI0 4 ·005•0 INFO 1 J ' • OCT-01 • IS0-00 001 R 08213eZ AUG 76 ZFF•4 -- rtt ••• USOEL SEC ETARY IN LAHORE TO SECSTATE WASHDC t SECRET S CTD 20089 NOOlS CtiEROKEE FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ROBINSO N FROM THE SECPETARY E o 11G5 n GOS TAGJ OVlF KISSINGER hENRY A suaJ CT NUCLE R OOPERATION WITH IRAN 1 IH y TALK· IT THE SHA I RAISED THE ISSUE OF OUR NUCLEAR COOPE ATICN AGREE E T THE SHAH'S BASIC CO CERN IS rHAT WE VOID DOING NYTMING WHICH OULD APPEAtt TO SE 0 l SC P' l NAT '3 RY AG AI NS T I RM• • 1 PROP OS f D T O THE SH AH AND Hf SEEM O AG EAB E TH T Wt UEVE OP AN AR A EHENT u eR HICH IRAN ouLO HAVE E OPTIONS FOR HANOLING ITS EPHOCESSING NEEDS NJ INAT J·Of'JA L LJ t T I IR-4 N WIT T US AS A P RTNEn 8uf1 MAOE IT CLfAq ThAT uNOER COR T 4NO FOR SEEJ LE CCHClTIO S THIS OULO NOT SE POSSIE l E IN Ar 1 ACCt PTAOLE p•I -' DJJ t l' f J OR lHROUGti f XC11 GE Q • l K' AQ UJ j f E F C P F i f 14 i t ITH THE lf s T iE FI1- AL Df Cl IO JuULD _BE M•OE Al SOME FUTLJPE DAT PERHAPS TEN YE4RS A AY WHEN THE tCONOMlC NEED FO P OCESSIN ARISES l AN WOULn HAVE THE OPPORTUttITY Tc CtiQOSE At ONG Ti-lESE Tt1 EE OPTIONS N TrlE FIRSi INSiA CE BUi T E l s Qlll O i Yf A YfIP I'-1 Abb I M DE _ li CLEAR THAT fcEP OC SSING_I JRA - N- I I X lJPJia iUSIS OULO Nor Bt AN ACCEPTA6LC S01 UTIO ___ _ __ ----------- - · I · ' 2 1 LAtER DISCUSSED THIS JPPROACH IN CONSIDERASLY 1· - o f o - JL WITH ANSAkI AND ETEMAD THE I TNQICATED THAT_ IRA•-4 1 0yt·p bE fP EPARED I O· Ji ll A L G WlfHTr IS SOLUTION · -'f SECRET -' N T TO BE REP ODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY UU LA a u u Department · of State SECTC 2i e9 062214Z R • t i It ti CD'1M • tjCI4L R ll 1 TM T IS ' IwA •5 tXCESS COSTS Of REP CCESSI G If WE fO CE THEM l _RO 'lOEr It'E Y-5 To OLLGW SuHfTHlhG nr t D ThA TM 06T iCONChICiL i P O CH ThEY FEEL SlRONGLY IHAT Sl CE lkAH IS A N T PA TY A O klLL hE T ITS O •P OLlfEriATlU 06LIGATlCNS FULLY THEY ShOUL NOT - FOOT ThE SILL IF E LEM O I • P ESTRAINTS bEYOND THE S FEGUARDS REOUIReO Sy THE TAEATY I 'j i -' f • 9 ·- ··1 ti· ··1 f K _ · 1 3 • TOL 0 Tt1Er THAT I IOULI SE E TO IT TH•T THE APfROACH • VAS CO l S IJ F R ED CAb E F UlL Y l N T11E INT ER AGE CY MUCL EAR REVl i 111 l'i l i E i AY ANO_ THAT We l' OULD ENOE VOR TO • • GIVE THtMA RESPO SE Sy EFT MbER ONE ' · F Wi A f se tCU UT OUR NO •PROLJFERATJO oa JECTlVES A O E PtCIALLY ABOUT AVOIDING NATl NAL RE F·RO Ce S S 1 Nb I EL I EV E E HA Y v S •' I Th A S lI IA-'L t LJf isA T I V E-W J DOES NOT Pt- N L 1 ZE T f i'i ECONC 1c·AbJ Y • T- fE APPROACH 1 -ourTt' -«re·ovET LL t°CC0 tPLIS11 HHS l UNt EH TAND H AT THE l·IAXlr UM POTENTIAL COSTS T O -I Ht us IF Ar 'r SHOULD St ·i·iCC E cATE • -ILLIO s A YEI R ANO Cc RlAINLY NOT · ILLIONS ThIS IS A S t-i AL PH fCE 1 TO PAY F 'Ft Al' VANCING OUR NOt- •PROLlFERATION OBJECTIVc S ANO OPENING THE OOOR FOR SEVE •L ti LLION UOLLA S O TH Or NIICLE4R EXPORT TRADE OF OlkECT f li FlT TD US I SC E PA TICULA ADVANTAGE GIVEN SOME Of THE C lTIClSM FREUUENTLY LEVELED AT IHA IF IRAN COULD E ERGE AS THE COU TRY ICH A ELPED US FINO A CONSTRUCTIY SOLUTION To THE FR JllF'C F ATlQt- 1ss11e -·I fl 5 l ST ESSEO Th•T 1 COULD NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENT AS TO WHtT OU RESPOhSE TO THIS ·PkOFOS4L OULD BE 1 ALSO SAI' THAl IT WAS IMPO TANT THll E HAY A CLEAR ANO · 0 L l l W ls l lJPI QF - HAT l§ M i I a Y · c o - Er1ctAL Rl_§J Wr ICH ThF - 1-iOULO bE CALLEO ON TO 6R° hARf TH Y GR E TO T Y TO CO L E JLl - COVE SUCrl ifs A OEflNITIO 6 T E SECOND MAJOR ISSUE RAISED BY ThE kANJANS IS T EIR CO CERN ThAT kRC EXPCRT LlC NSI G Th ATENS THE RELlAlilLITY or· OUR iJPPLl A§SlJf f-NCES E 't P i 1UGH IRAN -SECRET N T TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY DECLASSIFIED Department of State SECRET SECTO ir 89 ·0822141 PAGE Z3 CO PLIFS FULLY WITH TH AGREEMENT THEY E E CLEARLY Vt Ry • P 5 T ti Y Th I S t' RO b LE r ANO I ELl EV lT I - F § SEN i I_ i T t JT iii FI ' J l A l-l 2 Y 2 CP 'r J l AS r 1 TTt ST NO NO E' AkE OVIOING A AXl U I CE TIVE TQ OT fR CO J - I C S TO TU rt N ·T O C T HER S LI P PL c R t S l P A t- HAS 'LttEl t'Y oc c A1 0 OEFEloT TH VEf Y NQtJ-P nLIFEiiATION 0 oJ t CT IV TT l 111 E CL A l M TO HAVE' • AT A -1 l NIM u b' f-l t Q _ TO HA VE A J J b'-li_P Af 5 l D f U l AL 6ti0 EYEb COt Bf Ji S1Q£iAI _ Jit j i-'411 Q I' • OF THf UEPE O 18 IL 1TY OF OUR SUPPLY AR rH t- GE• Mt TS FO N TIONS WHICH LIVE UP TO THEIR NDh• RCLIFfRATlON · coMNlT E TS I TOLD ThE IRA IANS THAT l ijOULO ALSO CONSIDER THIS ISS E IN --UUR CURRENT REVIEW __ -- -- ______ • --- --- ----- _ '• 1 WOULP L KF T SP AK TO YOU SOON AFTER MY P TUR A OUT THf A P n Ch JO TMESE ISSUES HIC I OUTLI ED Ad VE I AuD tIOh TO HAVING T St PROPO ALS TAKEN UP y TMr iAS FO CE h ICh IS NG REVIE ING THE REP OCESSl 1 G IS ur · 1· E §'iPIJLO ALSll CQi iS r EIL W b To Go n rRE CTLY TO Tn r i__ c MJP IdLlkUJ l E T AL1'HCJUl il1 l A t lNCL t-lE07 0 tlv1 -rhE TAStc _ _f O 'ICLT ' _f I - -C UCr AT Tttl S • I OF CCJUH SC r1 Av I q°' IH 1'4D-1HA i Api RCiACi JC D eE E ER LlZEU TO PT COU TklES OT R THA l N IN AOOITIO TC ATHERTON K ATZE A O SIEVE IhG E f FRESENT WlT ME Ih THE Dl6C S5l0N ANO T L 1 EI THAT 1 hANTEO TO BE KEPJ lNFO nEo OF FHO R SS ANO TO 8E 0 ERSOijA LY INVOLVED HENEVER kECESSARY PENOI G y i - r J vou r ou Ji F 1 x f Ae J A o r a xA T E s T A f_ tJ J R rt o fl J l'ffP h E Bff I t S __y AT J' fR-· ' ' -O_A_ wU_j C 1 _ - Q t ff lf a f t ul I CL u S10 S I ALSO ° t-1 l 1g__ o 1- jiui J-'tV l JI 1-U -b 2 f_C S AR'' _ TO HJAC OFF Tf-fE CUHRE T-C 1 Q E S1DN4L l N l_T A T YES It• nits f'IEL D l'ffiICH wlLL FurnH t F'O CE OLiR FkltNOS 'To LOOI ELStWHERE ANO TRY T GtT THE CONGRtSS UN A MORE CCl-iSTRUC TI V APPRCl CH l Atf''PP EP AkEJ T0 YEE l -4R I ¥ A TEb f ITH PP O RJ T CO GkESSIO AL LE O Rb ON THIS lSSU SO TH•T I CAN TELL THEM FROM FI ST•H- 0 O StRVATlON f w ERE ou · kEbE T NUCLEAR · PULlCIES AR LEAPING s I 8ELIEY PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS HAV A MUCH 6 TTEH CHANCE OF SUCCES THAN FUPTHER P LIC HElRINGS A D l ELIF VE T loT l tttPERSJ DE PASTORE HIBICOfF JAVITS PEHCY ' SECRET N BE REPfDUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Ul A L A lr 11 U • I Depa1'·tment of State SECRET SECTO 20089 0822142 ANO GL TO JOIN WITH US I A CONSTRUCTIVE ANO REAL SlIC APFKOACH you SHOULD HOLD THIS CLOSELY YOU SHOULD SriAk IT ITH LO O IRVl G AND VtST SQ ThAT T EY 9 WHILE •• CAN GET STA TEO ON Tti _Nf C_E_S J Y- 5IAE f• tiO LK IT SKOULD NOT §0 Th TulN TE - EP RT MENTAL MACH I NER'y-tJNTlL I ETY8N Y I55INGER - ·- • J • SECRET i - ti