- - 1 ' i · MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HO USE WASHINGTON TOP GECRET SENSIT 'lElEXES ON§Y MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PARTICIPANTS Dr Henry A Kissinger Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs at beginning Mr Patrick Nairne UK Ministry of Defense Dr James R Schlesinger Chairman U S Atomic nergy Commission Maj or General Alexander M Haig Jr Deputy · Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs · Colonel Duff Aide to Schlesinger eter W · Rod man NSC Staff · ' - DA TE AND TIME Thursday August 10 1972 3 35 - 4 15_ p m PLACE Situation Room The White House Dr Kissinger This is Jim Schlesinger in whom we have total confidence I've told him to give you a theoretical idea of what the possibilities are Poseidon with or without a bus or Super Antelope with o·r without reservatio ns And to give you the costs And a little later we will make policy decision a All communication on this shall be confined to General Haig or myself Nairne I understand Dr Kissinger Any communication to Jim shall be through us it should go through us · Nairne Thl s is most helpful to us Dr Kissinger Thank you Jim I appreciate i Dr Kissinger leaves at 3 40 p m ·2 TOP S §CRET SENSITIV 2 - QYES ONLY · Dr Schlesinger As we see it in addition to the possibiHty of providing a £1 111 Pose_idon system -- which you see the_ s-ensitivity of -- there are other possibilities which may be worth ontemplating Number one Th easiest pos ibility is full support on Super Antelope As you are aware we can answer questions and act as technical support We have in the past answered with some reserve But we can g ve full support $200 million is our e-stimate You have an estimate of $100 million but that is somewhat low There are many things we can do _to assist with respect to hardening penetration and dispersal putting three heads on a Polaris · · Nairne This would be a possible direction which would go in the di r ection of hardening and dispersal beyond what s already -- _very helpful - · as sis tan c e · · ' ' J' fi ' f Jji J 'j½ • ·· · ' ' ' i •·· • Dr Schlesinger We would have to ·provide information on our estimate of the Soviet ABM capability and the degree f hardness required of the wa_rheads Our estimate is that the warheads would have to be harder than you can presently achieve and we would p_r_oyide assistance - • ' •• • # •• •••• 0 •• 0 R• - • The second possibility -- thi -is an inte_rni diate o0 e -- is to provide the design of the Poseidon RV and for the hard ning of the shell This is for the UK to manufacture themselves ·0ur estimate is that five RV 1 s could be put on a Polaris A 3-T 'J here is a little problem with the configuration We can't give you a refined estimate but we trunk five RV' s Your ability to penetrate the Soviet ABM would be conside ably enhanced You would have to increase the dispersal but it would not involve provision of the Poseidon bus or bus technology - · Nairne Let me be sure I understand singer 1 s last ·three sentences He then 1 ep ats ·verbatim Schle- Dr · Schlesinger· That would enhance the price the Soviets would be forced to pay with ABM ir - ·erceptors to _intercept such a hypotheticai attack A third possibility is We have the ULMS-1 missile in development which -- as soon as money is appropriated -- could be back fitted into Poseidon boats We could prqvide technical information and assistance with regar·d to your conversion of Polaris boats to Poseidon boats and sell you the ' QP 8ECRJ T SEH8ITIVE § -Y g 8 ONLX 3 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY Poseidon or ULMS 1 missile - ULMS would be the m re attractive -- and provide the Poseidon-design RV 1 s a 's specified under ption· 2 Namely the shell and design with you to manufacture it yourselves and we ·to work with you · · · Again we think this would substantially enha ce th price the So iets would · be forced to pay with their Galosi ABM interceptors Nairne · This is to convert Polaris to Trident or Poseidon· boats Dr Schiesinger No not the Trident submarine But the Poseidon-C boat can take either a Poseidon C-3 or C-4 missile or an ULMS missile · • · Nairne It includes the sale of non-nuclear components - · • ·- · - • · • • Dr Schlesinger Yes ' tt ' 'li t' i il j Nairne In p incipl - ith res - t -t · the n vis It' you have done in relation to the Polaris A-3 · · · Y _ · · - w- ld be the same as __ ·•-' ' · Dr Schlesinger Exactly Essentially all the _technoiogy with the exception · · · · · '' ·- · Of the bus ·· We ve costed out these possibilities Given _U S analogues we estimate that the cost at· $480 million to convert to Poseidon using the Poseidon missile without the bus Some years ago the figure· of $500 nillion was used in public and this is a similar figure 1 The Trident system would cost more To use ULMS-1 the cost in excess if $40-50 millio·n higher ove the cost of the -3 Nairne You are broadly thinking of a bracket depending on whether we use the C-3 or C-4 of $480-$600 million Dr Schlesinger If your shipyards are more efficient than ours that may be the low end The figure we normally use is $28-30 million per conversion But this is based on prior U S -procurement requirements The estimate with respect to the introduction· of the Poseidon RV on Polaris Option 2 is dif icult to make it would be a little intermediate About $150$175 million It would require additional developme nt to increase dispersal we don 1t have this technology in hand A small development effort would he iJJyolyeg_ _ QP SECflE SENSITIVE EYIQS Ql' LY' ' ' - - TOP SEGRET 8E'£ t8ITIVE EYES ONLY 4 It would save you the _ But it is probably cheap·er than the Super Antelope cost of warhead development f ight testing etc ·· Nairne I took notes Can you give me this in writing Dr Schlesinger Al OK General Haig Yes • Nairne I'm not a technical' man • General Haig The estimates are not refined _ • • • • • • • • l ••' • • •• Colonel Du ff Super Antelope· in ol ·- ome new R D which will be needed • t ·- 6 t a - f s- i -'t - r·s and what · Dr Schle inger We wo uld is involved For example in putting the Posei9-on RV on Polaris you also have to change the dispersal pattern to insure thc1 t the UK effort would in fact extract a high price in terms of So_viet ABM interceptors • - Nairne I have some questions · I don 1 t have a precise breakdown of the figures of our program K8793 But you think ·the· enhanced support in_ Option 1 would double th cost of the progra · Dr Schlesinger U S assistance would sav·e you some 'money but you may be presently underestimating the cost because new developments are involved Nairne Is this something youtve ever dis_cussed with us before Option l Dr Schlesinger We have not Our assis tanc·e has been in the form of answer ing questions and saying whether you're on the right or wrong track It 1 s been negative assistance •ut we 1 ve never given you positive assistance What w contemplate in Option 1 is to provide complete support Nairne One of the problems exercising us is as Sir Burke Trend told Dr Kissinger the o her day our Ministers might make a decision to carry forward with Super Antelope equally they might like to keep the options open in the light of the political _considerations thp t Dr Kissinger was spelling out The efore it woulc t be g od to minimize the commitments in ''f OP SECRET S WN ITJ YEiR JE8 ONLX _ 5 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY going ahead with Super Antelope but also to keep the momentum going We would like to discuss this with you through Herman Bondy Dr Schlesinger The alternatives are not necessarily exclusive It is possible to contemplate that the U S Governm·ent would be prepared to go ahead with affirmative discussion with you on Super Antelope which could enable you to make progress without any outlays on·your part keeping open the possibility of othe_ programs Nairne · Since Sir Burke Trend returned ·we have been giving thought to the Poseidon-ULMS option less the bus bur experts are far from_ sure whether there is a viable option relating to the Poseidon missile or the front end minus· the bus The helpful way you've summarized the options implies to me as layman _ that it might make sense - _ · - - - · - -· - ·_ - - - _ -- · i lt ' i f· i ·• it y a f · - - - - Are the options based on yom own view th t from the t chnical point of view there is a viable option · - - · · · · ·-' J -- _ · ·· · ·-' - -· · ·_ -_ -- - · · _- · · t rff _ ' __ _ Dr Schlesinger Yes indeed We -would have to do some careful work on that particularly in the case of putting the Mark ID on the Poiaris · which we have not done· ourselves But we believe it i a viable option and would do further ·investiga·ting and would discuss it with you The words I 1 sed before w_ere carefully ·chosen Such a capability would provide British boats with an enhanced much enhanced ca_pability of penetrating the Soviet ABM defense · _ ··· •p • •• There has been as you are aware much discussion of the possibility of the Soviets upgrading their SAM1 s to an·ABM role The Poseidon RV being a beta RV can g_o past any upgraded SA The Polaris A-3-RV could be · vulne i -able · · · Nairne Yes I find it difficult to speculate on the possibility of the Soviets 1 doing just that The possibility is clearly there What would be the factors · which would lead them to do that Dr Schlesinger Given the nature of the SALT agreement the constraints are there for example on radars assuming they scrupulously abide by the agreement · Nairne You judge it would be possible to provide design information about the warheads and in fact sell us non-nuclear components exactly on the basis you were able to do with Polaris · · ' f'QF QEGRE T SE'E' SITIYE EYES Q JLX -6 • TOP SEGRET SENSITPlE EYES ONLY Dr Schlesinger Yes Of course· it involves a major savings especially with respect to Super Antelope you Nairpe All our discussion this afternoon ·is on the likely basis that in • SALT II there wi l be overriding objections to - he· transfer o the bus · Dr Schlesinger T i ier e c uld_ be constr ints That is a possibility·-without prejudging what American Government might do Nairne You _have been mo_st helpful SJ Nl·TJ ZED Dr ·schle singer r Ste 2 ei · 1 1 ·There i9 ·one other ppin Pr viding Mark in other · than the design it wa developed for -- that is for the bus -- may have to involv_ _spr n e_ sl gh-1 a_d qi ti ona1_ wpr_k on that_ RV which we ould dis uss ·sm ll cha nge and a relativ ly ea sy- change from · the pr esent c·onfiguration · · _ ·-· · - · r · f t· ti 1il- · _ _ · _i - - - - i - f _ _ · _ ·· · · - · Nairne · To Haig With respe t__to' follcrw up _·we t mder·stand that this is to be done through Dr Kissinger _or ·you but to Schlesinger Pm sure we would want our technical people to come to talk to yourselves For example Bondy • - · •· · ' -· · Dr ·schiesinger Bondy has a· wide-a qu intanceship in U S Government • But he sh ll foll-ow the· same proc_edur s as·_ y u through Dr Kissinger· General Haig We'll capsulize what we 1 ve put-out here ·It will take a half 'hour We'li _have it £or you by 5 30 Dr Schlesinp er We would want to add a few tJungs We'll do it here - Nairne The status of'the pr posal I will tell the Prime Minister is these options you have been kind enough to provide with -regard to enabling us to maintain effective strategic deterrent The options stated verbally during the meeting_ by Dr Schles nger were then reduced to pap r in somewhat rearranged order The paper is at Tab A OP $EQR f' f SENSI-TIVE 12YlfS ONL'i Modernization Possibilities Option I Unequivocal ·support of the Super Antelope Program This implies straightforward assi tance in accomplishm ent of hardening penetration and RV dispersal Nonetheless total R D costs not previously- included in Supe Antelope c st e_stimates could be in the range of $200 million Option 2 Modify the Polaris -reentry system by adapting it to accept 5 Poseidon reentry vehicles through achieving This should enhance penetration capab lity a higher degree of dispersal include a Poseidon bus or bus technology However it would not T he approximate cost of this option could range from $150 to $175_ million Option 3 Sare of Poseidon missile with MIRV bus Poseidon RVs and without a Th is would enhance penetrability against ABM defenses The cost estimate £or this option is approximately $500-550 million Option 4 ·- Acquisition of ULMS-1 with Poseidon bus flexibility and added range This would provide The costs in this case are estimated to be approximately $550-600 million ' - •· 2 In Options 2 3 and 4 the warhead design_and nonnuclear components would be obtained ext rnally be internal Warhead manufacture would Submarine modification ·designs and associated downstage missiles and navigation and fire control systems would be obtained externally • faff1 1 • '· ·•·· 1'l u f oq i '4t 'fT P ·•frt Jf '·