lie' It --I- I i Wit-r H35 - SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE Office of Sciennl i fie Intelligence - June 1965 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25x1 Approved For Release Approved For Release 2005311121 SECRET CONTENTS Soviet woon st Radar Probably a Knife Rest l3 Modification Japan Plans to Develop a Communication Satellite System Soviets Expanding Str-ong Research Program in Seismic Engineering Polish Human Centrifuge for Studies of Gravitational Forces I Center for the-lSoviet Plowshare Type Program Japanese Develop Rocket Borne TV System onlbteteorologicai Soviet'Resear-oh and Development on the Deaaiting of Water Soviet Research and Development in Selected Fluid Separation Techniques Second Prominent Soviet Meteorologist Identified as a Member of the Committee for the Exploration and Utilization of Space Quality of Soviiet Satellite Studies of the Ionoephere Probably Low The Soviet SA-Z Surlao'e to Air Missile System Soviet Capability in Bathymetric Surveys for Submarine and Antiv- 27 i 215x13 - 23 29 30 sun 65-6 NSA review completed June 65 Declass Review by 25X1 SECRET THE SOVIET SA-2 MISSILE 25X1A Defensive Systems Division With Contributions By 25X1A ONC LU SIGNS The Soviet system the most eat- tensively deployed surface-to air mis v sile SAM system in being constitutes the major air defense weapon of the USSR and the European Satellites It is also installed'or being deployed in eight other countries both Communist and nan Bloc Since its initial deployment in 1958 the SA-2 system has been upgraded frequently With further re- visions in the design of the system and subsequent modification of the deployed units the will probably continue to be an essential component oi the Soviet Bloc air defense system for the next decade The existing system poses a serious threat to all operational Western attack and reconnaissance aircraft ex- cept those ying at very low altitudes As deployed in quantity and depth this Reprint 0 Conclusions and Summary of 3 May 1965 SECHE weapons system has a potentially high kill probability against medium- and high-altitude targets operating at velocities up to Mach 2 with a reduced capability against faster targets The has been previously reported to be effective against targets flying between i Recent design changes which may not have been ex tended to all units probably will pro-- vide a system capability against targets flying as low as 1 600 feet With degrade- tion in maximum intercept range and lethal radius the Six 2 system probably can be employed successfully against targets flying at altitudes somewhat under 1 600 feet Lowwaltitude capability will vary somewhat from site to site de- pending upon terrain 25x10 cent modi cations in the bar radar suggest further efforts to reduce SLD 65 6 June 65 320 SECRET SECRET The major limitations ofthe sys tem are its inability to cope with high - altitude highuspeed targets at long range marginal effectiveness against very low altitude targets inability to handle more than one engagement at a time per site and long reloading period following the expending of the six mis siles on the launchers Additionally while the system is it requires 4 to 6 hours to disassemble a site and a similar period to set up in a new location The first two limitations presumably are problems which must he overcome by the employment clothe-r SUMMARY The Sin-2 system probably first de- ployed in 1958 is the most widely de ployed SAM system in'the Communist Bloc At least 1 100 sites have been identified in the Soviet Bloc about 950 of them within the USSR and in Communist China North Korea and Cuba Approximately 20 additional sites are deployed in such nonniigned coun- tries as indonesia Egypt India Yugoslavia and Afghanistan The system is transportable and is relatively simple in design and opera- tion Unlike the earlier system all components of the SA-2 system including the missile launchers and radar are on wheels The design concepts on which the SA--2 system is based are different from weapons systems and the other draw- backs are compensated largely by the great number of deployed sites The Soviet SAH2 system has been designed to emphasize simplicity in operation and high kill probability against single targets through inten- tional limiting of intercept range and application of weapon redundancy De sign features of the system include con servative engineering practices a mini- mum of automatic procedures and fairly simple operation that can be carried out by relatively unskilled operators How- ever the system does require large unit and apparently an extensive maintencance effort involving skilled technicians - those followed by the United States in the design of the Nike systems 3Whereasthe Nike systems have multiple radars for target and missile tracking and as a source of missile guidance signals the uses one radar the FAN SONG for these functions The use of one radar alleviates to a large extent the problems of parallax boresighting and zation which a surfaCe to air system- would normally encounter Of the five different FAN SONG models which have been identified three of them s B and probably L operate nd appear to be essentially mi ar 0 each other The other two models FAN SONGS and E operate Em appear to wrap Sill 65-6 June 65 21 SECRET 25X'i SECRET significantly from the odels and frorn one another Regnr ass of model the FAN SONG radar is a truck-while- scun type which combines target and missile tracking functions in one radar along with the missile guidance function The antennas transmitters receivers tracking cirCuits and guidance com puters and utilize combina- tions of standard techniques The radar system relies an manually aided auto- matic tracking in fulfilling most of its functions An site consists of 1 FAN SONG tracking and guidance radar which ii six launchers arranged in ng around the FAN SONG liil one Guideline missile per launcher and pro- visions for 6 additional missiles in hold positions iv missile trunSporters operational vans including separate Ones probably for power distribution control computer and generators vi an acquisition and identifitmuon section usually SPOON REST A radar and equipment of the SCORE HOAHU type with associated equipment vii a Mercury Grass _communicutions van support equipment and ix admin istrative and housing facilities The periormance characteristics of the system with the FAN SONG radar are believed tobeas ows Dautical miles mantle- 11 miles Maximum missile guided flight time 55 seconds Missile flight distance before self destruct Missile inte rcepi capability Minimum altitude Maximum altitude Minimum range Maximum range 22 nautical lies About 1 600 feet possibly lower depending upon terrain Condi tions and target velocity About 8 5 00 0 feet 5 to 6 nautical miles 1 nautical miles SLD 65 6 June 65 22 SECRET SEC REIT Maximum target speed intercept capa billty Number of targets which can be one gaged simultaneou sly Mach 2 with a row laced capability above this ve locity 1 group targets can be engaged when closely bunched Number of missiles which can be con- trolled simultaneou sly The Soviet-stated probabilitiesol kill for 1 2 and 3 missile firings against a single target are 70 went respec- tively within the estimated range and ale titude limitations noted above The specific poriorm rac- teristics attributed to the FAN SONG Shiv-2 systems by the USSR are unknown but are estimated similar to or better than those of tthl- AN SONG SA-Z 5y stern Up toil pilot and the receiver transponder sec- tion Additional unknown aspects of the missile Intercept capability Ior-tne im- proved SAL-2 system probably has been increase to an estimated maximum range of about nautical miles Certain important characteristics of both the ystems are not knoi detailed sequences and times required for track ing and firing and ill some missile de- tails relating to the radio fuzo the auto- the twin parabolic dish re ectors that are mounted on top of the horizontal scanning antenna SONG E and the improvements over the em he most likely_ explanations 'o the purpose or the twin dishes on the advanced FAN SONG I12 are that they act as an electronic counter countermeasure ECCM modification or that they se rve to enhance the detection capability of the radar against small targets The former purpose is believed the more likely However these dishes may be for a completely different pur pose The Guideline missile in the system uses a microwave radio fuze for detonation of the-warhead after it is armed by the guidance link from the FAN SONG A considerable amount of detail on the missile-associated elec- tronics however still is not fully known SID 65 6 June 65 23 SECRET SECRET 'En November 1963 a modified Guidcline missile Mark was identified at the site at Gino East Germany The configuration of the missile-and probably the propulsion parameters of its susw Mark I Sustainer Length n14 Diameter in Total wcight Uh Burning time set-J Thrust 0 Booster 8 57 2 12 2 266 Length 01 Diameter it Tot-a weight Thrust tuincr engine had been modified but the extent and purpose of these changes are unknown Significant physical chnruc-m teristics of the three known mode-is of the_GuideIine missiles are as follows MM 26 24 1 60 2 756 48 50 6 500 59 400 to 110 000 depending on ambient air temperature of to Duration of thrust sec 4 3 to 3 0 Assumed to be the sumo as Mark I The system has been froquvntiy since its initial in 1958 Technical improvcrnonts been noted in each successivc modvi of the three Guidvlinv missiles that have tie-en di'tci'tcd since 1957 The' five versions nrlgi the FAN SONG radar also probably nu fleet improvements Honcc the systor n probably has been developed to moot a number oi different operational situa tions in as simple a manner as possible and n the east possible cost Further improvvments expected in the system inrludu ii an increase in the missile boostvr thrust ii a provision for launching the missile when the FAN SONG is I Jami in incIuSion oi an automaticiucility 511 65 6 June 65 SECRET to handle some of the tasks presently p erformed by human operators pair ticularly in the critical fire control area The system has some serious _Iim itations in particular the inability to track more than one target or com pact group of targets at the same time and the lack of good very low IeVel coverage For the earlier versions 1 long time between de ec on and firing up to 40 sea-bonds and a short readiness time 25 minutes before recycling which takes 10 to 15 minutes ported These limitations for the ver-slot may have been reduced urn the development of the newer The inability of the system to track more than one target at a given time is due todesign restrictions Hence to improve this particular charac teristic the complexity of the system i would have to 'be increased to a large degree Tile re orted 40-second timelag for the system between detectiorl and ring of a missile cannot be ex- plained The capability of the system could be handicapped severely if this 40 second period occurs at a critical time lit is probable that 40 seconds is an average figure rather than a mini- mum required time The 25-minute limit on the readiness state of the system appears to be necessitated by overheating of missile components A 10- to 15-minute re cycling time is needed apparently to allow the critical components to cool If the problem of overheating is solved the readiness time probably could be extended until some other factor for example gyro precession becomes the 25X1 311 65-43 June 65 25 SECRET                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu