J 7 TOf SEG ETI '-------- b 1 ROUllNG TO NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS 1 2 3 b 3 EO 12958 1 4 b 25Yrs EO 12958 1 4 c 25Yrs EO 12958 1 4 d 25Yrs EO 129581 4 e 25Yrs EO 129583 S c -· 111111111111 4 CfAcrc- 5 6 CONIROl 111111111111 N W 5 -tfjtJ1-ft J1t 7 COPY 1 _1_ OF__ 8 111111111111 9 10 REMARKS FROM NAME ADDRESS AND PHONE NO -- APPROVED FOR RELEASED DATE 25-April-2012 I DATE NATIONALSE FORMATION lhorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanelions W8FNNOTFillIDINTIDSC-0VffiSHEfilIBUNcus D - ' _ - - · ·t·· i -t - ' l '·lf 1• t •· • •· •i ' - - ·1 $ f ·· -- r· • r· · • t - - -- - · - • ••- ii - · - • •• • k' • 0 -· • • ·co5416972 '· • • • • -I' - · · · - - - ' _ C05416972 Sf S l i H £ 1 - - - - - - - - - 11 September The Plot and the Plotters CUJ Scape Note IU Our knowledge of the 11 September plot-is still increasing and evolving-this paper does not represent all we will ever know about the attacks Information in this paper is current through May 2003 I I The judgments in this assessment are drawn from analysis of a variety of sources e have included all information we deemed credible but frequently were forced to rel on uncorroborated or sin le-source re orting for some of the judgments - --- ---- ---- -- -- ----c - --- - --- ---- --- ---- -' provided a great deal of information on the activities of the hijackers abroad as we11 as details on how the plot came together and who was involved The information on the activities of the hi ackers within the United States is from the FBI INS Customs and the FAA This publication focuses on the events leading to _the 11 September attacks and the actual participants in the attacks Since 11 September 2001 we have identified the 19 individuals who carried out the attacks Zacarias Moussaoui who is the subject of a US criminal investigation-and others who may have been involved have not been included in this publicatio I Note on our use of names Because of the Jength and complexity of Middle Eastern names we tend to use abbreviated versicms of the name of the l9 hijackers throughout this assessment The fuller and formally correct names are captured in the individual data sheets in appendix B It is common for individuals with Arabic names to have four or more parts to their name to distinguish between father and son or brothers with similar multiple-name constructs U Individuals and places pictured on the front cover Left side first photo Photos of hi ackers Hani Hanjur and Majid 'Awfi a k a Majid MuqidJ I_ _ ____ j left side second photo Hijacker 'Abd al-Aziz al-Umari Left side third photo Hijackersfrom United Airlines flight 175 Left side fourth photo _Hijacker Ahmad al-Haznawi as portrayed in a testimonial Pideo left side fifth photo ffijacker-pilot Ziad Jarra I Left side sixth photo Photos of hijackers Muhammad Atta and 'Abd al-Aziz al-Umari as they pass through the Portland International Mainre _J _et p_or_t _ _ _-- Mid page center Hija ·ker-pilot Muhammad Atta This research paper was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed t I I ------ C05416972 Contents Page Scope Note CU iii The 11 September Plot The Evolution of the Attacks £UJ 1 r Appendixes A 8 C The 11 September Hijackers Diverse Paths to Terrorism • I 19 Hijackers' Profiles CUJ 31 Timelines Ul 53 Other Publications on the 11 September Attacks CU 61 p CO 5 4_169 7 2J if - 1 w• 1_ ••• ' Ji '· -- • •T · '8• _ L-----------' • • •• • • • • • • • • •• • • •• • • • The 11 Sep tember-2001 Plot The Evolution of_ the Attacks CU - · • · j • •• •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• •• •• •• • • ·•_ C05416972 -----------' The 11 September 2001 Plot The Evolution of the Attacks UI The plot to attack the United States on 11 September 2001 evolved over a period of several years and its roots go back even further to the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 An inv tigation of the 11 September attacks has revealed that one of its chief planners Khalid Shaykh Muhammad is not only the uncle of Ramzi Yousef-the mastennind of the 1993 plot-but also provided funds training and other support to the conspirators of the bombing in 1993 Key Findings Ul I I The idea for the attacks reportedly received Usarna Bin Ladin 's approval in 1998 after which al-Qa'ida leaders began to select the young men who would carry them out • Three of the four pilots-Muhammad Atta Marwan a1-Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah-were apparently recruited for the plot from Germany where they had come to study from Egypt the United Arab Emirates UAE and Lebanon A network of al-Qa'ida associates in Hamburg supported their efforts • 1 vo of the hijackers- --Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar-had been active in al-Qa'ida circles since the mid-199Os had fought with other jihadists in three countries and arrived in the United States well before any of the other hijackers Khalid left the country after they briefly attempted flight training in the United States in 2000 Nawaf remained in the United States serving-as second in command for the plot • The fourth pilot-Hani Hanjur-and the remaining hijackers with the exception of UAE citizen Fayiz Banihammad were Saudis They largely appear to have been radicalized by contacts at universities religious camps and mosques in the late 199Os and were probably brought into the plot in the latter half of 2000 • I The plot was launched in earnest in late 1999 when the three Hamburg-based · pilots traveled to Afghanistan and al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar coordinated their travel to Malaysia after which they entered the United States The Hamburg pilots came to the United States in late May and June 2000 spending the rest of the year in flight training in Florida Hanjur entered the United States in late 2000 and paired up with al-Hazmi in Arizona to continue the flight training he had intermittently pursued in the United States since 1996 The supponing hiiackers began entering the United States in· late April 2001 I -· t- •• C05416972 T -- Although the 11 September plotters made mistalces and ran into a number of obstacles they were able to carry out the hijackings because of several facmrs • Shrewd selection of operatives With the exception of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar the men sent into the United States were clean and had no trouble entering the country The four pilots also had the advantage of years of experience in Western countries where they became familiar with banking communication · and travel practices • Relatively safe operating environment The planners of the I t September attacks evidently felt comfortable enough with their assessment of US society-open mobile and diverse-that they could leave crucial operatives in place for more than a year without fear of discovery • Flexibility and mission focus Conspirators who either failed to qualify _as pilots or to enter the United States assumed new roles in the plot while other operatives were found to fulfill their original roles • Well-coached and coordinated financial operations The financial transactions that facilitated the l l September operation reflected al-Qa'ida•s long experience in moving funds unobtrusivelyj I In spite of increased security consciousness and regulations since fall 2001 a Qa 'ida could still duplicate certain aspects of the 11 September plot given the extreme difficulty of identifying suspicious individuals financial transactions or communications in a country and economy as large and diverse as the United States The hijackers' ability to operate unnoticed inside the United States for more than a year in some cases may even have convinced al-Qa'ida leaders that using operatives to carry out future attacks in the United States even in an atmosphere of heightened vigilance is a risk well worth aking J J Ji' - ·· · C05416972 Contents The Evolution ·ot the Attacks lUJ Page Key Findings CU Early Conceptual Roots 1 5 5 The Plot Takes Shape 5 Development of the 11 September Attacks CU Executioners of the Plot Ul 6 Two al-Qa'ida Veterans 6 The Hamburg Network 6 Young Saudis Gravitate Toward al-Qa'ida 7 Exploitation of Afghan Camps I I 8 Travel Patterns Lead to Afghanistan 8 Crucial Planning Meetings g Preparations for the Mission CU 9 New Passports Cover Tracks 9 First Group of Saudis Arrive in the United States 10 Pilot Training - 10 2001 The Plot Gathers Steam I Fourth Pilot Arrives Pilots Travel Abroad Second Wave Arrives Hiding in Plain View Final Preparations I Keys to Success CUJ 12 12 12 12 14 14 15· Shrewd Selection of Operatives 15 Relatively Safe Operating Environment 15 Flexibility and Mission Focus 16 16 18 Well-Coached and Coordinated Finance Continuing Collection and Analytic Efforts Ul C05416972 •• The 11 September 2001 Plot The Evolution of che Attacks UJ Development of the 11 September Attacks UJ • That August Bin Ladin issued a declaration of war against the United States calling on his supporters to begin a gueniUa campaign that would drive US forces out of the Saudi Arabian peninsutal - - Early Concept uul Roots The 11 September attack was a sophisticated plot that was probably in the planning stages for more than two years and carried out by a group of 19 committed individuals as well as an extensive network of largely· unwitting supporters and facilitators r · • In an interview for al-Jazirah television aired on 8 September 2002 high-ranking al-Qa'ida member Khalid Shaykh Muhammad KSM said that the attacks were planned during a three-year period a study of possible targets began at tlle same time al-Qa'ida prepared for the US Embassy bombing operation in 1998 in Africai I We believe tllat a common thread runs between tlle first attack on the World Trade Center in february I993 and the attacks on I I September 2001 I amed KSM as eithe the mastennind or one of the key planners of the 1t September operation KSM the uncle of Ramzi Yousef who masterminded the 1993 bombing plot against the World Trade Center provided financial and logistic support for the 1993 operation I The Plot Takes Shape As Bin Ladin's determination to strike America at home increased in 1998 th ideas about destroyinj commercial airliners were revived I S' -M p-ro-p-os-ed t o Bin Ladin that small aircraft packed with explosives target the World Trade Center Bin Ladin reportedly suggested using even larger planes saying why use an axe-if you can use a bu1ldozer • In an interview for al-Jazirah television KSM said that he had come up with the proposal that a martyrdom operation in the United States should tar et rominent buildin s reconniussance team'' traveled to the United States during 1998-99 to look at potential targets The original list reportedly included thirty targers 1 but al-Qa'ida's leadership and military committee narrowed down the list leaving other tar ets for future o rations After this me the selection of o erauves or t e attac s - -- c---- -- --' • Following the 1993 attack Yousef and KSM plotted in 1995 to blow up 12 US planes flying East Asian SM claimed that al-Qa•ida routes-for which KSM was indicted in 1996-and -co-ns id e-re-d s-tr ik i ng-'· nuclear facilities'· but shelved to fly a plane into CIA headquarters Philippine the idea for fear that it could o out of control authorities uncovered the plot and Yousef was later arrested in Pakistan but KSM escapedi I KSM was not the only al-Qa'ida figure to consider destroying commercial aircraft in the mid-1990s In 1996 Usama Bin Ladin's second in command Muhammad 'Atif a k a Abu Hafs drew up a study on the feasibility of hijacking US planes and destroying them in flight possibly influenced by Yousef's and KSM's unrealized plans C05416972 · _ Figure 1 The Hijackers and Their Flights CUI Flight Name Target that would have brought them to the attention of authorities in the West The hijackers were also chosen on the basis of nationa ity so that they would not have trouble obtaining US visas World Trade Center -·· • Marwan al-Shebhi - - Ahmadal-Gh WoridToide Center SM who on the basis of his own experience in living in the United States shared insights on how to behave unobtrusively I I -1Q · _ Hamzaal- i Two af Qa'ida Veterans ·· i i ···· Fayiz Banibamn'iad Of alt the hijackers chosen Saudis Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar had the most established extremist credentials They first came into the al-Qa'ida orbit as early as the mid-1990s r Muhannadal-SWmtl HamHanjur Pentagon · _ Na waf al-Hazrni --• Salim al l amu _ _ ' Khalid Mihdbar · · ·r - Majid M d Crashed in Pennsylvania nable to come to an '-- a-gE1 - ee m -en t' o n - w - hc e thc e r n uc ear targets shou d be considered because nuclear targets would be very difficult to hit Airspace around them was typically restricted making reconnaissance overflights impossible and increasing the possibility that they would be shot down before reaching their target Executiuners of the Plot UJ awaf al-Bazmi and Khalid al-Mindhar were two of tl e first hijackers selected by Bin Ladin to be Dart of the attacks on the United States l tif deliberately chose the se_c_o-nd·w-av-e 'h ijackers from among young · Arab men who had no previous terrorist activities • A1-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi oined other militants to fi ht in Bosnia 1-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi then traveled to Afghanistan and by the late 1990s were committed al-Qa'ida fighter I The Hamburg Network Muhammad Atta Marwan al-Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah-who would go on to play a pivotal role in the 11 September conspiracy-emerged from a group of young Muslim men in Hamburg Gennany that had come together by late 1998 Although the members of this group came from different countries and backgrounds they attended the same mosques shared common acquaintance and were drawn together by their increasingly extreme fslamist views and disenchantment with the West • Muhammad Atta an Egyptian who would later serve as the senior coordinator of the plot inside the United States and pilot the first plane into the World Trade Center arrived in Hamburg in 1992 He enrolled at Hamburg-HarburgTechnical University in an architecture-planning program from which ·he eventually received the German equh'alent of a master's degree · • Hijacker-pilot Marwan al-Shehhi came to Gennany from the United Arab Emirates UAE in April I996 on a UAE military scholarship Al-Shehhi moved C05416972 -----• •• to Hamburg in 199 lled at the university where Atta studiedL__J • Atta and Bin al-Shibh also reportedly traveled within Gennany_ to talk to other students about religion and politics I I Atta and al Shehhi probably knew each other before that at least by mid 1998 They shared a common acquaintance with Mounir Motassa eq a Moroccan living in Hamburg convicted of complicity in the plot in February 2003 by Gennan authorities • In January 2000 Al Shehhi moved into the 54 Marianstrasse apanment that Atta and two others had rented in late 1998-a loc on that ayears to · be central to the planning of the liJperation I Ziad Jairah traveled from his home in Lebanon to Germany study in 1996 initially attempting to enter medical school in Greif wald In August Jarrah moved to Hamburg where he began studies in aircraft construction at Hamburg's School of Applied Sciences to • He never lived at the 54 Marianstrasse apartment however he had begun to associate with key associates of Atta and al Shehhi by at least the summer of 1998 I I Other individuals who would later figure in the 11 September plot were also in Hamburg by the late 1990s Motassadeq who helped the hijackers move some of the money needed to finance the plot arrived in 1995 as did Sa'id Bahaj and Ramzi Bin al-Shibh who became Atta's roommates in November 1998 I I Young Saudis Gravitate Toward al Qa'ida Thirteen of the remaining fourteen hijackers chosen came from southwest Saudi Arabia five from the Asir Province on Saudi Arabia's ·porous border with Yemen four from neighboring Al Bahah and four from the Makkah Province These young Saudi men who made up the majority of the 11 September hijackers were a diverse group some struggled with depression or alcohol abuse a few had higher education and others little and their families came from different pans of the socioeconomic spectrum • This group was most likely recruited in local mosques or universities which several of them attended Most of them began procuring new passports and US visas during the fall of 2000 suggesting thr they recruited after the first five hijackers · wer Saudi Hani Hanjur is similar to the other young Saudi hijackers in some ways yet stands out because of his prolonged and frequent presence in the United States before 11 September and his position in the operation as a pilot • The individual described Atta as the Jeader of the group which reportedly regarded Jews and Americans as ''the enemy and met in small groups I to discuss Islamic principlel I • Against the wishes of his family in 1991 Hanjur traveled to the United States to study English He returned to Saudi Arabia four and a-half months later Hanjur returned to the United States in April 1996 and again in November 1997 I I· Exploitation of Afghan CampsLJ Travel Patterns Lead to Afghanistan I 19 of the hijackers spent time in al-Qa'ida training camps in Afghanistan during late 1999-2001 ________________ the hijackers traveled through one or more other countries before entering Af g anistan to disguise their destination Several appear to have traveled to Afghanistan more than once and except for the pilots ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - were there for visits of several months• duration • Bin al-Shibh was the last of the four to travel to Af hanistan • Hijackers Majid Muqid a k a Majid 'Awfi and · Othman al-Suqami a k a Satam al-Su ami were in M hanistan least twice en ma- 1 Jome and Jarrah at Bin Ladin•s military eamp near the Kandahar airport he learned that they had already met witlt and pledged bayat to Bin Ladin at I I - --------- '---------' Atta may have traveled to Afghanistan for the first time in early 1998 when he told his roommate he was gone for two months on a pilgrimage I oung Saudis jail-of them were present in At hanistan at some pomt in late 2000 or early 2001 by the spring of 2001 the most1y Saudi support hijackers were training in Afghanistan They reportedly knew they were training for a martyrdom operation but did not know the details In late 1999 Atta al-Shehhi Jarrah and Bin al-Shibh all traveled to Afghanistan separately e p anners eptember attac s screene possible ·C05416972 •· n · participants for their psycho1ogical fitness for such an operation • According to an al-Jaziera interview Bin Ladin I personally met with and assessed each hijacker I I -•ial PlannlnQ Meet As they left Afghanistan Atta and Bin al-Shibh I Atta- met with senior al-Qa'ida leaders in Kandahar met' on at least three occasions with KSM -- ------ ' - - - · Afghanistan during Ramadan in December 1999 Atta reportedly met during this periotl with Bin Ladin more than once and met eypeatedly with his lieutenant '- ------- --- ---- --'J_ate 'Atif as details of the plot were being worked out • In their Karachi meetings KSM briefed Atta ·on the habits of Americans and presumably on how to avoid the scrutiny of American authorities • 'Thwfiq Bin Attash a k a Khallad a key planner of the 2000 attack on the USS Cole was also in Kandahar at this tim I Preparations far the Mission IUJ I - New Passports Cover Tracks When they left Afghanistan the future pilots • All available information suggests that following the Ramadan meetings in Afghanistan Atta had immediately began to prepare for their mission no more direct connections to the al-Qa•ida senior al-Shehhi Jarrah and Bin al-Shibh to clean their leadership and that information was passed to and instructions received frorn them via intermediaries passports of Pakistani visas before applying for a US I I I po• lhok I RWm 1oGennany they' ' drek I In subsequent meetings Bin Ladin selected targets for the l l September anacks and five candidates for pilot trainin 1 • As a result of the Kandahar meetings the five designated pilots at that time were Atta Jarrah al-Shehbi Nawaf al-Hazmi and Bin al-Shibh I I • Al-Shehhi obtained a new passport in the UAE on 2 January 2000 reporting his old-one lostj ' - - - - - - - - - - - ' nd on 18 January received a US visa from the US Consulate in Dubai I UAE • Jamili returned to Hamburg inLadm Atta a een c osen as the plot's senior coor ator and that ihey all would receive additional operational instructions from 'Atif I reported tluit his passport had been lost He received a visa from the US Embassy in Berlin on 25 May Los Angeles California and took up residency in San Diego I e used the name Muhammad Atta on this passport although on his previous passports he had used the name Muhammad al-Amir according to ap al-Jazirah interview of KSM On 18 May the US Embassy in Berlin issued him a US visa • In May 2000 Bin al-Shibh was denied a US visa In July 2000 during an interV' w at the US Embassy in Berlin Bin al-Shibh was told that since he had only been in Germany for two years he had insufficient connections lD assure his departure from the United Statesj I I Within several months of entering the United States the two inquired about flight training in Florida according to law enforcement information and court documents In May 2000 they took two flight familiarization trips from a school in San Di go however they never signed up for fonnal flight training similar to the course of instruction that the hijacker-pilots seemed to have taken Soon after these flights the two split u with al-Mihdhar leaving the country in June 2000 not to return for more than a year and al-Hazmi remaining ill San Diego for the rest of the year • AI-Hazmi did little that was operat onally significant Upon their return from Afghanistan in 2000 Atta al-Shehhi Jarrah and Bin al-Shibh began looking for flight schools in Europe and learned that European flight schools were very expensive and involved a very long training period They soon learned that flight schools in the United States were less expensive of shorter duration and not terribly rigorous and began looking for flight schools in the United States via the Internet • In March 2000 Atta sent e-mails to flight schools in for the rest of 2000 he eventually took a part-time job in a gas station from a local jihadist contact according to law enforcement information • Al-Hazmi remained in the San Diego area until December 2000 when he met up with Hanjur-the hijacker who later piloted American Airlines flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon-and the two paired up and moved to Phoenix Arizona where Hanjur brushed up or stayed current on his tlying skills I j Florida and Oklahoma asking about pilot training I I First Group of Saudis Arrive in the United States While the Hamburg pilots were wrapping up their business in Afghanistan and returning to Gennany halfway around the world in Malaysia the al-Qa'ida veterans Nawaf al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were also preparing to come to the United States After receiving US visas in April both men had traveled · n and f ce'ved s cia trai · in the • Al-l lazmi and al-Mihdharentered the United States on 15 January 2000 from Bangkok Thailand via Hong Kong They entered the United States through ·Pilot Training Al-Shehhi Atta and Jarrah entered the United States in May and June 2000 from three different European cities On 29 May al-Shehhi flew from Brussels to Newark Atta traveled by bus to Prague entering the city on 2 June 2000 and flew to Newark the next day Jarrah flew from Dusseldorf to Newark and then on to Venice Florida on 27 Junei I The three Hamburg pilots spent the latter half of 2000 Ieaming to fly in Florida After briefly touring the Airman Flight School in Oklahoma in early July 2000 Ana and al-Shehhi trained at Huffman Aviation with a brief unsuccessful stint at nearby Jones Aviation while Jarrah enroUed alone at the Florida Flight Training Center It appears however that Jarrah was also to have had a Hamburg partner in Florida C05416972 ··' · T ---- Southeast Asia Meetings Advance I al-Oa lda Operations In early January 2000 al-Mihdhar and al•Hazmi met in Kuala Lumpur with USS Cole suspect Tawfiq bin al-Attash a k a Khallad I I • The Kuala Lumpur meetings were held in an -apanment belonging to Malaysian extremist Yazid Sufaatl · I • Iraqi national and suspected al-Qa'ida operative Ahmad Hilanat Shakit al-Azzawi'tllet iµ-Mihdhar and possibly others at the airport where he had served as a ground staff employee assisting Arab travelers since 19991 I I On 8January a1-Mihdhar al-Hazmi andKhallad traveled to Bangkok Thailand AI-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi stayed in Bangkok until they left for Los Angeles on is January We have no reporting on what -Mihdhar and al•Hazmi did during tbeir stay in Bangkok • According to FBI deb iefings of arrested USS Cole bombing suspect Fahd al-Quso while in Bangkok Khallad met with him and fellow USS Cole suspect Ibrahim al-Nibras Al-Quso and al-Nibras had arrived from Yemen apparently to give Khallad $36 000 By al-Quso's account he and al-Nibras did not meet al-Mihdhar or al-Hazmi and left Bangkok on 18 January - I I There has been some speculation that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi may have been involved in the preparation of a separate terr9rist operation on US soil in 2000 before they became involved in the 11 September operation • The January 2000 meetings followed the failed millennium attacks in the Unite States and Jordan and the aborted attack on the USS The Sullivans in Yeme I C05416972 • 01RE'f1l -------- • Bin al-Shibh sent a deposit to the Florida Flight Training Center but failed on multiple occasions in 2000 to obtain a US visa Zakaria Essabar a member of the Hamburg cell and key associate of pilots Atta al-Shehhi and Jarrah also tried and failed lo obtain a visa in January 2001 He too was trying to reach Florida and even made a reservation at a Miami hotel before his visa application was rejected Neither was turned down because he was believed to be a terrorist but rather for fear he would not leave the United States after his visa expired I Atta and al-Shehhi remained paired up during early 2001 settling for a time in Georgia where they practiced their flying skills and traveled twice-in February and early April-to the Norfolk-Virginia Beach area for an undetermined reason • Once they had settled in Florida and opened a joint bank account Atta and at-Shehhi began receiving substantial funds-more than $100 000-to pay for their training and living expenses These funds originated in the UAE-a key financial hub for the operation-and came into the United States either directly from the UAE or were funneled through Atta•s and al-Shehhi's Hamburg associates Bin a1-Shibh and Motassad_eqj j 2001 The Plot Gathe Stea -- Fourth Pilot Arrives As 2000 drew to a close the Hamburg pilots completed the crucial first stage of their mission they received their pilot licenses and gained experience on jet simulators At the same time Hanjur-who had already obtained a pilot license in April 1999entered the United States in early December paired up with Nawaf al-Hazmi and began jet training in Arizona • At the end of March 200 l the two drove cross country and eventua11y met up with other hijackers connected to 11 September I I Pil ts Travel Abroad AH three of the Hamburg pilots traveled outside the United States in 2001 and probably conducted the majority of the operational meetings with overseas operatives see appendix C for a timeJine of hijackers· travel outside the United States • On 3 January 200 I Atta flew from Tampa Florida to Berlin via Madrid Spain to meet with Bin al-Shibh Atta told Bin al-Shibh during this - · meeting that the three pilots had finished initial flight training obtained their pilot's licenses and were awaiting further instructions from Bin Ladin Atta asked Bin al-Shibh to travel to Afghanistan to receive these instructions On 10 January Atta returned to the United States flying from Madrid to Miami • Jarrah traveled extensively in the early part of 200 I for both· personal-visiting his wife in Gennanyas well as operational reasons Jarrah left the United States six times apparently spending most of his time outside the United States in Lebanon or Germany • Al-Shehhi also traveled outside the United States flying to the UAE Germany Morocco and Egypt on three different trips While it is known that al-Shehhi visited Atta' s father during his April 2001 trip to Egypt to collect Atta's international drive s license nothing else is known of al-Shehhi's activities whiJe traveling outside the United States I I Second Wave Arrives The second wave which would support the pilots on l l September began to enter the country in late April 2001 • After leaving Afghanistan these hijackers spent approximately a week in the UAE presumably 10 receive final instructions and funds before entering the United States through Florida Northern Virginia and New York City • These hijackers all arrived in the United States in pairs or groups of three either with members of their own flight team or members from another flight team j j · C05416972 TAP ·Alleged Travel to Pragu uei rnl ______________ I these visits is complicated and sometimes contradictory A CIA and FBI review of intelligence Although we cannot rule it out we ar e increasingly ·skeptical that Muhammad Atta met with Iraqi Intelligence Service IIS officer Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samiral-Ani in Prague in April 2001 We have received conflicting reports that allege that Atta traveled to Prague and met with al-Ani but we have not been able to verify or refute these claims - and open-source reporting leads us to question the information provided by the Czech service source that claimed that Atta met al-Ani j I D -• Vari pus reports put Atta in Prague -· at least four occasiof etween late 1994 and th ng f 2001 but we can confirm only two of lbese tnr-lll December 1994 and June 2000 Atta arrived at the Prague airport on 19 December 1994 checked into a transit hotel and departed the Czech Republic the next da We do not know the purpose of the I trip and have no infonnation about whom he met I • This may have been a leg on his travel to Syria According to press reporting Atta and a German student made a second research trip to Syria at the endof 1994 I Atta arrived in Prague by bus from Gennanv at 0615 local time on 2 June 2000l purchased an airline ticket f r cash I and departedlbePrai ne at 1140 hours on 3 June 2000 to Newark - l IAfta traveled to the United IU-Ani was away m Brno at least a YO-minute drive from Pra1 ue on 9 Annl 2001 States ttom Prague to conceal where his travel originated Atta stayed for one night only in a Prague hotel and left for the United States the next day without meeting with anyone I The other I I 19 Apn WI I fie uafa surrouncbng I C05416972 MP §rcn --------- Hiding in Plain View Final Pl'eparationsLJ The Saudi second wave hijackers spent Jess than five months in the United States before the l l September attacks During this time they kept a low profile and maintained a Westernized appearance-they had shaved off their beards before coming to the United States and wore Western dress--to fit into society They shared residences bank accounts and debit and credit cards The young Saudi hijackers settled in Florida and New Jersey and for the most part traveled liule during their time in the United States The majority lived with other members of their flight teams r · • The only ex ceptions were Ahmad al-Ghamdi and · •AJ d al-Aziz al-Umari who lived with American · Airlines flight 77 hijackers in New Jersey until midAugust when they moved down to Florida to join their flight teams • According to law enforcement data Suqami and Wa'il al-She ri tried to visit the Bahamas in May 2001 but were denied entry because they did not have the proper papers with them · • In late July Walid al-Shehri traveled first class to San Francisco I Beginning in mid-2001 the four pilot for the 11 September attacks and Nawaf al-Hazmi made six visits to Las Vegas Nevada possibly as dry-run flights from the East to the West Coa it on the same model of aircraft they would hijack on I 1 September These and other domestic airline travel also allowed the hijackers to study security procedures in a variety of US airports • The hijackers traveled to and from Las Vegasgenerally on connecting flights that sometimes included transcontinental legs-giving them a fiple opponunity to assess several key aspects of the hijack planj I tta traveled to_Ma_d_n d S-pru -n -o_n_8_J_u_ly_2_00_l_ H-e rented a car on 9 J ly while '1ill M 'dl • On 19 July 2001 Atta returned to Madrid and flew back to Atlanta then on to Fort Lauderdale I The last nonpilot hijacker to enter the country was al-Mihdhar who returned to the United States on 4 July 200 I after spending nearly a vear travelim between Yemen and Af hanistan • On 13 June al-Mihdhar obtuined a US visa in Jiddah He s nt the following month at the home of -- tat - m In a September 2002 interview with al-Jazirah television KSM and Bin al-Shibh said that in July 2001 Atta and Bin al-Shibh met in Spain to finalize the details of the operation agreeing that Atta would have control-over the final choice of targets and the timing of the attacks • During this trip Atta told Bin al-Shibh that the planning for the three targets was complete-Hanjur Pentagon Jarrah Congres ' and Atta and at hehhi World Trade Center Atta said the pilots had volunteered for their targets He also said that al-Hazmi and Hanjur had flown reconnaissance flights near the_ Pentagon I I United States • AJ-Mihdhar apparently knew at this point that he was embarking on a suicide mission before leaving Saudi Arabia on 3 July he aske I o look after his wife and daughter in I I The terms used were academic the Pentagon was the faculty of fine ans the World Trade Center was the faculty of architecture and the US Capitol-allegedly the target of Flight 93 that crashed in Pennsylvania- C05416972 t ' 4 - - - - - - - - - was the facuity oflaw KSM claimed to a1-Jazirah that the idea of striking the White House had been dropped for navigation reasons follow al-Qa'ida guidance on having operatives enter the site of an attack separately The next morning they took an early connecting flight to Boston and boarded flight 11J J Keys ta Success UJ Important factors-that are still relevant and difficult to fully mitigate-led to the success of the 11 September hijackers I I Atta relayef the date to Bin al-Shibb by phone on 29 Au ust 2001 but in veiled Ian ua e Bin al-Shibh assed the infonnation to KSM who c-o-nv-e-ed th e messa e to Bin Ladin Shrewd Selection of Operatives With- the exception of Nawaf al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar who had been actively involved with al-Qa ida since the mid-1990s the men sent into the United States were expected to have little trouble entering the country on the basis of their nationality and clean records Even Bin al-Shibh and Essabar in Hamburg were turned down on suspicion that they would not leave the United States after entering not because of suspected terrorist links • Without existing derogatory infonnation on the individuals involved it will be extremely difficult to identify suspicious individuals among the millions who enter the United States every yearJ During the first week of September 2001 the hijackers began to consolidate in tile northeast leaving their Florida residences and to return unused operational funds to al-Qa'ida Atta al-Shehhi Walid al-Shehri and Fayiz Banihammad wired a total of $26 000 back to the UAE from 6 to 10 September while al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi apparently tried to send back more than $10 000 They opened a bank account with unused funds and addressed a package containing the account's bankcard and PIN to a UAE post office box but the package did not leave the United States before 11 September J J By 10 September the hijackers were in the cities from which they would depart the following morning The only exception to the pattern was Atta and fellow flight 11 hijacker al-Umari who drove from Boston to Portland Maine on the afternoon of 10 September Their known activities in Portland appear innocuous-visiting ATMs a gas station and Wal-Mart-and the trip may have been an effort to · The four pilots-who would have to spend the ·most time in the United States-also had the advantage of years of experience in and out of Western countries where they became familiar with banking communication and travel practices KSM said in an al-Jazirah television interview that one of the first problems for the plotters was to select suitable people who were familiar with the West j __ _ Relatively Safe Operating Environment The planners of the 11 September attacks evidently felt comfortable enough with their assessment of US society-open mobile and diverse-that they could leave crucial operatives in place for more than a year without fear of discovery Although pilot training is available in other countries they chose to train their • C05416972 rar scc4 ____________ pilots for months inside the United States itself The · patient long-term nature of the planning-roughly three years in all-allowed for careful assessment of the operating environment inside the United States before the hijackers entered and for the operatives themselves to conduct an unhurried study of US airline practices once they were here LJd Flexibility and Mission Focus The plotters encountered prohl ms when Nawaf al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar w _unable to undertake pilot training and Hamburg network member Bin al-Shibh was unable to enter the country for training but· they quickly readjusted A -flazmi and al-Mihdhar went on to act as support hijackers Hanjur brought the number of qualified pilots up to four and Bin al-Shibh changed roles-becoming an apparent financial and communications intennediary between the plotters in the United States and those in Afghanistan I I Well-Coached and Coordinated Financial Operations The transactions that supported the plot dovetailed with the cover stories and clean records of the conspirators and generally bore the mark of having learned from aJ-Qa 'ida's long experience in moving funds unobtrusively In using the international financial system the plotters gave indication of their awareness of procedural requirements and reporting regulations often tiling obvious··pains to be in compliance They relied on their appearance oflegitimacy and conducted a multitude of relatively minor transactions that-abs nt additional incriminating evidence-did not arouse suspicion Financing he 11 Septembal Plot lUJ Key characteristics of the financial support for the 11 September operation include • Long-Term Planning Transfers of significant funds related to the operation began nearly two years before the attacks and appear to have been calculated to cover specific training and travel needs • Division of Labor Each hijacker appears to have been responsible for maintaining bis own account and personal transactions while three hijackers generally assumed responsibility for communicating with financial facilitators receiving funds and distributing them to other hijackers · • Pervasive Use of Cash The plotters used cash to open accounts and effectively concealed their day-to-day activities through cash withdrawals rather than check or credit transactions • Trickle-Down Via Intennediarles The plotters obscured the operation's u1timate funding sources by sending funds through various individuals before reaching the final recipient • Exploitation of Open Economies The operation's principal financial hubs were the United Arab Emirates UAE Germany and the United States partly because of the relative ease and anonymity with which financial transactions can be conducted in these countriesj I I Continuing Collection and Analytic Efforts UJ We continue to have several large gaps in our • understanding of the 11 September plot Continuing co11ection and analysis could fiJI in some of these gaps and help us to understand the larger picture of bow al-Qa'ida plans and prepares its operations We are working with foreign liaison services and other US Government agencies to address several key questions C05416972 _ r or 11 cRElj ---------- US Still Viable Operating Base Security measures since 11 September have created a tougher o ational environment for al-Oa 'ida Nevertheless I I al-Qa'ida y still view the United States as a reiauvely safe operational venue for its next wave of attacks • The large multicultural communities in the United States that allowed the t°J September hijackers to operate unseen for up tol8 months sl ill offer al-Qa'ida operatives a convenient ethnically diverse backdrop while large pools of transient housing allow them to acquire short-term rentals that normally require less stringent background checks Cultural and commercial considerations especially in tourist have f stered a climate of tolerance respect for personal privacy ar I areas Open-source information that reviews the effectiveness of enhanced security measures in the United States is available to al-Qa'ida and other extremists and is likely to foster the belief that some US sites continue to be relatively safe operational venues Open-source infonnation that is available also allows terrorist operatives to look for ways to circumvent current security practices at what he learned I in the US media about azed the security changes since the 11 September auacks and that w esses could be identified by studying what the media reported 1 • How frequently and in what venues the hijackers coordinated with outside supporters on key decisions-such as target and date selection-after their arrival in the United States • What support network witting or unwitting of the plot assisted the hijackers within the United States I I I C05416972- -m _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ • T O P c _ __ _ _ __ Appendix A ' ' I The 11 September ·2001 Hijackers Di_verse Paths to Terrorism I I C05416972 ••• ------- The 11 September 2001 Hijackers Diverse Paths to Terrorism I Introduction lUJ The 19 terrorists whom Osama Bin Ladin chose to hijack and crash four planes into US buildings on 11 September 2001 came from diverse backgrounds and were almost complete unknowns from an intelligence and law enforcement perspective until the day of the attacks Since that time we have sorted through a bevy of information to pu Mpgether a •clearer but still incomplete picture of the individual histories of these 19 young men and how they carried out this ttack • • Of the 19 hijackers 15 were born in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia two in the United Arab Emirates UAE one in Lebanon and one in Egypt see map in appendix B with birthplaces of the hijackers The high-numbers of Saudi nationals among this group was almost certainly intentional and probably fulfilled operational as well as al-Qa'ida symbolic objectives • The hijackers' ages ranged from 20 to 33-but age does not seem to be a key factor in detennining their role or participation in the pl_o I Although it is not clear what motivated all of them to become manyrs individual differences among the hijackers' personal histories family situations and levels of devotion to Islam suggest that no single factor was determinative to their recruitment to al-Qa'ida Information from a variety of sources suggests that several were adrift or ha significant family conflicts but not all • Economic circumstances among the 19 varied greatly according to media reports but several cmnc from well-off families extremist cause primarily because of personal and family considerations rather than deeply ingrained religious beliefs I I The Hijacker Network - - The 19 hijackers reflect four distinct subgroupings based on characteristics such as the length of their involvement with extremism how and where they were recruited their level of involvement and role in the plot and when they entered the United States • The early extremists Nawar al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar the first two hijackers to enter the United States in an operational capacity were born in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and had been close friends and involved with extremists since the mid1990s • The pilots from Hamburg Muhammad Atta Marwan al-Shehbi and Ziad Jarrah-three of lhe four hijacker-pilots on 11 September-were nonSaudi Arabs who lived in Germany for between four and eight years and probably became involved with Islamic extremists while there • The 12 young Saudis More notable for their numbers and nationality than any specific skills this grouping that we colloquially refer to as the second wave came to the United States about a year after the first two groups • The two anomalies Saudi national Rani Banjur the fourth pilot came to the United States after the first five Emirate national Fayiz Banihammad hijacker who played a financial role was one of the last hijackers to arrive in the United States I The Early Extremist __ __ Nawaf al-Hanni and Khalid al-Mihdhar who entered the United States together on 15 January 2000 ' were attracte d-10-1 he _ __ were from Saudi Arabia Unlike several of the other some I l September hijacke C05416972 • ll r -----------' hijackers wh_o were from the southwestern ------ these two were bom and raised in Mecc Born one year apart the two had bec -o-m-c fi ri-en-d s i-n__ middle school according to family members Reports differ about whether they both completed middle school but neither appeared to have studied at any university • Al-Mihdhar had four brothers and two sisters al-Hazmi had at east one younger brother Salim who later became involved in the plot Recruitment For Jihad A First Step to al-Qa'ida For these two hijackers recruitment into al-Qa'ida probably started with recruitment into the international mujahidin network In contrast to the other Saudi hijackers who signed up for jihad much later these two Saudis formed militant jihadist connections in the early-to-mid 1990s ·1 ----------------- 1 • AJ-Hazmi first traveled to Afghanistan in 1993 when he was 17 years old Al-Hazmi's father reportedly followed him and forced him to return to Saudi Arabia even taldng away his passport in an - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - unsuccessful effort to prevent him from pursuing Frain Devo1m Muslims to Extremists such activities Al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar attended their local mosques regularly in Saudi Arabiaj • A year later after he returned to Saudi Arabia I t the two did not appear t o be-re l igi ·o_u_s__ al-Hazmi zealots ___ _ __ same year al-Mihdhar dropped out of school to pursue extremist activities possibly recruited by al-Hazmi or one of his contacts • In 1995 al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar went to Bosnia and Herzegovina and fought alongside foreign mujahidin against the Serbs The two men subsequently strengthened their connections to al-Qa'ida by separately swearing loyalty to Bin Ladin perhaps as early as 1996 and in 1998 respectively The Pilots From Hamburg' ----' Muhammad Atta Marwan al-Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah Jived in Hamburg Germany-a port city of some 1 7 million people inc1uding 80 000 ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' Muslims-before coming to the United States in May C05416972 7 • and June 2000 They were from Egypt UAE and Lebanon respectively By comparison to the rest of the hijackers they were better educated came from more cosmopolitan families were themselves well traveled and were on average older The three ·also shared similar personal circumstances coming from upper-middle-class backgrounds with fathers or families who pushed them to further their education · son and find another place to live because his strict Islamii beliefs made them uncomfortable • Jarrah's family and press reports claim that Jarrah drank alcohol partied and did not hold any extreme religious beliefs before leavin for Germany Howevetj _ information he was'-e-xtr e-rri el y-r-el ig 1-o-us- -a-n hl s-- activities had been contentious with his family I I Pursuit of Higher Education • Al-Shehhi was born in the Qusaibat settlement in UAE's Rass al Khaimah Emirate-it ranks in the middle ofUAE's prosperous seven principalities Al-Shehhi's father who died in 1998 was a Muslim prayer leader at the local mosque The three came o Germany independently and in different years but each ostensibly to gain more education Atta the first of the three to come to Germany entered in 1992 when he was 24 spurred by his father to obtain a Western duate degree While Atta earned respectable grades and obtained · a bachelor's degree from Cairo University in architectural engineering they were not sufficient to secure him a spot in the graduate program at Cairo University · • Atta originally applied to the architecture program • Jarrah like Atta was one of three siblin s and the on1 son sent to the est most expensive Christian schools in Beirut--chosen for educational not religious reason j · Religious Transformation Over Time The degree to which they practiced or accepted their faith varied among the three and changed over time Al-Sbebhi whose father was an imam or prayer leader in the local mosque was considered very devout by his neighbors • Reports vary about bow strictAtta's religious observance was before arriving in Germany In Germany Atta attended a mosque daily according to press reports The first family he Jived with in Germany told th press that it ad to ask Atta to at the School of Applied Science 'in Hamburg but was told the program was full was admitted after filing a complaint but withdrew when he was granted admission to the Techniclll University'of Hamburg-Harburg He • Unlike al-Shehhi and Jarrah Atta was a serious student attended classes regularly and eventually succeeded in obtaining a degree the equivalent of a master's degree-in urban planning in 1999 I I Al-Shehhi also came to Gennany to study After high school al-Shehhi joined the military-a common p tth among members of his tribe that are heavily represented in the military and police forces-and earned a scholarship to study in Germany In April 1996 he came to Germany at age J 8 and settled in Bonn and took German language classes a prerequisite before registering to study at a German university He received ·a monthly stipend from the Emirate Governmrt as part his scholarship to study in Germal y y C05416972 mp 116'1R -------- Jarrah first came to Griefswald a city in the former East Germany in 1996 at age 21 with his cousin I trhere he began to study aeronautical and flight engineering It was also in Griefswald that he established a Ion -tenn romantic relationshi with A sel SengWl • By fall 1997 Jarrah moved to Hamburg Unlike Atta and al-Shehhi Jarrah attended the School of Applied Sciences in Hamburg nnan Gem n mk I ° ' u _ iru i idnd -- - --- '- etghtened secunty ccause of the East African US Embassy bombings in August 1998 may have delayed cheir travel I J Recruited for al-Qa'ida From Europe In a marked difference from lhe rest-of the hijackers who appear to have been recruited in their home countries Atta al-Shehhi and Jarrah may have 'been recruited in Germany A common acquaintance of members of Atta's circle was Gennan-S rian Muhammad He dar Zamma that al-Shehhi and Jarrah may have been connected to exttemistsj fore coming to Germany The Young Saudis ' - I_ _ _ _ _ The 12 Saudi hijackers who came to the United States ins rin 2001 served to fill out the four hi'ack teams three hi· ac ker- ilots to travel to Af hanistan the actual travel did not take place '- u n 'uerr a 'te -- -- '' t is possible that the three hijackerpilots had traveled earlier to Afghanistan jMore co-n-ta-ct_w_i th 1--al - Q a 1 ·d a in Af g h_a_n is-ta_n_w_o_u ld Jbolster al-Qa'ida's confidence toward entrusting this operation to these individuals • In mid-1998 both Atta and al•Shehhi transferred general power of attorney over their individual come from a-van e_ty_o f fi a_m ila--y b-ac k-gf_o_u_n d s-a-nd ha-'ve various educational levels-although few had moved beyond the equivalent of a high school education ' - - j_ _ _ _ They appear to have joined the plot at a later stage than the pilots and most but not all have personal histories that would suggest their ties to exlTe is ts ____ did not go back more than two or three years C05416972 119' l I I I I I E i - - - - - - - - - They had several older brothers who were successful businessmen or officers in the Saudi armed forces The Four Ghamdis wa'il suffered fic-ro_m__ d-ep_re_sst o_n_a_n_d__a_s ke-d fo-r-a--- -- 1eave of absence Ahmad al-Ghamdi Sa'id al-Ghamdi Hamza from his job to travel for treatment in April or al-Ghamdi and Ahmad al-Haznawi all hail from a cluster of three towns in or near the Al Bahah re ion - May 2000 Walid dropped out of university and of Saudi Arabia accompanied him to Jiddah l I four share the same tribal affiliation-a strong social identifier in Saudi Arabia-and belong to the al-Ghamdi tribe that numbers·1mme 200 000 in Saudi Arabia The four were practi lly the same age- --each born in 1979 or 1980- -and none complete a university degree a'id left h_o_m_e_i n-Oc to b e-r 1 9-99 to_c_o_n-t1 n-ue h is-u niversity studies in al-Qassim bu I two months later and said he was going to jihad in Chechnya r------------T rec_o_g-ni z-ed --a- '--p_h_o-to-o fth e-fa-th er-of H a-mz-·-a-al---G lhamdisuggesting at least some family interaction among the group before l I September Ahmad al Nami-the oldest of 10 siblings according to an interview his father gave to US mediareportedly was the imam in his local mosque in Abha He bad trained at King Khaled University Islamic law school in Abba • According to al-Narni's father by spring 2000 his son had withdrawn from the university and told his family he was traveling to Mecca to conduct the minor hajj and to look for work He contacted his family five months later for the last time I Probably in 1997 Muhannad al-Shehri began his studies at the hnam Muhammad lbn Saud Islamic University's branch in Abba and studied in Riyadh for a short time but retumed to the university in Abba after failing his exams in Riyadh He had six brothers • Based on travel patterns and infonnation from relatives we believe the four were in contact with each other by the fall of 1999 ' - - - - - - - - ' The Five From 'Asir Wa'iJ and Walid al•Shehri Ahmad al-Nami Mubannad al Shehri and 'Abd al-Aziz al-Umari haH from the Sowli Arnbi n ' A s k I' Yemen In contrast to the four al-Ghamdis the five from 'Asirhad started university studies • Wa'il al-Shehri completed a course of study and teaching rysica1 Education in Abba in 1999 starti Wa'il and his younger brother Walid al-Shehri came from a well-off family of 20 children according to an interview their father gave to the US media 'Abd al-Aziz al-Umari studied in Oman during his middle school years graduated with honors from high school and after he graduated from the Imam Jlniversitv rffliedl ---------- C05416972 EefiE'fL__________ The Remaining Thl Be Salim al-Hazmi born in Mecca Saudi Arabia was I the younger brother of Nawaf al-Hazmi · alim was a quarrelsome teenager and created problems for his family because of excessive drinking and petty theft ____J • The three al-Ghamdi's were devout Muslims who attended prayer service$ regularly according to their families Al-Umari was described s a conservative and devoutly religious young man who often served as an imam for his mosque L---- ------ - -----J---H--- aznawij came closest t relig'-i-ou_s_ _ Othman al-Suqami a k a Satam Suqami from Riyadh and Majid Muqid a k a Majid 'Awfi -from a small town Annakhil west of Medina-bad no known connections with any of _the other hijackers or each other before becoming involved with extremists by 999 • According to press Muqid was the son of a locaJ village elder Friends have reported to the Saudi press that he was known for his desire to join a jihad and that he had a relative who took in the 1979 storming of Mecca's Grand Mosquej I lhe had dropped out of the · university in late 2000 early 2001 after traveling to Bahrain • Al-Suqami reportedly worked in al-Taif as a security guard for a hospital Al-Suqami had very little education and rep ortedly was involved jn drinking alcohol and perhaps drugs During the last few years he had become introverted and withdrawn from his family and friends-freqrntlv disanneanne from home for periods of time I Path to Religious Extremism All of the young Saudis' families maintain that their sons were not religious zealots Interviews with families portrayed some of the hijackers as devout while others appeared lacking in their faith • Despite their early exposure to Islam according to Mabahith interviews with the hijackers' families al-Suqami and Salim al-Hazmi were unconcerned with religion and contrary to Islamic law drank alcohol According to Salim's father however three months before he left home after being released from jail Salim began attending the mosque regularly and quit drinking extremist ---------' eaning toward a strict severe viewpoint and expressing a desire to participate in the jihad in Chechnya I fl-Nami h __ad_be_g_u_n_to__ exhibit signs of extremism in 1997 when he grew a heard and stunned jatching teJevision I I - Recruitment Similar to Two Early Extremists The majority of the Saudi second wave hijackers I began to break contact with their families in late 1999 and into 2000 While several of them evinced interest in ongoing jihads-especially the conflict in Chechnya according t information from family and friends-few probably fought anywhere other than in Afghanistan given the shortness of time and difficulty getting to Chechnya However in many cases it is difficult to verify whether such statements· about travel are true or just cover stories • The four al-Gham dis were probably 19 or younger when they went off for jihad each told their · families that he was going to Chechnya ---_ only two fuJackers-Ahmad al-Ghamdi and Sa'id al-Ghamdi-have documentation suggesting travel to a Russian republic it is possible that they were trying to get to Chechnya 2 • Salim al-Hazmi did spend some time in Afghanistan fighting against the Northern Alliance 2 In 1999 Ibn al-Khattab-the primary commander of Arab nationals in Chechnya-began turning away most foreign• born Afghanistan-trained mujahidin because of their lack of operational experience and heir inability to adjust to the region's terrain and climate or to speak local dialects C05416972 he was a Saudi national He was born in At-Taif in 1972 the third of four brothers in a fairly well-todo family His eldest brother has been head of the household since the death of Hanjur's father • We do not have information about when or where Hanjur was recruited but it may have been as early as 1989 when as a 17 year old he left Saudi Arabia to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan Because the Soviets were withdrawing from Afghanistan at his time Hanjur claims he spent most of his time working with the al-Ighatha Relief AgencyMuhannad aJ-Shehhi may also have worked with this agency-arranging for the transfer of goods from Peshawar Pakistan to Kabul Afghanistan The hijackers came into contact with individuals who may have put them onto the ·Pl -th toward jihad and ultimately al-Qa'ida through personal contacts in Saudi Arabia or at places such as yniversities or mosques For example one of these Saudis 'Abd al-Aziz al-Urnari was a student of radical cleric 1• Unlike the other hijackers Hanjur spent time in the United States-Florida California and Arizona- before the plot was organize anjur tra v-e-led-to_th_e U n-it_ed_ States for the first time in t 991 hoping that learning English would assist him in bec•oming a pilot Family members say he retuned that same year a different man supporting militant Islam ---------------- I I • Sa'id al-Ghamdi and Muhannad al-Shehri lost contact with their families shortly before expressing a desire to travel to or having spent time in al-Qassim Province • In addition some Western media reports claim that • During the next few years he finished his secondary education but despite achieving fairly respectable scores on his final high school exams he was denied entrance nto the ivil Aviation School in Jiddah-a longtime dream according to press reports al-Haznawi may have had a hand in the recruitment of Hamza al-Ghamdi and Ahmad al-Ghamdi a claim we cannot fully corroborate • Al-Nami may have recruited Walid and subsequently his older brother Wa'il into the jihadist movement After returning from a government religious camp in 1999 al-Nami had become very religious According to press repons in the spring of 2000 al-Nami the al-Shehri brothers and Sa'id al-Ghamdi gathered in a local mosque to pray and meditate in an informal ceremony that bound them to jihad and if necessary to die in the defense' of Islam • His second attempt to attend the Civil Aviation Schoo a few years later also ended in failure-even after a second trip to the United States in 1996 to talce some pilot training • In 1997 on probably his third trip to the Unitt d States Hanjur traveled to Phoenix Arizona to again study English and take more pilot training finally earning his private pilot's license inApril 1998 and a commercial pilot's license in April 1999 He returned home in April 19991 I Two Anomalie '------' Hani Haniur-A Different Pat h Hani Hanjur shares commonalities with all three subgroupings of hijackers-his jihadist ties go back as far as a decade he was the plot's fourth pilot and hortly after his return from the United States in 1999 Hanjur left home to reportedly take a job in the UAE as a pilot It is possible that he was in a training camp in Afghan_istan C05416972 I dwingdns 1m '-I- ____________ • He retumed home just once afterward in September 2000 During this time he applied for and received a·new US visa His fourth and last trip to the lnited States occurred in December 2000 I Who is Fayi i Banihammad We have limited information on Fayiz Rashid · Banihammad and little unde tanding of his family or personal history He was born in 19TI in the port ci of Khawr Fakkan in Sha ah Emirate UAE he was married Personal con iectionr and family ties among the hijackers rtand out as important to forming the ll September hijacker network Among the 19 were two sets of brothers-Walid and Wa'il al-Shehri and Nawaf and Salim al-Hazmi-and other subgroupings in which individuals have each other for years before the plot rav krwn It ill not clear what motivated all ofthem to become martyrs and no single root cause seems lo underpin their actions Although most of the Saudis tended to mm toward jihad during or near the end of their high school years not all fit this pattern Rather the preconditions for recruitment-both for jihad and later for al-Qa'ida-appear to stem from multiple causes including but not limited to deteriorating or difficult family relationships overly high or low personal expectations or a need for personal fulfillment - Several did appear to have fairly significant conflicts-or feel extreme pressure-from their fathers or father substitutes according to medio Conclusions About the 11 September Hijackers UJ In our Piew the hijackers were carefully selected with an eye to their operational and political value For instance the large number of Saudi nationals was most likely chosen not only because of the ease with which Saudi nationals could get US visas but also because Bin Ladin could send a message to the Saudi Royal family that he had deep support from the southwestern tribes for his jihad against the United States acco rding to press reports • Saudi nationals especially from the southwest region played a prominent role in several past al-Qa'ida terrorist attacks against the United States including the USS Cole bombing in October 2000 and the US Embassy bombings in 1998 ·• One-quarter of the plotters for the l J September attacks were recruited from the 'Asir region-an area traditionally known for extremist activities and the region where Bin Ladin grew upj j • Although most attended mosques regularly few stood out from the others as religious extremists from an early age Each individual seemed to undergo a personal experience or meet an individual that steered them down the ex tremist path •Obviously the 19 shared a commttment to al-Qa'ida and a hatred of the United States The underlying reasons for the hatred of the United States are probably not the same in each case I I As their extremist sympathies deepened all tended to undergo changes noticeable to their families including the expression of radical ideology and of the dictates of their religion such as eliminating alcohol or growing a beard • Some of the hijackers had family members attempt to moderate their views or behaviors to no avail C05416972 II t • • Within a year or two before CQming to the United States almost all of the hijackers seemed to have become estranged from their families I I This plot marks the first time al-Qa'ida has used Arabs living in Europe as martyrs although there have been European Arabs in al-Qa'ida or years ·• rd • The Hamburg pilots lived in the West spoke English and knew the Western of life able to study in the United States wry - were their young ages limits the amount of time they have been involved in jihad it is very possible that these young men bad been extremists lonJi before the 11 Seutember plot was approved - _ - I - JU----- • lilil U Appendix B Hijackers ·· Profiles U •£11 - -• lilM ••• · p• - •-• C05416972 • • • -• • Birthplaces of 11 September Terrorists UJ • • • • • • American Airlines Flight 11 100Miles 50 0 American Airlines Flight 93 United Airlines Flight 175 Color co eS onds to hijacl et's flight Jiddah Mecca Province boundary •AtTa'lf Saudi Arabia · m a d at-Ghamdi I Ghamld • l laljurshl JUhayah Baljurshi Qal'at Bishah anah Hamza al-Ghamdi Red Al Qunfudhah• ·· Muhannad al•Shehri Tanumah Sea Ahmad al-Nami Abila Sudan 0 SDmalia 0 200 400 1 2 0 I C05416972 ••• • •• Muhammad al-Amir Awad al-Sayed Atta • Aliases variants • • •• Nationality • Date of birth • Place of birth • Age -- ---· Egyptian 1 September 1968 Kafr el-Sheikh Egypt Gender • • • • • '--------'•• Hair color • Eye color Height Weight Marital status • Role Single Suspected Pilot AA flight 11 • • • Other • documentation •• • Visa information • • • Education • Florida driver's llcense #A300-540·68-321-0 issued 2 May 2001 FAA commercial pilot's license #2638890 US B1 82 visa control no 20001389580003 issued 18 May 2000 Berlin Germany expires 16 May 2005 Degrees from Cairo University Hamburg-Harburg Technical University in architectural engineering urban planning • • information •• •• Atta an Egyp an national bOrn in Kafr el•Sheikh E gypt in 1968 was the pilot••• Muhammad hijacker onboard American Airlines flight 11 Atta was the only son and youngest of three • Family • siblings His famil seems to have stressed arsenal and rofessional achievement-his • • • ••• •• • • father Is a lawya __ _ - -- ----- -- ---- 1 At the Insistence of his father he traveled to Germany to pursue his studies U Atta lived in Hamburg Germany from 1992 to 2000 receiving a degree ln urban planning in 1999 After an apparent trip to Afghanistan in December 1999-February 2000 he entered the United States in June 2000 and spent the rest of the year in flight training with flight 175 pllot·hljacker Marwan al·Shehhi Atta traveled both abroad and domestically before r- v r to Boston and Portland Maine immediately preceding the 11 September attacks• ••• • • 'Abd al•Aziz 'Abd al Rahman Muhammad al Umari • • Aliases variants • • ••• Nationality Date of birth •• Place of birth • • • • I 28 May 1979 al Awran Saudi Arabia Age 22 years Gender Male •• Hair color •• Eyecolor •• Height Weight status ••• Marital •• Role • I - No data available Suspected hijacker AA flight 11 Other International driver's license IADC-O10726217 • • issued 27 July 2001- Virginia ID issued 2 August 2001 Customer# listed as A69600385 documentation •• •• Visa information ••• Education • Family • information •• •• •• •• • US visa control no 20011690590010 issued 18 June 2001 Jiddah Saudi Arabia Graduated Imam University 'Abel al-Aziz al-Umari a Saudi national born on 28 May 1979 in al-'Awran Saudi Arabia was one of the last two participants in the 11 Se tember lot to arrive in the United States roundin out the total corn lement at 19 • ••• • Al•Umari entered the United States on a B1 82 visa on 29 June 2001 flying from Dubai to London and then on to New York City aboard the same flight as American Airlines flight n hijacker Sa6m al-Hazmi He resided in New Jersey until early August when he moved to Florida to join his flight team It is still unclear why al-Umrl and Atta trreled to Portland Maine the evening preceding the 11 September attacks C05416972 - •• • •• • Uthman bin Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Suqami • - - - - - - - Aliases variants •• •• Nationality Saudi • ft •• - 1 • ' • • Place of birth • •• Age •• Gender •• Hair color • • Eye color •• Height 28June 1976 Weight No data available • Date of birth Riyadh Saudi Arabia • Marital status • ••• • Role Suspected hijacker AA flight 11 • Other documentation No data available Visa information 81 82 US visa visa control no 20003267080004 issued 21 November 2000 Riyadh Saudi Arabia ••• Ed cation Attended Royal Faculty engineering • • Family information • al-Suqami a k a Satam Sugami was a Saudi national born on 28 June 1976 In •• Ulhman Riyadh Saudi Arabia According to Saudi authorities Suqami came from a broken family of whose members had much education Before his recruitment by al-Qa'ida he had •• none held an unskilled ·ob as a security guard and may have had a drinking problemJ I •• n 1999 Suqami and Majid Muqid American Airlines fliaht 77 huaokjr • __re-- p-- -ort e-- -y t ra ve -1ec -'d to and spent time in a training camp in Afghanistan - - - • Suqaml arrived In the United States on 23 April 2001 together with fellow AA flight 11 Walid al-Shehrl Information from another US Government agency indicates that ••• hijacker Suqami Jived in Florida after his arrival in the United States and held a joint bank account • with Walid al-Shehri There is little other reporting on Suqaml to suggest that he contributed • much besides muscle to the mix of skills of the 11 September plotters I • • - C05416972 • •• • •• Wa'il Muhammad • Aiiasesrvariants ' •• Nationality •• Date of birth _____ __• '· Place - pf birth ------- • • Age I 'Abdallah af Shehri Saudi · Khamis Mushayt Saudi Arabia • • -Gender • •• Eye color • Hair color• • • Height • Weight_ •• Marital status •• Role •• • • Other _ · • • No• data • available • • Suspected hijacker AA flight 11 Florida driver's license A426-880-76-001 ·O CLASS E • dticumentation • • Visa iriformation 81 B2 US visa issued 24 October 2000 Jiddah Education Family I 1-1 -- • information Brother Walid Muhammad Abdallah al-Shehri • • • Wa'il al-Shehri was a Saudi national born in Khamis Mushayt Saudi Arabia on 31 July • 1973 He came from a large prosperous famlly-13 brothers and 6 sisters After receiving • his teaching certificate he worked as a teacher in a nearby school According to his family • in mid-2O0O after suffering from·depression Wa'il asked for leave of absence from his AI-Shehri and his younger brother AA flight 11 hijacker Walid al-Shehri supposedly •• job traveled to Jiddah They returned home for a short time in fall 2000 They left home in • November 2000 without telling their faev where tjey were going-they reportedly spent • time in a training camp in Afghanistan ___ ____ • • • AI-Shehri entered the United States on 8 June 2001 along with Ahmad al-Haznawl United • Airlines flight n d resided in Florida until he and Walid flew to Boston on • 5 September L_J • C05416972 ______________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ • • • •• Walid Muhammad • • • ---- - -- 1 Full name 'Abdallah al-Shehri Walid Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Shehri • Aliases variants • • • Nationality Saudi • Date of birth 20 December 1978 • • Place of birth •• Age •• Gender • Hair color •• Eye color •• Height · ·· Khamis Mushayt Saudi Arabia 22 years 11 --- • Weight No data available Marital status Suspected hijacker AA flight 11 • Rofe • • • • • Other • documentation • • Visa information • Education • Family Florida driver's license •A42689378460 issued 4 May 2001 duplicate issued 5 May 2001 International driver's license permit #179581 issued 5 June 01 UAE B 1-6 2 US visa control no 20002982510003 issued 24 October 2000 Jiddah Saudi Arabia Second-year student at a teacher's college in probably Abha Saudi Arabia dropped out and never completed studies I • information ••• • • • •• •• • •• • • • Brother Wa'il Muhammad 'Abdallah at Shehri Walid al-Shehrl a Saudi national born in Khamis Mushayt Saudi Arabia on 20 December 1978 was one offive hijackers on American Airlines flight 11 He came from a large prosperous family-13 brothers and 6 sisters He studied at a teachers college until·he dropped out to accompany his brother on an extended trip to Jiddah in mid-2000 They returned home for a short time in fall 2000 They left home in November 2000 without telling their family where they were going-they reportedly spent time in a training camp in Afghanistan j AI-Shehrl entered the United States in late April 2001 with American Airlines flight 11 hijacker Satam al-Suqami While in th United States al-Shehri flew to-but did not enter-the Bahamas and later flew from Flor Iida to San rncisco and back the next day He and Wa'il flew to Boston on 5 September_ _ C05416972 • ••• Marwan Yousef Muhammad Rashid •• Lekrab al-Shehhi • Nationality Emirate • 9May1978 Date Qf birth •• Place of birth • Ras al-Khaymah United Arab Emirates • Age • Gender· • • Haircolor • Eye color •• Height • Weight - - - - - • • Marttal status Married Role Suspected pilot UA flight 175 •• • • • Ottwr • documentation •• •• VISA information • • Education • • Family Florida driver's ·ucensa A420•540-78-169·0 issued 12April 2001 replacement issued 19 June 2001 Commercial pilot's license 002636862 first issued from FAA Southern Region 21 December 2000 replacement issued 19 June 2001 10-year 81 B2 multiple-entry visa issued 18 January 2000 US Consulate Dubai UAE tudied electrical engineering atTechnical University in Germany Studied German at university in Bonn • •information ••· Marwan al-Shehhi an Emirate national was born on 9 May 1978 in Ras al-Khaymah •• UAE He joined the United Arab Emirates military after completing high school In spring • 1996 al-Shehhi traveled to Germany on a military scholarship to study at the Goethe Institute in Bonn After the Goethe Institute al-Shehhi continued his studies in Hamburg • where he flunked out Sometime during his stay in Hamburg al-Shehhl became acquainted •• with Muhammad Atta and moved into 54 Marienstrasse an apartment located in a lowerneighborhood in Hamburg lt was also during this period that al-Shehhi spent •• middle-class time in an al-Qa'ida training camp in Afghanistanj I • • • •• •• • Al-Shehhi arrived In the United States on 29 May 2000 Al-Shehhi and Atta attended flight training in Florida from July-December 2000 AI-Shehhi made at least two trips outside the United States after first arriving from Germany on 27 May 2000 AI-Shehhi appears to have handled much of the logistics and some of the financing for the hijackers He is the · suspected pllot of United Airlines flight 175 that crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Cante · · C05416972 - • '-----------'I • •• • • •• Fayiz Rashid Ahmad Hassan al Qadi • Aliases variants - - · f •• •• Nationality _______ _ •• Date of birth 19 March 1977 • Place of birth •• Banihammad Khorfakkan United Arab Emirates • Age •· • • Gender • Hair color • • __ _ _ __ • Eye color • • Height •• Weight No data available Marital status Married w child nfi • Suspected hijacker UA flight 175 • • Role • • Other • documentation • Visa information • • • Education Florida driver's license F200-060-77-099-0 International driver's license #32199 US visa control 20011694710006 foil # 45915108 issued 18 June 2001 · • Famlly • inforrriation • •• • Faylz Banihammad a k a Fa ·z Ahmad was an Emirat n Khorfakkan UAE Banihammad wasL t e a st o t-e 1-ac er-s to tra i-n n th e A fg h-an is t-an_c_a_m_p_s _ _ ___ •• • • •• Part of the second wave of hijackers he entered the United States on 27 June 2001 with United Airlines flight 93 hijacker Sa'id al-Ghamdi Acc9rding to information provided by another government agency Banihammad lived with Marwan al-Shehhi in Florida until their flight team moved into place in Boston in early September 2001 Banihamm a_d_ _ • appears to have played a significant financial role in the 11 September attacks • • • I •· C05416972 •• • •• Ahmad Salih Sa id al-Kurshi al-Ghamdi JI 5 • - - - - - - - Aliases variants _ • ••'- l · • - • · Q • Nationality • Date of birth 2July 1979 • Place of birth Alamarassa Saudi Arabia • -' -'- ' '-'• --- - - ----i • Age •• Gender • Haircolor Eye color Height - ----- ' I Weight 13CM501bs Suspected hijacker UA flight 175 Iii • Other· • documentation USAID card 3403401372-C • Visa information • • Education •• Completed high school graduated from Health Community School as a nurse • Family • information •• • •• ••• • • •• • • • • Ahmad al-Ghamdi a k a Ahmad al-Kushi a Saudi national was born on 2 July 1979 in Alamarassa Saudi Arabia He left home in 1998-99 supposedly for Chechnya He returned and left a final time in September 2000 after obtaining a US visa He arrived In the United States from Dubai UAE via London on 2 May 2001 with American Airlines flight 77 hijacker Majid 'Awfij I There is some Indication that he was travel coordinator for the group Also it was odd that he stayed In New Jersey with members of AA flight 77 when he arrived he did not move to Florida until 9 Augusl He was one of six hijackers who received a fraudulent Virginia driver's license in August 2001 He also was one of the hijackers who recruited a Middle Eastern man from a 7-11 store in Falls Church to take Nawaf al-Hazmi Hani Hanjur Majid Mu n mself to Fairmont Connecticut He was a hijacker on l Jnited Airlines flight • 175 • - C05416972----------------- •• •• • • Hamza Salih Ahmad al-Hamid al-Ghamdi • --- - - ---- Aliases variants •• • • Nationality • • Date of birth • Place of birth ------- • • Age •• Gender 18 November 1980 Ajandam Saudi Arabia • • Hair color • Eye color ____ ____ ____ Height •Jl-------iil - •• Weight • • Marital status • f _ l - _ --------'• Role Suspected hijacker UA flight 175 Other Florida driver's license A425-337-80-418-0 issued 2 July 2001 Florida ID A425 337 80 418 0 issued 26 June 2001 Florida learner license A425-337-80-418-0 • documentation ••• •• • • issued on 27 June 2001 Duplicate Florida driver's license A425-337-80-418-0 Issued 27 August 2001 • Visa information • • Education •• Family Visa control 20002918210007 B2 visa Complet_ed high school applied not accepted to university information • •• •• • •• • •• Hamza al-Ghamdi a Saudi national was born on 18 November 1980 in Ajandam Saudi Arabia Hamza received a US visa in October 2000 and left Saudi Arabia in November 2000 He arrived In the United States on 28 May 2001 from Dubai UAE via London with fellow United Airlines flight 175 hijacker Mahamld al-Shehri and United Airlines flight 93 hijacker Ahmad al Nami j I According to information from another government agency al-Ghamdi resided in Florida · ··ackers until early September 2001 when he moved into place in Boston • C05416972 · • • II •• II • Muhannad Fayiz al-Shehri • ----- - ----- Aliases variants - _ • ·- A ' W 1 • Place of birth 7Mayf979 Tanumah Saudi Arabia -------- • Age No data available • Marital statos •- Role •• Suspected hijacker UA flight 175 • • Other - - - - - - - ' documentation Visa information • Education II Florida State ID Card #A426-540-79-167-0 issued 2 July 2001 Visa control no #20002979630009 issued 23 October 2000 Riyadh Saudi Arabia Dropped out of university in Abha Saudi Arabia briefly attended a universi in Ai adh • Family • informatloll • •• • • Muhalinad al-Shehri a k a Mohand al-Shehri a Saudi national was born on 7 May 1979 in Tanumah Saudi Arabia ' - - n r ' 1-Shehri had entered Abha University after graduating rom secon ary sc oo ut soon left to go to a university in Riyadh His ·father asked him to return to Abha University after he failed his exams in Riyadhj I · •• • AI-Shehri left home in late 1999 When he contacted his family in early 2000 he told them • • he was In a refugee camp in lngushetia arid would be home soon However although he •• • US visa in October 2001 and left Saudi Arabia in November 2000 I • kept In contact with his family until Spring 2001 he never returned home He received a • • • I He arrived in the United States·trom Dubai UAE via London on 28 May 2001 along with United Airlines fliaht 175 hlla ker Hamza al Ghamdi and United Airlines flight 93 hijacker Ahmad al Nami -- 1 C05416972 I • •• • • • Ziad Samir Jarrah • - - - - - - - Aliases Variants • Lebanese Nationality 11 May 1975 Al-Marj Lebanon - Date of birth • Place of birth • • Gender · •• HaircoJor • Age Eyeeotor Blonde Green • Height 5 10 •• Weight · 174 lbs Married· Pilot UA flight 93 •I • • Other • Florida driver's license #J600997751710 issued 2 May 2001 ·expiration 11 May 2007 Virginia ID #T6619335 issued 29 August 2001 expires 31 May 2005 FAA private pilot certification #2633773 International Student ID Card UNESCO S-049-207-976-467 Vl$a infortnation US visa #34138882 issued 3 September 2000 in Beirut • Education Graduated Hikmeh High School Christian school in Beirut Attended university in Germany documentation •• • • • • Family • information • • •• •• •• II •• cc ••• •• • • •• ••• Ziad Jarrah a Lebanese national born on 11 May 1975 in Al-Marj Lebanon was the pilot for the hijack team that took over United Airlines flight 93 Jarrah was the only son of a gover ker He had two sisters His father sent him to the best Christian schools in BeirutL_J · When he was 21 years old Jarrah moved to Germany to continue his studies He lived first in the eastern city of Greifswald and then moved to Hamburg where he met fellow hijackers Muhammad Atta and Marwan al-Shehhl lnformalion from a variety of sources indicates that Jarrah was radicalized in Germany and then went to Pakistan and Afghanistan from late November 1999 through late January 2000 I Jarrah entered the United States on a B1 82 visa for the first time on 27 June 2000 flying from Ousseldorf to Newark and then on to Atlanta and Venice Florida He traveled outside he United States six times after that to the Bahamas Europe and the Middle East He obtained ilot certlflcation after studying at a flight school in Florida during 2000-01 ' C05416972------------------------- · v aP az 41 ___________ •• •• • ' · • Ahmad 'Abdallah Ahmad al-Nami ••• Aliases variants •• Nationality •• Date of birth 7 December 1977 • Place of birth Abha Saudi Arabia • Age •• Gender • • Hair color • Eye color • • • Height • • - - - - - - • Marital status • Weight • No• data • available • • Suspected hijacker UA flight 93 • Role •• • Other • documentation • Visa information •• • •• US visa #39731764 issued 28 October 2000 in Jicldah Saudi Arabia US visa #43139969 issued 23 April 2001 in Jiddah Saudi Arabia • Education •• Family Dropped out of university in Abha Saudi Arabia • information ••• • • • • Information from a variety of sources indicates that al-Nami was radicalized in Saudi dropping out of sight by the late spring of 2oooj • · · al-Nami traveled to Beirut and then on to Tehran w i ffi fe ll ow •• hijackers Walid and Wall al•Shehri in November 2000-a customary route tor al-Qa'ida • members going to Afghanistan • • AI-Nami entered the United States on a 81 82 visa on 28 May 2001 flying from Dubai to • London and then on to Miami aboard the same flight as hijackers Mohand al-Shehri and _77 ---- -- -- - - - -- - - - -- -' • Hamza al-Ghamdi According to information from another government agency al-Naml • •• · · ida until September 2001 when he moved into place in Newark New Jersey• C05416972 • •• • ••• Ahmad • Ibrahim Ali al-Haznawi - - - - - Aliases variants • •• • Nationality • Date of birth '------'• • Place of birth -------- •• Age 11- October 1980 Baljorashi Saudi Arabia • Gender • Hair color • E'l' e color Height No·data available • No data available • Weight • • Marital status •• Rote Suspected hijacker UA flight 93 •• Other • documentation • •• • Visa information US visa #39731493 issued 12 November 2000 in Jiddah Education Attended an engineering university droppa out Saudi Arabia Family • information • ••• • •• ••' • Ahmad al-Haznawi a Saudi national bom in Baljorashi Saudi Arabia on 11 October 1980 was one of the four hijackers of United Airlines flight 93 According to his father Ahmad al-Haznawi had a strict viewpoint and expressed a desire to participate in the jihad in Chechnya 1nformalion from various sources suggests that In the two years before his arrival in the United States alHaznawl traveled to Kuwait Pakistan Afghanistan Syria and the United Arab Emirates I Miami Florida from the UAE via London England He arrived with fellow hfjacker Wa'il ••• al-Shehri H · · orida until early September 2001 when he moved to a hotel in On 8 June 2001 al-Haz_nawi entered the United States with a B1 B2 visa arriving in m - • NewJerse C05416972 • •• ••• • Sa'id 'Abdallah Ali Salman al-Ghamdi • Aliases variants • • • • Nationality • • Date of birth •• Place of birth •• Age •• Gender •• Hair cotor 21 Nov l1ber 1979 Baljorashi Saudi Arabia No data available • Marital status • Role • • • •• Other Suspected hijacker UA flight 93 Florida driver's license documentation Visa information US visa #39737298 issued 3 April 2000 • In Jiddah Saudi Arabia US visa #43146043 issued 12 June 2001 in Jiddah Saudi Arabia • •• •• Education • •• Family ••• • • ••• •• • •• • • • Imam University School of Religious Study University of Qasim information Sa'ld al-Ghamdi a Saudi national born in Baljurshi Saudi Arabia on 21 November 1979 was one of the four hijackers of United Airlines flight 93 J a'id al Ghamdl contacted his fami around December 1999 to sa that he had left for Phad in Chechnya __ _--c-- -c-a- -----c- ---- -- ------ ------ -a----c nformation from various sources suggests that in the two years before his arrival in the United States alGhamdi traveled to Moldova Bahrain Lebanon Qatar Pakistan Afghanistan and the United Arab Emiratesj On 27 June 2001 al-Ghamdi entered the United States with a B1 82 visa arriving in Orlando Florida from the UAE via London England along with United Airlines flight 175 hijacker Faylz Banihamma Sa'ld remained In Florida until early September when he moved to a hotel in New Jersey j C05416972 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ I I • • • • • 1i • Hani Salih Hasan Hanjur • r--- ai - --- 'I • • Aliases variants •• Nationality Date of birth Saudi 30 August 1972 • Place of birth Ta'if Saudi Arabia • Age 29years • __ _ Gender ·· I 11 · ale -------- • Haircolor • Eye color · •• Height ' • Welght - •• ·1 i '' •w• J -••• •• •· • Marital status Role • Other • documentation • •• •• •• Visa information ••• • Education • • International Saudi Arabia drivers license #190311 1016769372 Commercial pilot certHicate 002576802 issued 15 April 1999 Arizona driver's license #B11977869 issued on 29 November 1991 Florlda driver's license #H526-337-72-310-0 issued 15 April 1996 Maryland ID card #H-526-298-757-675 Virginia State nondriver's license #T66-19-0719 issued on 1 August 2001 -- --- $SN US visa #03901826609 issued in Jlddah on 25 September 2000 Tait Secondary School Tait Saudi Arabia • ELS Language Genter Oakland California • Family lnformation • •• • • Hani Hanjur a Saud national was one of the five hijackers and suspected pilot of American • Airlines flight 77 Hanjur was born on 30 August 1972 in the Saudi city of Ta'if Hanjur was • •• ••• •• • •• CJ • • • • a graduate of the local high school and I hen he was only 17 traveled to Afghanistan to take part in the jihad against the Soviet Army In 1991 Hani traveled to Phoenix to study English In 1992 Hanjur returned to Saudi Arabia and managed one of the HanJur family's agricultural properties during the mid· 1990S I I On 2 April 1996 Hanjur returned to the United States and during his eight-month stay he studied English and began flight training He returned to Saudi Arabia on 29 November 1996 then returned to the United States after a year's absence and earned his commercial pilot's license in April 1999 Less than two weeks later Hanjur ieft the United States He obtained a new Saudi passport In Saudi Arabia in July 2000 and in December of that year retumecl to the United States During the next year he spent time in Arizona Virginia Connecllc w Jerse Maryland and Las Vegas with o her'h jackers and practiced his flyingskllls -------------------- C05416972 I • •• - · - r --- • 'i k- r· -• -- -- • a •• i f L • '-9 _ i r 'Je ' µ - · • Khalid Muhammad 'Abdulfah al-Mihdhar • - - - - - - - - Aliases variants II • Nationality Yemeni Saudi after 1995 • Date of birth 5May 1975 •• Place of birth •• Age Mecca Saudi Arabia • • Gender •• Haircolor •• Eye color • Height • Weight Marital status ____ _ _ __ • Role Suspected hijacker AA flight n • • • Other • documentation • •• Visa information • ••• Education Virginia State nondrivers license ID #T66190718 California driver license #D24 I 6697 issued 5 April 2000 USA ID identification B·1 B-2 multiple-entry visa issued at Jiddah Saudi Arabia on 13 June 2001 expires 12 June 2003 B-1 8-2 multiple-entry visa issued at Jiddah Saudi Arabia on 7 April 1999 expires 6 April 2000 Middle school commercial seconda academy dropped out • Family information •• ••• al-Mihdhar a Saudi national was one of the five hijackers of American Airlines flight 77 • Khalid He was born in Mecca saudi Arabia on 16 May 1975 He was married with a young child In •• the mld-1990s he and flight 77 hijacker Nawaf al-Hazmi joined other Arabs to fight in Bosnia as • members of a mujahidin force led by a prominent at-Qa1da operative ---- •• AI-Mlhdhar obtained a US visa in Saudi Arabia in April 1999 and in January 2000 he and al• Hazmi traveled to Malaysia where he was observed meeting with a known al-Qa'ida operative • -Khaffad Shortly thereafter he and al-Hazml arrived In the United States Al•Mihdhar left the United States in June 2000 after briefly attempting flight training He evidently traveled between Yemen Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia He obtained another United States visa in Jlddah In June ••• 2001 and returned lo the United Slates the following month Durtna the next two months he I •• spent time in New York New Jeraey Virginia and Maryland ------- -------------------------------•-· _ C05416972 - - - - - - - - - - • • • • • • Nawaf bin Muhammad Salim al-Hazmi Saudi 9 f ugust 1976 Mecca Saudi Arabia Suspected hijacker AA flight 77 • Other • documentation ••• VtSA information •• • Education INS# 89473829607 California driver's license D2416698 Florida driver's license A425-633-76-288-0 1 8-2 multiple-entry visa issued at Jlddah Saudi Arabia on 3 April 1999 expires 2 Aptil 2001 visa no 14436338• -- Family • information ••• Nawaf al-Hazmi a Saudi national was one of the five hijackers of American Airlines fHght He was bom in Mecca Saudi Arabia on 9 August 1976 According to Saudi authorities ••• 77 al-Hazmf's father disapproved of his son's extremist activities and followed Nawaf to in 1993 forcing him to return to Saudi Arabia In the mid-1990s he and flight • Afghanistan 77 hijacker Khalid al•Mihdhar fOught fn Bosnia By 1998 al-Hazmi was well integrated into al-Qa'ida network He was issued a new Saudi passport in March 1999 and a US •• avisaSaudi in April In late 1999 he traveled again to Afghanistan relocating to Pakistan by the I • end of the yeari II ••• •• • AI-Hazmi and al•Mihdhar flew to Malaysia in January 2000 where they were observed meeting with al-Qa'ida operatiVe Walld Ba Attash a k a Khaflad The two men then flew to the United States where they resided in San Diego California Other than taking a couple of hours of flight lessons It is not known what they were doing during their stay in California I I · • • • AI-Mihdhar left lhe United States for the latter half of 2000 and al-Hazmi remained In the El •• 1 San Diego area until December·when he moved to Arizona with Hanf Hanjur In April 2001 at-Hazmi and flight 77 pilot Hani Hanjur left Arizona and eventually settled In New Jersey __ C05416972 e • I T ----------' ••• •• • Salim Muhammad Salim al-Hazmi • Date of birth • • Place of birth • 2 February 1981 Mecca Saudi Arabia • Age • -----• • Gender ' •• Hair color • Eye color • • Height • 1 - - - - - - Weight • • Marital status • Role • • Suspected hijacker AA flight 77 • • Other Virginia State driver's license ID # A69-60-0408 USA ID #3408828-A Apollo International Travel NJ • documentation • • Visa information US visa B-2 Admin# 96582215707 issued 4 April 1999 Jiddah Saudi Arabia expires 28 December 2001 ••• I• • Education •• Family information Brother Nawaf bin Muhammad Salim al-Hazmi ••• •• Salim al-Hazml a Saudi national was one of the five hijackers of American Airlines flight and the brother of fellow flight 77 hijacker Nawaf al-Hazmi Salim was born in Mecca •• nSaudi Arabia on 5 February 1981 A troublesome teenager aft r being released from Jail the t tll of 1999 he reportedly became very pious after which he left home and never • inreturned I I • 18 • I - • • Between 1996 and late 1999 Salim traveled to Afghanistan at least once and fought with • the Taliban against the Northern·Alfiance In January 2000 Salim traveled to Yemen and returned to Afghanistan at some point during 2000 In June 2001 Salim· received a new Saudi passport and a US visa and arrived in the United States on 29 June along ••• prob bly with American Airlines flight 11 hij cker 'Abd al-'Urnarl They lived in New Jersey with • • several other hi ackers and fraudulently obtained Virginia IDs in early August 2001 • • C05416972 a em r I l£1P DECR -------- ••• ••• Majid Muqid Mash'an bin Mawqid 'Awfi - - - - - Aliases variants ti • ·x f •4 - • -·' J nality - • • Nati • • Date of birth • • - - - - - - Place Of birth AI-Nakhll Saudi Arabia • Age 1111 Gender •• Hair color • • Eye color •• • Height •• Weight • Maritat status •• Role· Suspected hijacker AA flight Ill •• • • Other • documentation •• • • Vlsa h1format1on n Virginia State nondriver's license ID #A69600405 USA ID card #3402618-D from Apollo International Travel New Jersey US visa B2 01820353409 • • Education • Dropped out of university Family Brother Khalid Mash'an Mawqid • information •• Majid Muqid a k a Majid 'Awfl a Saudi national was one of tile five hijackers of American Airlines flight 77 He was born In al-Nakhll Saudi Arabia on 18 June 1977 He reportedly university until late 2000 when he quit and said ha was going abroad In ••• attended November he obtained a new Saudi passport and a US visa he then may have traveled to I •• Afghanistan along with American Airlines fight 11 hijacker atam Saqami l He arrived in the United States In May 2001 with United Airlines flight 175 hijacker Ahmad ••• al-Ghamdi and settled in New Jersey In August he moved to Marand and shared an I • apartment with Khalid al-Mihdhar until the 11 September attacks _ C05416972 I ·• L _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J Appendix C Timelines U I C05416972_ __ -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · - · · - ·-- I C05416972 I ' • -- - • '- - '• _ ' i' ' ·° -' J f - - · · • 1· • · ·- £_ _ -·_ · •· - J · r · - · C05416972 I- 5 ----- •• Key Events leading to the 11 September 2001 •Attacks- • L----c-----ar--------------- -----i---- J·he 11 September attacks were concelved r -- c - - - r - - -- r fter Usama Bin ladln's declared jihad against t e nit tates in 1998 e ave rmation at all 19 hijackers each spent time in Afghanistan camps during late 1999 and early 2001 presumably receiving general al-Qa'ida training · The leadership cadre arrived in the United States in woo colloquially referred to as the first wave All of them had some pilot or flight training in the United States The ·second wave of hijackers probably responsible for controlling the passengers on the 11 September flights entered the United States during the spring and sum er of 2001 i I· · 2000 5-11 January 15 18 3 April May 17 25 29 3June 10 27 JulySeptember September• November November• December BDecember 18-20 June Second wave_ of hijackers traveled to Iran and Pakistan during 2000 probably for onward travel to Afghanistan for trE tlning AI-Mihdhar amj al-Hazmi hold meetings with a senior UBL field operative in Malaysia and Bangkok Khalid al·Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi arrive in Los Angeles from Bangkok Marwan al-Shehhi receives US visa Sa'id al-Ghamdi receives US visa receives another US visa on 12 June 2001 that he uses to travel to the United States Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi take flying lessons in San Diego Mohammad Atta and Ziad Jarrah receive US visas AI-Shehhi arrives in Newark from Belgium Atta arrives in Newark from Czech Republic Reportedly makes a few trips outside the United States between January and September 2001 AI-Mihdhar leaves the United States does not return until 5 July 2001 Jarrah arrives in Newark from Germany He travels between the United States and Europe six times between June and August 2000 · Atta and al-Shehhi begin flight training at Huffman Aviation and Jones Flying Service Twelve of the second wave of hijackers receive US visas Atta purchases flight-deck videos for the Boeing 747 model 200 Boeing 757 Model 22 Boeing 767 Model 300EA and the Airbus Model 200 and other items from a pilot store in Ohio Hani Hanjur arrives In Cincinnati from UAE He had been entering and leaving the United States periodically since the early 1990s Atta and al-Shehhi receive their pilot licenses The second wave of hijackers arrive in the United States throughout the eastern seaboard · · Atta receives Florida driver's license Many of the hijackers obtained US state driver's licenses or state IDs presumably to make it easier to check in at the airport on 11 September 'Abd al-Aziz al-Umarl Fayiz Banlhammad and Salim al-Ha zmi receive US visas C05416972 7 • • Key Events Leading to the 11 September 2001 • Attacks continued • 14-16 August·- 25-31 4September 5 6 7 8 9 Nawaf al-Hazmi Hanjur and Atta travel to Las Vegas during the same three-day period al-Shehhi flew to Las Vegas In late May and Jarrah flew to Las Vegas in late June All flew on aircraft similar to those used in the 11 September attacks All of the hijackers buy tickets for 11 September Hijackers residing in Flordia begin to purchase tickets to Boston and Newark to position themselves for 11 September Atta cashes check for $5 300 in South Pompano Beach Florida Satam Suqami Wail al-Shehri and Abd al-Aziz al-Umari arrive in Boston from Florida to-position themselves for 11 September Banihammad wires $8 055 f om his Florida Sun Trust account to his Standard Chartered bank account in UAE Hamza and Ahmad al-Ghamdi arrive in Boston from Florida Atta arrives In Baltimore from Florida Jarrah at-Haznawi al-Nami and Sa'id al-Ghamdi arrive in Newark from Florida Atta wires $2 860 and $5 000 to Mustafa Ahmed in UAE Fayiz Banihammad and Muhannad al-Shehri arrive in Boston from Florida AI-Shehri wires $5 000 to al-Husawi in Sharjah UAE Marwan al-Shehhi arrives in Boston from Florida Atta ma kes his last phone call to his fathe Atta travels from Baltimore to Boston 10 11 Atta and al-Umari drive to Portland Marwan al-Shehhi wires $5 400 to Mustafa Ahmad in UAE Nawat al-Hamzi checks into Herndon hotel Most of flight AA 77 team already In general area Laurel MD Ziad Jarra phones father for last tim hones wife for last time '-------------' Atta and al-Umari travel via Colgan Air to Boston Atta receives a phone call from a payphone in Logan's terminal C United at 6 53AM · A cell phone call lasting a few min4tes Is made between the hijack teams at Logan Airport 58 Atta uses a cellular phone immediately before boarding Flight 11 to call a number belonging to hijacker Shehrl among others Attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon C05416__9 7 2 __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ------ _ e ---- r••s I Tirneline of the 1 'l September Hijackers First Entrir to th Flight M77 0 UA175 0AAl1 0 US and Subsequent Travel Outside the UA93 US- First entry Into US 15 Jan 2000 • Bangkok Thailand• Hong Kong• Los Angeles CA 10 Jun 2000 • Los Angeles CA• Frankfurt Germany 4 Jul 2001 • Saudi Arabia • New York NY Nawaf al-Hazml Marwan 11-Shehhl Pilot Muhammad Atta Pi Pt 15 Jan 2000 Bangkok Thruland • Hong Kong• Los Angeles CA 29 May zooo • Brussels aelgtum • Newark NJ 23 Dec 2000 • UAE • Germany 12·18 Jan 2001 • New York NY •Casablanca Morocco• New York NY 20 Apr 2ll01- • Miami FL• Amsterdam Netherlands• Cairo Egypt• 2 May 2001 Amslerdam Nelherfancls • New York NY 3 Jun 2000 • P agua Czech Republic• NQwark NJ MO Jan 2001 • Tampa FL• Madrid Spain •Tampa FL 8·9 Apr 2001 • Germany • Prague Czeoh Republic• 7-19Jut 2001 • Miami Fl• Ztlrich switierfand • Madrid Spain• Atlanta GA ZladJarrah 27 Jun 2000 • Dusseldorf Garmany• Newark NJ• Atlanta GA• Pilot Venlce FL ni Han HanJur -Pilot Ulhman al Suqaml 7•29 Oct 2000 • Atlanta GA • Dusseldorf Germany • Boohum Germany • Paris mnce • ousseldorf Germany • Frankfurt Germany • Tampa FL 24-25 Nov 2000 •·Miami FL • Nassau The Bahamas• New Port Richey FL 26 Dec 2000· • Miami FL• Munich Germany• Istanbul Turkey• Beirut Lebanon• 4 Jan 2001 Beirut Lebanon • Germany • Athens Greece to Damascus Syria Dusseldorf Germany• Newark NJ 26 Jan 2001 • Newark NJ • Dussaldorf Germany• Beirut Lebanon • 13ochum Germany 18•26 Feb 2001 • Beirut Lebanon• Bocllum Germany• Dusseldorf Germany• Newark NJ• Atlanta GA• Vtlrlice FL 30 Mar- • AUanta GA• Amsterdam Netherlands• Alfanta GA• 13Apr 2001 Venice FL 25 Jul- • Newark NJ• Dusseldort Germany• Boch um Germany• 5 Aug 2001 Dusseldorf Germany • Newark NJ • Miami FL 8 Dec 2000 • Saudi Arabia • Dubai UAE • Paris France• Cincinnati OHb 23 Apr 2001 • Dubai UAe • London UK• Orlando FL 16 May 2001 • Fort Lauderdale FL• The Bahamas• Fort Lauderdale FL0 Walld al·Shehrl 23 Apr 2001 • Dubai UAE • London UK • Orlando FL 16 May 2001 • Fort Lauderdale FL• The Bahamas• Fort Laudeldale FL0 2 May 2001 • Duba UAE • London UK • Dulles VA M• Pd Muqld 2 May 2001 • Dubai UAE • Lonclon UK • Dulles VA 28 May 2001 • Dubai UAE • London UK• MJaml FL Muhllnnad al•Shehrl 2S May 2001 • Dubai UAE • London UK• Miami FL 28 May 2001 • Dubai UAE • London UK• Miami FL Ahmad al-Haznawl P Jun 2001 • Dubai UAE • London UK• Mlami FL 8 Jun 2001 • Dubai UAE • London UK• Miami Fl Fayll Ahmad· 'Z1 Jun 2001 • Dubai UAE • London UK• Orlando FL aanfhanunad 'J 1 Jun 2001 • Dubai UAE • London UK• Orianclo FL 'Abd Ill-Aziz al•Umarl 2ll Jun 2001 • Dubai UAE • Zurich Swllzerfand • New 'ibrk NY 211 Jun 2001 • Dubai UAE • ZUrlch SWHzerland • New Vbrk NY • I C05416972 -·• '---------' 1 Appendix D Other Publications on the 11 Septem er Attacks UJ C05416972 ft''1¥5tt1 t J • •••• Othei- Publlcatlnna an the 11 Septo111ber Attacks IUI thQ Gauging Terraris111 Mast 11 S11ptember Tarrorist Practices · Stilt Vipbl11 30 Jenua 2002• Analysis of lhi eptember hijacker tradecraft 511ggcsts that the key n quiremonLs for such attacks remain readily avaiiable in the United States The heightened security environment within the United Slates rendered more difficult-thoush by no means impossible-future terrorist auocks within the -United States exacll like those that occurred on J I S mber has Arizona Lang-Tarm N • xus for Islamic Extremists 15 May 20D2 CTC 2D02-3D037H joint paper with FBJ Loooely affiliated hlamic extremists in Arizona pose • credible threat based on their violently anti-US view and ties to senior al-Qa'ida operatives esides bcooming involved directly in operalions these militants would b ' well positioned to fin•rna or aid the lnivel of other operatives le5S familiar 1 11 • C05416972 d I Ifft • with operating in the United StatesJ Alternative Vlewt ptambnr Hijack11ra Possibly lnvohmd in Prevlaus US PlatL_J S Jul'I 2002 CTC-2002-30064 · 'lwo of the 11 September hijacl en Kll lid al-Mihdhm' and Nawaf al-Hazmi may have been involved in lhe preparation of a terrorist o ration on US oil in 2000 ¢fem the became involved In the 11 S tember mtion FaclRtatlng Disaster An Ove Jew of 11 SepteMbllr Fln11ACII lU 22 August 2002 · The financial transactions that supponcd the 11 September atlacks in many ways rellected the overall nature of the operalion relying on ostensibly legi matc actlvitics carried out in lhe United Sillies 1 1ld Western Europe over the course of more than two yClll'S The hUackers and their financial facilitators oppear to have been weU coached by an organizational leadership wilh lengthy Cllpcricnee in moving funds unobtrusively In the ere 2002-40093H pre-l l September atmosphere the plotters' clean personal histories and close adherence to nn unobtrusive system of financial ioleraction that supported the plot could not-absent additional cause ror suspicion-have alerted US 01lic1als or linonciol- iector observers to the impending disasterc J Threat Thr11• d11 Rei ent Advane11s In Understanding 11 Sept11111blll'CJ 16 S pt11mbar 2002 · CTC 2DD2-3D0B6CH I ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___J