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United States Experts to the Technical Discussions on the Problem of Surprise Attack, “Stability – A Criterion for Evaluating Inspection and Control Systems, Application to Mixed Systems and to the 1962 Strategic Postures,” by Vincent V. McRae, Philip H. Lowry, and Joseph O. Harrison, 12 November 1958, SAG/10, Top Secret

• UNITED STATES EXPERTS to the TECHNICAL DISCUSS ONS ON ' l'HE l HOBlE N OF SURPRISE ATTAClC t · _ •• --' STABILI' Y _ A CRITERIQlf FOR EVALUATING INSPECTION AND CON•rROL SYSTEMS ro en APr'T ICATION TO MIXED SYSTE AND TO THE 1962 STRATEGIC POSTURES C11 This 1s a continuation of SAW 1 47 by fhi11p H LowryJoseph 0 Ha r1aon Jr Vincent V McRae ll •H I c N · ' c it 11 J · AUG I 1 gA - • J lufllY IO i 1 j _ 0 - ---- IC OAt ilt • • I 1 uSpe6 i RHand11ng Requir ed Not _ 11 ' c1• ' Relee s·able to Foreign Nationals 1 365910 ' • • • - ' ' The sta ility of strategic attaek systems such as ICBMs IR13Ms n l nned e 1rc art 1 and' ballistic missile sub t ar-inl s tn various eombin at ions are collipsreQ to th'e stability ietel' lllne i iii S W J 47 f6ti the e se -Wl el'e ICBMs are t only strategic weapi Q on bqth aid e s Due to time constraJ rte only cl tet-1a A atabi li ty is con s idered Although soine combinations -change the degree of stab11 ity or instabLl ity ot the CBM duel there ar Qnly t ro strategic pqs't 11 'es -w4icn rnal al l cases unifo stable independent or the I CBM capability 1 Posse s sion by both sides of a manned bo rnber force invulnerable to SUt'pt Se attack by ICBMs erhaps by being cc nt nuousJ y airborne • 'Which is e·a pable or pen trat'tl'lg alert ail' defenses artd inflioti ng ct itlcal danta-ge on the 11ggressQf Is e1t1es J 5 20 10-t l'J' boro bs or 40-60 1-MT l litr-to-suri'ace m1ss Lles 2 P¢sieas1on b - botl sides o r- a biD 11st 1 c mlsslle s bmat i e capa_bility Wlt1cn cat i inflict crlt1¢tl d ge op the nggressorts cities tn r etaliation 80- 8 5 ½- MT POLARIS-type mi11siles Estim tes of the tptal number of submarines re Q 1ll Jt6 il tt gge ¾Jtorn · 9 ' t oor8 t T ne estil 11 a tad 19'6 2 str tegfc 1 lQsture of t'® US and USSR is e am n$il fi U sttaltSli ty ·wttll · iu •w11lhe 1fF soine t ypes or inspE1cti ort Without any 1nspectioa the dominating Influence on the likelihood Qf a US surpl se attack is the av-e ila ble inte1 Ll genoe on the location of Sovt et lOBM oases The VSSR es n a lwa r8 insure erltic dam e by re t al'ia_tion 1 r- tii e usdoes not know the loc t iop of more than 75•80 pe o$nt at' these bases S ince such complete 1nt·e 11·1genee 1a mlike ly w1thou1 inspectton the 11S may t e considered to be al ways dete i-red Stabil1 t r t here fore depends on whether o 'not the USSU 1 s aJ s o det erred The dominating influence on ·the 111ce' l 1 hood of e Soviet survttiae attAok is tfle alel't ste tus of us forces· If fast response foroef l capable · oi 1 nt1 1ct ing or1t1oal dan ag13 on the USSR o an be made invulnerat le to lCBM a ttaeic with or without a BMEWS the s i tuation ta stable rt the Uss' R CBM att aok oatches trs bombers and tcBMa t Ii the ground the sit1 1«tiQn is l lh $ t$ ble ani l i'a vor able to t le USSl With an • • I • ' -2With art 1 nspeot ton sys·te111 of a sufficiently h1 gh orde to guarantee that the JS can ottaclc 80 percent or 111011e or the Soviet ICBM bases stabilit depends entirely on the alet-t status of the fot•ces on both sldes I C sufficient_retaliatory i'oroas on l o th s des survive en ICBM ettaclc th si tuetion ts always stRbl e lf the retalia toi y capa'b111ty of Only tine side survives the situation is stable in favor of that aide I t a suf'f'icient retaliatory ·c apaoillty on neithe t e US or USSR a vil v e - the slt u atton •is tmstpl ile in tbe bta nest degnee ·Botb the oz end' USSR· eai m ak -- a highly Juc ce-ssl'ul surprise e ttacl and both fear tnat the otbex wlll do so Inspection therefore does 1 ncrea e stability only to the ex t nt that 1 t provide sufficient w arning to z•ender e 'feotive retal1atol'y forces 1nvulner able on both sides An e c runinat ion of the 11nil e te1•al acticns h ioh b·o th the USSS might t c l e prier to the inception 01' ap agrestoont or artet• llome ypo·a 9f agrei 1tnents clearly demonstrates that mch actions can pr0d u c a stebl posture with inspection $tab-d 11ty will only be ach1 e f d however 1 f both the U$ and the OSSR take such actt ons I f OW'I sid e t -a kes action arid the o1 per does no t symmeti ic 1nstabil' 1tiea • ill 8 y becQ il e asynroietric n favor· of the side taklng the act1on and ste 11 e -postures may become asyih t r1eally unstable Examples of -un11 P teral actions are h1 'l ing hardening diape sin g or changing- the conf'lgurat1 o n of J CBM IRBM and bomber ba es building ballistic missile submarines maintaining 1_al'ger bomber forces on aix borne al ert or in general lne-re s1 n the cespotise time o-r otfen$1ve s ysteMs We have not examined unil teJ al actions 1n detail and nave Olllitted de t ail consi ieration of ao·t 1 ve defenses Yet it is clear ·t la t even low 1 eve·l active ICB -4· de tenses pa rticula1•ly if -use d in co njwtct'ion with hardening U d dispersal could af fec t ste bi11tyas ·m-ucn as the othe r unDatere l act1 o ns discussed the US end - --j #fcxw T • - j- P•ART I TJ BILl TY OP b1J J fil STRATEGIC SY$ EMS ROBLEM To de'ter J d l' e tto wh t- deg 'ee the s tabi11ty found 111 SAW 147 for ' ll '6 'ICBM systems is· ohan geli l y il ntroducipg other att ateg c sys telll8 'IllBMa submarine- launched m1·ss1les t and raanneµ boni bel s in va t i0us eombina tions DEFIN ION •F STABILITY ln SAW JJ 7 · Cl i tet ia A tabili ty was d efined 1n tel'Ms of the t elati ve effecttveness or· irurj r1se -retalia to ry attacks in inflioting orttic a l damar e while holding o ne•s own d t Jllae e to l ess than or tt ieal vel • e stall consider C ritElria A at'a l bility irt this repo1•t unles s otherwise specified 'l'he fol l ow1ng deflnlttona diatinguisl between s able and unstable situa- tions Staple · Neither the US tlQl' i tl e USSR by surpt ise a€lack esn both ini'lii t er1t 1ca 1 d ge op the e e and trevent the r e t $ 1 ie tion from infli t1 ng c t'itioe l damage on him eli' nat ible• Elther- the US and or the· USSR or both by- surpr14e tl'ttack can both infl ict cri t1caI dsmnse •ll tile eneir y and p - vent ·t tie retaliation from inflicting ·critical damage on 'biroselt Cr -ti cs 1 d '1Jisge wa1 1 defined aa the ability t o 20 Percent of th tu-ban po ' ulartion destroy 30 percent of the indus tt-y- a f a nation It 'as asstlmed that no r a tions 1 e g• ss r would make a sux rise attack i 'he were onV1need that hia 0 111 losses would be at least this gveat It 1s posaibl e to 1nd1 ca te degrees- or stability end instab l lity by J eferenee to Figure l A1 l possible outol' i es of a thermonuclear exche n ge are indicated by a point on the following u asram relating tb t damage 1n Clicted by surprts$ attack to the dSI1U1ge suffered in retalintion The mo1J t stable situation t s one in wnich the attacke r · who atteinpts tci miniiiitze his own dllll lge l' 8Ce1 ves IUOl'e damage t'r om the ret·a l1ato ry stril than he· 1nflJ cta by· t1 swpri se attack Tn se outcomes lll'a 110 11 fer a USSR attack and- D tor a U3 - -4- DMlai e to US SR zo- 3o t' C B A D Damage t-0 OS fol' a u s attack st·111 staole but 1 e ss so al' O -Se 13 whe r e cr1tioa1 dams_ge is rece ved by both aides Nigardlese of who ·a ttacks 1'B11 'or· each sid e or wh5re th eTe al 'o indecisive oul icoriu 1st o oml irui t ot S o t 11 A'' end '1B ' w1 tlt 1'0'1 and 11 0° • 10 11 ooourring -when tl' e ussll atta c'ks and P ocoW'ring when the US at tacks 1 he unstable c ases roa v be subd i ided into 't he lee st unstable USSJ't attack gi vas l 1D but US attacks gives 'I 11 A'' or P where the aggre- a sor has no fear • e t1' er -of r ets 11at1o n or of sl 'rprise at'taoic by the oth e t s de ½lo the Jt10St on- $tab1 0 0 11 fpt' QESR at t ack 'lilad' 11 S11 'er US a t t -Ql l e e bo-tb sides can me lte effee-tive ourprise 11ttack an4 teal' a alll'pr i se a•t tack by the other STABILITY OF PURE ' CB f $ STEMS Th e snabill t'y of pure CBM systems is shown in To ble 1 where pa rtty in numb r•s • yield CEP base he rdfaess o nd base 011fig l' a ti•n is ass- 44ed t etw en th 1JS and tha USSR Un• st'ab1e ai tuatJ pos at-iee f W '28t'AlJ y w ien bo-t h side11 fu 1e s oft We do no£ oonside ir the j ndecisive situation -where neither ·si ht can inflict critical d arne ge by aw-prise attaok nor alee an efi'eotive retaliation All of this dtscussiQn o stab11fty re fe rs on l y to a single crttex• on or da mase de f'ined at that 1e v el of 'dema e to himself which l'OUld de ter a rational aggressor SAW 147 i itscussea enot'fi er o r 1 tar ion defin 'ld Era a higher level of dmnf ge which would deter a leas r ational aggres soi- and aasui ied tp b 50 j el cen t deat h of ur bM popula t 1 on 60 percent dest ruc t ion of industry bases and I I • ' I - ·5bases and accurate missiles at l le situations when Qth aides have hard bases and inaecurate mis·sil s In conditionally unstable itt tions tabll1ty depends on the ab solute nwnbers and or 7ields between reasonable limits auoh as 200-800 missil es and ¼-10 megatons rt generalt greater nUlllbers make unstab'l e s1 tu a t1ons lltoJ 'e unstable and stable situations more stable The ' llodel used to obtain Table 1 consisted of a surprise atta k which directed eno gh mJ as11es at the defender•s bases to prev ent ett'ective retaliation and lilrected the relllB in i ng mJ ssilea if any at the defen ierf'$ cities The retaliation was S l a -s direo t ed at cities only Tabl 1 Stability of Pure ICBM SyeteinS CEP n ll i i3ase Hardness ¼ l 2 '2 psi 1J u u 25 psi u 100 psi t s S crater lip s s s U • S ' - 5 ' $ 'UnS ta lE condit1onal l y unstable stable condt t onally mstable favoring USSR conditionally unstable favoring US STABILITY F 1l CSM-IRBM SYS'l'EMS Unlike ICBMa IRBMs inevitably produce an asymmetric situation between the 'US and 't he USSR We can ass'UJJ 8 tbat the USSR can and would move their ICBM 1 Ja es out of range of US and NATO lRBMs sh oennot il ove ber o1t1es out of range Thus US and NATO IRBMl deploye d overseas can attack Soviet RBMs and cities • while Soviet IRBMe will only attack US and NATO IRBMS F'o r simpf1city the model does not cons ider PS attacks on Satellite cities nor Soviet attacks on the cities 0£ ou r allies The tabilit r 9410 B9-ik I ' - I ' ' 8J alll ' -6 'ne etab1 I 1ty ·of a lllixed IC H-IRBM system is sho-wn in The ICBM model 1s the a8llle as before IRBMs are Table 2 T able 2 Stt1 bility of Mi ed maM-ICBM Sy items CEP n m t ¼ l 2 2 P l l'i tr u u 25 psi u 1 ii-- s psi 'l s crater lip '1 s s s s BaE1·e H iiia iesc 100 5 U - unst11b1 e 'l • condi't1Qnally unstable conditi onally unstable favo ing USSR - aondttionatly unstaole favoring us S - stable U • unstable favorin Os I treated differently for simplicity A11 IR Ma are assumed to have a yield of 2-MI' and a CEP ro 2 n m The -US is given 100 while the USSR ls _give enough to destroy all overseas tR bases when ilak ng a S U'prise attaok These as suml tions regarding nunibet-e appeal' reasonablf ¼ beoa se th ml tieed only 4-0 to cause 20 percent de J ths to th i Soviet urban population b r IRBM- attack only- and beo use i ntel ligence estimates indicate that tl'SSR cnpab111ties in IRBM8 will depend on their requirements and their r1 tquirelll lnts never exceed a few hund r ed in this m odel - If we compare Table 1 and Ta'b e 2 we see that the re is 1 it tle ohange One unstable oase is changed to a conditionall y unstable case 100 psi ½-mile CEP and a ocnditionally unstable oase with USSR supe r 1oricy ls changed to e 11 unstable case wil th US supe r iority The laok of ahange in stability is the more remarkable when lt is reoa I d t1 l1t the assumptions imply that the US suprlse attack 111 always produce a 0- itic11l damage o the Sov·1 ets While the ov1et surprise al tac O'Jt come is not changed STABILITY FOR WSECRET -7STABitI'l'Y F'OR ICBM SUBMARt LA tJNCHF D 1'1' ISSI E SYSTEM No oa e l-a t on is v eq1 1i11ed £ or determ nil g the stahiU' iy wnert the attack systelll3 cQns st ot ICBM ancl submaI1 ne 1aun¢tled missJ l»s The sub max ine t'oroe at sea is inyul n ra le to IeBMs either init t al 1y oi- 1n xietali a tion during t 11 1 t irst few hours •of an attack We Oll 4 saf'ely assume ther1 1t'ore that i ·n this o a sa a1l sub11111t ines wt th1n range of thetr te l'gets at tlle ¢ut 'prealt o w' u' can fll'e t eu ent'ire lc 84 ot mis iles It both sides nave a capability of 100 or so missiles tlle si tlllat1on ia always st-al te because Qnl r 8Q tp 115 missil s th a t-Ml' warbes 4 and a CEP na t m01'e tbM 2 ·n m e re requir ed to l n• Oiet 20 percent demage on the us ot• m ISR Thus neitlilil1' side can prevent effective r e taliat1on on tts c1tit s «rt-er 11 s·urpr1 s ilttack 'llhe number f su b iries requ1 re i b y- each s d e to assUi 'e itse11 o this oap ab 111ty need flllly be d term ned for the defender· inoe tba attacke can always pl ce his total i 'lubrne rine capabi t ty in the pooper l U'e1i The qefartdei 11' he la t rU ly surprised will only pave h1111 on- st at1on aub111arine·s properly p1a9ed JJ st ates of the fJ act£on ot on ·stst n sub merlnes vai'fee f oni one·--thil'd to one he lf o£ the total force I£ we a Jsume tnat all t1Ubl1larine111 oarl'Y 16 m1ssl lee tp e ·a f tac er requires 6 sutmiarines artd the defender 12- 18 1lubli S rirtes to guarantee stsoJ11ty Th nt mibet• required by tne decender may ve'l 1 be lese th an this if h e has l'easonable asauranoe that his in-tra mli t submarines can re1 1oh thei t opet•at1 areaa Md f1Te t he1t •missiles undetected The -enemy cities $rid 1nd1 18trial plants w11 l stil 11 'be there fq r the l ate-ooruers tQ destroy a lthou gh the populati·o n will b e m'1 h bet·tei J i'otected at this tlms 'The on'J y V111nei'a ble s1 1bmanii'lE1 sr e assumed to be those in the etend ei • s potots at the ttma ot the surprise abtaQk Opt1ll 11st1cally we wil l estimate t h$t two- thk-ds of the de 'en4er 's 'ballistic missile aubll arine tot-ce ean rire their wea pons 'l'he requir ed number ot subl1 i8 1'li es 1n tpis oas E is ntne We may eonoJ ude t hAt Criteria A •I Jpe s tabililty may be as·s ed if betwe n 9 and 18 missile-o a rrying su marinei fire possess·ed b 7 bpth sides f we con81Qer t case wm re only the US posses ll lissile ¢ ir ryil g SU1 JT1arines the situation is identical 'to that gi en i 1' Cable 2 ftrto IRBMs exeept that all the 1nstab111ties ill-8 in favor of the us The Soviet apability is not ePMget s n e theil' lRBl ts now have no ccunter- i'oroe I'Qle ' I'll US pos i es19es the eapsh111ty by surprise ttQ ek and iletali atiion which assures - ertec t 1ve datt1aWr ' - - SBCHa'i' -8e1'1'ect1 e damage to the SQV t U111ol i On sho' l ld e- c e rei'ul therefore not to o¢ns1der s t at - 1 11 ty a OrtYI11o'lls witb one's own preponde -a QQlh The other side will hold a vastly di1'fl 'lrent point o r view ST IBirLITY FOR ICBM-MANNEll T30MBER SY-STEMS Attacks by manned bombers di f' 'er f' rl l ll ba1 11s t1c miasi l e attack beea1J 11e aot 1 e dei'Q ses agai nst manned b Oll bel's extat tQday i n both the us and USSR It is not sufrietent tbererore 1Tl8 rely to detel'lll-ine the alert c JH bllity and Slll Vival probab1 1ty of maMed bo 11 be rs 1n the fa qe i' attacks on their bases by b 1ist1Q miss1 lea One must e iso l Stimate reaitona ble l j l'i'O' l''illiU' ce level111 against the aot ve d tet1st1s at 'l cOtq1t y in order to obtain tlle number lftucl i Dll 18 t be seh1 1n e sw prl se attack or l btoh lttUSt survi e a oounte1--1'oroe attaok 1n order to 1n1'11 Q t critic -1 i_atnage on the en e'lllY'• lt iii poseiblE1 howevar to lirdt the number or casea in which tbs 1ntrodu o t1ol'l ot nrenned bombers c hangei th e a t abiUty hich bas been estimated for ptire O BM systeliU For exaltlple if the situation 1$ ·s ts b le beoaui e bqth _aides cen retal-iate t e f feo t1ve11 w1 th tOBMs Ill one J11Mned bomber-a -•tum tCJ lske the e ttutUffl l' tl table The a Jits o kl r will alre•ady be cri1 lca1 ly d-8 lllB ged by- re t a•l 1ating ICBMs betore a WMned bortibel a t taek 01'l 1nfl UGnoe the issue - reinain1ng- st aole oas·es end unstab l e eases however muat be e Candtled ·o ne by one 1 o esti111ate the effect of J CSM a'btaolt on the retaliatory capability Qf the oppQtier lllAtmed bo@er s makfrig assumptic n reg9 J l1ng wavntng # a ls t atatus and penetration o apabi11 ty and t he targets e p- pl'opi 1ete An 11dequjl te ·analys1 s or the mannl 'ld 'boinbers and IGBM's ta not available cfor thia paper- Acaol'dingly we wil 1 $6nstd·e r two extreme cases an alert bollibar· tor¢e an l a nQn- aleI't bom'be r for ce An al ert force will be defined as one which ii e11pable o'f inflJ at ing ·oritioal damage on en eneil Y' who make s a surprlae att ack with ICBMs We do not speo 1 f'y li w thi a t 1 1 l ' ne l'res'Ull1ab1y it is dona bv a cQml ln tion 01' s n airborne alert force and an eft eoti ve Bl'1EWS ombined 1th fl r J llway ale r t force ICBt-1 atta Qka against qombel basea undar su oh l'on4itlons aoeolttJ liabce li'ttle A rt on- ale rt force is one wh ich ie a'ut' f i c1ently 'VUlnerable tt ICBM' attac that a s _cceset u1 IC 3M attack on bomber base-a w11 l prevent l ennea 1 lonllJ eva i'ront 1ntlletln critical damage n r- barr e -bas d planes are 11' pJ 1c1t r 11 l e t_l he-·· imr ed bomber d1scus 1on SEeRt' ' retal1at1on It -9vee·al t at tqn 'I t is assumed th t an ava r a damage o£ 90 percent to all oo mbar bases ldll pl event a non-alert force rrom mald ng an efteotive r etali8tion F'ox rni rpo sea oi' this paper• an av lrage dall111 ge o 1 ess than 50 percQnt to bQ er bases is as slil@d t o permit even a non-s l ert bGl l' ber torce to inflict oritiee l dariaae 1n retaliation ThEI manned bomber foI'Ce of the e ttaoke'rl sS tllilsrly be eon sideI ed tn two extreme eases hie bomb r force can lnfiict by itse1f cr1t1ca1 Q ai lage on the enemy ot it cannot This gt oup ng g1v es us S oasQs f o't' manned bOJ11ber s c an alone whi'Oh ar-e sho i n in l igUI'e 2 w1 th the out comes resul t ing b-0111 t _aupsequen t a ot t v Lt es ot the manned bom bers 1J Al 1 oi Lt-came e re ·stat Le except the P C qase« To determme stab1li't «T ii' a l¢ lt ' in 'Wl' igll the Qlll f stri t'orces Figure 2'• Outcomes f'or Maimed i30ll bar A t tack c§nlY Derende 's ann d DQlllbe s Alert Ati ckerfe Att1 101tars· Ml lnl lea Bol'llbet-s N'o n•Alert D C infliot ori ttoa1 demage ICt3 111 SAC bases B B 1 1 B d¢ bQ ia1'1 lot oritioal 13•amage A A do not 1 1llc SAO bases ·kill SAC base s do not'-kill SAC bases' trSSR at t aek US•aattaclr are milnn d bQmbel S and ICBMs we must add the pure manned bQP l er o utcQll e$ of' Figw-i '2 to l jte IC M' du l B lt before c l1 '1 18 that we can ar r tve t seve i al o·onclusions by inapectton It is obvio ua that all oa 1 1s are stab'le in whi n tb e· de f 'ender 1 s bombers are invulnerable to 1CB a W need oons1d there f ore o lly the oases where the· de fende rts marrned bombers are not aie t t The ICBK duel • I 'l'p SECRE'P -10- The IOBM dtlel cons1 ilts ot' t ·nr e target systems· J or the a tt-ackel' e qual number o f I-CBM 'bases 50 ti$ Md 55 USSR SAC bases · and cities the de1'end e r • as before attacks only o·1ties We combine the results of the ICBM ca lculati Qf ls and Figure 2 itito Tables j and 4 tor the tw-o dases of interast the defende - is not ilert and the 11 ita 6ker•s bopib rs are - ef£ectivei t e defender ls alert and the attacke rs bOl'nbeps are ineffective TabJ e 3• ·st -bi lity' of lOBM - Manned Bomber Sy-steI11B Attao er's ijombers Effective CEP 2 ps 1 -' g 1 2 2 u u uu psi u 100 psi 1 Cr ater 11-p 7 25 ir-a b 4 r 3 y s s $ s s • Stllb1il dl Y •Gf OBM-Manne - aomber S St'e lm ·Attaoker-t•s B lilb l'a Ine1'feot1 ve CEP J 2 2 2 _psi i u u 1i 2 psi u s 100 psi s s s Ora tar llp $ s S- U - unstable 1 - oond1 t1one lly unstable 'l • condi tiona lly- unstabl·e f avoring USSR '1 • coi1 d1 t1o r e lly UI 1 1table i'avorrS-ng US S • stable Two l lonclusions ' ' ' Two conolusim1s can be a rAwn from a glanoo ct these ta b1ee The edd1t1on or lltanned bombers of ICBMs does not greatly ohaoge the n lliibe o cases whioh are stable o r un stable T re are a ' fe'tf moli6 stehl e oaaeJ1 w1tb an a tta ok by inerreotive manned bombers but not as much as one would 1 n1 ulttvely ·suppo11e T second onclusion is that syn •• mstr1oally dt'eotive 111anned b'Oll bera do not cruing9 the nUmber of stable or unstable cases ai all but the1 do ohange the ohe racter ot conditional 1l'il tabil1ties advel' ely td tile us In the p IX'e ICBM dU l• 3 out or 5 oonditional tnsta i1lttes f'avored the us Whert effeot1ve manned bombers are a clded none favor the us It should be observed again t iat only criteria A type stability is being considered nere ll'ld that considerations of lethal damage l l ay mcxiify some or the st-atements Jllll de 'WhereAs the IGB model 1Tll1Y give sts bl e· reaults· When onlt or1ttoa1 levels are aonai-dered the co ined CBM-Manned Bomber Molie1 wou1tl -in general c se the a Jt cked nat-ton to sue ta1 a l ttui l lev i or damage This would l ave' e gri ateJ ' deste billzing e£ t'ec t t -ban that ind Qated here Thi'S i s pal' ticula rly true 11' as m11trio bomber ass pt1ons hold · Ta b1 es 3 and 4- a 1Jsumed the Sam alert status for both eitdea Tile 1 1itu atJon for et'1'ect1ve boll ber attack and only the US a1 ert ls sh own in Table 5- Table 5 Stability 1'Ci ' ICBM•Manned Bomber systems OS Alert OBP ½ 1 2 psi u u 21 pd u u s 1 00 psi oi-ater l'r 11-p 5- 2 u 's 'S s s s s g s O' • unstable • condi t1onal1 y unstsable 'HI•• oond1 ti-onally unstable favor-i •ng USSR e1 cond1t1-onally S - a t able unstable favoring us u - unstabl 1 favoring us From the us • -l2From the point or v tew- the a1tU'lttion ts exo ll ene i all the instabl1it-tea res ult from a us oapability for auc$es·a ful attao w len the USSR has not such oape bility Fi-o111 tlul soviet point- of '11ell the s ttuat1 oll is dii aetroua 1t we compare Table 5 with Table 4 from th purely objective standpoint of' stabi11 ty e 1'ind a s' l ightly greater ri llll ber ot a table oases but the gen$l'al de8l e-e of ste bility- is often much 1 eas • condi t1ona1l 1 unstable cases ha'te beoome stable 1 two c-onditiona'l ly unatab le cases ba v become mate ble and one unatable ee ae has become oondi lonally unstable The cMe w'h'ere only- the USSR is alert 1s neel'ly identical except tbat ' he U$SR ii substituted tor th US as 'tihe fa 'or -ed aide 1n tbe vn-steb1e case11 If e d o not d s t ing is h betwee·n ci-it'l cal a rt l t'bal d8Ill llge we l lay oonclu de that 111anned bombers t oge-t her wt t J CBMa have t'' l followi'l'l$ effects ori stability as established by the ICBN b'last a uel 1 2 Both sides alert with BMEWS - l le th i r stde e lert st able 1rrespeo1 1Ve l' OBM outcorn or stap•i e cases less stabl e unstable eases 1-e ss - sta'l 'i 3 Onlr IJS a lert steble oases Jiess s t able all uns-t able asea favor us 4• On 1 y 11$$R al art stable c ees less stabl all uns le oases 1'1 VOI' USSR MIXED ATTAGK SYS1'EMS In the prece·g 1ng e otlons w- eon idered the et f 'ect ot vari-ou s atta ek systems one e t a ti rn this section w wil1 f Ut toom together in ira rioµ s coJrib na1 1¢ns to determine tbe e££eet 9n stab 11tyco llPered to the plWe ICBM d el Tb gen ral col' lclusions are glven 1n 'Table 6 Which compues 36 comb-inat ons of lGB s tRBMs alert manned b0lllber41 nonalert manned boxnbers and POLAR'l aubmar 1nes • to the pure ICBM due 1 om tbe standpolnth fis stl tbil 1tyr 1Qn•ibi ebt tuE nnadu'bambel ' ' f bees ·9 tofll8 POU Rm l3wm Mt 1l e e-t't t1'tfi f • 1 • 1 · t · · n •r- ' ' l l V J - - ·t ' flc tln••l d bnF ·- 1' • r ti p SEORET 1 8- • e s-13Ul'lltng that I - - iie SECRET -13 esum1ng that tbe se are tru1y ipvulnerable a thoaa OJ' station can alw s deliver the 11' full cpmplement of 'Weapons on each side oan a sure eqttil1 bri ura in the sense that neither the OS nor the USSR oan by surprise attack prevent effective retaliation by 1 be other · The stability aohlevea therefore is stability 'by teu·• not stabtlity in tb e sense of 'positive ssuranoe that on 1 s own -o untr1 can survive • ' rabl 6 illustl'a tes the dominating effect of relatively tnvul n rab'le· systems that ala possestJ a capability to in 'liot critical d8Ji age M111s11a-carrying subl UU'1•nes end alert manned bombers dominate their respective rows nd c·olumnii If both e ldes pos less this o-apability the sttuat1on is always tabl e The stability- does not depend on the ICBM po ture If only one s1de poasEYsseJ thi oapability the stability does not depend on the ICBM posture 6asea wlJ ioh were table fi r· the 'I CBM duel remain a table oases which were unstable -remain unstable but the unstable cases always tavo'L' the side osaessing the capabiUty 1 It is necessary to reoal1 at this point that the• alert manned bomber roroe was a seumed a flcient to penetl'ate the atea and local defen ses •of the Oitber If this asSUllt_ptton is rejected ther e a no dif t'erence betwoon ale11t and non-alert manned bomber foroes in Table 6 4 j 0 -'17 l -- ' '-- 4 '£ 1-1' ' ' efiRitffi Fl i I - - -' ' -1 3A- Table 6 Cl1a11ges in Stablll cy $ ICBt-1 Syste lla are Imbedded in M1xed Attack Sys tenu - IRBM USSR 1 IRBM L tttle change RBM H j lRBM non- alel't mBM alert _ P OLA RIS bom Oe r s bombers Little cha 6e us I Llttle TW jPOLA nIS POLARll I non-al e1't alert 'bombera bomberS' clla1e us Litt'le change L t ttle us I us I L 1tt e ALWAYS AWAYS change STP BLE Al W tYS S'PABLE L1ttle ohange us I 0 ange - 1RBM Alert Bombers Little hange USSR STABLE IRBM Little Little change· ALWAYS USSR I us us cllare us us IRBM POLARIS Little charlge ALWt YS L1ttl e $TABLE Bombe1•a harlge USSR chaQge cfi7e us Little A'f WAYS At WAYS STABLE ALWAYS STABLE ALWAYS L1ttle change ALWAYS STABµE I S ABLE change US lJ'SSR USSR - IRBM POLARIS Alert I liittle Nonalert l ' L tttle ehange S' l ' ABLE l AlMAYS S'JJABLE Little change ALWAYS STABLE STABLE USSR Bombet s - Change· USSR I POL IRIS tlon alert I ittle ALWAYS c i'ange STltBLE USSR I ALWAYS ST ABLE · l Bombe rl5 l I e favotlecl $ RE1' • ALWAYS STABLE 'I I •• PJIRT II I sotm ERFECTS OF NSPEC' t Olf AND CONTROL ON STABIU'l Y IN'mOOOCTION In part I ve rio'l eombirta t ions Of atrategl c at t a systems 11e eOCSil ned f or e tabili ty under cpn tl tiona or a ppto iniate paTlt - in numbers and qUfl ll1 y o wi ·e p ms In Part II we cQlil ider the erfeets of various insp ec tion pl'o p os ls on the s t billty of ixe 1 ay tems in general a n4 on th a 1962 strateg1'c p 1 a ture ot the US and liSSR in p a rticul ar l •l'l the latter case -we al 130 examine the eCt'Elcts en atabilityor various Unilate r al a e t ions which both aides might take in any eivent or a I a result or -an 1nspec t 1on agl'ee11l en t EFFECT S OF lNS Jl CTION Oi J S' PABU l TY OF MI ttD SYS IEMS l' anne boraber inspeo ti on proposals might ai'i'ect atabil1ty in at l ease thretl ways oy decreas1 ng tbe size ot the initial wave or $'1J l'l riae atta¢ and gerie a1iv by inore1 1si ng t he warnins ti1Mi d thus allo wins the defeqger 1 s bor lbers a g reater chan te of avo1ding_ 1ca11 attack and by trtcreas ing tile knO ' ledge of ooth sides of the locat_i·on of cur nt ac tlve· bomber bases It in1 pecti n increases WIU'D1ng time ffJr both ai®s stf lbi li t y ts incz eas a to the extent that the alert bombE t' 1'01•ce on bo t n sides coul d execut an f rectiv re tal atoey il tnqk in tl e fe le 01' a surprise lCB t attack on aii bases Tp e 1mpro v ed intelligence on the daily status· of SAC and S'O$AC base act Lvlty f'or• bo t h sides wo1J ld tend to deeveruie stability by inorea slng l' he -probability ·01' a suce esstul a ttack on thees bases Th is 'S tatement ass me s that the inte 1 1 gence on both sid s is• about the aatte 1£ ae m l y be Ukel7 t e U·SSR alre ady nas euf 'ioi ent int'l 1lliP en¢e on SAC opel e ttone to bl'tmt the US r ann it boratte i - 1•etallaticin t y ICBM attack on air bs ses ruad ae tive bombat- defenses an i tne USSJ l b lieves that the 'US does not possess a simila» capal l l ty a gainst the USSR the inteUig nce ri ins from an speetlon agreei11ant woulci deo r f se stat ili ty 1 1 incr asiP o USSR tears of a surprise a ttack but t bis wo11ld probab be orr- et Y the U SSffls increased blow dge of tbe stat s ot our fot ces U 1 Bl i i nape'c'tion prO'vtded· suf' fic tetit e arl r warning then bt jt i siqes would p-o ssess alert manne d bom ber roro As - e have see n in PaJ'1l I an alert mapned bombe - f orce on both sid $• which Ls atl equate to inflict cri ti cal dar iage J n l' italie ticn1 will malre all Y table __ BBeRET -15tmlltab le si ti1 a1 1 ems stable r Etgar dless ot· bhe lCBH posture The only pro poiia i regardi ng rr ssi le--carrpng SW l't t•ines -wh lich can affaci s tability concerns the division ·o the woi'ld 1 s ooe-ans betwee n the US and USSR su ch that neithet side would h ave on-station subiliar 1ne11 capai le of ir fliotiJ tg ear ge Qn the othe r by surpr18e at tack rn eval ua t1ng t4e effec t if this proposal on lltab1H ty i t 1 necessary to considet the p robabili ty tba t the de f'enc le'r ' r a Jili es1 1e · ca rryiatg submarines c reach their a ttaok at a t ons a rter an lCBH atte ck and fire their ll1i l l liles without aeteQtion ntl c es ti-uc iQn 'If tbe potential asg i essor be U eves tfl1s prob bi l i ty- to be high an attreer11ent li m 1 ttng deplo ymen t r mrely delaya tho retaliation s nd he will b e detei'» 34 fr om at t acking lr both s1oes Js ve a high probabi liity of subi ia r tne penetratiop and sv£ficient su bmaiI'inea a_ll cases are stable Th ' 1 st a oillty a9'b ie ·ed by 14itit1ne pes eetime deployment· oC llli ile - ca t'jtin submarines d pen ds not only on the capabil1 ty Of both side·s to reach 'l helr fi rt_ng st ation and t'f re i r url ss1les e fte·r an ICBM attack bu t on me ntunbers e vail bl e ln lpect1on proposala tor 'IRBfls dp not dif f r 'r m I CBI ts So lone as tb e inspect or canno t keep his hand on the f ±rin button whon a otential aggressor dee des to attack the best that onn be achieved by agreements 1s an inci ensed wartdn g ti mEi Curr•ent i nape ction sy2teJ11s for IC ltfls and IRBM a1'e aimed at p rovid1ng either tactical warning - lone essentially warning of'• l a inch oi bo th taotl·cal and tl'ategic warning of nda ile •a ttaok warnlnfl of the order of from one to six hours for fi ist 1 1 s ner2 tion missiles 'lll lo second t y-p 7 of warn tr g ha s not t e-e p evalU ited in thi repo ' tt but i t is cJoubt ' 'ul t hat warnin ' ot USSR IRBrT launohee will pemit a retaliatory strike hy US IRBtr It i also 1 oubtful ' w hethei airc raft ·o n runway alert could avoid deatz uc'tion b r warn n g of lRBr- a ttao k It is P t obably not far wrong to state that tactical 01 la t'Q'lch warning obtained from ltt B 'f d napecti m aye te irs 'Will l' e of margi•nal valu_e to the· defender and wi1 1 have ll Ltl effec t on stab il ity 'lne e ' '8ct-s ox S P ''l 1etri e tac t 1 ¢al I CBM 11arning i r many 'bu t perhaps the most ilnpo·rtant is the 't i t would provi de b oti s i des with rel lti ve ly e 'tec ti ve BMEWS The e f fect - 1 I I -16effect Qf thi UJ On s ta bilit y wquld a epend on the alert etatue of th t110 A C foroe1 1• and hence ve ry much upon unilateral aotion I• Taotioal warrtill8' may or ll1ay- not be aooompal4ed by posit inn disolo e ure It'1 in addition greater specific intelligence s obta ined by 1 n peotione stability mey be aft'ected greatly In l l'enei·al such di11closures 1'111 t ·end to deitebilize trom a mutual point of view by µi p ng the U s c apability for counterforce action The iml l'O ed intelligence qf lliBM locations can only feet sta biiit y ii -the lll6d il ooneiderecl wh n the USSR does ·not knovr tb e p eoise loca tion11 of o S arid N-4 'l'O IllBM 1 s t1 But it a p pe l I unlikel t t ha t this is the case US ignorance of· tae loca t1on of Soviet IRBl e d es not a f'fect stabili 7 because the stability model does not t$ke aoool ht ot e ttaoks on Allied or Satellite ait1as Fl'Oill the S Viet point of• vi ew an Illl M atcta ok l in 'OSSB cities ia lier to 'be reared than an IRlll i ttaok ti their IRml sites 'l'p era1'oret US IRBl ls attack only cities Soviet lmMe on the ot er 4W' d1 must destroy- l S tHB s in order to protect USSR cities - The Ue UBS i 9 l O8 9 --Y77 1 I 6@@£ ' -1ciST A 6IL1TY OF ES'l'IMATZD US-USSR 1 ' oi 1962 'l'hs US-'OSSR posture in I2Q re811 tdillt ICBMs ia sstima teci to be sa foilO'lil'lr US Capability 1 'l'ypa Jiiesils ATLAS ¥um1 ot Ba see 13' iTLAS TIT Alf Total 1·4 4 T tal JI a rdness Yi ssiles ix 3 0 J Bi 25 Coni'igupai i on psi MQi B -15 K-f 'l 7 Response Response 31 42 36 5 4 3 6 11 7 13 3 USSR eapagili t J 'l'ype M iasile Pµ ea Mobile Number 25 25 T t otal Iiead y --Hardneas Coni'ipavlon 2· psi l r_ 5 1 x S psi 13 14 4 39 l 3 1 X 9 100 p Min 1l88E FV8 Mi si il _ ilissils 1'25 125 125 125 Totll-1 1 Ali misi iles Jlave -2 UT warheads We shall consider first of bQ llb l' - mi seil e weapons system all the stability e£ jus t t he ma nn ed · l ·W ithout insoecti oi'l i -e •• 1 1$ intellisenoe 1esa than 50 • If the US atte oke the ussa llJld yields 1Lt re at least 2 14'1'· on both aides then wj th an' CEJ 's up to 2 n m ll otli sides will t ffer dam i ue i q· at l e st the 20jt level This follows f't'l' lln th a fact that t a USSR alwe y il has sufficient mil'ls i J es whose locations a i e unknQl'ln t o t he us to destroy 20' Q f US cities 60 missi es at most I b US lWs YB nas s1rfficient mis i•l ee t o desti-oy laiawn WSli mi seile sitee 2 5 sitea ltot ll OS't i n l baa suf fiei et1t llli sailes l'Ql lii ini to a estroy 20 of ussa cities 4• missiles at' ·moat - 11' t he USSR I • -18 If i he 1 JSSR at taok13 the 11S and l l4E'11$ does t t' Ol'kt or the does not fire r n 2 only the minj mam R -1'5 11eapon se 13 mi s siles a f'i11ea by tbe us then the 1J5SR' a tiElolc i s auocessfu l i n the_1uinee that t US will receive 20% diw ge 1 birt the U$SR will e er lese 'than 2r damage in 'the reta'J latory 'blow a nd On tb does ot J er hand j f the USSl l ·e tta cks th US 4ncl ll tEW$ does wcr k' f4 e on ming e nd tile aµIIIUll ltt-l ·5 J espon e ls ti6h'i vea 'f'6'j mu esilees the11 the ussa a ttack is unauooe'al lful in tbs e ee h ' although th e US$R clestroya at J ea t 2 o'f US oi tiee be u'W' l i'-' auf tera 2oi dest·ructi® of las cttieci it reta11r1 'f lliltnne4 'bombers 8 l'e cOmii derad in sddi tion to ICJ ma io t h e• e rlent O sott bases on esoh eiiie 'the11 the a Ltua't i o n is unliliang•d 11 hen the 1 S t tta ck s 1 ll e USSR 'l'll ie t 'l because e msnned boro'bera e ann ot result iri l ee dam e to ei ar e1de n d eao'h e1 de al eM Y l as eo-1 i -ted 20' • oi1 y- dm111i ge · ot • rf manned bombers a re ooneide red in a4d1 'ti on l p ICBMs and 'th• USSR tte Qkis t-he 1JS' d tb 2 l Wt la pons the USaR has eu f'i iient Cl Ms ·to deetr enough U3 IOlllls -to i l avent effeptive retaliation 112 w eaJ Onr 1 dest J'Oy Wl cit i' ett o 't ho 20 lievel 60 weapons and at ta-Ok each US $AC 'base to the l eV el 1ft 1½ W l l Pons per bttlie 78 wea p9ll'a • il '• wo'Uld ei pe t- 'tQ' eflt rw ab01Jt 4 o t the 50 SAC baeee or it the very l -eae1 to filsrop t them - d inake th ein 1rµlnera b'l e t Q a 'later bOJ'llhl l l attau The situat·ion 'tlle l £or estimated i-962 ·poaturaa ·wi1 b out i n@eo't i OXl l il as Summal'i Ill Id in 'J abl a 71 ' able ' Stability o t962 CmJ i fa noea Bombet Posture i'l' l th ut nspection 1JS Respon e - Bl4El'IS dc ea not vro rlt or US -- does not fire on warning 2t oni in1 mum B l5 US response BJdEl'IS wor s OS fi're on w ingmf JCimwn B 15 US response - - ICllMa and 'Manned llOl 'lb rs JifeYo- r P 'IY f'or 2 UT ' ea ons depending 11 pon aJ e rtneaa ot US S'A C · and 0 1' ·eft eoti lenees of undeat-r-oyail S W -l 9 'he ll ll ee sfts tl e ab' 1 e I Cl%'1 1 eir ia A1 bp'th -tha US and th e USSR bs ing aet ert-ad 1 ' ro111 111 11'1 ' a Q ll' J riee attaok b y- i-eoei lrin as muob damage e e tltq i ntlict 1'he D s i ases a re '1bst able in 'iiavo r-• o t' 1 he· USSl t h US 1 fl de 't e r r ed frOIII makin i a e irpris at-t ack oy receivi as ml Jell damage lli8 w-e intJ ict Jhl1e the US$R need not e ctl -cal damage bf etal a t i an U she lllakelil e ti U'priee a tte ck Th i nec1Jillilfl r Y' condttiona for staQi l i r 1 heret re iil P 1 Y- on iy t t tlll e us ' 'l' l th9ut 111iE '1S etability o only be aohieved in l 962 o r maint nipg a bom er tpr oe o-apa bl ot enl3tre ting alert Soviet a-1 r def' ee and drQppirig- pn t Jr t citi 1s at lee et J 5 IO JitT weapons 4Q HQtml l OO •ias i'les M'ter a surp -tse missile· attack Vi th J3HElr 3 and the capability of fi-rint e i lee at 40 IC s in 15 Hutes th e lJS can ai M eve eta bi1 ity wif hbii' t reg 'l i-d 1lo the inert 11ta tus qf bombers so lo ali we a rs Will 1-nir to i'i iie lCJ IM s on 1' arl'l 1 ng oi ily Et w-e are ·not the a le rt SAC 'bombet cap i bili'ty mi st be 913 pable of del ivarin J t lee at 15 10-MT bQml1 s 40 H DOG nds s ilas on part cular tar t citi es 2 With lni rpection In tbs foregoing- non-inEtpec ti ¢l ca se i t 'W 8 q11s1Wed tbat locations o all 'US ICBY sit el'I - are k I 9'iffi to the tfSi R1 but tha t a t most of the USSll ICBH aite s were known to the US An assump-tion -of 50% malces no ditttu ene in the ' IU'suroent ' presented - In tnis s ot on th e ef t'eots _of nspect±o tni1 be irted rrom the point ot view o'f d' ierm n ing hat' fl 'action ot USSR milisila sit es ml 1st be '9'ul n e ble to US 111iseile fire in rder to affect th e- e ta iliily J sa l mptio i rela ti i to nlatmed bo llber r ain the same When tbi1s1 fi aoUoX iii -OV fSr 50$ aa wi'J l a lw83 s be th e o 1 se it implies 'the ex i at 'lnce ·i f im inspection and commutiioations system 11hich· ' ill dete1' 11il1e and report locati ons of n1o'bi1e 'lil'SSR sites sUfti ciE p tly rs i idly to e them • tlllnarabl e ta US miesi 1 e so t i l'e When the UiiSR a ttacks tlte US the fraction of vulnerabl1 1 USSR llli1 1sil le si tes is i lllllaterllll Bence in thelle ¢ a sE1-s the relat i ve post is m oha nge'd When OB at't·a okil USSR th e elative post ure represented lette o '3 will be changed -to c if a high eno h ltte of US intell-ig ence on USSR mis$ il e l l ites u iet 411 t i f th1 1 USSR i l li no lf'fective alert fox ce ' of USSR ml esile The r s intelligence as measured 'by the fraction s i tes 'VUlri erabl to US fire required to• qh lnge ll to C in -the P lll' 'l f Clll l qase vmen• the 11S att'a cks i s a $ foll·owe t • -2elilinimum US Intelligence Bequi rements • on Soviet I0lll4 lases 10 1ll' 1 lx5 Sites lxlO eites n 10 2 n m l n m • 2 n m 1ai 88% tf VSSR can use its ·re1Serve missiles 1 n the retaliation blow the lxlO ·9 0nfiguratton applies I£ not the l J 5 configuration appl iee When mallned bombers are e ided on 'the US side nothing is oh ged Now consider tbe case when manned bombers are added o the USSR eide ASS l ll ine the levels ot' US intelligence indicated above the US it attacks will have f ro111 31 to 39 lllililsiles left over foi· USSR a irfiel $ probably en insufficient nl lil ber to prevent a retaJiaton WS bomber blow ' 'hue US intelligenoe doe2 not ob n8e the mixed CID1-B0111be r ·o aee• when Tb a situation then for estimated 1962 postures with thlr levels of · inspection indicated above is swnm ed in Table 8 Table 8 Stability of l 962 tCB -Maruled Bomber Posture With Inspection j 'Pure JS doee not work • or· US does not ire on warning i only minimum ' l 15 US response J3W WS works a nd tJs i'ires on warning - 10l Ms Uld Manned Bom ICmls UB Re-sponse D C B or D B dependi-llt upon alertness and or effecti V'eness of -undest 'Oy-ed SAC B C and m im®i 11 15 US response B ll C RE 1 'l tr•--- Al D8 9 -YI • •' • ' I _ • i -21Jf w oompe re 'l'able 8 f l th 'l'aole 7 we f l' ld 'tha t ins-peo' icm wol'kB to the a dv tag e of the Ul I The only oaae wher e inei ection do11a ·not onange ·the tavorable position lJOBaessed by the USS Ii without inspection cpneicet I of e non-alel 't US bolllber ay _d miBai e toroe The mixed IOBlitbomber ettack is o-them Be illw s s'tia ble We now oonaider tb e influence 9f IRBMe 81 d miasile qa r subm il ines on the et abl lity- o£ t le l 962 postlll e We a il SWll 'I i hat the US possesees o overseas l Un aites and 5 POWJlll3 eubmarin e with a to·t ai of 120 IRil14e ¾id 80 POLAW missiles We t u th 'IT assume th t no Illl3lf bases or 11ullnia rlnee will 1le iest rQyed by Tet liation when t1l e US makes a a _rprise i tte ok · The ' Ill 8l4s cannot cb11ge the eetiltl of' 'l'a ble 1 rt1 1 ina1 eotion bacaµee the d sst ructi on of llSSR bomb qases do ea no t -reduce 'j te C mf oapabi'lxtyto 'inti iot on tical damage on 1iS o tie o a US surpl'iEle e ttaak and beee use the USSR may lie Jl l'esumed to 'know the loe tion of all US Ill' BM Bites B ll4 i oi ee es a su tfi•oient IR ml oapabilit y 9f it'B own to de t I oy them before -they os n fire in the eaiie of a USSR surprise a 1itaok POLMUS a ieo will not oha ge th$ tasults of table 7 because the 11ubmarine o pability' 1'o r immed 111 t8 rstalil'l-tiOZ in the 1lS$R Will be no more than 4• llrl asil81l at best Yhic h ilil la ea than oµ e -half tll e r ' tiirem ent to inflict Qri tica 1 dalll 8 on Soviet • i t•ies ii the· ¢a$ of a SoViet S ll PMSe a ttaok ln a us· surpz iee tta ak we opuid 1Jte tion all 5 e u'bma rines a nd fir-e their full c plement of •80· 111issW ee but ttie 'US la ck of j 11 telli11 ence on the locati Pl'I of Soviet IO BM b ase1 1 rO rais al lows her to inflict oritioal dama ge on the US b y -etallation With inspeotion l owEMer the existence of US iI11 l314e and POLARIS s11bmerinee does cba Dglil tJte i' S ll te g1 ven iu Table 8 lf the 'US m kea $ surprise eit ta ok on tne ussn there will oe auffioient milrsi1'8s to destl'O y ell 55 ·smAC bases and re'duoe the C'Bll for e o jjnpotllinoe loca tiona assumed to be lcnoYllh It -th USSR does not possess ·a bo lll e I ' force ou ooqti nuoua ai r b6rne alert oapll ble of perretrt ting ale rt US air d ena1 1 and in 'Licting critical damag e on US •citieSt the destruotion of h eee SUSAC l a ses 011n be consider d equivalent• to b1untixig their retaliat6ry ca paliilit by manne4 'boinbers ¼ai nst a ot1-$lert SoViet 'Qomber force therefore a US SUl ptiSS 4ttael with ICBMs IRBMs POLUUS submt zj nea a nd ml rlned bomber$ oan fpflic t cntic a l_dan age Ort th USStl ·w ttbout J e U' 9f reg j ying cri ti bal dam ige in r tu m J Q 1 efo r-e1 ltnspectj on yielding on ly ta gt 1 cal warning does not change tb e ou tcoma When t'he WSR makes a SU11 r'i s11 at4ok IDhe res llts -£or IRBLfs o l potll s ides and 5 U$ Po LARIS IJ t max'ines are shown in ' 'able - w $mRl f' • ---22 - fable 9 Sta bilit11' ot 1962 Postl re I0 BJ4s IlUMe Maruted Airc ra tt ii'lib Inspeoti® US Besponea llUE '15' ·does not work or lJS d oes hot f'i t e oh 'Nlll'liSint q¢y lilini111 Ull Rt-15 us zies1 onse or B C and D 0 de Pertding upon al srtnees anfi or sffeni veness of l t destr 1yed SAC BLmWS works and 0$ ires on warningand i la ximum H i5 US response B C USSll tllRED POS'PURE _Ill 1962 The pr e c eedio5 section anaJ tzeo the stabili y of the l962 11t1 s te o posture$- based 1 uion o ent 'll$ intelligenae estill tea of the Soviet force levels orgll ni ation and deployment• in 1962 Tiu irrlelltgenoe on US'Sll lClll £ a leveli r 01 ganiz tion an l PlU'ticularly- depl•lfll en Le aa toi tt ed y weu Mirl'or-iluage r easonil18 and 0111e a dd1-t iop al evid' ence hs s led t o the eetimil te th11 t 1 0 USSR mieailes will be ieployeA at a soft site 2 psi 1V11h 5 J d$ lanoe 5 111l ee11 es would be in l 'ell8l V8 iI f' these si tea u•e soft as estimated tp' i onQ the1 r looatione become known ihe1 become 811 tremely vulnerable if 'the mMrter in wbicb they e d e ployed ie not changed If the estimate 'arG co 'J eot a nd ii' inspection agr eSl lents were 1mpl8 11ented end locations revealed t le t81liph tio11 to oh lJl8e i b 91 1e il eploymet ttrl c uld 'b strong econOlllioa l B tJ d could be ao9ompliehed either prior to disolcsur e o iafte1' disclosure The latter r1ould not abbregate an a gre81 1ent Wtl j i JS specifically- provided fa ' J' n - ot these factEI 'it appe s desirable to ozamine the effects ot changes 'i n deplO 'llient upo 1c Btability Inteliigenoe relative t o bardenirul' and force leve at 8¥1¥ future time likewise is not f l r1tt h$n08 these a lso vill be 'i7ai ied e genel' l ap roa oh will be to ·dete rmioe a a ectruin of requi e11 ents whicp would 111ake the 1962 posture µnstable with U3SR euperio nty Aocordingli we ·ehe l i ooneiLder bot A Sorlet offensive and· def'en11i e req uirement a The effects of un l l-t r il c-t onz and eorne to l'ltra of ir spec-t fon -on these raqui' ramenta wtlcl a lea be oon ide te a Of'fenei 4l 18 9-IV J '' l Offensive Regui r_ _ Pts 1'1'e oonai d8l' ' first ii he Soviet 111i ssilti requirenumts to Pe lee an e f'£ectW e iUl'p t1 se attaclt on the Unita4 State's and i t-s o 'e i seae b ses If the 115 ha1 1 a e0p t n11ousl y i b bol' e l cmbel' C ir¢e capal ile Q'f infliot p g Qritical dama o µ Soviet oi-tiest t le USS oannot 11 qpe 'to eliminate effective ret44'1a ion except by improving ita a ir 01efen_se and civil d etense capa'l Uit A de1 a$ led examinat l ott of the varl oue 11 ltermi t i vea for thia case is beyond the oops of this stu l£ u 1 5· US iniesile caJ 'ryins sub11ta rines c an deli -er the ir ill oOl lplenent of ·lJli $Si les 80 1 the 'Soviet Union can elimil'iate e ritio a dB111age only b'y r edU oing the VS lcml IRBU cap1 1bi lity to less· than 5 2 misaflti 'fhe C 'BJ ifl 11e1 1l ed to ac ompliilh tll s o r er 91' de11 truQtion to ·tbe 25 plli ATL A$ 1Jite11 ancl- lQO psi 'l'I'l'AN aitea a re very large irtde ed Nearly 500 ICml'fl 'QIQuld be reguired a gad net the ICIIU capability alone a t urther 100 01• so a r r e qui ea to 1 ecluee l IAC base and cau11e cl'itical daJnage to us cities a od poviaation lf bo we-ver no more t ll l 3 POL UUS su'brnarina13 osn attaole the USSR and an lC Blil - ttsck i S Cc a ble 9f T lunt l 18 tlie' US l Ot lber and 111iee-ile foI1oe 1 he 'S oviet requirements bQQogie 1•aaeonable and well wi-thin thei eoonomi c C Jl46ity The ce -loul ation l'equires the USSR to be oapa'ble pf' f i l'il'lg 3 l l' J CJma in a lary nnorl time with a 2 rarhead a nd a Cl lP of' 2' n m -to oatuie at le ast 90 eroeut dara ge i o 27 soft a nil m'edi 1111 ATLAS Sites U il 5Q soft S' AC ba aeG li5 percent averl ge lBllla5e to 4 hard TITAN s i-tes and to bll at least 2Q per ent Qf the US induetrlal population an4 d eetro y e t least JO peroent ot US war 111anu£aoturing oa ac t r 'Ttle emain i ng US ICBMs 2d and effeo't'ive POLARIS 111issilea 48 a ee ina li'tici @i to in t'liot criticl J dama8e on the So1ri et i opuiatlon e nli ecotlQ DY and it i s not unreasi nebla to ae1Jume th 11 t the resi l u l US borilber oapability can be i'urther reduo a d by follow-up a tta9ke with So v ie-t bocnbers 1 i' not by S6viet air- l e f' enaes Soviet IRm requiretie11tis a gainat 1JS oversea l Uru 1 i1iee nwn' ler abo11t l OO relia l ile I Hl IMe· of ' tba s ame yield and CEF as t he IO llKs Un Bl these aQsUlllptions miseile-oarrying submarines l'B not n00-E1BS Ll'y 1'or So'9'1 et otfensive eqµirements 'l'be target rec a ini fo I' Soviet D lilMed bCl llbers appear to be a relat ively sma 11 111llllber ot clean up types if on riy critic 1 damage is conSidared The re • • - I CHE'l' --- -2 - 'l'tie presence or absence of ine pect1on dPes not appeav to sjgnj f1cant'ly af f ecb the Sov l et PQStl1re or requirernents in oft'ens 1 ve warfare Inspe ioh of -course may make it more difftcult to achj ve ·surprise and- thereby reduce vi - 11 ct - i L er t he cnances of success but the reducecJ chances gf success ar1se trom ·s -ources that they cannot be compens l t ed for by a ditional physical llll aos ot attack· rt appeai 'a to· be· · generally agreed that present So11iet lmowiedge o f US bases a 'ld rorcea is ent' Lt'ely •t idequate tor a successful surpz tae at tack to be made Tbus· Lt Y 'be d oubte wheth r tbe additional intelligence oi' U$ operations gained by inopection ha a my ubstantial pay-of f for-· the Sovie t Union aa far aa Q1'fens 1it'e requirements ane· concer•ned Defens·1 ve Re irements The max1m1 1rn US capab1 l 1ty for ck on ene Soviet Union is tlie- bas ts t'Ql l discuss 1on of USSR iei ensJve requil'lements 't is reasonable for the Srjviet Urt16n to make the t'ollowlng assumpt l ans as 'to• tbe US m 1 a 'file capability in 196'2 · 2 a surprise missile t 117 2-MT ICBM 2 n •m OBP 120 2-M'll IRBM 2 n m CEP ·eo ½-Mil' POLARIS Paced with tl13 -s tl reat the most obYiot1s requ1reinent or the USSR ie to place t heli' ICBM bacsea out of range of US lRBMs and POLARIS rni13s11es 'l'bro ugho1 1t the present pet' we nave assumed that this has been done Even so resent US estimates of the 1962 Soviet posture makea the U SSR exeremely vulnerab le to a US su r prise attack If the US knows· the locat1on of 30 P ercent of the Soviet ICBM ba sei and 1r the vu1rierab11 it y of these bases remains as estinia ted the US i e eapable of inflicting c t ical damage on the USSR c1na can p event tbe USSR from int1icting critical damage on ·the US by t'etali t 1on The US IRBM and POLARIS capability alone can alway a infl 1ct -critical damage on the Soviet population arid economy 40 2-MT or 85 t-111T missiles Ev n tn the unlikel y case 131' wai•n tng su ff1c te n t to allow tbe PQ_pulat1on to reach shelters b¢Tore IRBM attack the soviet 1 'ldustr1al plant remains vulnerable to attack 'l 'he best that the Soviet Unior1 can do when t ac ing the poss1b J lity of a trs surprise attack is to h1det ·oa den and disper·ae their retal1ato'I'y force 1n order tey asaure that enough surv tve to 1nfli-0t cr ttica 1 damag e o n the us o 1 ong a·s IRBMs and POl' MIS exist 1n the IJJS force a t r ctUD and no anti- mis s il e mieaj le- de t'en 'le l slle defense are avanalle the Soviet 11nlon annot hqpe to -reduce the vulnerabili tw of hex• industry to critical damage f om a US surprise ttack We nQw e m1ne 1n turn the unilateral ac ion which t e So vl et Crt1on might take betW en now and 196 to $trengthen the -retal1a•tory ca pability of her manned bombers ba 111st1cMmiss1J e submarine a an d r-cBMs Defenses for Manned Bombers It would be pos sible for the USSR to make aOiile portion 'of her ma n ned b omber force· invulnerable to ICBM attrack by maintaining a continuously airborne ale r t f'oI 'ce which might be strong enough to have some chance of penetrating ale i't us a1r d fenses and inf ich some damag on the us popula1 1-on and 1ndustr y- If tnii s foroe could 111flic e1 1t1caJ ngamage -on the US 20 10- MT bOlllba on ape-c1fi c target c1 t1es 11 t would set' a'lone ae an effective deterrent A se con i pol s -biUty would 'Qe 't o har leri air t aees eo that even non aletlt 'bOiilb er's wou-111 ha fe aelile p c-otect 1 6n ag 1 nat I CBM a tl ack tr all air c -vaf t on the ground were protected to 25 psi for example the numba or 2·-MT weapons required by the US tor i ercent prQb b tl 1 ty of ne traliz1n$ an airbase increase from one to abo t ix to eight If the ha dened bases were a1s Qiaj eraed out of range of Os IRBMs the entir e Us I CBM capabil'tty• after destroyin S 50 sof t ICBM aites - co1 1l l l' O i de stroy mo re· than one-th trd of these nardened cand dispersed ai rba ee Since these actions are relat1v'el-y straightforward if expensive the Soviet Union has no need ho tt l' to hide bomber bases f rol'Jl tl1e V$ Disc l os 'A'e ot all lX m'be t 1 ai es lla1S oeen a asU Jled in the pr t eeding calcu1 ation ot VS lOBM r equ1r e ll enta and under disclosure the USSR could thl'ouijh unilateral aat1ons assui•e a reasonable assurance of sur vival agai nl' t a us surprise a tta¢1 as far aa their manned a 1 rcraf't are cq11cerned b Bal11stic-MiaS 1 l e Submarin ee Fi•esent US intelligence e6t1mates suggest that the OsSR will have one s u bmarine capabl e of f1r-ing ballistic missiies in 19 2 asellre quick retaliat l on after a su rpris a ttack by the' US th e s oviet Union would requir1 a capa bility of f rin abQut 80 POLMlStype m1 ss1les The s tze of the submarine force· needed to ma1ntain 5 or 6 ves se-is oeaP the coasts of' tte us ranges ·fron1 9 to 18 supma ri riE S When the' USSR can operate an FBM aubmarine 'leet of this ma•g n itUde· eff'ective re't a 11at1on is reasonably assured in the event o f' a US aurpt i se attack even without any other or b'he poas ible Soviet a i ternat1ve actions c CBM Regllirements 'Pop Si C'Jl m J o irCBM Re u 1rements tt w s stioWl' bove that• when the VS attacks n SSR nas a requirement tor suft 1c1ent ICBMs to a·bso rtb the attack t'X t lil all 117 US ICBMs and p osseas enough ICBMs left over to 1nfl tct ol l tical daitlage oh the cities of the US Thie requirement can be fulfilled by var 1 ou s oomb J na-t ions of base hardness co eealrrtent and contlgurati m Cons 1 der first the requ 1 r ement in tel m e of nUinbet-a of m1s l es located on oft 2 psi bases w th a · 1 x 5 configura tion and perfect intelligence on the rt ·of' the US S 1noe one attacking missile an d st-r9y ne Sovtet ICBM ba s e t le USSR ml lst Mve 60 in 1 sa1les to 1nf11ct criti cal dama-g e t o us cities plui 11'7 sites to absoi-b the trs ICBM attack Wlth a 11 -eitie s l x 5 the USSR needs 129 sites and 645 ICBMs l ' all othet' conditions remain the same exc pt that the CBM bases are hardened fewer sites are neelie4 to absorb ti e 117 US lCBMs ' he num ts are gtven be1ol'l USSR Missii-e Sites Req uired no eoncea lment Hardness ·No Sites No Qi' M11 silee· P 81 129 649 5 psi -' 4 170 10 0 J l i 2020 100 As an alter tive to hardening and1 perhaps m eh less expena ive ·t he u·SSR might ren r some ·s 'ee s inw-lnerable to us m1ss11e fire by eencea Lmenv bis woyld ce tainly re th case without inspection and would probably ocou even with a sophiJ'l'ticated 1nspect1on system· The eft'eet or eopM cealment might also be achieved by lflo1 1le ll $sile i ttes with very rast reaction times lo aey event there 1 trade·oft between con ealment however obtained and hardening Th1 trade-off is sho't 1'1 in Figure 3 In -wovds - dii SEG 'U 'P - • • I -27- VSSR' ICBM Requirements No qif 13 ltes Hardness Hr 15 · 16 18 8 18 9 19 19 20 12 1 4 15 i7 20 22 25 28 30 31 34 12· 1 4 15 11 20 24 30 4o 6o 120 l o 0 1 o 0 3 o 4 o s o 6 0 1 100 psi t 25 pei 2 psl o a 0 9 1 0 Fraction of ICBM a1tes tmown -to us In words Figure 3 1 s in rpret d as tbllows If the U attacks wl th the e•s timated 1902 POLARIS lCJ WI and IRBr-f c apa•b 111ty the USSR 1s alW$ Y cr1ticaJ ly gamageq If however the USSR has at 1east a a many 1 x 5 ICBM sites as is shown 1n Figure 3 with the 1ndi ated hardnesa and concealment the USSR always eriticalfy damages the US in re l1a' i Lon Tl e relative pt stu r e· ie thus described by B If the USS has 'ewer than the number of ICBM s1tes ind Icated in Figure 3 the o tcome is 7 0 Ae an alternative to hardening and concealment the USSR m1Sht decz ease its missile requirements by a change tn configuration The compl t tra-de-ofr t l le fol' pardneas concealtnent and configuration has not been worked out due te laek ·o f time For' zerG concealment per tect J aapect1on the number EJf at'tes and missiles required 'tor val'ious degreea EJf hat dness and varj ous configurations are shown in the following tabl·e N USSR M'ies Lles and Missile Bases Jlequired no conceai- ment Hardness CO'NFI GURAT l ON lx' 2_ x 1 lx3 l x 10 MisMisMisMisBases a1les Eases s les Bases siies Bases si1es l 2 psi 25 ps1 100 Si 177 177 68 68 88 88 ------l 37 43 28 411 l1i 9 fl j 129 34 20 645 170 100 123 4 i 3 1230 2 4 0' l O • • 1ffleRH't -28W1tpout int pection and hence with lot US inbelligenoe 1t is seen in F1$Ure 3 that the U$SR10'B II equi ements are modest -- r if the Q'rder 0£ Q soft 1 5 l laaea With ll nspec tlop anaob' 11QUS Soviet aetion would be to establ 1Jsn 6• covert lCBMe in •S oft bases o ' any eeonom t cal con£ t guta1 ion say l x 5 and Qisperse aQcl harden is overt bases enough tq at i orb the us a't t1 1 ck or 117 ICBWa 'X-he· Soviet requirement fqr thi S- •comb1 nat1on of ·conceallil rtit 1 har len ng and con ti gura ' fo n ts as f'ollows No USSR Mi ss i J es and Mis 1 1e Base Re-quired 60 m1ss1les co11ceaJ ed in J 2 aot't t a ses Hard riess CONFIGURATION Ix 3 1 X 1 11 II filfl q ' Mis- J X5 Mis- Bas e s sile1 1 Bases- siles Baeea ·s11 'es 2 psi 1 29 177 129 411 129 645 25 psi 28 76 2 8 108 8 14o 100 psi rr 65 3 7 75 17 85 BaseG d Ef't'ect on Sbao 111 ey _ If we l'eca n from page j ttiat the USSR requu es 300-600 C C' BMs for an adequate otf'ens·1 ve capability 1t is appar ent that she hag great lat tµde in base onfi gurat16n and cQn ea1r ient bsJ ree aon o he ir veey emall detensive requirernent·s ip· null ber of' l s Any one ·of the pr opoee q cbaoges in posture-· whether or manne bQmbin y ICBMai ot ball-1atic-miss11e sub rines - wi11 deteI' the US i'rem making a surpr l i e at t ck by making it impoaei ble to limit the Sc wie -i al1atocy ce Pab1H ty el ow the critical level 20 perc ent deaths to the- US city pQpl lla tion 30 J errcent dest ct1on of US war iudustcy Any pc iturei therefore Which at e unstable and favorable to the US will become etablie Unstable Postures whi'Oh are ravoral le to the t SSR oe n only be ect l fi ed by US unilateral action US REQUIRED POSTUifE IN 1962 The coureifs of a ct-ion which the USSR m1gbt take to reduce its vulnerab11-1 ty tc su 1 prlae at1 a¢k apply e41 1 lly to the tis It seems uonecessacy to present detaii l tl llbera here 'I he i wale an l eosta of tl$ a t ie ns are pr obably gr eater than fot the U$8R 'because tl e USSR lCBf l threat i s 3-5 times as great as the US ICBM 'thDeat 1 n 1962 The ef'fec t on stao1 1tty hoivever will be the same I - • 29- be the same 1t may· tie tmpossittle for the us to pro-t ect its ax- JJ1duat r ' agalnat $ rrprise attack butr it i s certa1n1y po19- al tile to deteili' a sur P1 ise a·ttacl y the USSR by making i t impossibl f'or the soviet Union to r d ce- the US reta11i itovy capao J i'ty beJ 0111 the •ot ttl cal l evel By this m ans all 110- st a ble p ostu t-e W'h1cl l are tavorahle to the USSR -WllJ be'eome stable If it ls as sui- e d tbat both sides ta the nece ssaI'¥ unila tex-al act ton all postures become stable