rum Memorandum re ConsultantsT Discusslon iv iinll Ea Illa 411 5511 Slim siztiiatgevix 5 5 1 ll Attachmentdiscussions that I have attended It was one of the best 15% A MbCloy of interest checked for accuracy with Messrs Aches 'on and I ch We have You will fi nd this report whi Counselor and Chairman Policy Planning Council Washington DEPARTMENT OF STATE b we nonsense 3 SECRET MEMORANDUM SUBJECT Consultants' Discussion of Atlantic Affairs i Ea Introduction The Policy Planning Council's Board i L i of Consultants met on July 2 to discuss US policy toward f EurOpe after the German elections Ambassador Bruce Qined' these members of the Board Messrs Acheson McCloy anv fo Smith and Professors Neustadt Millikan Bowie and Ef f Messrs Ball Mann and Leddy joined the discussion W a - 4 - - Hana km r at lunch and a smaller group continued after lunch in Mr Leddy's office if ggix 2 Conclusion The Consultants quickly put to one side the paper which had been prepared for this meeting They thought that it focused too narrowly on NATO ItThey suggested that economic issues deserved urgent attention notably the UK economic situation the '4 ftfg Kennedy Round and monetary reform - 50 did political issues policy toward Eastern i333 Europe proposals on German unification and consultation about third areas 3 Tiif In the Politico-military area they felt that q i' non-proliferation and nuclear sharing was the leading issue 3T Vrga Forward motion in each of these fields seemed to hinge on discussion among the three major Western powers dedicated to common action the US Germany and the UK 2 The Consultants suggested that US-UK-German staff Ehki r level talks about this range of issues begin soon if the 3 1 Germans were willing In any event talks at a higher and i more visible level should take place soon after the Germany 'M1 ta election UK and German views were tending to Converge along pii fip _fairly sensible lines A US initiative in bringing about - trilateral talks could well translate this convergence into - i I nes-rid- - Authority Nb ol 1 3 - 25 Such a crisis was met last fall when the US- and yEuther countries shored Up sterling with very substantial term credits 5 _iand a US initiative in getting the talks started at the SECRET 2 - into agreement on action But clarity as to the US position right moment would be indispensable ingredients Otherwise nothing much was likely to happen Neither the British nor the Germans were likely to take the first step in bringing the three governments together In this-event more than opportunity for forward motion would be lost The UK - faced with a continuing economic probIem and denied a constructive political role in EurOpe - might well drift off into becoming what Ambassador Brude described as a bigger Sweden The Germans - seeing no prospect of progress toward either German unification or EurOpean integration -and feeling that they are still Iraveling second class twenty years after rthe War - could also succumb to melancholy gabsorption in their own concerns which would alienate them in some degree from the rest of the western community 3 Key Issues After this broad cut at the problem -the Censultants focused on two issues which they felt should figure prominently in a US UK German agenda since they-L eculd soon create upheavals in Atlantic affairs a i The UK financial situation Non-proliferation- 4 UK Economy Ambassador Bruce pointed out that pressure on sterling could become critical at any time if the trade figures were bad enough to trigger a crisis of confidence In another crisis the US might well again feel compelled to provide aid - in order to protect the dollar avoid a SECRET gnu th wmy Nbcq l 3 avoid a drastic cutback in UK defense commitments and SECRET 3 - maintain US-UK solidarity Such an emergency operation might not however be the most effective way of providing aid For it would be 03 might thus have to put up most of the aid and without difficult at short notice to put together a package of long- term aid including other countries as well as the US and inVolving meaningful pledges from the UK in return The getting maximum return on its investment Preferable to such an emergency bai1#out the Con- sultants suggeSted would be a long term loan made before the crisis broke If the-US and Germany the other country most likely to see that it has a political stake in the matter were to provide such aid others m1ght join in ct- Any discussion of this possibility would be an extra- ordinarily sensitive business The public UK position is that they are not in bad shape A leak that long-term aid was being considered could damage this position No matter how useful preliminary contacts with German central bankers might be the eventual German decision would be made by the political leadership - and at least partly on political grounds The Consultants suggested that this 0pic should-thus be given a large place in the high level talks which they had already suggested be addressed to political and defense as well as economic issues 4 Non-Proliferation The Consultants saw pressures mounting for a choice between two possible approaches to averting the spread of nuclear weapons Being willing to give up a collective nuclear force in order to obtain non-proliferation agreement with -the USSR When we have proposed such an agreement to the Soviets they have made clear that this is their price We and our allies have so far refused to pay that price The' if SECRET lane D di s tn - mm 3 - 3 th SECRET - 4 - The Consultants discussed possible effects of a non- 3 proliferation agreement on other countries' courses of action j Wm lf i Swedish Japanese and Indian representatives in the 3 recent UN disarmament debate have suggested that their countries might well refuse to sign a non-proliferation agreement unless it also involved some nuclear disarmament %53' by the great powers The Soviet position on inspection makes such disarmament unlikely a A 2 Hw- h- The Italians and Israeli have also intimated that they might not be willing to sign a non-proliferation agreement standing by-itself 14Schroeder said publicly a few days ago that Germanx would accede to a nuclear non-disseminatidn agreement only if an atomic organization within the Western-alliance is multilateral nuclear force or something suggestion of a Select Committee does 3 - 3 not constitute an adequate alternative is If these keygnon nuclear countries - and China and per- iK haps France as well - abstained the agreement would not amount to much It would on the other hand arouse great 1 concern among major European non nuclear countries The Germans would take our seeking agreement with the USSR over their objections and as they saw it at their eXpense _as confirmation of de Gaulle's warnings against a US Soviet 'condominium We would strain the alliance without gettigg l much in return i The other approach creating a collective g alternative to national nuclear programs would also involve large difficulties given bitter French and Soviet objections The French could exert considerable leverage in threatening to withdraw their support for German unity if the Germans joined a collective nuclear forcethe other hand the Consultants felt that this 3 'ba approach if the Germans were ready to proceed could do' - more to 3' r I SECRET rfk m - nmm y lI'rU-vlw p r in- 2 1 1 a 5 4 we 3 7131Imiru'mg- 4'21 7 a fut 1 2133 - r urn- - 1 5-1 _t 4 19 41- awe-5 - 9 1 fl wag-it 1 1v Authority 1 i 3 SECRET 5 avert the Spread of nuclear weapons than a non-proliferation agreement The UK which has shown some surprising flexibility in the Pari s Working Group has publicly indicated a willingness to submerge its national deterrent into a collective force Elimination of one of the five existing national deterrents would constitute a dramatic and concrete nonwproliferation success Moreover5 once a collective nuclear force had thus come into being the Soviets might as Ambassador Kohler has suggestec eventually reexamine thei -r present insistence that a non- proliferation agreement must be couched in terms which would -preclude such a force ' So that we mightH in the long run conceivably get both the force and the agreement Here again the Consultants saw the need as being for UK- FRG talks after the German election to reach agreement on a non- proliferation strategy and thus choose between the two courses outlined above There is no point in the US czoncluding that course is preferable unless it is clear that the Germans will be ready to go forward after the German election in the face of grave French threats Only high level talks in which all the choices and possible con- sequences are thoroughly canvassed can make clear whether this is the case - 5 Tactics The Consultants discussed various tactical issues connected with getting US-UK German talks going They thought that the first step should be early bilateral US discussion with the UK and with Germany about the need For having such talks at a high Under Secretary level after the German election WW They advised against focusing exclusively in either these initial bilateral approaches later trilateral talks on planning defensive reactions to possible moves by de Gaulle against although obviously this would have to be covered The major emphasis should instead be on constructive moves that the US UK and Germany could 'take - moves which Would not be directed against de Gaulle and in which France could if she wished eventually take part i It'was i 3 1 i 7 A' x x Authority 61 16 3 arewas recognized that a-major thread running through lit igf all this was the likelihood of French attacks on both NATO i3 and the EEC The full force of the EEC crisis had not yet made itself felt when the Consultants met Obviously this prospect would color the attitudes and decisions of igial the US UK and German governments on all the matters to be discussed among them i 6 Next Step The Consultants concluded that the first hp need was for the US Government to decide that it wanted 3 y 33 trilateral high level US-UK German talks after the German TE election and that it wanted them to result in US- -German disposition to pfpvide long- -term 1 aid to the such aid proved needed and if the UK in return offered necessary pledges re Economic performance notably an effective incomes policy and ii agreed to d fulfill its existing defense commitments in EurOpe and 3 East of Suez 5 British willingness at the same time to offer the Germans prospective equality in a collective nuclear force and a clear German decision one way or a 5 another as to whether they wanted to go forward with such a force despite the risk of a confrontation with de Gaulle v 3 I - glh l The Consultants suggested that the Department now prepare Specific preposals on these points and on the rest of a US- UK German agenda for higher approval With sharp v3 35 warnings against allowing the matter to bog down in gg d'hsf committees they departed 1 f1 1 x 3 5541 SECRET 7 9 u 1 in 5 n Jvr'r v-r 7 s rvv v mu                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu