UNCLASSIFIED 84050 2 DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE DIRECTOR OF INTE LLIGENCt NO RESCARCH WAlH·U OTON February 17 1984 RELEASED IN FULL MEMORANDUM TO M - Ambassador Ro l I Spiers FROM INR - 11 g h Montg - SUBJECT India Pakis tan· and -'Nticlecir Proliferation • With a 11 the p ressures on y our ti me· 1 dpub you •·ar al le· to · - look at many of nra Is l nger rntelligence R rt s ' ola t tj _ · ·· ft½ bring the attached orie Report 778 M to your iltt entioJ l for ·• ' - • c c t- - ' • ' _ ' · First · it d eals with _a • •• ' - - • ' • • · efforts 'c eiiteted ih INR LAR an the r ·· one of ye ur ' iig les tO tiffl · L _ - ' Atta erit · 778-Alf •· ·_ · • - '- · · · ' ' - ' · ' • · • ' '· · -- ·•· - - · •• '• _ ' - · ' • • ··- --· · '· • - - · • · · · _ UNITED STATES O£PARTI 'fENTOF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY FRANKE SCHMEL ER DATE CASE ID 24 FEB 2005 200402643 ' • - • · •- · · --- - · · · ' • - l• •- ' · · · •- ' · ·· •·• Dra ter INR LAR ERPlatig ljp 2 16 84 x21342 i · · - - · ' -· •- - 0 a lf 0 V ro - t i- - - _ - - --· - · - - ·- - s - -·- _· - t - - L -- -- - - -·· _ • ••- · ·· • - · _ · ___ -' - -·· -t · -· ·- ·· UNCLASSIFIED _ - - ·- - ' - - --· - · _ L - - - ___ ' -•_ -· ·- · -- _ f_ t _ __ ' - •- ·· _P 7 - ' -- t ••• · ·_ · __ _ f'Et4t0112 - 058 LIMITEO OFFICIAL OSE 0 INDIA-PAKISTAN PRESSURES FOR NOCLEAR PROLIPE'lUTIOK BURERU Of SWIDlary Pakistan's nuclear prog am is ikely to b - e · · · t major source of tension in Indo-Pakistani reiations _ i r ¾ over the oex f · e ye 'rs J ite · Ia ainab d • · · _ · ' ¾ repeated denials avu labl ev1dence P oints tQ ·• · _ _ · • • · -- c landesti oe pro-1ra m direct tovud nuclear v eappii · ' · ·' '· capability • 'rhe qu•a io n s re· b v 1 ong__ ¥1l L - ·J6e·' · r · t bef c• Pakistan att in$ t bat · •P it d e · - ·t i·t it n s it wbethe 1 t will t - • na ear ·-- t ·t· -- 1 · - S option• _for testing prodµ'ction _and eploymen·t · · ·· • t· h - • llll Elli mCE fll10 RfSmRCH • • ' f SSE ffilS no ·o a bo - • • • • • • · · · - -- • · • ' • '· ' · _ t ··· · - • •'i ' ' i r t t ' Because of India Is ow n pr o •n ' 'b'ap·ab'ili f i-i -••l• ' t t • • Ff -_ t _- _ · w ld fear that Pa is 4 2 ·w Y •l in_9 - ' PC • 1 · j ' · I · cov rtly _e ven f at ainme1 1t ' ·z e n o i l Y ' f a - • • 1f tes leavin rOOJII in t r n f _ r · un r a - · tr r · ' it• · · Indian pursuit of ci covert prograJ l in r- e oiise - ' ✓- f • - _ i· -Paki did test 'India r r ba _ly•· wc _ 141 i '1 fal i t - t f - 'ff initial y from de elopi i wea ns- - - w · t -·1 ·- t_ __ · least re-swne testing a sc al_ to - C · - · f t - _ Jt f resolve and tecbnol091ca1 · cap c 1 t y · -- - -' ° ' - ·ls tben could• impel both sides to paz sue· weapon·s i ' - • ·· · · • fY • - • - _ t _ •• · 6il- development further at · leir _ co ert · '· · · -·-· ·- _ - · r fi -f J R£SffiflCH • • • • •l ' ' ' I _ '_ • '9 -- -r ••- -- 1 f' • •· - · - ·-· - · ·· · fi·- - · 5-- •• • · • lw t · - · i - a- p f _S f 4 •r- -tt e - preempti Ve In i an lld t- r y Pat ist u • s nuclear f acil i'ties ' is · not at ' J l f eiy • j_ · - _ • _·L J • t _· - -·· · · -· -' · bi paper s dra1 l_ f o11_ - u 9 er ll au'r i · • ··· re nd • in Indian foreip • p 11 c y_ P r•p red· l Y - - - · ao bert I Hardgrave thii•et Y J · te a -_a'a P• t · · of In a Scholar • y ·t P _9 gt·- - · • - _i'evs - · ·_ e reased hereb clo_ D - 'll_ e·ce• t 1 f ··1 • tlio•e of he •' US -· Go eru rfeil · Se• 'ar-so ·· INB · _' - ·••' V '• '- · ' • • ' ·-• • - · 11 ·• eP 'o r 761- 41 - ·1 ·1 - - e _ t o • _ It f g- -ll · ·1- - Trends • LIMIT O · o rnct P ' _ 1a j•· Yf J 8 • · i' • _ '- ' 1 4 au d 7 6° - -- ·• ·-l liit i g i i foa· • r aj • r a· for ' -_ ··· ImproT e_d lel·a t oiia· • · 1 1' i• O_ t _ l J f f - · 1auuaryl8 · 1 $4 - _ • - · f · · - _ r -U -i -- -· · · - 't' • • · · · ·---• • • 'f •i · · I • • • • •• ol • 1 - ··- ' ·' ·· • • °' • 1' • _ DATE CASE ID 29 APR 2005 20040164 J- · · _ • o orrtcIAL Os e_ De contror a 1 s4· · · U ITE0 STATES DEP RTME T OF STATE · REVIE ' AUTHOR TY HA ON Ei'AflM D ' ·· ReP ·r -' - 7 8-AR '· · LIMinD ' • · 1 • • · · · F ebru·ary 10 ' 1984 ' oEc·oNTROLLEn UNcc-Ass 1tJBo· · · - -c· · · _ _ _ _ -- - _ ··- • - • ' · - J J • l _ • Jv 1 _ • r _ z · • - t - ' _ J l-'t MUl l - O t ft t LIMITED OFF C AL OSE - ii - reaction considering the risks of failure and even tbe costs of success to India in terms of its foreign relations ex oscre of Indian territory to tne resulting radiation and the ca Jger of Pakistani retaliation ·' nuclear weapocs m ght pro e b t i u t1o b e s t e •c ri ii n i 1g i et · outweigh the attraction of such stability ·· ' lie si t1 a ion also · A situation where both sides had · ·· · · _f- ' ' · 1 · ' t - •· _ also vould upset the nuclear balance not only in South Asia ut ozf· · __ - -· D s 1 yifnnr d1 is·its£ fti i i itJi ljf t ill tecbnol09ieal development anc i a nu lear cap4P_i lity 1 lace · · 2 ' t n r tllb t r i ijt jtJf· 4 t f nuclear· option partly out of consideratii ri f or Iiidl _ iri'o ·- it- 2 1 0 loqi ·shortcomings · and · inancial weak n e s tt 5 c cif qney JDlg ' % · t be shaken by a ·serious ' ecurity peri·l AiQwev e r' 3u·c 1£ ·i - at s1ri t· i fI' '· '··· r approchement ·_ that i eroded·o'Nf lw i»ttllii •s ie c Qnfi en i iin J li• V'-·-' i tU ci iiria · In · addi'tion SOD1e P iesenf 1iicffarf ' i ' t J · policy prior tie·s · 'S Ch iJS d te e c ' ci s i t ' ' ¢ # lit § JfaJff i1 f1 f • Soviet OSSif as a deterrettt to 0 tn 0 - m threat a ild exclus1 n · of •supei power · i _nvolveD t· ·f om ·tb _ t JJ J - -· ti ent militate agai 1 t· a tJfn r l The tJ pr o ly we uld' bave little l r · n J t tit f t f - once the parties conduct d u le r es •·· 11 1 t Pftt y· t hi• J·' t1 '' '· contrast · tbe OS h s some _ta•irly cz -neia l lev r ge py • v i - ftt i ·r- - _ its inf luenc over the supply of v c d · A - J f titi· 1 f1 f ' j0 t % t§ Pakis an W1 thholding such arms · wo ld J e- a csi - pg ' 1 tf s a a st - e rercise f th e· n' cJ ear opt10 t y kJ l ' · y j_l l9 ' ti t f t them c onversely I ·co ld 91 ve ak st_ n t h ' ' 1 f ' ilj • ztJ - j obviate _ tbe n lear o pt n • The 10 n 1 r pe 1 of - E 'li· - ' 'i ' • · ' 1·· cc Arming Pakistan ·_ to the extent that· 1t· -thr atened ·Indian secur1 t y ' · - j ' · · · ··· · ' - ·- •··- · ' ' · · - · • · -- - • •· · ·· • i ·· · · · - - · · - ' · ·• · - • - t••·•• - could fue1 ·•n · arm s race that would ·1ncreasE O tllf sttr ·· f nu ·1 -' ' ' ii tJ m e · · 0 5t i f 1 iJf t f' - - · - · - -·· rti·· · t iJ · _ -- · -- - -· • • • _ ' · • - ' '· •' - - · ' i • ' · s · ···• · · ' _ j ·ct jf · • _ - _• •- - - ·· ' i ' ·· • ' ·· · · · _ ·· ·· · - - _ · ' · ' - _ _ -_ - i-t F · - - LIMI TED OFFIC · - E - - - · · - ·· • ·_ · · i t - _ _ _ ·- · - ··__- _ · • ·_ DECONTROLLED GI-A Scl'EJEilli · - · · · - · ' · - · •- ·- r - J i ' f h - · · -1' • t '- · 11 · - • • 1t o ' i ' Z '- ' 7 _ •• ° - - ' t - - 4_ ' '- d_- t ' f t- - 2 r s - i __ PB'½Oli2-0J89 LIMITED OFFICIAL OSB RELEASED IN FULL Pakistan's Nuclear Program and Possible Indian Reactions Most observers now believe that Pakistan is not as close to nuclear capability as once thought but barring major technological problems Pakistan should · reach capability within the next five·years Whether or not Pakistan takes the nuclear option it seems determined to have that option - - The situation is inherently unstable for in the capacity J o choose the weapons option is the capacity- to · devel op a -i _bomb • covertly India today can have the demonstrated ·ca c-ity to mann- · · · -·r · factt Ye a nuclear weapon but forgo the decision tcf do 'so - -eitber · ·_ 0 i j overt y or eovertly-b ca us Pakistan does n·o t· yet hcive · b4 t · _• A -- _ jj capacity Wbex both Indi a and Pakistan hav J the capacit y the - _ 1 _ · feu that one might already have taken the covert option i may b _ • - i· - 0 ·- snffieient to impel the other to do likewise· ti c lear ··t e· t# oJogy _ - i today is sufficiently advanced that a · test may ' ot be et • ssa-ry- •· - _ '' ft Israel for example is· believed to have developed a nuclear · ' ' - · · r i 1 weapon vi tbout actuall ha- in 3 tested t • • · _-_· · ' i _-- ' tf -• s t rf tf If Pakistan does proceed to a nuc·le ar test ' iiutto bo· 'i ni • Hi' • · _ t tiated the Pakistani program insisted there - cl 9- no· suc 11' f·bing· ai - · C ' i a •peaceful nuclear ezplosion Ind ia w Qold be com l°led'' · to J•Lf - -- --- respond in som way '7 her would be ·enormous poli tic AJr •- r f _f- i·_- 1 for India having__ successful ¥ condacte- i _its q - - l a- t ' iD 'j -' · - ii ·j 1974 to tate the wea s 01 t1on _·and move ovard __proc 9 ctfo ·- · -· •'· '· - _ _- fifit dep oyment Most wel -1nformed observ rs 1 n Incb ho11 r _ __ - • • ' · -_ j ' '· 5 § f believe that the govermnellt would continue to r ist th '· W p9 n · · t - f ' option In these cir tances InC ia likely would · res_ ma t s t --·-· _· r _ fi · i' · 'i t probably vitb a seri -· _ _ _ __ _ ' · Given India• S c appz ebension al out · P Jcistan 's fl- pr 09 am · · · · there bas b n speculation as to a possible pr mp t 1 ve· strl e Y · ' India against Pakistan The re are five princip a l cil i-ties in _ · ··· · the Pakistani prog am ' 'the bhuta ·uruium cenefifuge - xeprocess- ing plants · at Chana· and - f ll bad · t _ Mtg -- l a'ff' i p - -- -and the Karachi riacl'ear power- plant -Xahuta ·probably ·woi Ud· · ·be the· _ critical t arcjet ' in destroying akist ani capacity t f• op •a -- _ _ - - ·Y • t nuclear weapon • ' ut howevet ·is _und rgro up4 nd ' iJ''j r o __ ' · - ·S tected An Indian · ai r tj i e c o iid '- ta 9 wo n J d _ba_j 16 'Jiuar · - ' · t' · 5 antee of success · Pat·ist a i iie 'E r ' repor t qf J1 i- # I s elF' · - · F ' collusion for a planned Israelf - tri t ' f om an Iild a1f S se'''a·re · ' · or highly improbable - - · Any preemptive striJc either ·d ·rectly by I l' ldJ - b Y a th rd power vi th Indian collal oration ou i _-__carry b_igb · cc ts_ f pr _India UNITED TATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW A UTHORITY SHARON E AHM AD DATE CASE ID 29 APR 2005 200402643 - · · - • - · • · LIMinti · oPFICIAL - ·osE DECONTROLLED UNCLA SIFIED ' · · · -• - ' • · ·• - • ' ' • •- - - 1 i ' t -' ·· ' -· -- _' • PB i 0112- 0590 LIMITED OFP CIAL _OSE 2 - LIMITED OFFICIAL OSE - 3 Desai for e ampl are not prepared to forswear the option There is no anti-nuclear movement in South Asia although some serious doubts are now beginning to be raise about nuclear power as the answer to India 1 s energy needs · P B40 U 2- 0592 LIMITED OFFICIAL OS - 4 - --India rejects the concept of a nuclear-weapons-free zone as it does the NPT as a legitimation of nuclear weapons in the hands of those wbc already possess them and as a _ means by · wbicb those powers seek to reta-in their nuclear weapons monopoly - •· Moscow and Beijin·g Neither Moscow nor · Beijing appears to be _ -- contributing pressures to proliferation 'The Soviet Onion · · _ - - _ · ' expressly oppc ses - proliferation and bas given India no erico tage __ -- ' ment in taking tbe naclea·r weapons option Chlna's positiorf' ts - ' - that it is the S V ereign right of any nation tcfdev«tlo p iJfown _·i _ nuclear weapons There ha 9e bet var ous pr ss report's 9 f _ - · _ ·_ - concern to India of Chinese technical as·sistance to -P akfstian' in- - - · - its nuclear program and Chines willingness · t test a · Patisc-anl i f - v st bomb at its ovn-'gr s _ in t e 1 • rbat· China would assist P akistan ·in fabric ating' a J1u'c lear ' - ·- U itfi' weapon - anlilcely'' a d at o cla__ itjl _C iJ1 Ji r ¥#il ·tg · i T- g'i1 bas sought to -impro ve - relations w1 th· nd 1a and ·· to- encou i age· · - - ••' ' i • · • · · · • • 't• 1 • · ' • ' ·- -· • - ·- · _• •1 · i • -- -· Ta tla tJ - n ·S f - · _ ii t E· iJ 7 T _I £ f 0 f tu - - 1n i _ e t _ t --¢ t o t t rt f til t - 1J J ift' t 1 i 't se - ff rts eepen iilg- s iQii ·J e ' -- li nJ tt k-tf -8 India• and· Paidatan and forcing Iiidia 'i1ito greate s'eeunt fl c lepena - - it ence·· upori h_e _l ov_ i t tJJl D · - · · · _ · · r·' ' t t itr t i frY 1 1- Ji JUre ly • _vou J d jin d_e in · - ·O rs _ OS -0 ·m · '· ' · · · ·· ' _ - - %• · --N'- _ · - · · · _ _ · · _ _ -· ---- - _ - _ - '- i · · l i fi 3 t tt Onder ·'t te s · t e - ti NOD ' t l if e_r ati t l J ijj' A - 1 j nuclear testing by paJtistan and India would - tri9g e r• •ttie· SU $Pension l r · - • -- of ' ·OS ass stance to _ ea¢b ri ation J Tbt qs· ·J h e by ji ciµld fi ie·iwh_ a i 1 ' tJr r e tlit J 1f 1 r r tgf _ r l l ¥ 1 11it i 1gJm ba e c_c t ' ' -¼ i t · j ' t 0 Leveragl · on Proliferation ' effect op d' ut of the region a a · a stx eg i Onion· · - •··· - · · - · · ·· ·i-- - t ' ·· -' tit-W _ - · - - '- • - i to tbe Sov '-et a • • - •• • t' · - • · • _··-- · - · - - · · _ - _ · ·_ · -·_ ---- · ·-·t · If India·· were --t ta th ·nuclear· w apc ns _op_txon in ' r esponse -- · f to Pakist ant t of if ii _ ere to su t t apo1fs pr' 9t if 9 _ t _ - ·r its OllP ii ti t- 1 i ' -p lic opi li on e cf Ji t - · · t_n $ - i -4 j _• -f · call fot · the · fmposl'tton of ·severe · inteination·a l sanctiolis'ragaina·t •· -- ' ' -1' India iosed loan'tw±ndovs _· °t't'ade· restrl· tioilsi-kcand- denied acceis - - tt ft ro - ••• - --- - - ·•- iitJiitl f t · · - __to b_i tf eC 1 •_ - -9 uf n 1 # - µ nf fi i i iHt c f- £i - · · weaP OPS 1 1 - - y- · « t J i t • z m 0 p ' ·-I tr '1 - J' fli -- - _ - _ · ··· _ deP e t - - - · t h - v_ t ' - D 91 l · apd i a k ta _ i ip f · - •f-- f fo •_ j ·• j ' f-1t 'cf• _ _______ • •• ••• · -• - - _ ••• ·- - -- • • - • - •• - ' ' 4 - - ei·J 1f riJ 1t iJ 1 i Jt lt r ffli'f l •-V'- ··· - · · - -·· - - i ti fi - '- at 'ie·a·st oii- iiie ·pi vo t ai ·c ·re ttft- Pat'fs'ia · ·- · ilf s taifrl's liD Os - '4 j wholly -dependent· -' oii· exte riiaJ · Jiodrce·i ifor conveiitional arms ·iind -' J - Jit 1 i · wou qu - - Jj ·- au t t- F s pl_f f i r e i'f_ fit e t lt9 r - ·· -· - · _ Cliina cannot supplYi -techno·l ogi'cal-ly _ advancady weapqns · and -ct lii rd ' s1 0 - 'f- '- l - - -2 JR ffl J Jilk- s - - q •lt R-k •-' _ l -_1 - _v - ' K '-•' LIMITED OPPICIAL USE 5 - party transf ers--through Saudi Arabia Egypt or Turkey for example--would be a necessarily limited and insecure· source · - _ A nuclear deterrent-if t _h at is Pakist p• s goalcwoUld· # o J displace the need for conventional arms Without a· conventional ·- · · ·_ •_ - i deterrent _ Paki st n would co p_e lled to re pond 't o- 'a y - -ac k oi · _ '2 £if incursion vi h - s ili e ret lia _io • or tcf uie - 0 '-99t sf f ti • 1 sion Moreover 1n he _ sout h Asian -conte_ x t· -- unless Pakistan· fa ed - _ - nuclear weapon ·across the P tdi t ' in · India· iit_ s own- J 9mh ci'uit t _ t Jt J - provide no grea r deterre •¢ e • o -an·· India t ack thazi' 'e e_c £v i • t t be _ I _it _s-- ee tfatJ f tf ' t iic·e i P _ ' $ tt c' nvention•l _ 14 l Ons b _1 lity _ Pa_ _ist lr a dy ha s -su 1 en _ tr nCl p t i _ f t1 i _ · lW i£ i - r • - - e r st _ i- g h · t' i lli# t i t i ti i JD 1 li tarily nor- w o uld nuclear- vec1pons 91 vt · it · -that· stren¢ n - - for ' ' ' tl 1i · ili li e t t it tf if f or e 9 #S t l Ji ion -in· ou - - Hi •·- '1' e- ' '-P 9J _e Pl lk1 t aJ l • - _f£1 e t -- - ¥ e -- n - ts 'R S u_rt r 1 t tJ tt l t t t fin -- th• -P 11 c 1 f t t _ c ll l ss_ · • t ac Jy a i 9 --e S g1 f I t Jir c _ toq y DO · J llger__ tJ f'- 'J J tY f i t r ' _ l n t J P' J 1 9 wi 1t -- 0 it1 it ti r1K mi iitiit tlitlll i i t1e a1 veap 11s t o Pak t st -- - ou t ti t c P S _t ·i J 1 J fA °' _% s mil1 tary _st _en9t1 1 _-tb U l nti11 « tn os - - 1 g _µ i 9 · t - $ 1 t1 level of sopbist1cation 1n· arms as did the p 16 v-i llr 'fuelh t ·be- 'f-- J--_ l '- 0 a t ij r 11 'to any _i on-' - rid -I -- agg s 1- jJJ1_ r - -' q - ist t i i- f t J ·armamtHits ·10 pr rii ling ams to PaJci sta nir t lie- JJS snoul_d eo'nsui't ' i k i ' •'' ' ¥1 1 · · -· · •·-c · - n i- ·_ali at least ·_ _ ek_ o_· -- I #a·-· _ lf _ f · y 9 i -l -t i - -- • - - - • ·• • ·- · - _ •· ·· • t 1' - - l ' l a _· 1 - ' it - ' - - -r --·_ i zi '' - J _ _ - _ · ·_ - - - -i t t tt i - Lf l 1it t J- k • Pr os pects - - o « _ i _ _ _· - · - _· li Y' - t • · - · f - Nuclear -·- - -·proliletat·ion - - j i · ·t · -i- -n · ··south ' - · -·- Asia Jls _ t · -- - not s inev itab'le' f- i In lci4t · - ·t ·• _ -2 l lii 4 4 s - i • • _ ' 11'° • • •• •• _ •1 a -h_ _ •• · _ - Pakistani-7det ente· v ou'1d·' reduce 'the danqer b11t1 not- - who'l ly sol v elttlie 'I '• • - - - ' e I 4 • - _ - • • • • • '- t • • •• ' t 1 _' ' • _ _ • • - • --'-- 0 • - _ 'JI - • 'i ' t_ - _ ' · ·· p·roti1ea• 'of - do®t f Given-'-' ±ncffa s ' s ciir i t 'kci'oneerris ts a vts ciitna f 1 ··t _ • · · •· -v -- -• - ·l- - • · -' '·• J · • - -- - - ' • ' t • - - - _ 'l •- r - -- r- 1-· •_- _ · •· and · its J 9Sit1oh'' ·vttb' -- r'9a-r d to 'the '-• 1egi'tima - '·acccirded ·1·t-he_ _ J'i ' - % 0 ' -_ -nucle'ar ·we a -oiis ·_·owefi- -b- ·t0t 11 m -T ·th4tire l's 'lit i1 t· r t-· c¥ Jtt·r ' tr 1 - - 14' 1 1- -_ - ·-·- FJECONIR JLLED fi - s-- r v i $ i t ' - - t -- • · • · - · _ _ k - c· - - - _ __ _ •'· -· - _ - -· '-••• • • I PB'lD 112- 05Y'1 LIMITEn OPFICIA L OSE 6 tbe declaration of $outb Asia as a nuclear-weapons-free zone or for opening· all nuclear facilities in tbe region to international inspection Within tbe framework of Indo-Pakistani detente however is tbe possibility for a uclear -accord between _the two state•• ' A Ji· I11di n proposal for e rample to e rten'd t e- scope of the jo t · -· · co ission on- c_o operat on in the f i id o l c e af pergy ici t be · · _ ·· -' • · a l 1 111portant fi st st·e p on a long ro d to w r utual iJ sp ct ·o - - · -- · 'c i and - be developaen t of a· south Asian iv l nt of Eur tom - · • ·_ _· - - · - i ' ' _ '·· · ·' · · • • •• · • · _ _· · t · t ·• _ii- f - __ J · · -_ - · i ' · • • •• • • • · • • •• • ' Prepar l Y _ BdWafd · G • Griff in_ 632 39_6 8' · l • 2' 1f'l · '' ' ' - ·• i' - ' 51 r · tic t · 1· __ _ 1 ··'l - · · · ·- •·· ' ·- ' _ · · o ' - 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