Date

Nov 12, 1958

Description

In this follow-up report to Document 2, the same analysts went beyond the “ICBM duel” and evaluated combinations of ICBMs, bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles to determine their relationship to stability. They used only “critical damage” criteria in this report. In cases where both sides had invulnerable airborne-alert bomber forces or SLBMs that could cause critical damage to each other, the situation would be stable because neither side could prevent attacks on their cities. Equilibrium or “stability by fear” could obtain when both sides had mixed systems of bombers, SLBMs, and ICBMs because neither side could launch a surprise attack and “prevent effective retaliation by the other.”

If there was a “high order” inspection system that made it possible for the U.S. to identify and attack 80 percent or more of Soviet ICBM bases, the situation would be stable as long as both sides had high-alert forces. “If sufficient retaliatory forces on both sides survive an ICBM attack, the situation is always stable.” But the situation would be unstable if one side could not protect its retaliatory capability and would be highly unstable if neither side could survive. Each would fear that the other could launch a successful surprise attack.

Inspection and controls could contribute to stability by increasing warning. For example, a system of ICBM inspection could provide enough warning time to prepare bombers for a retaliatory strike. ] Also potentially adding to stability would be an agreement by both sides to keep missile-launching submarines away from their attack stations. If a potential aggressor believed that the defending nation could deploy its submarines rapidly enough to their attack-stations and retaliate without being detected, the aggressor could be deterred.

Unilateral measures, such as hardening and concealment, were important for evaluating their contribution to retaliatory potential and to stability. For example, while the U.S. may have been unable to protect the war industry from a surprise attack, it could deter one by making it “impossible for the Soviet Union to reduce the US retaliatory capability below the critical level.” Thus, an unstable situation would become stable.

Source

RG 59, 1955-1959 decimal files, 600.0012/11-1258

Document published in following posting(s):

Strategic Stability and Instability during the Middle Years of the Cold War

Dec 10, 2021