C05257123 SECREf APPROVED FOR RELEASED DATE Cl -23-2008 I THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON D C 20505 i Deputy Director for National foreign Assessment 2 1 SE 1981 EO 12958 3 3 b 1 25Yrs C MEMORANDUM FOR Honorable-Richard T Kennedy Under Secretary of State for Management SUBJECT Special National Intelligence Estimate on Indian Reactions to Nuclear Developments in Pakistan The Intelligence Connnunity has just completed a Special National Intelligence Estimate on Indian reactions to nuclear develop ents in Pakistan In it we estimate that although Prime Minister Gandhi's strategy of indirect pressure is unlikely to be adequate over the long run we do not believe Gandhi has made a decision to take any direct action at th s time Furthermore despite the greater sense of urgency on the nuclear issue spawned by Indian concern over US arms aid to Islamabad we estimate that India will follow a wait-and-see strategy over the next 12 to 24 month waiting for·a Pakistani t st with the intention of conducting an answering test Nevertheless in the longer term we believe India would be willing to use military force to eliminate the threat of a nuclear-armed Pakistan a decision which would depend critically on political and strategic circumstances pre vailing at the time I I I rhn N McMahon Attachment SNIE t U· mrnL 8 Cf E f C0 25ll25 I __ APPROVED FOR RELEASE o DATE 07-23-2008 D f 1 1 EO 12958 3 4 b 1 25Yrs· S C052 7125 DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS NOFORNNOCONTRACTPROPINNFIBONLYORCON- REL ••FGI- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor Consultants Caution-Proprietary Information Involved NFIB 'Deportments Only Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator Thb Information Hos Been Authorized for Release to Foreign Government Information - C05257125 THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS The following intelligence organizaNons participated in the preparation of the Estimate The Central Intelligence Agency the Defense Intelligence Agency the Notional Security Agency end the intelligence organizations of the Deportments of State and Trecisury A so Participating The Assistant Chief of Stoff for Intelligence Department of the Army The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy The Assistant Chief of_ Staff Intelligence Deportment of the Air Force • I C0 257 125 SNIE 31 32-81 INDIA'S REA°CTIONS· TO NUCLE AR DEVELOPME NTS IN PAKISTAN Information available as of l Seplember 1981 was used in the prepar tion of this Estimate ---------------- c o5257125 OVERVIEW Pakistan is pursuing a riiiclear explosi_ves development program which if carried to the production of weapons would be regarded bv New Delhi as a ·direct threat to India and to its regional and global am'bitions Th ivaiial ie e id e nce·is insufficient 'predict Ind ia's response to this t reat Prime Minister Gandhi has dealt with the problem through indirect pressure and although that course is unlikely to be · adequate over the long nw we du Hot believe that Gandhi has made a decision to take any direct action India is developing contingency options for destroying Pakistan's nuclear facilities for responding to a Pakistani nuclear test by exploding an Indian test d vice and for coping with an established Pakistani nuclear weapons capability · to An uncertainty in estimating what ·candhi will do about the Pakistani problem in the near term is the extent of Indian concern about US arms sales to Islamabad particularly the F-16 aircraft India has long exaggerated the threat posed by US arms sales to Pakistan in order to discourage the United States from providing Islamabad with sophisticated arms The us proposal to sell F-16s to Pakistan is IlO ' being-associated by New Delhi with the potential Pakistani nuclear threat Reporting received since 7 Ju·ne wben Israel used F-16s to destroy a reactor in Iraq indicates that high-level officials in the Indian Government are genuinely alarmed about F-16s going to Pakistan and the extent to which this hmits India's optioqs for dealing with Pakistan's nuclear · activities India fears that with the F-16 ·Pakistan has the capacity to counteratlac effectively aguiust some Indian nuclear facilities Moreover it fears that a rearmed Pakistan backed by a VS commitment will become more adventurous and hostile toward India In the extreme case if Indian concerns increase over the next two pr three months we believe the conditions could be ripe for a decision by Prime Minister Gandhi to instigate· a military confrontation with Pakistan primarily to provide a framework for destroying Pakistan's nuclear facilities We judge that the sense of urgency in New Delhi is not likely to dissipate in the coming months · Over the next 12 to 24 months our estimate nonetheless is that India will follow a wait-and-see strategy-waiting for Pakistan to conduct I 'SECI El C0 5257 125 a nuclear test with the intention of exploding an Indian device in response and assessing Pakistan's further ambitions lf Pakistan persists toward nuclear weapons production or if Pakfatan moves to acquire a strategic stockpile of nuclear material then New Delhi will face a choice of accepting the high probability of a nuclear arms race or destroying Pakistan's nuclear facilities Any fh1al Indian decision is likely to depend criticaHy on political and strategic circumstances prevailing at that time C0 5257 125 DISCUSSION Present Situation 1 India is following Pakistani progress t ward a nuclear weapons production capability with growing concer·n - In-India's-view - Pakistani• production of-m clear eaixms would pose a direct 'threat to lndian natiorial security India's broader goal of beco'ming a major global power through its preeminence in South Asia would lie threatened by a Pakistani nuclear challenge to such· preeminence It would dilute the effectiveness of India's superiority · in conventional military capabilities and would require New Delhi to· authorize a costly Indian nuclear weapons production program Therefore the Indian Government has been considering ways to prevent Pakistan from becoming a nuclear weapons state · 2 Pakistan is approaching a capability to produce· plutonium and highly enriched uranium for use in a nuclear explosives development program Prime Mi ister Gandhi ' evident responded to the threat by authorizing Indian nuclear test preparat gps In Februarv·excavation was begun in the Thar Desert to permit the underground explosion of a n Indian test device on short notice ' 3 In May c - c - - - - - ' preparations had hy Jncl_ia for a 40-kiloton nuciear test-presumab y ---- --- Preparation of the device itself as e cavation at the test site was still under way Jndia reportedly was to explode the device about one week after• the expected Pakistani test India did not intend to try to p-re_v_e_n_t_P_a k-i-st_a_n_f-ro-m conducting a·· nuclear test he en· completed Evidently the I dian Government calculated that a Pakistani nuclear explosion per se would not constitute a national security threat and that the damage to India's image of preeminence in the region could be minimized by a resumption of the peaceful nuclear e 'lplosive PNE D 'ogram 1 4 A small group of Indian strategists who have niuei I for nuclear ·weapons 'production since China's nuclear test program began are now citing the Pakistan nuclear program as a requirement for an Indian nuclear deterrent on two fronts Prime Minister Gandhi approved the publication of a long editorial by one of these nuclear weapons advocates Work under W Y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' is intended to give India bv late 1982 its first-supply of plutonium totally unencumbered by any international controls and therefore usable in nuclear weapons Ve believe however that India probably is preparing for contingencies rather than beginning a weapons production program As New Delhi's primary objective is to prevent Pakistan from producing nuclear wearions Indian deplormenf of nuclear weapons would be ' There is some evidence that lndia 's plans fer resuming its PNE lest program include efforts to clevt'lop a thermonuclear device Arter India's test In 19i4 Indian scientists spoke of plans to develop a ibermonuclear PNE as a logical next tep in their explosives program That program appears to have ceased shortly after the 1974 test but recent indications are that various laboratories in India's Der Jartment' of Atomic Energy have been tasked to work on the development of a hydrogen test de ·ice Estimates of the time and effort reciuir d lo design a succesiful thermonuclear device ·ar ' widely but the complexity of the design prohlem r Jrobably would not deter t te Indians from attempting the development of a thermonuclear explosive India is aware that China's third'test was thermonucleur and that it occurred only Ji 'months after the first Chinese test in 1964 and much useful information hos been published since then Pakistan's explosion of an initial fission device would pale in the light of'an Indian tbermorrnclear test serving New Delhi's objecti ·e of showing to Islamabad the futility of a nuclear arms race and attempting to show to the rest of the world that India's regional preeminence remained secure • I C052 5 7125 •' ' likely in the near term only _if other efforts failed to ston the Pakistanis Indian Stra1egy e enric men p ant wou e a so t target 5 Since-June high-level strategist in the Ministry of particu arly 'if it were in operation at the time of Defense and Ministry of External Affairs have been attack when the spinning centrifuges would be likely focusing more closely on various plans for military to self-destruct from the concussion of exp osion5 No action against Pakistan The impetus almost certainly· dangerous radioactive materials would be released comes from Israel's use of US-supplied F-16s to defrom the plant The difficulty of acquiring necessary Cvii•Pviil' ui auJ 1t Luiltli11i r the piant probabiy wouid announcement days later of US plans to supply F-16s rule out production of highly enriched uranium for to Pakistan Before the Israeli raid rndian leaders may · several years have been resigned o the sale of F-16s over· their 8 Damage lo the reprocessing plants would be protests and they seemed to regard Pakistan's nuclear more uncertain because of the extensive concrete activities as a separate threat Since then however shielding surrounding the equipment Nevertheless Indian concern about the two threats has intensified enough damage almost certainly would be done in In Top officials in the defense establishment have exinitial strike preclude any operapon of the facilities pressed concern about possible Pakistani attacks for many months Problems resulting from local radioagainst the Indian nuclear facilities and similar warn-· active contamination could make repairs infeasible ings by top officials in the Ministry of External Affairs indefinitely • indicate that this reaction by the military probably is widely shared The Indian Government probably is rrobable Develop ents concerned that its options are narrowing-that its 9 Prime Minister Gandhi probably has not yet contingency plans for stopping the Pakistani nuclear made a decision to exe rcise a military option against program by force could not be implemented without Pakistan In the extreme case if India's concern about inviting reciproc l attacks which if conducted with deliveries of F-i6s to Pakistan increases before the F-16s could not be adequately thwarted QY existing optimum time for exercising the military option in Indian air defenses October or November ------- -- ---- --- ' the conditions could be ripe for Prime Minister Gandhi to 6 In mid-July the Jndian service chiefs reportedly carry _out the contingency strike plans Our best were to consider tndian arms requirements as a result estimate however is that India will fpllow a wait-andof Pakistan's expected acouisitiop of US arms see strategy As the shock of the Israeli strike fades · Indian military strategists probably will become more confident of their ability to cope •'IVith_ the Pakistani reporte y was consi ering t e possibilities of starting F-16s before the first deliveries-the timing of which a military confrontation with· Pakistan before ·F-16s is still under discussion Polltical strategists probably began to arrive Earlier in July a senior Indian defense will focus attention on tlie potentially extreme political official stated that though no decision had been made costs involved in attacking Pakistan including the to attack Pakistan contingency plans calling for a late possibility of a Muslim oil embargo against India 1981 surprise attack did exist Jndia reportedly would use border skirmishes to justify such an attack India's IO The Indians now believe that th e Pakistanis exaggerated media treatment of border incidents in ould be able to conduct a nuclear test within a year recent weeks indicates that the government may be keeping this option ready • The reprocessini facililies will in to contain highly radioactive material as soon as they begin to treat irradiated nuclear fuel 7 India's ability lo carry out the military option is or lo store such fuel India's apparent plan earlier this year to await not in Question a Pakistani test before taking any serious action suggesf that Gandhi · did not consider the vossibilitv of local radioaciive contamination to • For a discussion of Incentives and disincentives for India to be a driving factor In determining the feasibility or timing of an • I ' to produce nuclear weal Ons see the anne Indian attack r C0 5257125 •' Gandhi has been told that if the Unitc-d States were to 1983 This would give India time to conduct adJitional halt the sale of F-16s Pakistan would undoubtedly test PNE tests perh ps pf'rmitting a thermonuclear lest and produce nuclear weapons India probably would 12 react to a Pakistani test by conducting an Indian test in response New Delhi would hope that an ndian test recommendations ha 'e recently been an the predictable wave of international pressure n-1-a' d-e-in___ f a-v or of exercising the nuclear weapons would deter the Pakistanis from proceeding with a option and that the detailf'd recommendations were nuclef ar weapons program but in all probability Pakicirculated widely in the Indian Government We have stait would continue producing weapons-usable nualso noted that Gandhi has at least some interest in this clear material -If that were the case India would h l ·e • viewpoint Bur we do not know whether the Prime to c nsider whether to try to destroy Pakistan's nuclear Minister favors that course and we have not obsen·ed facilities before a nuclear stockpile rendered the miliany activity by· the Indian military that would suggest tary option ineffecti •e Alternatively Pakistan may authorization for a nuclear weapons program The decide to delay a nuclear test while awaiting the full considerations- discussed-in- the-annex-suggest- that· implementation of the US arms deal If Pakistan · india would ultimately choose to meet the Pakistani defers nuclear testing the Indians will face the pros• · nuclear challenge by establishing a supe ior ·nuclear pect of Pakistani accumulation of a significant stockforce but the decision is likely to depend critically on pile of nuclear material for eventual weapons use the prevailing political and strategic circumstances Thus in this case too India would confront a decision ' 3 If India chose to rely on nuclear deterrence the either to strike Pakistan's nuclear facilities or to face a present paee of Pakistan's nuclear program would · high probability of eventual Pakistani production of point to nuclear testing by both countries in late 1982 nuclear weapons or 1983 India's basic objectives as noted in paragraph l l A critical factor in estimating what Gandhi · 1 would require Indian efforts to be more impressive would do when ultimately faced with the choice of · than Pakistan's accomplishments It is possible that either attacking Pakistan or allowing Pakis an to proPakistan would be sufficiently impressed by India's duce a stockpile of weapons-usable nucl ar material is capability to decide that its best course lay in avoiding her attitude towa'rd exercising India's own nuclear a nuclear arms race Even so mutual suspicion and weapons option If the Indians were adamantly op• miscalculation probably would defeat such restraint posed to developing their·own nuclear weapons they 14 f on the other hand India chose to ttat'k probably would try to destroy Pakistan's nuclear faciliPakistan's nuclear facilities the hostilities would esca- ties before a significant stockpile of nuclear material late quickly could be produced If on the other ·hand the Indians are seriously considering the establishment of their own nuclear strike capability against China destruc Pakistan would need outside help to avoid a tion of Pakistan's nuclear facilities would become a defeat presenting the United States with the dilemma less attractive option From lhe Indian perspective it of direct involvement or seeing the defeat of a security would have the serious drawback of inviting Chinese partner The Soviet Union might attempt to exploit the intervention Moreover the international reaction to hostilities for example by launching limited strikes an Indian attack probably' would be s 'ere Heliancf Jund r Afghan colors against-' insurgent camps across on the option of building a nuclear deterrent force to the Pakistani border ' deal with the Pakistani nuclear threat would e teml India's time for reaction until nearly the point whe1 • For a· discussion of possible Sovi t actions against Pakistan see Pakistan actually began to produce deployable nuclear · SNIE 11 32-81 The Soviet Threat to Pakistan 12 August 1981 wea·pons which probably would not occur b fore late 5 - 05257125 ANNEX India's Nuclear Weapons Option might prefer to delar · 1auriehing· nucle r weaoons India's earJ plt'dgt's to use its Canadiansupplie l resear h re ctnr r nh· for r 'eucefiil purpases for example mai - make Gandhi reluc tant to use this focilitr for weapons p oduction· · and India's other operatiomd reactors are covered b ' international nonproliferation safeguards India is building a research reador•ai1d a power reactor tha will be ·able to begin produdng unsafeguar led plutoniuin iu large quantities in lute 1982 if all proceeds according to plun 1 Thus Gandhi would fine I it expedient lo defer weapcms production al least until about 1983 In the meantime unsafeguarded plutonium frnm the Canaclian-s111 plied CIR US reactor could be used to conduct peaceful underground nuclear tests 1 'progrur T 1e strategic argument in ' f'a_v_o_r_o'f -p -ro-c'h-1c---- i -11-g_n_l_lc --- · -e-a_ 1r weapons 1mlicable to use ugainst China i11d11des two Indian c·onsiderulion The of first is that China poses a threat to Indian freedom action in South Asia Either by coercive diplori1ucy or ·hr supporting i11surrt ction in small neighboring states China is likely t' 'enluall ' lo restrict InJia 's c·nnlrol over eYents ·in the region unless deterred by a strong and determined government in New Delhi The second consideration is that China poses a more direct threat to India's 5ecurity because it is likely to encourage and supp0rt Pakistani aggression against India IJY providing military eqt1ipment to Islamabad or by tying up Indian troops along the northeastern border during an -Jmlo--Pakislani conflict Nuclear weupons according lo Jntlian proponents would end the present dangerous dt gree of asymmetry between China's power and that of Tn lia un l t 'l mld in time produce a climate conducive to iini roving relations between the two countries - -1 The Indians would have ome economic considerations in deciding whether to become a nuclear weapon state Although the cost of producing a small stockpile of fission bombs would probably not be great Gandhi probably would realize at the outset that t mbarking on a nuclear Wt apons pr 1gram would entail a commitment to ever-incrt asing defense budgets One Indian proposal is to spend $10 billion over five •ears-presumably by increasing the· defense budget somewhat from its current level of about 3 5 percent of India's gross national product-to pay for the production of several hundred nuclear-armed missiles and aircraft recommended for deployment · against China Another major cost of establishing a nuc lear det rreut would be the expense re uired to 2 Also Indinn nuclear weapoi1s advocates regard production of nuclear weapons as a means to reassert India ·s regional preeminence in the face of increasing Soviet and US activit ' in the art•u Events in Iran and Afghanistan and the subseque11t reucticms by superpowers probably ha 'C led munr Imlia11s iududing Cu11dhi to conclude that Nt' ' Delhi is nearly helpless lo influence the resoJ ulion of imt ortanl probleins in tlw rn inn Nuclear ·weapons according to some lndi m strategists would lead the superpowers to accord l cliu gr 'a er respect if_ not as the nation having overnll resJ msibilil ' for maintaining 1 eace in the n•gion-tlie status to which fndia ultimately aspiresll1en at least as rn equal participant in resol 'ing rl'gional crises 1 Tht' plan fnclucles using domestically produc 'd heavy wnll'r in the reactors India's persistent problems in producing this waler and ils crilkal need to increase electrical power generating capacih· will creale conflieting dt sires India ill wunl to start up rhe · POWer reactor as soon as possible which means using heavy waler available from the Sovit t V11ion undt'r safeguards The Indians would like to operate the J Jwer reactor without s ifegn rds however wl1ich might require postponing lie startup date India might choose to keep its new re areh Tl J •tor free of safeguards-to s11pi' ort a wt-upons program-while using sufeguarded heavy water in the power reactor to t 11sure its timt h· startup this co11rse would argue for a deferral of overt 'eapons de ·elopment until the Soviet Union liud rinish f'd supph·ing the desired he- iv • wa_ter 3 Despilft these incentive's there are several techni- cal and political reasons why the Indian Government 7 -------------·-···-----···- • • • • C05257125 create a nuclear strike force with adequate personnel training and command and control procedures Hidden costs would take the form of increased requirements for nonnudear equipment and capabilitiescosts relating to enhanced early warning systems for e ample ·5_ Costs would not prohibit India from becoming a nuclear weapan state but they would relate importantly to the pace at which India's nuclear force would grow Although Iindia_could raoidlv- outnar P l si ki tsin -i thed i y e t of simple fission b mbs without• straining its economy the government would wis to minimize the time between declaring itself a nuclear weapon state and establishing a-credible deterrent to Chinese agg ession The pr sent sta te 6f I di i i nuclear and missile capabilities is such that the creation of a ·nuclear weapons force in the near future probably Vould cal1 for a greater infusion of funds-more of a c_rash effort-than would be required later in the decade 6 India possesses the technology necessary to develop a ballistic missile system of sufficient range and payload' capabilities to strike important Chinese targets This technology is embodied in work being done by the Indian Department of Space which has produced and tested a satellite launch vehic e designated the SLV-3 similar to the US Scout Designed to be capable of placing a jsatellite into a circular or it the S 'S em potentially could · deliver a nuclear pavload _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ to a target kilometers distant A strap-on booster engine under development could incrna P either ·the ra ge or parlo d India however lacks the production capability needed to support a ballistic missile program Also a more accurate guidance system probablv would be required by the rnilitary 2 Several 'ears probably would he required therefore before India could begin to produce intermediaterange ballistic missiles D I I I 'Historically the military has not been noted lo be involved Jn· the worl of India's Department of Space although the Ministry of Defense is believed lo be developing misslle•Pra'pulsion and inertia guidance srstems j' CQ525 7125 DISSEMINATION NOTICE 1 This document was disseminated by the Notional Foreign Asses·sment Center This copy is for the information and use of_ the recipient and of persons under his or her jurisdiction on a need-to-know basis Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments a Director of lnteltigence and Research for the D partment of State b Director Defense Intelligence Agency for the Office o f the Secretary of Defense and the organization af the Joint Chiefs of Staff c Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence for the Department of the Army d Director of Naval Intelligence for the Deportment of the Navy e Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence for the Department of the Air Force f Director of Intelligence for Headquarters Marine Corps g Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Intelligence Analysis for the Deportment of Energy · h Assistant Director FBI for the Federal Bureau of Investigation i Director of NSA for the National Security Agency j Special Assistant to the Secretory for Notional Security for the Deportment of the Treasury k The Deputy Director for Notional Foreign Assessment for any other Department or Agency 2 b·e retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations or rf tur the Notional Foreign Assessment Center 3 When this document is disseminated over he overseas recipients may retain it for a ·period not in excess o_f one year At the end of this perio ocument should be destroyed or returned to the forwarding agency or permission should be reque agency to retain it _in accordance with IAC-0-69 2 22 June 1953 4 The ti le of this document when used separc itefy•from the text is UNCLASSIFIED '