No Objection To Declassi cation 2008 06 06 - 1 mm 5-9 in AMB 10 28 85 2 POL CHRON 44- K E hssY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY moscou REVIEWED DECLASSIFIED IN FROM AMBASSADOR E O 12356 DECL OADR TAGS PREL US IN SUBJECT VISIT TO MOSCOW 1 ENTIRE TEXT 2 ON OCTOBER 27 RAJIV GANDHI RETURNED TO NEW DELHI AND I WENT TO THE AIRPORT TO WELCOME HIM BACK FROM BRIEF CONVERSATIONS WITH INDIAN OFFICIALS AND DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES I HAVE PIECED TOGETHER MY INTERPRETATION WHY GANDHI WENT TO MOSCOW WHEN THE DECISION WAS WHAT CAME OUT OF THE MEETING 3 WHEN THE DECISION WAS TAKEN TO GO TO MOSCOW - A THE POSSIBILITY OF GANDHI STOPPING IN MOSCOW HAD BEEN RAISED WITH THE SOVIETS WELL BEFORE TRAVEL TO NEW YORK RAJIV CONFIRMED THIS IN HIS HOMECOMING PRESS CONFERENCE I NOTE THAT MRS SONIA GANDHI HAD A FUR-COAT AND FUR HAT WHEN SHE VISITED MOSCOW PERHAPS SOMETHING SHE HAD PACKED BEFORE LEAVING KEEPING IN MIND THAT A STOPOVER IN MOSCOW WAS NOT EXCLUDED EH - - WW CONFIDENTIAL No Objection To Declassi cation 2008 06 06 No Objection To Declassi cation 2008 06 06 NLC-131-5-4-7-9 CONFIDENTIAL lull- I - -- no IDMLIJ PRECISE TIMING ONLY FELL INTO PLACE AT THE LAST MOMENT WHEN GANDHI WAS VISITING THE NETHERLANDS APPARENTLY THE INDIANS HAD NOTIFIED THE SOVIETS THAT GANDHI COULD STOP IN MOSCOW ON THE WAY HOME AND WHEN GORBACHEV SHORTENED HIS STAY IN SOFIA BY 24 HOURS IT MADE THE GANDHI STOPOVER IN MOSCOW POSSIBLE BUT WORD THAT THE MOSCOW STOPOVER WAS ON ONLY CAME ONE HOUR BEFORE GANDHI WAS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE THE NETHERLANDS TO THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR WHICH EXPLAINED THE MANY CHANGES WE RECEIVED HERE ON WHEN WE SHOULD BE AT THE AIRPORT TO WELCOME BACK THE INDIAN PRIME MINISTER - C MOST OBSERVERS FEEL THAT THE INITIATIVE FOR THE MOSCOW STOPOVER CAME FROM RAJIV GANDHI 4 WHY DID RAJIV WANT THE MOSCOW A THE MOST LIKELY REASON IS THAT RAJIV WANTED THE ADDITIONAL PRESTIGE AS A LEADER WHO WAS NOT ONLY EFFECTIVE ON DOMESTIC POLITICS BUT ALSO HAD BECOME AN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL FIGURE A TELEVISION COMMENTARY WHICH I WATCHED LAST OCTOBER 27 STRESSED THE ROLE OF GANDHI AS A WORTHY SUCCESSOR OF HIS GRANDFATHER AND MOTHER AS AN INTERNATIONAL LEADER AND NOT ONLY AS AN EFFECTIVE HEAD OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT - B NEXT YEAR INDIA GIVES UP THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE MOVEMENT HIS STOPOVER IN MOSCOW AGAIN HIGHLIGHTED CURRENT POSITION AS THE HEAD OF THE NAM AND REMINDS THE WORLD THAT INDIA IS THE LEADING NON- ALIGNED COUNTRY INDIA MAY WANT TO USE GROWING INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE TO SUSTAIN THE INFLUENCE AND PRETIGE IT WOULD OTHERWISE LOSE WHEN IT PASSES THE NAM BATON TO ZIMBABWE 1 2 i CONFIDENTIAL No Objection To Declasai cation 2008l06 06 NLC-131-5-4-7- No Objection To Declassi cation 2008 06 06 NLC-131-5-4-7-9 - CONFIDENTIAL vital-I0 - I clown-no- 0 - In uw- I lq 1 - C IT ALSO PERMITTED RAJIV T0 BALANCE HIS NELL- PUBLICIZED ROLE AT THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE IN NASSAU AND HIS MEETING NITH PRESIDENT REAGAN IN NEW YORK STOPPING IN MOSCOW TO MEET UITH GORBACHEV HELPED TO CREATE AN IMAGE OF BALANCE - D PERHAPS RAJIV HISHED TO BRIEF GORBACHEV ABOUT HIS MEETING HITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF CHINA IN ORDER TO ASSUAGE CONTINUING SOVIET DOUBTS ABOUT CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO TRADITIONAL INDIAN POLICIES E UHILE RAJIV CERTAINLY GOT WORLD ATTENTION BY HIS STOPOVER IN MOSCOW GORBACHEV ALSO PROBABLY LIKED THE IDEA SINCE IT REINFORCED HIS POSITION WITH THE NON- ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND WITH THE INDIAN PUBLIC 4 UHAT CAME OUT OF THE - A AT THIS STAGE WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF ANY PRECISE IT WOULD APPEAR THAT RAJIV USED HIS CONVERSATIONS NITH GORBACHEV TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON DISARMAMENT IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR THE GORBACHEV MEETING TO FOCUS ON DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR MATTERS RATHER THAN ON REGIONAL PROBLEMS - B RAJIV ALSO FOCUSSED ATTENTION ON HIS CURRENT FIXATIONI PAKISTAN MAKING A NUCLEAR BOMB DESPITE PRESIDENT ASSERTION TO THE CONTRARY - C NHILE GANDHI UNDOUBTEDLY NISHED TO BE SEEN AS BEING EVENHANDED I FEAR THAT THE PRESS CONFERENCE HE GAVE UPON HIS RETURN TO DELHI AND THE GENERAL TONE AND TREATMENT BY THE LOCAL MEDIA OF THE MOSCOH STOPOVER PICTURES POLICIES TO BE CLOSER TO THAT OF INDIA THAN THOSE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN I CANNOT HELP BUT COME AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT GORBACHEV IS PICTURED BY GANDHI AS BEING MORE UNDERSTANDING OF INDIAN AND NAM CONCERNS THAN PRESIDENT REAGAN 5 ii div fa 133M -L- If CONFIDENTIAL No Objection To Declassi cation 2008 06 06 NLC-131-5-4-7- 1 No Objection To Declassi cation 2008 06 06 CONFIDENTIAL - - 'ul 'Auu lat-on uI--nm I In-dn-o 01 II 'IIb-Ihmyl - mitt-5 m2 l 1mm l D GANDHI STRESSED PUBLICLY THAT THE SOVIET OFFER FOR A 50 PERCENT CUT IN ARMS TO BE DISCUSSED IN THE FORTHCOMING GENEVA TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES MOST SERIOUS SUPPORT FOR THE SOVIET POSITION - E EXPRESSING HIS THAT PAKISTAN WAS MAKING A NUCLEAR BOMB GANDHI HAD CITED PRESIDENT PLEA TO HIM T0 SPEEDILY START BILATERAL TALKS WITH PAKISTAN A POINT OF NO RETURN IS AS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT PAKISTAN WAS WORKING ON THE PRODUCTION OF A NUCLEAR BOMB MUCH IS ALSO MADE BY THE MEDIA OF THE FACT THAT AT NO TIME DURING HIS RECENT MEETING WITH MR REAGAN HAD THE PRESIDENT TOLD GANDHI THAT PAKISTAN HAD NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM ON THE OTHER GORBACHEV IS ALLEGED TO HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT NUCLEAR DESIGNS TO RAJIV IN THE COURSE OF THE MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS F APPARENTLY AFGHANISTAN WAS DISCUSSED BY RAJIV WITH GORBACHEV RAJIV IS QUOTED AS HAVING TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT WILLING TO TALK ABOUT ANY GUARANTEE AFTER THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN UNLESS THERE IS SOME GUARANTEE POSITIVE RESULTS ARE DIFFICULT TO COMMENT CLEARLY RAJIV HAS MISUNDERSTOOD THE US POSITION ON THE ROLE OF GUARANTEES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL AFGHANISTAN SETTLEMENT 6 COMMENT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A READOUT MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT IN NEW YORK THIS MAY SHED ADDITIONAL LIGHT 0N VISIT MOSCOW 3131 No Objection To Declassi cation 2008 06 06 NLC-131-5-4-7-9 No Objection To Declassi cation 2006 06 06 1 CONFIDENTIAL Jul-E - I il il i' IE5 5 4 G IN COMPARING NOTES WITH MY BRITISH HE THOUGHT THAT THE PUBLIC DECLARATIONS ONLY PRESENT PART OF THE PICTURE HE THOUGHT THAT AT LEAST FIVE SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED BETWEEN GORBACHEV AND GANDHI 1 FORTHCOMING 2 SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT 3 4 AND 5 AFGHANISTAN ON THE SUMMIT THE PUBLIC STATEMENT BY RAJIV PROBABLY REFLECTED THE DISCUSSION ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT ISSUES THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER THOUGHT THAT SECRETARY DISCLOSURE OF THE SOVIET PRODUCTION OF THE 5525 MAY HAVE BEEN RAISED BY RAJIV ON CHINA WHERE THE INDIAN PRIME MINISTER HAD MADE SOME VERY POSITIVE AND OPTIMISTIC STATEMENTS THE INDIAN PRIME MINISTER PROBABLY WISHED ALSO TO GAUGE THE SOVIET CURRENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS CHINA ON PAKISTAN THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS PROBABLY REFLECTED THE STATE OF THE DISCUSSION ON AFGHANISTAN THE HIGH COMMISSIONER THOUGHT THAT RAJIV IS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SOVIET STAND THAN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS WOULD MAKE US BELIEVE THE HIGH COMMISSIONER THOUGHT THAT THIS MATTER WAS NOT DISCUSSED IN DEPTH AND IN THIS CONNECTION NOTED THAT FOREIGN SECRETARY BHANDARI HAD REMAINED BEHIND IN NEW YORK IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT IT WAS BHANDARI WHO HELD MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP LAST JUNE FOLLOWING VISIT TO WASHINGTON THE ONLY SENIOR SUPPORT STAFF WHO ACCOMPANIED RAJIV TO MOSCOW WERE REPORTEDLY ADDITIONAL SECRETARY C R GHAREKHAN AND INFORMATION SECRETARY SHARADA PRASADI NEITHER OF WHOM ARE FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXPERTS ON AFGHANISTAN 6 COMMENT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A READOUT ON MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT IN NEW YORK LAST WEEK THIS MAY SHED ADDITIONAL LIGHT ON VISIT TO MOSCOW it Ll- CONFIDENTIAL No Objection To Declassi cation 2008 06 06 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu