CENТRAL INrEШGENCE AGENCY CIA Documents оп the СuвлN M1ss1LE CRis1s 1962 i 1 1 ----- Editor Маrу S McAuliffe CIA Нistory Staff OctoЬer 1992 - - •• - 33 Special Yational Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62 The Military Buildup in СиЬа ·· 19 September 1962 Excerpt SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIМAТЕ NUМВER 85-3-62 The Military Buildup in Cuba 19 SepternЬer 1962 - 91 • - 33 Continued ТНЕ MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA ТНЕ PROBLEM То assess the strategic and political signi icance of the recent military buildup in Cuba and of the possiЫe future development of additional military capabilities there CONCLUSIONS А We believe that the USSR values its pos1tion in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to Ье derived from it and consequently tl1at the щain purpose of the present mili­ tary Ьuildup in СuЬа is to strengthen the Conununist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to Ье а danger that the US may attempt Ьу one means or an­ other to overthrow it Тhе Sov1ets evidently hope to deter any such attempt Ьу enhancing Castro's defensive capablii­ ties and Ьу threatening Soviet military retaliation At the same time they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military Ьаsе in Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose Раrщ 1-11 В In terms of military signiдcance the current Soviet deliveries are substantially improving air defense and coastal defense capaЫlities in Cuba Their political significance is that in conjunction with the Soviet statement of 11 Septem­ Ьer they are likely to Ье regarded as ensuring the contint1a­ tion of the Castro regime in power with consequent discotir­ agement to the opposit1on at home and in exile The threat inherent in these developments is that to the extent that the Ca stro regime thereby gains а sense of security at home 92 33 ContinuedJ it will Ье emЬoldened to Ьесоmе more aggressi e in fomenting re olutionary activity in Latin America Para s 18-21 С As the buildup continues the USSR may Ье tempted to est ablish in СuЬа other weэ pons represented w Ье defen­ sive in purpose but о а more ofien sive character e g light ЬomЬers submarines and additional types of short­ range surf e-to-surface mi ssiles SSМs А decision to provide such wеэ рош will continue to depend 11eэ vily on the Soviet estimate as to whether they could Ье introduced without pro oking а US military r�tion Paras 22-28 D Тhе USSR could derive ron sideraЫe military advan1 ta ge from the estг blishment of Soviet medium and i lter1 ' mediate range Ьallistic missiles in Cuba or from the estaЬ­ lishment of а Soviet submarine Ьаsе there As Ьetween these two the establishment о а submarine Ьэ sе would Ье the more likely Either de elopment however would Ье in­ compatiЬle with Soviet practice to date and with Sortet policy as we presently estim ate it It would indicate а far �ter willingne ss tQ inc� д� level of risk in US SOviet relations than the ПSSR has dispJзз _y# ·thus· far and ёoriseqiiёn�ly _ 1�ould ha e important oolicv imp icatieвs vnth respeet te other areas and oth ш __proЬШ ms in East-West relations Para s 29--JЗ Е Тhе Latin American reaction will Ье to the evidence of an increased Soviet commitment to Сuьа rather th2 n to the technical implications of the milita ry Ьuildup маnу Latin Americans will fear and resent а Soviet military intru­ sion into the Hemisphere but will regard the proЫem as one to Ье met Ьу the US and not their responsibility We esti­ m ate the chances are Ьetter now than they v ere at Punta del te to obtain the necessary two-thirds OAS majority for sanctions and other steps short of direct milita ry action aimed at If it оесгmе clear that the USSR v a s establishing an offen si e Ьаsе in СUЬа most Latin Ameri­ can governments would expect the US to e1irniпate it Ьу whatever means were necessary but шаnу of them would still seek to a oid direct invol ement Pa ra s 34-37 еuьа 2 Re ·erse Вlank - - 93 - -