1 a summons smooch - Luncheon today'-a BACKGROUND with Today' 3 raid on N V-nam is a major step endin the retaliation phase and entering the phase which 3 Ibomb clusters which can be tmi March 2 1965 expected to on until there is some change of heart by Hanoi and or Peking Hence the prospect is for more raids with greater intensity aimed essentially at bringinga political response and only secondarily at military damage on the North as such The anti-aircraft fire is intense though so far it is - from WW II equipment updated with lock-on radar and other new devices The logic is that the US probably -- though it is not clear whether LBJ has yet approved -- go to 'high level bombing out of AA range by 8-473 and Rain B-52s safely based in tend flying from such places as the Philippines a awsa and Okinawa or more likely Guam'ehich is undisputed US territory Escalation is clearly under way LBJ is commited to keep at it until Hanoi cracks in some form But it seems evident that no one here is certain when or how that might cone or in what form Much discussion here of what might be acceptable but apparently no agreement It also appears that some new types of neap onry in the US arsenal are now being trotted out -- the anti-personnel cluster bomb about which we wrote Sunda and I am not sure whether this has yet been employed delayed action nei to go off immediately an hour or a day or more later Theory here is that masses of such stuff apparently already stockpiled -in V-N will give the Viet Cong pause going through the jungles especially in coming down from the North say be other items in the works too A Rand group I know from other sources a while back recommended numerous such steps even then within the rules of staying in the South only As to Soviet SA-Bs their best AA estimate here is that '7 they probably could be broight into N V-n in three weeks if ordered by Moscow at time Kosygin was in Hanoi that would be about now Presumably by sea from Vladivastock Possibly by air too as the Soviets have enough large tranSports to carry knocked down and some of theie so have recently been sighted in the area High level bombing could not get above the SA-Zs and presumably Soviet crews would be involved Cuban experiences produces estimate that it take 6 months to a year to train inex- periences crews incidentally estimate now is that the Cubans today do have complete control of the without a Soviet key as a veto 3 - Er 1 315 51 -2 e11- _r n- e- h e-t nEei-E a 2 43333 j s a ygimsr QM Backdrop of new orders m it seems he is riding her on personally in each rai thus far - also 1 Joint Chiefs pressea so har he 1cng resisted them unt11 Izs he felt secure in terms of po113 showing US public 'f-npprovel he ocul twist some Goo ressionel arms as is now evident from HiIl comments c feeling that foreign V-reaotion would not he too he cepeoially after State 3 Ihite paper maae a case of Hanoi' 3 control of V C i Further feeling here that Soviets are 1In 'awkunn__hox too that power sixg_tion in Moscow 13 from certain after Khrushchev Belief here Soviets do not consiaer SEA area of ma oo ccncern 'hIence odds perhaps ilrto 1 vs whole thing ending in nuclear confrontation l 1 Possibility taken seriously that US air Fi iihr i 'attack could lead Hanoi to employ its well trained Irmy 250 000 I think is the figure regulars hi sending them -into South but odds felt to be agelnst in i 7 Basically _ issue is whether US pressure on Kano 1 can be sufficient to counteract erosion of war in 7 South they -winning where our estimate is V hold about 30% 91 land area n b other eetimates considerably higher Special effort was made by sending mission to Lonaon 1 convince British Hanoi really is running the '75nohcum EK grateful it's said for White Pager in terms of UK public opinion Top officials inclu ingiForeign 'Secretary Stewart Were given claSsificd 111 in as well on US evi ence which was not aisclosed in Ihite pepeI iI to protect intelligence sources No effort made to persuade French who rated unpresusachle Sooroe swears no hit of evidence eepiIte reports from Paris of toy approach as yet froIm HanoiI                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu