Search PART 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1955-1957 KOREA VOLUME XXIII 212 Memorandum of Discussion at the 318th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington April 4 19571 Washington April 4 1957 Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-3 4 U S Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea NSC 5514 Progress Report dated March 6 1957 by OCB on NSC 55142 Mr Cutler brie y summarized the highlights of the Progress Report on the subject and suggested that the Council consider them in connection with the next item on the agenda The National Security Council 3 Noted the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board 5 US Policy Toward Korea NSC 5514 NSC 5610 Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary subject U S Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea dated October 12 and November 6 1956 NSC Actions Nos 1624 and 1660 NSC 5702 Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary subject Evaluation of Alternative Military Programs for Korea dated January 30 1957 4 Progress Report dated March 6 1957 by OCB on NSC 5514 NSC 5702 1 Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary subject U S Policy Toward Korea dated April 2 19575 Mr Cutler briefed the Council at some length on the contents of NSC 5702 1 emphasizing the di ering views of the Departments of State and Defense with respect to the introduction of certain dual conventional-nuclear weapons in connection with the modernization of U S forces in Korea He pointed out that the di erence in view was most apparent in paragraph 19-b of NSC 5702 1 reading as follows b The timing of the introduction of dual conventional nuclear weapons under paragraph 9-a shall be decided upon by the Secretaries of State and Defense in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence only after they shall have determined that publishable evidence establishes Communist violations su cient to warrant such action by the United 6 States State proposal A copy of Mr Cutler's brie ng note is led in the minutes of the meeting Page 421 At the conclusion of his brie ng Mr Cutler called on Secretary Dulles Secretary Dulles stated that he had long been quite sympathetic to the point of view of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Sta with respect to modernizing the U S forces in Korea by the introduction of new weapons including some which had dual conventional-nuclear capabilities Indeed he said he had already gone a long way toward meeting these views Reluctantly however he had been forced to conclude that he could not go all the way desired by the military because he believed that if we introduced the two disputed items 280 mm guns and 762 mm rockets the political disadvantages of such a course of action would be greater in his mind than the military advantages At this point Mr Cutler distributed to the members of the Council a List of New Weapons for U S Forces in Korea 7 copy of which is led in the minutes of the meeting Secretary Dulles went on to state that there was no doubt that the Communists had substantially violated the terms of the Armistice in introducing new weapons into North Korea Secretary Dulles said he had gone over all of the available evidence both the classi ed evidence which of course could not be publicly revealed and the unclassi ed evidence which could be The sum total of all this evidence did not however in Secretary Dulles' view actually prove and demonstrate violations of the Armistice by the Communists of the magnitude which we in this country believe has actually occurred He repeated that he did not doubt that these violations had been on a very large scale even if the United States was not in a position to demonstrate this fact to the world On the other hand continued Secretary Dulles there was no evidence of the Communist introduction of weapons with atomic capabilities into North Korea and he personally doubted that this had happened because he thought it very unlikely that the Soviets would entrust atomic weapons to the Communist Chinese or to the North Korean armed forces Secretary Dulles thought it was also germane that most of the evidence that we have of Communist violations of the Armistice had been obtained prior to August 1956 when the activities of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission had been curtailed At the time that we succeeded in curtailing these NNSC activities we had informed the United Nations that this was the only alteration in the Armistice Agreement that the United States was seeking and that we proposed to adhere to all the Page 422 remaining portions of that Agreement In sum not only was the publishable evidence of Communist violations rather meager but also in a sense the United States was estopped from making use of the evidence since we had informed the UN last August that we sought no other changes in the Armistice terms beyond the change relative to the NNSC teams Secretary Dulles then pointed out the feeling of the State Department that the introduction of the 280 mm guns and the Honest John 762 mm rockets less than 1 line of source text not declassi ed would cause serious repercussions around the world Most of our friends and allies would feel that the United States had violated its own solemn agreement to observe the Armistice terms Likewise we should become a focal point for a tremendous Soviet propaganda campaign The e ect on our friends and allies would be considerable In support of this thesis Secretary Dulles revealed that he had last December mentioned to Macmillan that the United States was proposing to modernize its forces in South Korea The Prime Minister whom Secretary Dulles described as a pretty hard-headed man expressed himself as strongly in favor of the modernization of U S forces 2 lines of source text not declassi ed Secretary Dulles also pointed out the serious e ect of such a course of action on the announced willingness of the sixteen nations to join with us again to resist aggression in Korea in case the Communists resumed hostilities Secretary Dulles thought that this was an important commitment on the part of the sixteen allied nations in Korea and that we should do everything we could to keep the commitment alive The proposed course of action also was certain to stir up serious repercussions in Japan Secretary Dulles therefore asked the question whether it was really worthwhile to be regarded by our friends and allies as violators of a solemn international agreement simply in order to get these two particular weapons in the hands of our forces in Korea After all there was a considerable list of other new weapons which would go far to modernize U S forces in Korea despite the absence of the 280 mm gun and the Honest John rocket To add these last two items Secretary Dulles repeated would bring us to the point where the situation was positively disadvantageous 4 lines of source text not declassi ed In this contingency Rhee might well use the violation of the Armistice Agreement as a pretext for launching his much-desired march into North Korea All these were the reasons which explained the State Department position At the conclusion of Secretary Dulles' remarks Mr Cutler called on the Acting Secretary of Defense but Secretary Robertson8 requested that Admiral Radford be invited to speak rst Admiral Radford said that he rst wished to say that the Joint Chiefs of Sta had been very concerned about the Page 423 violations of the Armistice terms by the Communists and the need for U S counter-measures and had been pressing ever since 1954 for some sort of solution Indeed the matter had been discussed several times with the representatives of the sixteen nations and Admiral Radford said that he personally had made two presentations to these representatives He had come away on both occasions with a strong belief that the representatives of the sixteen nations were absolutely content with the status quo in Korea and were in no way moved by his presentation of the actualities Admiral Radford explained this attitude of satisfaction as a result of the fact that there was no pressure on the military forces of these allied nations because there were practically no forces left in Korea except those of the ROK and of the United States In any event Admiral Radford doubted very much that the sixteen-nation agreement mentioned earlier by Secretary Dulles was of any great military signi cance though perhaps it had political value He reasoned here that if ghting were resumed by the Communists in Korea the United States would have to bear most of the brunt With particular respect to paragraph 13 d of the Armistice Agreement Admiral Radford pointed out that it was so strictly worded that the United States would get into just as much hot water if it introduced the other new weapons proposed for the U S forces in Korea as it would if the 280 mm guns and the Honest John rockets were also included That is if we were going to meet di culty in introducing any new equipment into Korea for our forces we might just as well go the whole hog and introduce the entire list including the two disputed items Admiral Radford said that the Joint Chiefs also felt that as far as the military people around the world were concerned there was general agreement that the Communists had not observed the Armistice Indeed their violations had been of an extreme type even though Admiral Radford agreed with Secretary Dulles in doubting that the Communists had introduced atomic weapons into North Korea There was no particular reason why they should at this time because Soviet planes capable of carrying atomic bombs could be got very quickly to the Yalu River in the event that they were needed In summary Admiral Radford stated that the Joint Chiefs believed that from the military point of view anything short of the total proposal submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Sta for the package deal in South Korea would be inadequate to meet a surprise attack by the Communists on South Korea Secretary Robertson observed that in addition to the strong views of the Joint Chiefs of Sta as stated by Admiral Radford he would like to add another consideration--namely one from the domestic political point of view First however he Page 424 pointed out that the Defense Department did not share the apparent view of the Department of State that once we had secured the removal of the NNSC teams the United States would seek no further change in the Armistice Agreement and in particular with respect to paragraph 13 d of these terms Returning to his initial point Secretary Robertson indicated that a number of prominent members of Congress as well as distinguished citizens like Dr John Hannah 9 had recently been to Korea and had come back with very strong views about the inadequacy of our defenses Secretary Robertson warned that as a result the Administration would be exposed to very di cult questions as to why it was not a ording our troops in Korea the maximum possible protection Mr Cutler observed that the discussion up to this point had made very clear the breadth of the disagreement between State and Defense It appeared to him that the Joint Chiefs' attitude on the modernization of U S forces was so to speak an all-ornothing attitude Admiral Radford con rmed Mr Cutler's impression Secretary Dulles replied to the views earlier expressed by Admiral Radford and Secretary Robertson by repeating his belief that if we proceeded to modernize our forces with all the weapons suggested except the 280 mm gun and the Honest John rocket such a course of action would not constitute a breach of the Armistice Agreement but could be regarded rather as an interpretation of paragraph 13 d With respect to the problem of Congressional criticism Secretary Dulles believed that we could point out to our critics that we were using a whole lot of new weapons to modernize our forces apart from the two types which we were presently withholding At this point the President inquired whether at any time in the history of the United States this country had deliberately broken the terms of an international agreement Turning to Admiral Radford the President observed that the Admiral appeared to be carrying matters to extremes when he stated that paragraph 13 d of the Armistice Agreement made it possible for the United States to send in a new type of weapon such as a jet aircraft with nuclear capabilities as a replacement for a weapon that was no longer in production in the United States Such a course of action did not appear to the President as a violation of the Armistice Agreement Admiral Radford replied that weapons like the 280 mm guns which were primarily defensive in character were really more important to our forces in Korea than was the stationing of squadrons of atomic capable jet aircraft in South Korea Page 425 In point of fact the Defense Department was not contemplating the permanent stationing of squadrons of jet-atomic aircraft in Korea but instead wished to rotate squadrons to South Korea from Japan and elsewhere in order to provide familiarity with the terrain In any event he repeated that weapons like the 280 mm guns would be vital to the defense of cities like Seoul which were close to the North Korean border Thereafter Mr Cutler directed the Council's attention to paragraph 19 as quoted above and said that this seemed to put the question to the President in clear terms Mr Cutler pointed out that the arrangements for the new military program in Korea constituted essentially a package deal The active divisions of the ROK Army were to be reduced in phase with the modernization of U S forces in Korea It seemed to Mr Cutler to be the view of the Defense Department that it would be undesirable to go forward with a portion of the U S modernization program unless the program was complete and included the 280 mm guns and the Honest John rockets Also Defense presumably doubted the willingness of the ROK to reduce the number of active divisions unless these two important items were included in the U S modernization program Admiral Radford commented that the two disputed items seemed more important to the Department of Defense than all the rest put together and he doubted very much whether the South Koreans could be brought to agree to reduce their active divisions unless the U S modernization program included these two items The President stated that of course it was the responsibility of the Department of State to gauge the political e ects of a military course of action He tended to agree he said with Secretary Dulles that this particular moment 3-1 2 lines of source text not declassi ed However the President did speculate as to whether if the 280 mm guns and the Honest John rockets were introduced along with other weapons the fact of their introduction would ever be observed by the Communists or the Armistice Commission Admiral Radford pointed out at once that it was necessary to report each item of replacement which was why he had felt that some of the military items which the State Department had felt it would be appropriate to introduce would leave the impression of being as great a violation as the two items questioned by the State Department Secretary Dulles observed that public reactions are not always based on the pure logic of the situation Whatever the logic the fact was that we would get a hell of a repercussion around the world if we gave our forces the 280 mm gun and the Honest John rocket He again repeated that he had made every e ort to accommodate himself to the position of the Department of Defense In fact in the course of his brie ngs in the State Department in preparation for this meeting he had argued Page 426 vigorously in favor of the Defense Department position but in the last analysis he had failed to convince himself that these two items should be included Secretary Robertson inquired of Secretary Dulles what further evidence the latter thought would be required in order to convince our friends and allies of the large-scale Communist violation of the Armistice terms Secretary Dulles doubted if any further evidence would so convince them and repeated that the State Department was still rmly of the opinion that the changes in the weapons for our forces in Korea should be made as an interpretation of the terms of the Armistice rather than being based on a breach of the Armistice terms Perhaps it was true that we could not induce Rhee to approve our package military programs and reduce his active divisions unless these two disputed weapons were included This however was no reason to go along with Rhee because essentially Rhee wanted to see the Armistice Agreement completely destroyed Secretary Dulles added that the position he was taking today on this dispute was not to be interpreted to indicate that we could not perhaps in a year or two nd it possible to add the 280 mm guns and the Honest John rockets to our modernization program for the U S forces in Korea Mr Cutler turned to the President and said that the President seemed to agree with the Secretary of State The President replied in the a rmative 5 lines of source text not declassi ed There was a job of education to be done and he accordingly doubted the wisdom of agreeing with the proposed action of the Department of Defense He therefore suggested that Council action on this paper be held in abeyance until we could talk this issue over with some of our reliable allies particularly our NATO allies Admiral Radford pointed out to the President 2 lines of source text not declassi ed The President replied that even so we still needed our alliances and we must therefore move cautiously It would be better if Secretary Dulles and Mr Allen Dulles and Admiral Radford discussed this matter with the Standing Group of NATO 10 Admiral Radford repeated his view that the publicly available facts on Communist violations of paragraph 13 d of the Armistice Agreement were just as e ective 1-1 2 lines of source text not declassi ed He said however that there was a meeting of the Military Committee of NATO next Saturday 11 and an approach to the problem might be made at that time Secretary Dulles added that he would feel much more secure if even one solid ally like Great Britain could be brought to see Page 427 this matter as we saw it and agree on the wisdom of introducing the 280 mm gun and the Honest John rocket The National Security Council 12 a Noted and discussed the draft statement on policy on the subject contained in NSC 5702 1 prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No 1660-b in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Sta transmitted by the reference memorandum of April 2 1957 b Deferred action on NSC 5702 1 pending consultation with selected allies particularly NATO allies by the Departments of State and Defense Note The action in b above as approved by the President subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate action 6 Reimbursement for U S Logistic Support of Other UN Forces in Korea NSC Action No 85813 The National Security Council 14 Noted and concurred in the view that the request for legislation required to carry out the policy on the subject in the reference NSC Action should be postponed until the next session of Congress S Everett Gleason 1 Source Eisenhower Library Whitman File NSC Records Top Secret Eyes Only Drafted by Gleason on April 5 2 See Document 204 3 The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No 1694 approved by the President on April 8 Department of State S S-NSC Miscellaneous Files Lot 66 D 95 Records of Action by the National Security Council 4 See footnote 1 Document 199 5 See footnote 1 Document 210 6 Brackets in the source text 7 Presumably the list attached to Document 209 8 Acting Secretary of Defense Reuben B Robertson 9 John A Hannah President of Michigan State University and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel 1953-1954 10 The Standing Group of NATO consisted of the United States United Kingdom and France The Standing Group was the executive agency for NATO responsible for strategic guidance in areas in which NATO forces operated 11 April 6 12 Paragraphs a-b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No 1695 approved by President Eisenhower on April 4 Department of State S S-NSC Miscellaneous Files Lot 66 D 95 Records of Action by the National Security Council 13 NSC Action No 858 which outlined the conclusions relating to Additional United Nations Forces for Korea reached by the NSC on July 23 1953 is printed in Foreign Relations 1952-1954 vol XV Part 2 p 1425 14 The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No 1696 approved by President Eisenhower on April 8 Department of State S S-NSC Miscellaneous Files Lot 66 D 95 Records of Action by the National Security Council This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu